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Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)

So, IMHO, when the Def/ForPol review is finally finished, it may find itself confronted with an Army already well down the transformation road because, money or not, we could not wait.

Very true.  Whne Mr MacCallum was MND, he was very taken with the work that the Army had done on Transformation, and had asked the other services whren they were going to get on with their plans.  This lead to the unbalanced distribution of the extra cash that came in 2 years ago - to the chagrin of many (remeber that conversation in the smoking area that I alluded to?).

Having said that, DGSP (Dir Gen Strat Planning - no accident that it is MGen Dempster, former ACLS) has done some work on Force Planning Scenarios (that was then further developed by DGLCD (Dir Gen Land Cbt Development)).  Can't find the whole text, but here is a summary:

http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/scen_e.asp

More background coming...

Dave
 
This link might help to show where the Army plans to be for Tomorrow and the Future:

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/dlsc-dcsot/doc.asp
 
One thing which has not been touched upon is the need to "go it alone". There will be times when our national interest is not in accordance with our allies or potential allies. Under the current state of affairs, we would simply have to stay home.

This is not an idle threat, we have "stayed home" when it became clear the proposed intervention in Zaire would not be supported by any allies and would be actively opposed by Hutu militias (among others, many of the things I have read are contradictory), and despite the Prime Minister's brave words at the UN about the ongoing genocide in the Sudan, we have no ability to get there either. I can only say "thank God" it wasn't a major or direct threat to our national interest.

Alliances and multinational coalitions should also be treated with caution; what are their national interests? It is interesting that the investigation of the Oil for Food program is turning up evidence of massive corruption in the UN, the body that was supposed to provide "legitimacy" to any actions against Iraq. France and Russia were totally opposed to any actions against Iraq, and were threatening to veto any enforcement actions of US resolutions.  It should be no surprise that France and Russia were recipients of a great deal of Saddam Hussein's favors (in terms of oil allocations and contracts to their State oil companies). In that case, do we follow the UN, preserving a corrupt regime and taking the risk that Saddam Hussein might go back to his expansionist ways backed with a WMD program, or follow the Americans, who perceived their national interest would be threatened should the potential turn into reality?

Whatever you think of these examples, there should be a lot of thought put into the idea that we should always be limited to being a force provider in a larger coalition. Circumstances change, and it would be foolish to discount the notion that we must sometimes go it alone.
 
PPCLI Guy said:
Very true.   WWhenMr MacCallum was MND, he was very taken with the work that the Army had done on Transformation, and had asked the other services whren they were going to get on with their plans.  

I thought Leadmark pre-dated the army plan, before Mr. McGoo was even MND. The problem was getting the government to cough up the cash. Almost all of the capabilities currently sought by the other services from the Navy for the purposes of joint operations were part of the Navy vision through the ALSC and it's escorting vessels. [currently referred to as the JSS]. What wasn't envisioned in Leadmark was the idea of tailoring the Navy to meet the needs of a niche armed forces, since such tailoring would almost certainly force the Navy to abandon it's CP- EEZ and SLOC roles.    

I agree with your comments about the minister being taken with the work of the army, since in all likelihood the Navy once again failed to adequately cast it's plans as transformational [which they were/are] and of enhanced, perhaps even critical relevance to the defence of Canada.[The priority of domestic security as noted by all posters in this thread.]

With McCallum ousted, it looks like a more balanced approach to capability planning might return. There is a significant optimism to suggest, not withstanding the submarine problems, that Leadmark will be 90 percent implemented by 2020. If this turns out to be the case, the Navy will also have managed to accomplish and implement a de facto Maritime defence policy that will support whatever direction the higher order defence and foreign policy reviews might logically go. What the Navy probably hasn't planned on is being shoved off by those who erroneously view the Navy's sole purpose as being reduced to hauling a few army trucks and Griffons around and labelling that role as "jointness."

It remains to be seen whether the Navy can regain it's balance after the past month and then exercise some initiative to state it's case to those who might be willing to actually commit to a sound defence policy, backed up a decent set of plans.   Cheers.
 
What the Navy probably hasn't planned on is being shoved off by those who erroneously view the Navy's sole purpose as being reduced to hauling a few army trucks and Griffons around and labelling that role as "jointness."

Whoever thinks this is "jointness" is a nitwit. To me (and to respond to a point raised by a majoor,) our goal should be a Joint Expeditionary Force Package that can project/protect/employ/sustain/recover itself using all Canadian resources. This is not a pipedream. IMHO, this means a Navy that is more than just a barge service for the other two services. It means surface combatants that can escort the JEF, protecting it against likely threats, then contribute to Theatre Air Defense on arrival in the AOO. It means submarines that contribute to the "protect" piece but can operate independently as well, as part of the Maritime Component of a Combined Joint Task Force. It means capable landing support and replenishment vessels. It means the abiltity to C2 all of this while providing the Land Component Commander with an HQ afloat until the ground situation is established. In other words, a balanced, capable and modern Navy. I believe that such a force is within the grasp of our Navy, given adequate resources. Cheers.
 
I think I stated once before, on some other thread, that we probably need something like a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade, integrating land, sea and air in a true joint capability package.  No, it doesn't have to replicate a MEB one for one, but that would be the idea.  Such an organization would give Canada the opportunity to project varying types and amounts of force, depending on the need--whether a non-combatant overseas evacuation op, a humanitarian assistance op, or a war-fighting op.  This requires ships and aircraft that can haul and fight, a balanced ground force that has a reasonable degree of capability in any security environment, and doctrine and C2 infrastructure for the whole thing that is complete in itself, yet truly interoperable with our likely allies.

More fundamentally, however, is the need to back up and get this thing right in the first place, based on what Canada wants its military capability to be able to do.  This does require debate.  Right now, the military, and especially the army, are carrying the can for Canada on the global stage.  International aid is way down, and doesn't achieve much in terms of domestic visibility anyway.  We lack the economic oomph to be big players in the global market-place.  And our diplomatic corps has withered even more than our military.  So our military is doing too much--and not just militarily!
 
NMPeters said:
This link might help to show where the Army plans to be for Tomorrow and the Future:

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/dlsc-dcsot/doc.asp

Great link - thanks.  I encourage others to have a boo at this one.

Dave
 
Seems to me this is a good overview of why we need to review Canadian Foreign Affairs policy first, before Defence.   Having said that, it's ridiculous how the bureaucrats will drag it out as long as they can (as an aside, I find it amusing when a liberal-leaning newspaper refers to "Martins Liberals", implicitly insuating they're not "real" Liberals ... like "Papa Doc Crouton's" ... but, I digress).

This editorial offers it in point form, and for the sake of argument ... it's not too shabby:

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/Co...&c=Article&cid=1099000209076&call_pageid=null

(oh, Good Grief!  There's an equally compelling editorial in the National Post, too)
http://www.canada.com/national/nati....html?id=288802ab-4cdd-4334-8f75-5529dff8536f

Defining Canada's role in the world

Canadians aspire to a "very ambitious role in the world," Prime Minister Paul Martin declared during the election campaign. And so we should.

Our $1.3 trillion economy puts us in the elite Group of Seven club of wealthy democracies. We are a principal power, if not a major one, with wide interests. No country is closer to the United States, with its huge impact globally. Americans buy more than 80 per cent of our exports, and we buy 25 per cent of theirs. As friends, neighbours and allies, we understand Americans as few others do, and share values and interests.

And their perils. Osama bin Laden has named us as a target.

Canadians have similar ties of affection, too, with many other parts of the world, including Britain, China, Southeast Asia, Italy, Portugal, the Caribbean, Poland, the Philippines and Latin America. We can use them to make the world freer, safer, healthier.

To do that, Martin favours a "three-D" approach and an "integrated national agenda" combining diplomacy, defence and development. He promises better Canada/U.S./Mexico relations. A more coherent war on terror. A stronger effort to fight AIDS. And more.

But while Canada's interests are broad, our resources are finite. We spend more than $18 billion on diplomacy, defence and aid. That's $1.7 billion on our diplomatic corps in 2004/05, $13.6 billion on the military and some $3.3 billion on aid. Yet we could double our spending in these areas and still lag behind our allies, in relative terms. Had we done so by now, Canada's submarine fleet might not be in drydock today. And Martin might not have to suffer through lectures from allies, as well as critics at home, that we should spend more on aid.

Redefining Canada's sense of global purpose, as Martin proposes to do, will involve costly, wrenching change. And tough choices. After tightly managed consultations with bureaucrats, politicians and academics, Martin promises an International Policy Statement, the first since 1995, by late fall. A defence policy statement, the first since 1994, is to follow.

The timing of these reviews is ideal. Given the Liberals' minority status, this is a chance to define a role for Canada that embodies a broad national consensus, and that will far outlive the current government.

Typically, policy reviews produce checklists of priorities. In 1970, Pierre Trudeau put economic growth and social justice ahead of peace and security. By 1985 Brian Mulroney made national unity and sovereignty his main themes. In 1995, Jean Chrétien put prosperity first, then security.

This process of ranking matters to a government. It led Trudeau to screen foreign investment and redistribute oil wealth. Mulroney squandered energy on go-nowhere constitutional reform. And Chrétien favoured Team Canada trade missions over human rights.

What should Martin focus on?

First, coherency is key. Canada/U.S. relations are run out of the Prime Minister's Office, while the foreign affairs and trade department has been split in two. The potential for policy confusion, drift, and sending mixed signals to allies is evident. That would scupper Martin's ambitions.

Second, a focus on the North American hemisphere, with our American and Mexican partners, makes political and economic sense.

Third, we must stand by the United Nations and our other allies as required, and go our own way when necessary, as we did by not joining the Iraq war. Polls suggest Canadians are confident enough to disagree with allies and expect the government to speak boldly when need be.

How to define Canada's core interests? Here is a proposed list:

Promoting prosperity, and economic growth.

Affirming our sovereignty and independence.

Assuring our security in a world shaken by instability and terror.

Projecting our values: Democracy, peace, justice, compassion.

This ranking differs markedly from those of our our allies. The Americans put military supremacy first. So do the British. The French highlight independence. The Germans freedom, peace and prosperity. The Italians promote Euro-Atlantic relations. The Australians focus on Asian ties. New Zealanders focus on Australian ties. Each nation spends accordingly.

This ranking gives Canada/U.S. relations pride of place, but within a regional framework, and in the context of a sturdy nationalism. It also puts a higher priority on thwarting threats to this continent than on humanitarian concerns elsewhere. It reflects a 9/11 world dominated by the U.S., bound by a globalized economy and shaken by instability and terror.

In such a climate, Ottawa will have to be sovereignty-conscious, proactive and assertive to promote our interests even with friends.

Since 9/11 "the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values," said Richard Haass, former head of policy planning for the State Department. "We are doing this by persuading more and more governments ... to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate for our mutual benefit."

Canada will continue to feel this pressure whether President George Bush or Sen. John Kerry is elected on Tuesday.

Also, Canadians must juggle other priorities: Arctic sovereignty, foreign overfishing, the softwood lumber spat and beef exports. Africa's economic crisis and pandemics. United Nations reform. Martin's push for a broader Group of 20 club of nations to address pressing issues. Building stability in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti. The Mideast conflict. Saving lives in Darfur and other regions. Peacekeeping. Arms control.

However the Martin Liberals define our priorities, after due Parliamentary and public consultation, Canada's spending must be upgraded to match our ambitions. Otherwise the reviews will be sham exercises. Parliamentary committees and experts have called, credibly, for a defence budget of $20 billion or more, and for $8 billion in aid, within a few years.

Why spend so much, so fast? Because we must reverse a generation of decline. Martin's ambition to "build Canada's influence in the world" and to "take the lead" cannot be realized on the cheap.
 
And in line with this thread, and reading from PPCLI Guy's own preferred, leftist pinko liberal rag, (I just love stereotypical labels) ;D

We have this from the Toronto Star - an editorial calling for an upgrade in the defence and diplomacy budgets from 18 BCAD to at least 28 BCAD with DND's budget going from 13 BCAD to 20 BCAD in short order.

   


Oct. 30, 2004. 01:00 AM

Defining Canada's role in the world



Canadians aspire to a "very ambitious role in the world," Prime Minister Paul Martin declared during the election campaign. And so we should.

Our $1.3 trillion economy puts us in the elite Group of Seven club of wealthy democracies. We are a principal power, if not a major one, with wide interests. No country is closer to the United States, with its huge impact globally. Americans buy more than 80 per cent of our exports, and we buy 25 per cent of theirs. As friends, neighbours and allies, we understand Americans as few others do, and share values and interests.

And their perils. Osama bin Laden has named us as a target.

Canadians have similar ties of affection, too, with many other parts of the world, including Britain, China, Southeast Asia, Italy, Portugal, the Caribbean, Poland, the Philippines and Latin America. We can use them to make the world freer, safer, healthier.

To do that, Martin favours a "three-D" approach and an "integrated national agenda" combining diplomacy, defence and development. He promises better Canada/U.S./Mexico relations. A more coherent war on terror. A stronger effort to fight AIDS. And more.

But while Canada's interests are broad, our resources are finite. We spend more than $18 billion on diplomacy, defence and aid. That's $1.7 billion on our diplomatic corps in 2004/05, $13.6 billion on the military and some $3.3 billion on aid. Yet we could double our spending in these areas and still lag behind our allies, in relative terms. Had we done so by now, Canada's submarine fleet might not be in drydock today. And Martin might not have to suffer through lectures from allies, as well as critics at home, that we should spend more on aid.

Redefining Canada's sense of global purpose, as Martin proposes to do, will involve costly, wrenching change. And tough choices. After tightly managed consultations with bureaucrats, politicians and academics, Martin promises an International Policy Statement, the first since 1995, by late fall. A defence policy statement, the first since 1994, is to follow.

The timing of these reviews is ideal. Given the Liberals' minority status, this is a chance to define a role for Canada that embodies a broad national consensus, and that will far outlive the current government.

Typically, policy reviews produce checklists of priorities. In 1970, Pierre Trudeau put economic growth and social justice ahead of peace and security. By 1985 Brian Mulroney made national unity and sovereignty his main themes. In 1995, Jean Chrétien put prosperity first, then security.

This process of ranking matters to a government. It led Trudeau to screen foreign investment and redistribute oil wealth. Mulroney squandered energy on go-nowhere constitutional reform. And Chrétien favoured Team Canada trade missions over human rights.

What should Martin focus on?

First, coherency is key. Canada/U.S. relations are run out of the Prime Minister's Office, while the foreign affairs and trade department has been split in two. The potential for policy confusion, drift, and sending mixed signals to allies is evident. That would scupper Martin's ambitions.

Second, a focus on the North American hemisphere, with our American and Mexican partners, makes political and economic sense.

Third, we must stand by the United Nations and our other allies as required, and go our own way when necessary, as we did by not joining the Iraq war. Polls suggest Canadians are confident enough to disagree with allies and expect the government to speak boldly when need be.

How to define Canada's core interests? Here is a proposed list:

Promoting prosperity, and economic growth.

Affirming our sovereignty and independence.

Assuring our security in a world shaken by instability and terror.

Projecting our values: Democracy, peace, justice, compassion.

This ranking differs markedly from those of our our allies. The Americans put military supremacy first. So do the British. The French highlight independence. The Germans freedom, peace and prosperity. The Italians promote Euro-Atlantic relations. The Australians focus on Asian ties. New Zealanders focus on Australian ties. Each nation spends accordingly.

This ranking gives Canada/U.S. relations pride of place, but within a regional framework, and in the context of a sturdy nationalism. It also puts a higher priority on thwarting threats to this continent than on humanitarian concerns elsewhere. It reflects a 9/11 world dominated by the U.S., bound by a globalized economy and shaken by instability and terror.

In such a climate, Ottawa will have to be sovereignty-conscious, proactive and assertive to promote our interests even with friends.

Since 9/11 "the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values," said Richard Haass, former head of policy planning for the State Department. "We are doing this by persuading more and more governments ... to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate for our mutual benefit."

Canada will continue to feel this pressure whether President George Bush or Sen. John Kerry is elected on Tuesday.

Also, Canadians must juggle other priorities: Arctic sovereignty, foreign overfishing, the softwood lumber spat and beef exports. Africa's economic crisis and pandemics. United Nations reform. Martin's push for a broader Group of 20 club of nations to address pressing issues. Building stability in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti. The Mideast conflict. Saving lives in Darfur and other regions. Peacekeeping. Arms control.

However the Martin Liberals define our priorities, after due Parliamentary and public consultation, Canada's spending must be upgraded to match our ambitions. Otherwise the reviews will be sham exercises. Parliamentary committees and experts have called, credibly, for a defence budget of $20 billion or more, and for $8 billion in aid, within a few years.

Why spend so much, so fast? Because we must reverse a generation of decline. Martin's ambition to "build Canada's influence in the world" and to "take the lead" cannot be realized on the cheap.




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http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid=1099000209076&call_pageid=null

Keep wishing guys.  Sometimes Santa Claus does show up. 

Cheers.

 
And tomorrow's piece wll be specifically about the Defence Policy.
 
That's right, Santa put $100 million in the bank accounts of certain "Liberal friendly" ad agencies for little or no work. Since Santa was the Minister of Finance and president of the Quebec Caucus at the time, his protestations that he didn't know anything about this indicates he is totally clueless or a shameless lier.

Since all these fine words never lead to action, we should continue to hope the United States feels it is worth their time and effort to take on the bulk of Canada's defense. We can continue to fill the niche roles (bitter rant ends)
 
And here's part 2, just like PPCLI guy promised.  (If this keeps up I may have to consider revising some of the labels I apply to this paper ;D)

   


Oct. 31, 2004. 01:00 AM

Canada's military lacks focus, funds



Canadians were shocked to see the submarine HMCS Chicoutimi rolling helpless this month in the stormy North Atlantic, crippled by a fatal fire.

They shouldn't have been.

Just last year, an antique Sea King helicopter crashed on the deck of the vintage destroyer HMCS Iroquois. During Canada's peacekeeping airlift to East Timor in 1999, a defective Hercules transport was forced back to base by mechanical failures â ” three times. In 2000, the skipper of an American cargo ship held $223 million worth of Canadian military equipment at sea for six weeks, in a contract dispute. Lacking transport, Ottawa had hired the ship to bring the materiel home from a peacekeeping mission. Our navy had to board the ship.

These fiascos are reminders that the sadly rundown Canadian Forces lack the personnel, funding and equipment to defend our interests in a post-9/11 world where American "pre-emptive" wars, Rwanda type massacres, regional instability and terror are ugly realities.

In recent years, the forces have been busier than at any time in the past half-century. Today, more than 1,600 Canadian troops are serving abroad in Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf, in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Africa. The pressure isn't likely to abate any time soon.

Prime Minister Paul Martin promised in the throne speech earlier this month to invest more in the military. He has ordered Defence Minister Bill Graham to develop a new defence policy statement early next year, soon after Ottawa unveils a fresh foreign policy. Regrettably, the defence review will take place largely behind closed doors, to satisfy secrecy-loving bureaucrats who fear public "meddling" in this area. Taxpayers would be better served by a full public consultation and debate. Instead, Parliament will be called on to give Ottawa's plans close scrutiny.

For his part, Martin seems to understand that the Canadian Forces' chief duties are the defence of Canada, the defence of North America in co-operation with the United States, and contributing to global security.

Canada has earmarked $8 billion to bolster continental security after 9/11, and rightly so. Osama bin Laden has named this country as a target.

At the same time, the Canadian Forces must be sufficiently "robust" to comfort our American allies that we are doing what we can to prevent attacks on them from here. That can only enhance our sovereignty. We must maintain sufficient modern warplanes, warships and surveillance aircraft to help secure approaches to this continent. We must be able to project credible force over large distances.

Ottawa is also looking, rightly, to expand Canada/U.S. air defence co-operation to include the navy and cross-border assistance. And to join the U.S. missile defence system.

Further afield, the Canadian Forces must be equipped to mobilize rapidly deployable battle groups with lethal firepower to trouble spots overseas. While our forces need not be huge, they must be high-value.

The "Canadian difference" that Martin intends to make means helping the United Nations support democracy, keep the peace, shore up weak states, thwart genocide, promote development and battle disease. These roles contribute to global stability. Characteristically, they involve the army, airlift and generous aid. Most Canadians strongly support them.

While Canada has one of the world's 20 strongest military forces, it is nowhere as strong as it should be, given our national interests, the endless calls on Canadian troops to serve in places like Afghanistan, the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia and East Timor, and the size of our economy.

We must spend more than the $13.3 billion we do now, refit warships, aircraft and armour, and boost our military beyond the 60,000 mark, and our effective army strength past 15,000. Since 2000, Ottawa has added $2 billion to the base budget. And Martin plans to spend $7 billion on major equipment like the Sikorsky H-92 helicopters, naval supply ships and search-and-rescue aircraft. He has also pledged 5,000 more regulars and 3,000 reservists. It's a welcome start, but not more than that.

Parliamentary committees have urged a base budget in the $18 billion-plus range, just to offset past cuts and to support current missions. We could easily spend $24 billion a year and field 80,000 personnel, and still lag far behind most of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in relative spending terms. When inflation is taken into account, we spend less today than a decade ago.

Can Ottawa spend smarter? Yes, definitely. We can replace Cold War-era destroyers and tanks, close some military bases and thin out the military bureaucracy, while making better use of the cost-efficient reserves.

But we must also spend more. So far, Martin has shrunk from doing that. Yet Canada's relations with the U.S., the U.N. and key allies hang in the balance. Ultimately, so does our sovereignty

I continue to believe in Santa Claus a_majoor.  I believe there is a once in a generation confluence of events happening just now. 

Security interests, economic interests, sovereignty - all register high on the governments lists of concerns. 

The opposition parties, all of them, have either a pro-defence or at least not anti-defence position and are interested in maintaining Canada's ability to be perceived as not-American (much as I personally dislike that position - I prefer pro-Canadian rather than anti-anything). 

The Minority Government gives all parties power and all parties cover - consensus politics on this issue is possible.  If they can't get this one right then there ain't much hope for anything else.

Finally one of the side effects of all of these longterm "deals for a generation", regardless of how effective the deals are, is that the Canadian Public is becoming used to hearing about not hundreds of million dollar projects, nor even billion dollar projects but tens of billion dollar projects.  As well the projects are funded over long periods, at least a decade.

This last observation is the most critical for the CF and DND.  For Canada to do what Australia did, define a 60 Billion Dollar programme over 10-15 years, Canadians have to be brought to believe two things: 

1 - that these types of numbers are commonplace and affordable

2 - that these types of numbers, or better, higher numbers, have been applied to their priorities (health, equalization, daycare, aboriginals) before they have been applied to sending Canadian troops overseas with the right kit.

As to the "number" that might eventually be applied to the CF, that will depend on political will and election spin I think.  For instance an aggressive position could be to add up all of the funds supplied to the "priority" programmes,  likely to be in the 100 billion dollar, or greater, range over a 10-15 year period and then use the combined value as the bench march for justifying an Australian type 60 billion dollar project.  An alternate position could be to look at one project, for example the 41 billion for health, as an upper limit.  In between there are multiple variations allowing the government to choose a marketable benchmark and adjust the period of the programme.

I really believe, (OK maybe I just want to believe) that the ground work is in place to get the job done right for the CF.  Now whether it does get done right........................................
 
I really believe, (OK maybe I just want to believe) that the ground work is in place to get the job done right for the CF.  Now whether it does get done right

I too believe that the stars and planets may be lining up.
 
Hope springs eternal, and I want to believe just as much as the other readers here, but considering I trained and deployed to Bosnia on ROTO 13 without sufficient TCCCS, NVGs or even support weapons (we had to raid war stocks to get 1XC-9 per section, and never received the SF kit for the GPMG), my belief is wearing thin.

Many of the events like the helicopter crashes and inability to get to Zaire, East Timor or Afghanistan on our own have been widely publicised, with little result. Now that Osama bin Laden has resurfaced, we might get a little more attention, but only a real demonstration of enemy power like a 767 crashing into the CN tower will lift people out of their lethargy, and then of course is too late. If John Kerry is elected, the sudden pullback of American power might make the anti-American crowd happy, but who is considering the fact that someone will fill the vacuum left by the Americans, and they well might be a hostile power or power block.

I once wrote in the ADTB that the real choice isn't wether to have missile defense or unconventional forces, but rather how much of each we will need. The one thing I cannot find the answer to is how to "sell" that to the Canadian public....
 
The one thing I cannot find the answer to is how to "sell" that to the Canadian public....

Osmosis.

Get more Canadian youth to willingly commit to a basic engagement.   There, they will learn that the military is an active and essential part to the vitality of the state.

One of my favorite ideas for doing so is a much advertised, easy to use eduaction program akin to the Montgomery GI Bill.  A program like this would have to be universally recognized as a suitable way of earning a good portion of continually increasing post-secondary education costs.  This isn't conscription; three years good service will be expected and the GI Bill will be simply one of the options that a soldier has on completion of the BE - but if it is "sold" right at highschools, it should be one that will draw more people into the Forces.  Since Canada spends so much money on subsidization of education, I'm sure there would be no problem with getting the funds and essentially killing two birds with one stone (filling up the ranks of the Forces and offering alternative forms of education subsidization).

When you got a sizable chunk of people going into university, trade schools, and the public service with three years voluntary service and perhaps (more then likely) some operational experience, I honestly believe their will be a shift in perception.   I think the benefits of a shift like this would far outweigh any disadvantages conferred from having a good percentage of Privates being "short-timers" - from recent studies a something that is already a reality (ie: I'm in for three and then college for free - I just made that up too... 8)).
 
Infanteer said:
One of my favorite ideas for doing so is a much advertised, easy to use eduaction program akin to the Montgomery GI Bill.

I don't know if that was intentional, but it's good.

Acorn
 
While I support the idea of a "GI bill", this will start to run into a problem outlined in a few other threads: the narrow training base we now have. An infusion of funds and fresh recruits would have a negative effect if it isn't backed by sufficient resources to train these people.

Case in point, the influx of recruits who were taken on a few years ago to halt the "death spiral" (effective strength dropping below the 48000 mark) ended up being stranded in a "holding battalion" in Borden. There were no courses, no instructors, no kit...and so many of them sat for almost the entire initial engagement. Think of what sort of impression they got of military virtues and values.

Since we have a minority government, there is a "left flanking" option available; convince the Opposition party to sponsor a private members bill supporting the writing of a new White Paper which recognizes the new security environment and ensures the proper resources are devoted to the job. With some careful planning, there should be enough votes to pass the bill. Stephen Harper, are you a guest on this board?
 
I don't know if that was intentional, but it's good.

Touche; 60-70 wpm (and failure to use the spell check) has its drawbacks.... :)

While I support the idea of a "GI bill", this will start to run into a problem outlined in a few other threads: the narrow training base we now have. An infusion of funds and fresh recruits would have a negative effect if it isn't backed by sufficient resources to train these people.

Agree; that's why I find the notion that we'll mobilize the reserves when we need them about as absurd as the Government saying "we'll get 5,000 more soldiers!" (Try getting 5,000 bodies through CFRC quickly....)  Any buildup of numbers needs to be gradual and needs to take into account increased infrastructure requirements - my idea is a long-term proposal to encourage a broader understanding of the professional military in Canadian society while at the same time meeting the requirements for more filled boots.  Obviously, to work, it needs short-term solutions (like the one you presented).
 
Can we still talk about foreign policy?

I think we, Canadians, need to take a good, medium term look at the world around us as part of the process of reviewing, revising and enunciating our foreign policy.

The transitional era of one, lonely hyper-puissance will come to an end ... we will return to a bipolar world in which superpower status will be shared by America and China.   It will take China several decades to grow into a full fledged global superpower with global military, economic, political and even social powers, but it is, now, a major power - and not just a regional power.

The two superpowers will be 'attended' by other major powers: the European Union might overcome some difficult demographic, economic, social and political problems and emerge as a cohesive global power; Japan and, especially, India will be major regional powers - sometimes with global reach in some areas.   Brazil, too, will, eventually, get its act together and will be an important 'power.'

What about Canada?

We must accommodate the reality that we will, likely, 'decline' from being - as we are now by almost every sensible measure - one of the world's top ten to being one of the top twenty ... probably 'behind' America, China, Britain, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan and, perhaps, Spain but still 'ahead' of Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, etc.

What shall we do?

The answer is simple and must be made clear by Canadians to politicians: we must pursue, promote and protect our interests; we must do so efficiently and effectively.

We can sum up (and grossly oversimplify) our interests in two words: Peace and Prosperity.   Neither is a as simple as one word might appear and we have known, since Roman times, that the two are interdependent.   Peace is more, much more than the absence of war and prosperity is only valuable when we can use it to improve the commonwealth of our families, communities, nations and communities of nations.

It may be easier to say what we need to avoid rather than to try to specify desired foreign policy outcomes.   What we want to avoid, above all, is a global war between an American led West and a Chinese led East.   We must use our 'good offices' to convince our American friends - and they are our friends, our best friends whether some Canadian s like it or not - and our Chinese trading partners that they can have a competitive, even antagonistic relationship without slipping through adversary and into enemy status.

The first requirement is that we actually have some 'good offices' to use for that worthy purpose.   These 'good offices' are earned and must be maintained through a combination of political actions, economic measures - including foreign aid and investment and defence 'muscle' - muscle which is used.   This should be the first of series of explicit requirements for defence capabilities which need to fall out of our foreign policy.

We must, also, strive to maintain close, non-adversarial contacts in the emerging bi-polar world.   We have several unique advantages which we must be willing and able to exploit:

First, and I repeat: we are America's closest friend and they are ours - all the breast beating by a substantial minority of Canadians will not change that and must not be allowed to tarnish the relationship;

Second: we have good, historically friendly ties with China.   We can and should disagree with China on various issues without prejudicing our overall 'friendly' relationship - the Chinese, like all major powers, including America, have neither use nor respect for lapdogs;

Third: we have good, historically, friendly ties with India and the European Union - two of the key 'second tier' players.   Further, we have good relations with two important subsets -

o Globally: with the so called Anglosphere which consists of America, Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, and

o Regionally: with the smaller Northern Europeans - Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

This is an impressive base from which to pursue, promote and protect our interests - but it is a base which needs a bit of shoring up ... especially regarding its military foundation.   We may wish to revise some alliances - like NATO - to emphasize our strengths and interests and pay more attention to smaller, more exclusive bodies like the Anglosphere where our voice is a bit louder - where we are a bit more 'equal' than in other, larger, fora.   We should consider that our Atlantic and Pacific interests are, at least, equal albeit secondary to our North American ones.   Our military resources should   be applied, in order, to:

"¢ Continental issues;

"¢ Atlantic, Caribbean and Pacific (including Indian Ocean) issues, equally; and

"¢ Other areas - including Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia

We should, explicitly, announce our willingness to join coalitions of the willing which, serve our interests and preferably, serve and include (but, at least, do not offend) our traditional partners, allies and friends.   We should pronounce ourselves willing to be a regional actor - able and prepared to help in, especially, the Caribbean and Central America and, to a lesser extent, throughout the Commonwealth and la fracophonie.   Such help will, of necessity, have a military component and our foreign policy must require that we have the defence capacity to give military weight to our foreign policy initiatives.

Canadians like Lloyd Axworthy's human security agenda: it seems reasonable that middle powers like Canada - and Australia, Ireland, Norway and Sweden should be able to intervene when people are being starved and slaughtered.   Canadians seem less able (or willing) to understand that such interventions require military muscle - expensive military muscle which we, as a nation, must be willing and able to use, in accordance with international law, when the situations requires.   Our foreign policy must remind us, and our elected leaders, that we have ambitions in the world and that policy must remind us that our ambitions come with a price tage.

Above all: we must be free and fair traders.   We must be proponents of globalization because it is abundantly clear that globalization works.   The evidence, the hard data, is clear: there are fewer, many, many fewer really poor people than there were 30 years ago ... most of humanity is measurable better off because of freer, fairer trade and globalization ... the WTO does more for suffering humanity than the United Nations.   We should argue, on the world stage, for global free trade, using a rules based system with a dispute resolution mechanism and we might even wish to argue that the WTO should, gradually, usurp the UN's roles in many areas - for example: some UN members agencies like the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Labour Organization and the International Telecommunications Union would be 'better' under the WTO's jurisdiction.

More to follow, later ...


 
You will find another, expert view at: http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/benefactors_lecture_2004.pdf

This is Allan Gotlieb's very, very recent (3 Nov 04) address to the C.D. Howe institute.

Gotlieb and I disagree on several areas but, very broadly, if you want to doable, affordable, politically possible foreign policy then his views are better than mine.

Gotlieb does want more military spending - but not as much as most, many in the defence community believe is necessary.   Gotlieb suspects, almost certainly correctly, that, given the current state of affairs, Canadians will support some, small, steady increases in defence spending but the idea that we might jump to 2% of GDP in, say, five years is, in his mind, a pipe dream and will remain so unless or until one or more of our ships is sunk or one of units is savaged in operations.

It is a good read, I highly recommend it.
 
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