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Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

Old Sweat said:
Maybe that has coloured my thinking, and hopefully the flag and general officers are more aware of the needs of each of the services, but I still shudder at the memory of a general clad in light blue saying he thought the army had too many different weapon systems, and major economies could be realized by eliminating some of them.

Testimony that we tried it before and it wasn't a very good idea.  Good enough for me.

As for a 3* purple general for the Log Trade, I'd venture - if I understand the system right - that a signficant proportion of the CSS function (namely the first and second lines and, sometimes, the third lines) exists within the Services and its requirements and doctrine are best looked after by the ECS.
 
Infanteer said:
Testimony that we tried it before and it wasn't a very good idea.  Good enough for me.

As for a 3* purple general for the Log Trade, I'd venture - if I understand the system right - that a signficant proportion of the CSS function (namely the first and second lines and, sometimes, the third lines) exists within the Services and its requirements and doctrine are best looked after by the ECS.

Given the very limited training Cbt Arms officers receive on CSS planning I would be leery of relying excusively on them to plan and command all the way from first line to national depot level requirements.  There are interrelationships not immediately obvious that run rom top to bottom; and there are commanders who will strip out CSS for more combat power, then change the conops and not have the support capacity they require.  LCol Conrad's book on support in Afghanistan would be worthy of review on that topic.

(What's next - putting a Log 3* in charge of the army  >:D ?)


If we want the Army to focus on operational excellence, then responsibilities outside that should be stripped from the commander to permit him or her to focus on just that.  Remove the ASGs (leaving the Bdes with the Svc Bns and at least some notional Div support elements).  Remove the individual training sysetm to permit the commander to focus on the collective training and skills maintenance of the Army.  That is the vital ground for success.

Certainly, there must be close co-ord; the training command's job is to co-ord the training, not define the requirements.  But past failures need to be assessed and understood - was the idea flawed, the implementation flawed, or did the implementors ignore the plan completely?  To merely say "Tried it once.  Didn't work.  Never again." without understanding the why is foolish.

 
dapaterson said:
If we want the Army to focus on operational excellence, then responsibilities outside that should be stripped from the commander to permit him or her to focus on just that.

You speak of stripping out extraneous duties to focus on operational excellence, but previously, you speak of how the lack of CSS knowledge inhibits operational excellence (an argument I agree with).  A bit contradictory; I'd venture that we need a better relationship between the CSS and Combat Arms guys (ie: the merging of ATOC CA and CSS that is forthcoming) as opposed to splitting off vital functions from the Army simply because they also box stuff up for Navy guys from time to time.  That, if anything, smells of empire building (yeah, I'm looking at you Health Services....)
 
Infanteer said:
You speak of stripping out extraneous duties to focus on operational excellence, but previously, you speak of how the lack of CSS knowledge inhibits operational excellence (an argument I agree with).  A bit contradictory; I'd venture that we need a better relationship between the CSS and Combat Arms guys (ie: the merging of ATOC CA and CSS that is forthcoming) as opposed to splitting off vital functions from the Army simply because they also box stuff up for Navy guys from time to time.  That, if anything, smells of empire building (yeah, I'm looking at you Health Services....)

(a) Health Services:  No comment  :'(

(b) Yes, I'm a bit interally contradictory on CSS.  The problem: to build RCN CSS + Army CSS + RCAF CSS + CF CSS = lots of surplus capacity that will not be needed.  So we have to balance providing adequate for CF needs with adequate to each environmental need with adequate for environmental training and PD.  Magic formula with a magic answer?  I don't have it.  But leaving the Army with strong first & second line plus a shell of third line should be enough to permit training, plus encourage some degree of jointness (if only to get practice in begging the centre for more  :nod: )

But there is a strong need for a strong CF "corporate" (I loathe that word in this context, but at least it's understood) oversight to prevent Log or HS or other empire building.  In theory, that's the VCDS role - to keep a semblance of balance in the Force, and keep the dark side at bay.  Unfortunately, the VCDS hasn't been able to secure a reliable supply of midichlorians...
 
The Brits are wrestling with the same dragons.  I don't know if something similar would reduce any staffing, as our Directors all have day jobs, but the management aspect of this is worth examining (and perhaps useful in another thread).

http://news.scotsman.com/politics/End-of-cavalry-as-Dragoons.6814690.jp?articlepage=2

End of cavalry, as Dragoons to be merged with infantry

Published Date: 08 August 2011

By Stephen McGinty

THE Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, one of Scotland's oldest regiments, is to be merged with the infantry, marking the demise of the British Army's cavalry after 350 years.

Under new plans being drawn up by military chiefs, the cavalry will no longer operate as an independent force and will instead by restructured and combined with the infantry into a "combat capability directorate", according to a leaked army document.

Senior officers fear this will mean the demise of famous regimental names such as the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards and the King's Royal Hussars, which are likely to be split up into squadrons and incorporated into infantry battalions.

The cavalry, which long ago swapped horses for tanks, is one of the oldest of the forces, dating back to the Civil War in the 1640s.

The history of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards stretches back to 1678, and the regiment had a prestigious role in the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, when Sergeant Charles Ewart captured the Imperial Eagle of Napoleon's 45th Regiment.

The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards are currently based in North Germany, as part of the 7th Armoured Brigade, the Desert Rats, where they are equipped with the Challenger 2 main battle tank.

The planned restructuring will cut swathes of senior officer posts by combining the army's eight main corps into four capability directorates. But it is the merger of the cavalry and infantry, expected to begin later this year, that will most concern cavalry officers.

The document, an internal army briefing note, does how-ever attempt to reassure the cavalry that "the ethos of the regimental system will not change".

Army chiefs say they want to ensure senior officers represent the army's interests rather than those of their regiments. The note makes clear that restructuring will help end the practice of giving cavalry and infantry officers the top jobs.

"The new structure will better allow the regimental system to flourish without impairing the opportunities available to the military profession," it says.

The army restructuring will create three more capability directorates. Artillery and engineers will form the combat support capability directorate. Signals and intelligence will form the combat information capability directorate. Logistics and electrical and mechanical engineering will combine as the combat service support capability directorate.

The document explains that the restructuring is driven by cost and the need to "optimise use of limited resources".

The army is to lose about 12,000 staff over the next ten years.

Yesterday a Ministry of Defence spokesman said: "The Defence Secretary recently announced the most radical transformation of the MoD in a generation, giving the chiefs greater power to run their services.

"The army's new capability directorates will be more agile and responsive, providing capability development and delivery better aligned to the rest of defence."

Last night Clive Fairweather, a former army colonel and deputy commander of the SAS, said: "The tank is part of the changing aspect of the military. It has only been on the battlefield since the First World War and since then the whole nature of warfare has changed again and there are those who say we don't need quite so many tanks.

"The MoD thinks they are top-heavy and expensive, so if they can possibly consign some armour and some history to the bin, then they will. I suppose it is kind of inevitable but making them an adjunct to the infantry would require a bit more explanation to me."
 
Infanteer said:
The Brits are wrestling with the same dragons.  I don't know if something similar would reduce any staffing, as our Directors all have day jobs, but the management aspect of this is worth examining (and perhaps useful in another thread).

http://news.scotsman.com/politics/End-of-cavalry-as-Dragoons.6814690.jp?articlepage=2

They always hinted at creating 'Panzer Grenadier' regiments in the UK. Looks like it's finally happening.
 
MCG said:
You are at least 4 years out of date.
CTC consist of the Infantry school, armour school, artillery school, the tactics school, CFLAWC, LFTEU, CFSEME, CFSCE and (yes) CFSME.

Let's take CFSEME as an example; although 'purple', their entire branch wears the Army uniform and is career managed as one Army Branch.

Not so the purple Logistic Branch. Apples & Oranges. If you want to split the purple trades in purple uniforms into their 3 distinctive enviornments and career manage each by their own seperate merit lists --- then they'd become more like the EME Branch. Until then, they are quite distinct and seperate from comparison to your "purple" trade school listed above.
 
Infanteer said:
Testimony that we tried it before and it wasn't a very good idea.  Good enough for me.

As for a 3* purple general for the Log Trade, I'd venture - if I understand the system right - that a signficant proportion of the CSS function (namely the first and second lines and, sometimes, the third lines) exists within the Services and its requirements and doctrine are best looked after by the ECS.

Not a trade, but a Branch. And all three uniforms of that Branch perform quite distinct and seperate functions in each seperate enviornment they work in. Not one of the big 3 has "all the functions/like tasks required" in their enviornment. May as well give us to the RCN to manage --- why should the Army be the one who decides?
 
ArmyVern said:
Not a trade, but a Branch. And all three uniforms of that Branch perform quite distinct and seperate functions in each seperate enviornment they work in. Not one of the big 3 has "all the functions/like tasks required" in their enviornment. May as well give us to the RCN to manage --- why should the Army be the one who decides?

Yes, branch containing multiple trades - thanks for that.

As for have the "Army be the one who decides", I never said that.  If you reread my sentence (although it is tinged with Army-speak) I advocated for the Army to maintain significant input and control over "Army logisitics" and the Navy and Air Force the same for their respective slices of the pie, as opposed to taking it away and consolidating it somewhere else independant of the services.
 
ArmyVern said:
Let's take CFSEME as an example; although 'purple', their entire branch wears the Army uniform and is career managed as one Army Branch.

Not so the purple Logistic Branch. Apples & Oranges. If you want to split the purple trades in purple uniforms into their 3 distinctive enviornments and career manage each by their own seperate merit lists --- then they'd become more like the EME Branch. Until then, they are quite distinct and seperate from comparison to your "purple" trade school listed above.
I assume this rant means you believe the one purple occupation that I identified within CTC is EME?  That would be incorrect - CFSEME is an Army school that teaches Army occupations.  CFSME has Army and RCAF managed occupations, and CFCSE has all of RCAF, Army and purple managed occupations.

Tango2Bravo said:
There are certainly trades from outside the Army that have people completing training at Army schools (I can think of some engineer types at CFSME and some technicians at CFSCE). I would not use those technical trades, however, as support for an argument that "hard-Army" branches should be placed under a Joint training organization outside the Army command.
It is not just RCAF trades in Army schools.  There are hard Air officer occupations being taught by the Army - these individuals will be expected through thier careers to be a part of planning and conducting air operations.  However, I suspect you mean to say that the 90034 OPSG occupations (and their analogous NCM occupations) can only be trained by their respective environments.

If we can currently train Air Force occupations in Army schools that are fully within the Army, why would we not be able to train Army occupations in Army schools within an Army formation that is itself within a joint training group?

Infanteer said:
The Brits are wrestling with the same dragons.  I don't know if something similar would reduce any staffing, as our Directors all have day jobs, but the management aspect of this is worth examining (and perhaps useful in another thread).

http://news.scotsman.com/politics/End-of-cavalry-as-Dragoons.6814690.jp?articlepage=2
We have discussed this very thing as a means of structureing our own Army at the L3 and below:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28042.0.html
 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, is what purports to be a 'preview' of LGen Leslie's transformation report:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/generals-report-calls-for-dramatic-cuts-to-bloated-military-staffing/article2134511/
General’s report calls for dramatic cuts to bloated military staffing

JOHN IBBITSON

OTTAWA— From Friday's Globe and Mail
Published Friday, Aug. 19, 201

National Defence must take an axe to its bloated headquarters by dismissing or reassigning thousands of workers if the military is to meet its future obligations, concludes a landmark report charged with transforming the Canadian Forces.

This scathing assessment by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, who commanded the Canadian army during the Afghanistan war, arrives at a pivotal moment for the military, as the army returns from its troubled mission in Kandahar, the navy and air force seek new ships and aircraft, and the Conservative government vows to eliminate the federal deficit in a gloomy economy.

“If we are serious about the future – and we must be – the impact of reallocating thousands of people and billions of dollars from what they are doing now to what we want them to do ...will require some dramatic changes,” Gen. Leslie writes in Report on Transformation 2011. A copy of the report has been obtained by The Globe and Mail.

It offers 43 recommendations on how “to reduce the tail of today while investing in the teeth of tomorrow,” eliminating or reassigning some 11,000 of the 145,000 people in National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

The key recommendations include:

- Redeploying or eliminating 3,500 regular forces personnel who currently hold jobs that serve little purpose;
- doing the same to 3,500 civil servants in the department;
- cutting the number of full-time reservists – many of whom man desks at headquarters – in half, to 4,500 and converting them to part-time service, while preserving and strengthening their ranks within communities;
- cutting 30 per cent from the $2.7-billion spent annually on contractors, consultants and services provided by the private sector
- consolidating departments that overlap and duplicate each other.

nw-forces-chart2_1309874a.jpg


The changes are aimed at ending the “administrative incoherence ... stifling process, blurred authorities ... [and] reluctance at all levels to accept managerial risk” that Gen. Leslie maintains is hobbling the Canadian military’s efforts to meet its mandate of protecting Canada’s borders and working with allies overseas.

The changes would save the Canadian Forces an estimated $1-billion a year, the report concludes.

The Harper government named Gen. Leslie Chief of Transformation last year, charged with recommending ways both to save money and reposition the military for future challenges.
But whether General Walt Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, and Defence Minister Peter MacKay will act on Gen. Leslie’s recommendations is unknown. The report itself alludes to resistance within the military establishment while it was being prepared.

And sources who cannot be identified because they are not authorized to speak to the press tell of tensions between Gen. Leslie and Gen. Natynczyk, who won the job to which Gen. Leslie had aspired. Although the report was delivered to Mr. MacKay in July, National Defence has not released it.

Liberal and Conservative governments increased military spending 50 per cent between 2004 and 2010, largely in an effort to properly equip and support troops fighting in Afghanistan.

Over those six years the number of people serving in National Defence grew 18 per cent. But the number of regular Forces personnel – the people who carry guns, fly planes and man ships – grew only 11 per cent, while the civilian work force swelled by 33 per cent.

nw-forces-chart1_1309869a.jpg


At the extreme, the number of people serving in the navy grew by 3 per cent, but the ranks of civilians swelled by a third, while the number of actual navy personnel declined by 1 per cent.

Despite this burgeoning bureaucracy, Gen. Leslie notes, the Canadians Forces are getting steadily worse at actually spending the money allotted to them for new equipment and other capital purchases. By 2009-2010, the department was failing to spend more than $1-billion a year, thanks in part to “lack of project management capacity ... [an] overly protracted internal review and approval process” and “cumbersome and inflexible” spending controls.

The report offers a plethora of suggestions, many of them highly technical, for merging operations, for consolidating staff – so that the same number of people do the same kinds of jobs at military bases, for example – for contracting out internal operations in areas such as information management, and for converting full-time staff to part-time or temporary positions.

However, the report notes that previous efforts to tame the defence bureaucracy have been defeated by that very bureaucracy.

As a result “the headquarters and other overhead grew while ships were decommissioned, regular and reserve battalions were disbanded and whole aircraft fleets cashed in.”

The same fate, Gen. Leslie ruefully acknowledges, could await his own report, noting that his team met considerable resistance from within the department.

“The tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo,” he reports, noting that some internal consultations could best be described as “grimly amusing.”
...

FROM REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION 2011

Reactions to previous reports urging reform


“If the results were likely to cause institutional angst, a variety of options existed, from waiting until the team disappeared, to conducting lengthy reviews of the recommendations and, finally to classifying the work to an extent that only a few could see it.”

On resistance to this report

“[At] a large meeting in December 2010 involving the generals, admirals and senior DND civil servants ... it became apparent the tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo. ... Though grimly amusing, these interactions proved that consensus has not and probably never will be achieved on any significant change.”

How DND handles funding cuts

“Most subordinate organizations have done their very best to preserve their structures, their internal funding (what they need to take care of themselves) and their process ... which usually result in overhead staying much the same while support to the front-line deployable unit is cut far more than originally forecasted.”

On waste and inefficiency

“These are symptomatic of old processes, new overhead layered on old, lots of committees and in certain areas a sometimes bewildering number of steps ...to actually achieve a government directed spending outcome.”

Cause of increasing trend to not spend allotted money

“The issues of stifling process, blurred authorities and accountabilities, as well as some reluctance at all levels to accept managerial risk ... go a long way in explaining a disturbing and increasing trend as to why many hundreds of millions of dollars have remained unspent, starting in fiscal year 2006/07 and growing to this day.”


It appears, to me that the report has been leaked to the media in an effort to circumvent the “resistance” that LGen Leslie expects.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
It appears, to me that the report has been leaked to the media in an effort to circumvent the “resistance” that LGen Leslie expects.
It appears to have also been leaked (at least) to QMI Media as well....
The Department of Defence and the Canadian Forces are top heavy with too many civilian bosses in Ottawa and need to shift resources to the front lines, according to a secret defence report.

Between 2004 and 2010, civilian hires at DND and the CF outpaced hires in the regular forces three to one, and while the number of sailors fell, staff at DND/CF headquarters in Ottawa ballooned by 38%.

But the government says those hires were necessary to backfill positions left vacant by Canada's heavy involvement in Afghanistan, "so that military members could focus their efforts on operational matters," wrote Jay Paxton, a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay, in an e-mail Thursday.

The transformation report, authored by Gen. Andrew Leslie, was submitted in early July but has yet to be released publicly. QMI Agency obtained a copy from a military source ....
 
Infanteer said:
Yes, branch containing multiple trades - thanks for that.

As for have the "Army be the one who decides", I never said that.  If you reread my sentence (although it is tinged with Army-speak) I advocated for the Army to maintain significant input and control over "Army logisitics" and the Navy and Air Force the same for their respective slices of the pie, as opposed to taking it away and consolidating it somewhere else independant of the services.

In my comment "Army being the one to decide", I was referring to the suggested notion that these schools should fall under Army (LFDTS I believe it was suggested) mangement ... the point being that you'd need to actually slice that purple pie (3 seperate and distinct merit lists) into 3 different entities with each enviornment then taking ownership of it's own purple people. If we don't do that, then purple management is required at the top as, right now, we have one merit list and serve in all three enviornments competing against each other.

As it is now, a Navy background Master Seaman suppy is no 1 on the merit list, then he gets his Petty Officers ... and may very well then find himself posted into a first line Army Unit where he has zero experience.
 
MCG said:
I assume this rant means you believe the one purple occupation that I identified within CTC is EME? ...

No. Not a rant and you know better.  ::)  It was simply an example I used from the post.

Nothing wrong with the Army taking control of it's purple people ... just split us out into our 3 enviornments and seperate our merit lists before doing so.

That's 3 times I've said that now. What I learned while serving and doing the enviro quals for each of the 3 distinct enviornments in relation to my trade (I have served in all 3) are quite distinct and seperate (just so you know); the Army has no monopoly for trg of us - nor does the Navy or the AF. Split us out into our three colours and then everything will be just peachy.

Have a great day.

 
ArmyVern said:
Split us out into our three colours and then everything will be just peachy.

Have a great day.

So only three crayons required now?  ;D
 
Getting back to the stuff posted about general Leslie's report. What do people think?

My own opinion is that HQ staff can have tendency to grow and justify their existence. I remember belonging to a company that was stood up with a temporary basis in mind (2 years), we started off with about 9 staff supervising and looking after 250 PAT/PAR. Within 1 year, we had reduced to about 120 or so and the staff grew to 15. By the time we had 80 troops, we had a coy HQ of about 17 and the OC said enough. I agree that HQ must be kept trim and tight. I have heard all the "reasoning" people have put forth for their existence in jobs that do not always support the main effort.

What is the main effort of the CF? It surely is not to administer the men and woman of the CF. I beleive it is the defence of Canada, and having a HQ that is oversized does not support the main effort. Not matter how important people may think their jobs are.

Imagine at a simpler level, having a 40 man platoon with 12 in the platoon HQ?
 
ArmyRick said:
Imagine at a simpler level, having a 40 man platoon with 12 in the platoon HQ?

I can easily imagine that:

- Pl Comd
- Pl 2IC
- Pl Signaller
- Weapons Det Comd
- #1 C6
- #2 C6
- #1 84
-# 2 84
- LAV Driver
- LAV Gunner
- LAV Sgt
- Medic

I know I am being an ass. ;D
 
ArmyVern said:
Nothing wrong with the Army taking control of it's purple people ... just split us out into our 3 enviornments and seperate our merit lists before doing so.
Okay.  On that clarification, I have no idea what this post is attempting to interject to my observation that Army schools are already capably training hard RCAF occupations.  Are you suggesting that CFSAL needs to be split into three environment specific schools?

Future WLEO are already being developed by the Army's training system in hard RCAF occupations - if this is possible, then CFSAL should be more than capable of doing it regardless of the higher HQ being joint, army, RCAF or RCN.  Splitting CFSAL would be wasteful of PY resources.

ArmyRick said:
Getting back to the stuff posted about general Leslie's report. What do people think?

My own opinion is that HQ staff can have tendency to grow and justify their existence. I remember belonging to a company that was stood up with a temporary basis in mind (2 years), we started off with about 9 staff supervising and looking after 250 PAT/PAR. Within 1 year, we had reduced to about 120 or so and the staff grew to 15. By the time we had 80 troops, we had a coy HQ of about 17 and the OC said enough. I agree that HQ must be kept trim and tight. I have heard all the "reasoning" people have put forth for their existence in jobs that do not always support the main effort.

What is the main effort of the CF? It surely is not to administer the men and woman of the CF. I beleive it is the defence of Canada, and having a HQ that is oversized does not support the main effort. Not matter how important people may think their jobs are.
You are bang-on about HQs having a self-preserving & expansionist nature.  There is work that is required wherever HQs exist, so we expand HQs to do this work that only exists because the HQ is there (ie - we could eliminate the work & corresponding PY requirement by eliminating the HQ).

Where organizations fill static institutional functions, we need to look at reducing the layers of command and bureaucracy in order to free PY resources and improve lines of communication.

 
One of the problems to which LGen Leslie alluded is the 'tasks' or programmes or policies imposed upon DND (and other government departments) which bring with them a requirement to report at a very high level which seems to automatically require a flag/general officer or a civilian EX with, of course, an appropriate staff of captains/colonels, commanders/lieutenant colonels and so on, including a bevy of ASs, sergeants and CRs.

We cannot tell the government (or the policy centre (Privy Council Office)) "F_ck off! Rude message follows," but we can do menial tasks with relatively small, low ranked staffs. (I suspect we would actually raise the morale of the flag/general officer corps if we fired a bunch of 'em and gave their 'jobs' to lieutenant commanders/majors.)

Another issue might be internal accountability. Audit is an important function but we you appear, to me, over audit out of a combination of fear and risk aversion. You need a good strong, central, audit function - probably in the DM's staff. It will produce embarrassing reports; but an embarrassing report need not be a career-ender and should not be so dreaded as to require one to have an 'in house' audit staff to find problems before the real auditors come to visit. My sense is that much (most?) audit, evaluation and validation functions in most HQs are 'defensive' - aimed at preventing embarrassment, rather than 'offensive' - aimed at improving the performance of the command or organization.
 
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