Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)

[Humphrey Bogart]

I don't think we should spend any less on Defence then we already do.  What I do think we need to do is cut personnel costs so we can repurpose that money toward equipment and infrastructure. 

I think Rick Hillier was on point when he said in the Fall of 2013 that we just "can't get around cuts to personnel"

http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-just-can-t-get-around-army-cuts-hillier-says-1.1467584

I'd like Canada to follow the Australian lead of having a smaller but better equipped military.  The Australian's have a Defence Budget of over A$32 Billion (22 Billion US) but only have around 58,000 all ranks in the Regular Force.  By comparison, Canada spent C$18 Billion (12.5 Billion US) but have a Force of officially 68,000 all ranks in the Regular Force (In reality it's probably around 65,000).

So Australia has nearly 10,000 less personnel then we do but has a Defence Budget that in US Dollars, is almost double what ours is.  Obviously, the Australian Defence and Security situation is a little different than ours so we probably don't need to spend what they spend but we should definitely look at reducing our personnel costs to reflect our equipment and infrastructure situation.

 

[jmt18325]

Half of the Australian defence budget goes to killing scary looking spiders anyway, I'd imagine.

 

[George Wallace]

I'd like Canada to follow the Australian lead of having a smaller but better equipped military.  The Australian's have a Defence Budget of over A$32 Billion (22 Billion US) but only have around 58,000 all ranks in the Regular Force.  By comparison, Canada spent C$18 Billion (12.5 Billion US) but have a Force of officially 68,000 all ranks in the Regular Force (In reality it's probably around 65,000).

So Australia has nearly 10,000 less personnel then we do but has a Defence Budget that in US Dollars, is almost double what ours is.  Obviously, the Australian Defence and Security situation is a little different than ours so we probably don't need to spend what they spend but we should definitely look at reducing our personnel costs to reflect our equipment and infrastructure situation.

So?  Would you propose then that we make some cuts such as to SAR?  That the Government contract out the SAR role to civilian or other Government Departments (NOT DND) to provide SAR to both Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, the Arctic and then the Provinces?  Have the Government apply the same medical and dental services to the CAF as it does to the RCMP and Public Service and do away with the CAF Health Care Services?  Privatize the role played by MSE Ops?  Privatize the Supply System?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

So?  Would you propose then that we make some cuts such as to SAR?  That the Government contract out the SAR role to civilian or other Government Departments (NOT DND) to provide SAR to both Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, the Arctic and then the Provinces?  Have the Government apply the same medical and dental services to the CAF as it does to the RCMP and Public Service and do away with the CAF Health Care Services?  Privatize the role played by MSE Ops?  Privatize the Supply System?

Nope, the answer is to cut the number of officers we employ and also cut/amalgamate units and formations,  Our military is too top heavy and we've got paper Divisions, Brigades, Wings, etc...

We most certainly don't need 9 infantry Battalions and we also don't need 3 Armoured Regiments.  Our Regimental/Corps system used to be our biggest strength but it's probably become our biggest weakness.

In reality, we've got a paper military with a whole whack of people that are underemployed and spend far too much time feeding the bureaucracy rather then doing what they've been trained to do.  Of course, we need some level of bureaucracy but our bureaucracy has become more important than the field force it's supposed to support.

Our desire for symmetry in an asymmetrical world also makes zero sense.  To quote General Day in the interview he gave to Embassy News:

I would argue, as a consequence of the changing threat vector, as a consequence of climate change, as a consequence of the proliferation of IT capabilities, that building more of a force structure that looks remarkably like what we had in the ‘90s and the 2000s will serve us very poorly come 2020, 2030, 2040. My worry is that we’ll look at doing more of the same but making it more modern and more capable—and, I would argue, more irrelevant as a consequence.

http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105

 

[McG]

A couple things in the Globe and Mail on this today.  The suggestions don't seem that bad.  Cut fat to reinvest where needed, don't micromanage insignificant details away from commanders who are trusted with the lives of service members, provide enough money, and don't over promise. 

Deal of the century: Trudeau’s defence review will reverberate for decades
GEORGE PETROLEKAS and DAVE PERRY
Contributed to The Globe and Mail
21 Jan 2016

There has not been a full, cohesive and transparent defence review in Canada since the 1994 Defence White Paper. The Liberal government has promised to deliver one by the end of the year.

Given the decades required to develop and then use military capabilities, no other government review will be as consequential or long-lasting, given the size and breadth of National Defence. If history is any guide, equipment choices alone will affect defence until the turn of the next century. Given how many future governments the review affects, this exercise must become a national effort.

The Trudeau government inherited a military funded at $19.1-billion a year or 1 per cent of GDP – far below NATO’s target of 2 per cent of GDP – for 68,000 regular troops and 27,000 reservists.

The previous government’s defence strategy had many initiatives to commend it, but its proposed investments outstripped the supply of available funding by tens of billions of dollars. At its most basic level, defence strategy must be in alignment with the budget. Reducing the size of the Canadian Forces to liberate funds for capital spending should be on the table, but should also be examined as part of a broader review of the appropriate size of the entire defence apparatus, including civil servants and contractors.

As a starting point, the government must articulate in greater detail Canada’s role in the world and how defence fits into that effort. The world is increasingly shifting toward multipolarity, with less American engagement. Add in Russia’s new assertiveness, China’s rising-power status and Middle East instability, and our traditional thinking on global security is now being challenged. Natural disasters, narco-violence, population displacements from conflict, resource scarcity and economic disparity create international human security and humanitarian issues that are no less demanding or complex.

In truth, there are more threats in the world than we could ever afford to address with our military and diplomatic or aid initiatives. For Canada, defining that which we must do independently and what we can only achieve with allies will, in part, dictate the capabilities we require.

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan must consult widely outside the department to seek innovative solutions. Visiting our allies also affords an opportunity to see how they build ships, procure equipment, develop strategy and manage crises. Briefings cannot supplant first-hand observations.

In the short term however, the reality is the government will be constrained by legacy decisions. Many procurements are already contracted, or soon will be. Major adjustments to ongoing procurement plans will be difficult without imposing new delays. Any palpable improvement to military capability will only be realized if a sclerotic procurement process is transformed. Ad-hoc secretariats, layers of review boards and byzantine financial gateways provide political cover instead of effective procurement.

The government must also clarify its vision on industrial policy and how it intersects with defence spending. For example, the national shipbuilding strategy is also an industrial development and jobs creation strategy, in addition to a defence procurement. If there are premiums to be paid to fund the former, does that mean we will have less defence, or will the government ensure defence requirements remain top of mind.

Beyond procurement, rampant inefficiencies in administration need review. The deputy minister, who oversees billions of dollars in capital programs, also signs off on budgets authorizing subordinates to serve coffee, juice and muffins at a conference. The optics of accountability have overtaken the efficiency of management.

George Petrolekas served with the military in Bosnia, Afghanistan and NATO and was an adviser to senior NATO commanders and is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Dave Perry is the senior defence analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Together, they published an open letter to the Minister of National Defence

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/deal-of-the-century-trudeaus-defence-review-will-reverberate-for-decades/article28309381/

Reduce military staffing to help fund acquisitions, analysts urge Liberals
An open letter from two leading defence analysts at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute urges Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan to try to build a national consensus as the Forces plan for new ships and planes that will affect this country’s military capabilities for as long as 70 years into the future
Steven Chase
The Globe and Mail
21 Jan 2016

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan is being urged to significantly shrink plans for the next generation of military hardware in order to meet budget constraints and to consider cutting the size of the Armed Forces to free up more money for capital acquisitions.

An open letter from two leading defence analysts at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute urges Mr. Sajjan to try to build a national consensus as the Forces plan for new ships and planes that will affect this country’s military capabilities for as long as 70 years into the future.

Retired colonel George Petrolekas, a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and senior analyst David Perry are offering the defence minister tips to achieve the “leaner, more agile, better-equipped military” the Trudeau government promised in its December Speech from the Throne.

They say the Canada First Defence Strategy mapped out by the former Conservative government is hopelessly underfunded. The annual defence budget now exceeds $20-billion per year and automatic yearly increases already programmed into the fiscal framework will shortly hit 3 per cent. But even this budget track, backed by all three major parties, is not enough.

“Proposed investments dictated by the existing strategy, crafted in 2008, outstrip the supply of available funding by tens of billions of dollars,” they write.

“As you update the strategy to account for new priorities and potential threats, the funding pressures are likely to intensify.”

They warned Mr. Sajjan not to overpromise like the previous government. “Avoid that trap. As a government you will be criticized for being unable to deliver your promises, and your armed forces will feel as if they have been misled.”

The analysts urge the minister to rebuild the public affairs team at the Department of National Defence to the level it reached during the Afghanistan war so that the ministry can properly engage Canadians to help build a national consensus on what the military should look like in an era where American dominance is waning.

“Greater consensus can help make sense of global complexities. … Russia is no longer the partner it recently was, and its new assertiveness gives us reason to reassess how we defend North America. China’s economic and military power continues to grow,” they say.

“In North Africa and the Middle East the recent promise of an Arab Spring has morphed into a patchwork of regional instability led in principle by the Islamic State and its franchises using terrorism locally and abroad from a territorial base in failed states.”

Canada needs to improve its sclerotic military purchasing system, the Canadian Global Affairs Institute authors say – and could learn from its allies as it restructures its defence capability.

“Think outside the box and consult widely and often outside the department. Your government has indicated it welcomes the best advice available, and the greatest innovations will come from without, not within. Many of our allies have used exactly this type of outside perspective on their defence reviews,” they write.

The way forward could include a smaller military. “You also inherited a military funded for 68,000 regular troops and 27,000 reservists. Shrinking the military to liberate funds for capital spending should be investigated, so long as key personnel skills are retained and any capability reductions carefully considered.”

The biggest problem ahead is the massive shipbuilding effort to renew the Royal Canadian Navy.

“The most significant, complex and pressing example you face is with shipbuilding – which is not simply a defence procurement but also a matter of industrial policy, employment and regional benefits,” Mr. Petrolekas and Mr. Perry write.

“Critical decisions must be made in the next year on projects which will recapitalize the navy’s combat fleets. You must specify how many and what type of ships will be built, who will design them and integrate their combat systems.”

The next generation of fighter jets – an issue which bedevilled the former Conservative government – is another huge decision for the Liberals who have promised to keep the controversial F-35 fighter-bomber out of contention.

Some projects are too far along to significantly recast. “Many procurements are already in contract, like the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, or soon will be, like the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft. Marginal changes are possible, but as you discovered with the interim naval oiler project, whole scale adjustments in the short term are difficult unless you are willing to accept considerable delays.”

And finally, the authors plead for Mr. Sajjan to give senior Defence officials more manoeuvrability, arguing they are constrained by petty rules that need to be changed.

“Generals once entrusted to lead soldiers in Afghan combat now need ministerial approval to offer a visiting counterpart a glass of wine. The deputy minister, accountable for $19-billion a year in spending and well over $100-billion in defence investments, must authorize the juice and muffins if his subordinates hold a conference.”

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/liberals-should-shrink-defence-spending-analysts-urge/article28305861/

 

[George Wallace]

Nope, the answer is to cut the number of officers we employ and also cut/amalgamate units and formations,  Our military is too top heavy and we've got paper Divisions, Brigades, Wings, etc...

We most certainly don't need 9 infantry Battalions and we also don't need 3 Armoured Regiments.  Our Regimental/Corps system used to be our biggest strength but it's probably become our biggest weakness.

In reality, we've got a paper military with a whole whack of people that are underemployed and spend far too much time feeding the bureaucracy rather then doing what they've been trained to do.  Of course, we need some level of bureaucracy but our bureaucracy has become more important than the field force it's supposed to support.

Our desire for symmetry in an asymmetrical world also makes zero sense.  To quote General Day in the interview he gave to Embassy News:

I would argue, as a consequence of the changing threat vector, as a consequence of climate change, as a consequence of the proliferation of IT capabilities, that building more of a force structure that looks remarkably like what we had in the ‘90s and the 2000s will serve us very poorly come 2020, 2030, 2040. My worry is that we’ll look at doing more of the same but making it more modern and more capable—and, I would argue, more irrelevant as a consequence.

http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105

True.  We do have too many filling redundant positions at the top, in numerous redunduant or unnecessary HQs or positions. 

I disagree with the cutting of the sharp end number of Cbt Arms units. 

I also see General Day taking the stance General Hillier had, in the decision to do away with the tank and adopt the MGS instead.  That decision proved to be the wrong one then, and I am positive will be the wrong decision to make on such matters (not just Armour Corps) in the future.  There are better ways to ensure an effective Cbt Arms.  We just have to come up with them.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105


True.  We do have too many filling redundant positions at the top, in numerous redunduant or unnecessary HQs. 

I disagree with the cutting of the sharp end number of Cbt Arms units. 

I also see General Day taking the stance General Hillier had, in the decision to do away with the tank and adopt the MGS instead.  That decision proved to be the wrong one then, and I am positive will be the wrong decision to make on such matters (not just Armour Corps) in the future.  There are better ways to ensure an effective Cbt Arms.  We just have to come up with them.

Was it wrong though?  Or was the sending of tanks to Afghanistan a political move by the Armour Corps to protect Tanks?  My understanding was tanks were never actually asked for by pers in theatre; rather, a decision was made in Ottawa to send them. 

On that note though, I don't think the tank should be done away with; however, all tanks should be moved to 1 unit.  Our current position of having vehicles and weapons systems positioned in penny packets around the country needs to stop.  It's a foolish policy and creates unnecessary maintenance and sustainment issues which should not exist.

Naturally the LdSH will get all the tanks and this would rub all the RCDs and 12RBC folks the wrong way.  My response would be "Want to drive a tank?  Join the Stratchonas!"

If I had my way "Form would follow Function"

 

[Lumber]

In reality, we've got a paper military with a whole whack of people that are underemployed and spend far too much time feeding the bureaucracy rather then doing what they've been trained to do...

Such as browsing and posting on this site...

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I agree that we must not cut any deeper into the infantry.

Anybody here remember that the British had to use 14 infantry battalions to keep the peace in Belfast alone during the troubles? That is a city of about half a million inhabitants. If ever there was an increase in instances of terrorist attacks on Canadian soil, not much but enough for the government to be seen to do something strong (How far would you go? "Just watch me") in multiple cities, how much infantry do you think we would need?

Naturally the LdSH will get all the tanks and this would rub all the RCDs and 12RBC folks the wrong way.  My response would be "Want to drive a tank?  Join the Stratchonas!"

Or in other words: If you are French Canadian and want to help defend your country: Screw you.

And here I was thinking we were past these types of positions.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I agree that we must not cut any deeper into the infantry.

Anybody here remember that the British had to use 14 infantry battalions to keep the peace in Belfast alone during the troubles? That is a city of about half a million inhabitants. If ever there was an increase in instances of terrorist attacks on Canadian soil, not much but enough for the government to be seen to do something strong (How far would you go? "Just watch me") in multiple cities, how much infantry do you think we would need?

Or in other words: If you are French Canadian and want to help defend your country: Screw you.

And here I was thinking we were past these types of positions.

You're severely under appreciating the capabilities of Modern Canadian Police Forces.  All are far more capable then they were even 15 to 20 years ago.

Your point on Francophones wanting to drive tanks is taken; however, it basically substantiates my point on "form following function".  Dividing 80 tanks between three separate regiments may be politically expedient but it is militarily unsound. 

Possible solutions to this would be:

1.  1x Sqn of Strathconas are Francophone soldiers
2.  Move all Tanks to Gagetown and move a Regiment there with it
3.  Create a composite Regiment that draws from all three Regiments (Sort of like the Airborne Regiment)

Having penny packets of tanks divided up amongst each Regiment is good politics, but it's bad military advice and the Officers who made that decision should leave the military and become politicians.

The same can be said for a bunch of other decisions we've made, like having 3 Independent Jump Companies spread amongst three Mechanized Brigades.  A horrendously flawed concept that has gone on for far too long.

This political self-interest is another reason our military (the Army in particular) needs to be purged, as I said earlier in the thread:

Nope, the answer is to cut the number of officers we employ and also cut/amalgamate units and formations,  Our military is too top heavy and we've got paper Divisions, Brigades, Wings, etc...

We most certainly don't need 9 infantry Battalions and we also don't need 3 Armoured Regiments.  Our Regimental/Corps system used to be our biggest strength but it's probably become our biggest weakness.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I agree with HB. Define the minimum requirement:

    1. A Defence of Canada Force;

    2. Continental Defence Forces ~ treaty obligations (NORAD);

    3. Expeditionary Forces ~ a tough sell for this government, I think;

    4. Reserve forces ~ another tough nut with political traps all over the place; and

    5. Support, sustainment and management.

I have, over the years, advocated for Triple A+ armed forces. AAA+means that we recognize that we aren't in the "big leagues," but we willing to "play" at a respectable, middle power, level.

The Three As are:

    Appropriate - for a G7 nation;

    Available - which implies properly staffed and equipped and having access to transport, etc; and

    Adaptable - flexible, well organized, well designed to cope with situations which none of the last government, this government nor the next one will have foreseen.

The forth A, the A+ is:

    Affordable.

I also agree with HB that the place to start, even before the MND's defence review is done is by rationalizing cutting slashing the C2 superstructure and the hangers on, like the Intelligence Command. I think getting ourselves towards AAA+ will be painful and when we are going to tell soldiers to "grin and bear it" then it is best if the leadership has already set the example.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I agree with HB. Define the minimum requirement:

    1. A Defence of Canada Force;

    2. Continental Defence Forces ~ treaty obligations (NORAD);

    3. Expeditionary Forces ~ a tough sell for this government, I think;

    4. Reserve forces ~ another tough nut with political traps all over the place; and

    5. Support, sustainment and management.

I have, over the years, advocated for Triple A+ armed forces. AAA+means that we recognize that we aren't in the "big leagues," but we willing to "play" at a respectable, middle power, level.

The Three As are:

    Appropriate - for a G7 nation;

    Available - which implies properly staffed and equipped and having access to transport, etc; and

    Adaptable - flexible, well organized, well designed to cope with situations which none of the last government, this government nor the next one will have foreseen.

The forth A, the A+ is:

    Affordable.

I also agree with HB that the place to start, even before the MND's defence review is done is by rationalizing cutting slashing the C2 superstructure and the hangers on, like the Intelligence Command. I think getting ourselves towards AAA+ will be painful and when we are going to tell soldiers to "grin and bear it" then it is best if the leadership has already set the example.

As always Mr. Campbell, you're a beacon of light in a sea of darkness!

:goodpost:

 

[George Wallace]

Was it wrong though?  Or was the sending of tanks to Afghanistan a political move by the Armour Corps to protect Tanks?  My understanding was tanks were never actually asked for by pers in theatre; rather, a decision was made in Ottawa to send them. 

On that note though, I don't think the tank should be done away with; however, all tanks should be moved to 1 unit.  Our current position of having vehicles and weapons systems positioned in penny packets around the country needs to stop.  It's a foolish policy and creates unnecessary maintenance and sustainment issues which should not exist.

Naturally the LdSH will get all the tanks and this would rub all the RCDs and 12RBC folks the wrong way.  My response would be "Want to drive a tank?  Join the Stratchonas!"

If I had my way "Form would follow Function"

I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.

This is why you need to rotate people through the unit, either by forming a composite unit or by having people switch cap badges.  The Armour Corps isn't opposed to switching cap badges either.  As an example,  The present CO of the Strathconas is a career 12 RBC guy who only rebadged to command the Strathconas.

This is again, the weakness of our Regimental System, especially when dealing with platforms.  The Air Force has tribes that revolve around fighting platforms which can create friction at higher levels but otherwise doesn't do much damage.  The Army has platforms which create friction between different Corps but then they also have pieces of felt on their berets which create not only inter-Corps friction but also intra-Corps friction.

Solving the manning issues with all tanks in one Regiment is actually quite easy, it involves either a cap badge change or a new composite unit.  Either way, the savings and efficiencies gained by putting the tanks all in one place are well worth the cost.

Edit: 

To add, with the amount of tanks we have, we will only ever be able to deploy, at most, a squadron.  Maintaining a full up Regiment shouldn't be a problem. 

If A unit like CSOR can do it, why can't the Armour Corps?

 

[Fishbone Jones]

The first of these was the promise that the Report on Transformation 2011, written by a team headed by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie in 2010, would be implemented.

Reduce military staffing to help fund acquisitions, analysts urge Liberals

Both recommend a reduction in tail to teeth. The Trudeau Liberals promised to implement Leslie's plan.

This weeks GOFO announcement and the natural increase in Col\LCol\Major, because of the GOFO changes, including new positions to be filled, makes it hard for me to square the Trudeau Liberals promise.

 

[Journeyman]

I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.

Whether the tanks are in one location or spread throughout the country, there is a limit number of vehicles on which to keep people current.  You can't reasonably say, "OK LAV guys, every third week you're going to be Leo guys to maintain skills."

Having them all in one location eases several training, logistics, and maintenance issues... and hence financial issues. Post people in and change buttons & bows as required.

 

[Kirkhill]

I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.

Are you ever going to deploy more than a squadron of tanks though?  I can't see deploying all 80 vehicles in the fleet concurrently.  20 for training, 20 for fleet management, 20 deployed, 20 in reserve.  Isn't that the game plan?

If so, a Regiment of 3 active and 2 reserve sabre squadrons of people, to fall in on the two available squadrons of tanks in the Regiment could keep a deployed force in the field for a very extended period.  No?

Edit: apparently I am slow today.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

This is why you need to rotate people through the unit, either by forming a composite unit or by having people switch cap badges.  The Armour Corps isn't opposed to switching cap badges either.  As an example,  The present CO of the Strathconas is a career 12 RBC guy who only rebadged to command the Strathconas.

This is again, the weakness of our Regimental System, especially when dealing with platforms.  The Air Force has tribes that revolve around fighting platforms which can create friction at higher levels but otherwise doesn't do much damage.  The Army has platforms which create friction between different Corps but then they also have pieces of felt on their berets which create not only inter-Corps friction but also intra-Corps friction.

Solving the manning issues with all tanks in one Regiment is actually quite easy, it involves either a cap badge change or a new composite unit.  Either way, the savings and efficiencies gained by putting the tanks all in one place are well worth the cost.

Edit: 

To add, with the amount of tanks we have, we will only ever be able to deploy, at most, a squadron.  Maintaining a full up Regiment shouldn't be a problem. 

If A unit like CSOR can do it, why can't the Armour Corps?

Rotating people in and out on a piece of equipment, like the Leopard, causes a huge amount of skill fade for those that go somewhere else. You won't be able to just grab someone that drove a tank 5 years ago and have him crew command now, because he's been promoted, and is no longer in that driver position. Fighting a piece of equipment, like a tank, is not the same as replacing a machine gunner with a rifleman, in a section. If you rotate a bunch of guys into the tanks, even if they've been on them before, you'll likely have to start from scratch. They may call them refresher courses not to hurt anyone's feelings but they will be full blown trades courses. Vehicles get modified or upgraded, doctrine changes, techniques change. These all have to be taken into consideration for the workup prior to deployment. What takes 6-9 months of predeployment, will now become 9-12 months. At least the crews will have a chance to meld and become capable of fighting the tank as one.

 

[Edward Campbell]

A couple things in the Globe and Mail on this today.  The suggestions don't seem that bad.  Cut fat to reinvest where needed, don't micromanage insignificant details away from commanders who are trusted with the lives of service members, provide enough money, and don't over promise. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/deal-of-the-century-trudeaus-defence-review-will-reverberate-for-decades/article28309381/
...

Deal of the century? Reverberate for decades?

I don't think Trudeau's defence review will be consequential at all ... wheel spinning is all it will be, in fairness just more wheel spinning, since that's all the Conservatives did after 2012.

There is no pressing threat ... period.

Absent a real, pressing, well understood threat, Canadians are disinterested and, more important, unwilling to see their hard earned dollars spent on the military ... "toys for the boys" is how, I am fairly certain, Butts, Telford and company in the PMO see it, and that's how a solid majority of Canadians see it, too.

Minister Sajjan will take a year to conduct his review .... a few trees will be killed to publish it, several academics and journalists and other assorted experts will fill a few hundred computer screens with critical commentary. Canadians, even the very few tens of thousands who care, at all, will yawn. The cabinet P&P (plans and priorities) Committee will defer consideration to the late fall of 2017 by which time, being less than two years away from the next election, it will punt it to the Liberal campaign team for a few words in the platform.

Of course that all can and would change if (when?) there were to be a real, understood threat.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Rotating people in and out on a piece of equipment, like the Leopard, causes a huge amount of skill fade for those that go somewhere else. You won't be able to just grab someone that drove a tank 5 years ago and have him crew command now, because he's been promoted, and is no longer in that driver position. Fighting a piece of equipment, like a tank, is not the same as replacing a machine gunner with a rifleman, in a section. If you rotate a bunch of guys into the tanks, even if they've been on them before, you'll likely have to start from scratch. They may call them refresher courses not to hurt anyone's feelings but they will be full blown trades courses. Vehicles get modified or upgraded, doctrine changes, techniques change. These all have to be taken into consideration for the workup prior to deployment. What takes 6-9 months of predeployment, will now become 9-12 months. At least the crews will have a chance to meld and become capable of fighting the tank as one.

You will never deploy a whole Regiment though so this is a moot point.  I've already answered this a couple of times but Journeyman hit the nail on the head when he said:

Whether the tanks are in one location or spread throughout the country, there is a limit number of vehicles on which to keep people current.  You can't reasonably say, "OK LAV guys, every third week you're going to be Leo guys to maintain skills."

Having them all in one location eases several training, logistics, and maintenance issues... and hence financial issues. Post people in and change buttons & bows as required.

Deal of the century? Reverberate for decades?

I don't think Trudeau's defence review will be consequential at all ... wheel spinning is all it will be, in fairness just more wheel spinning, since that's all the Conservatives did after 2012.

There is no pressing threat ... period.

Absent a real, pressing, well understood threat, Canadians are disinterested and, more important, unwilling to see their hard earned dollars spent on the military ... "toys for the boys" is how, I am fairly certain, Butts, Telford and company in the PMO see it, and that's how a solid majority of Canadians see it, too.

Minister Sajjan will take a year to conduct his review .... a few trees will be killed to publish it, several academics and journalists and other assorted experts will fill a few hundred computer screens with critical commentary. Canadians, even the very few tens of thousands who care, at all, will yawn. The cabinet P&P (plans and priorities) Committee will defer consideration to the late fall of 2017 by which time, being less than two years away from the next election, it will punt it to the Liberal campaign team for a few words in the platform.

Of course that all can and would change if (when?) there were to be a real, understood threat.

:ditto: