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Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

dapaterson said:
Favourite quote of mine:

Overall the evidence shows that HQs have become too large; contain too many overlapping functions; have officers of inappropriately high ranks; plan too much; and tend to be very busy. However, they are not particularly productive; and produce orders that are too big and which arrive too late.



Anyone who has read the Army's annual strategic plans, can I have an "Amen"?

To heck with strategic plans, I can't even get through the mile high pile of 'Ethics' stuff that's been piled on my desk. I'm sure that Diogenes would not approve!

"He has the most who is most content with the least."

Diogenes

Read more: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/d/diogenes.html#ixzz1NsjReJbX
 
daftandbarmy said:
This is an intersting observation about HQ 'size creep'.

Storr is one of the most astute observors of modern military organizations out there.  One of the reason is that he looks for the cold hard facts instead of "professional opinion".
 
dapaterson said:
Of course, the large number of piddly little Reserve units, each with their own Colonel Blimp, would then have to be culled rather ruthlessly.  With 4 CBGs, we would want about a dozen Infantry Bn HQs (instead of the 51 we have today) and so on down the line.

Reserve LCOLs average more than 100 subordinates from my observations which is good for the military as a whole.  Sure it's low for operational units but I am not sure that the reserves have ever been viewed as operational, being reserves and all.

Trying to wring efficiency out of the reserve is a fools errand.  There is no fat.  They bled to death long ago.  They have no tools because they are ineffective and they are ineffective because they have no tools.  They are ineffective because they are undermanned and are undermanned because they are ineffective.
 
Dennis Ruhl said:
Reserve LCOLs average more than 100 subordinates from my observations which is good for the military as a whole.

Is the 100 average that you observed - the total effective strength, the number present on a parade night, that shows up for a weekend exercise or a summer concentration?
 
Simian Turner said:
Is the 100 average that you observed - the total effective strength, the number present on a parade night, that shows up for a weekend exercise or a summer concentration?

Regiments I was familiar with had between 100 and 200 total strength.  The rest of the numbers would be a guess.  For reservists, the military is probably the 2nd or 3rd most important thing in their life so commitment varies.
 
daftandbarmy said:
This is an intersting observation about HQ 'size creep'.
While the paper is about operational HQs deployed into wars, but much of the comment applies equally well to our static institutional HQs that will never deploy even within this country.  This could have been written about nearly any static Army HQ in Canada: "There appears to have been an unwarranted growth in staff functions and rank inflation. There is evidence of a tendency to plan excessively, and excessive but unfocussed staff activity which had no positive output beyond the confines of the headquarters."
 
Dennis Ruhl said:
The US Marines  have developed a culture consisting of 1 officer per 10 Marines which is where Canada was 60 years ago.  If anyone needs a successful working bare-bones management model, they don't have to go very far.  Whose idea was it to put officers at desks to create a paper blizzard?  Was there something wrong with simply commanding and supervising?

Be careful in looking to the USMC as a model for this.  It is important to note that unlike the other armed services in the US, the USMC does not operate independently.  Many of its staff functions are actually provided by the US Navy, so the 1 to 10 ratio of officers to marines is not entirely accurate.  The USMC "employs' more officers than that, but they don't wear USMC uniforms.

In the broader sense, most officer to soldier ratios quoted by pundits seem to be based on an army combat arms model.  However, this neglects to take into account that other branches of the armed forces are structured differently and some branches have very good reasons for what would appear to be a top-heavy structure.  How many privates are there in the Chaplain or Legal Branches?  This is not to say that the CF is not top-heavy, but rather that it is not simple problem.
 
Pusser said:
Be careful in looking to the USMC as a model for this.  It is important to note that unlike the other armed services in the US, the USMC does not operate independently.  Many of its staff functions are actually provided by the US Navy, so the 1 to 10 ratio of officers to marines is not entirely accurate.  The USMC "employs' more officers than that, but they don't wear USMC uniforms.
Might, then, be a good place to see what functions need to be filled by CBG or CMBG staffs, and which should be kicked up or sideways to other, more purple organizations, or ditched entirely.

daftandbarmy, are you referring to Brigade HQs? Or the seemingly never-ending wealth of Commands? If the former, perhaps a more vigorous role for the actual brigade-commanding part of the HQ might prevent at least some growth; perhaps as the deployable core for overseas or domestic operations. Pare off the non-command functions into a "brigade support unit," which might, incidentally, be able to offer relatively short-term staff roles for PRes officers and SNCOs within the brigade.
 
quadrapiper said:
Might, then, be a good place to see what functions need to be filled by CBG or CMBG staffs, and which should be kicked up or sideways to other, more purple organizations, or ditched entirely.

daftandbarmy, are you referring to Brigade HQs? Or the seemingly never-ending wealth of Commands? If the former, perhaps a more vigorous role for the actual brigade-commanding part of the HQ might prevent at least some growth; perhaps as the deployable core for overseas or domestic operations. Pare off the non-command functions into a "brigade support unit," which might, incidentally, be able to offer relatively short-term staff roles for PRes officers and SNCOs within the brigade.

I'm talking about the CBGs.

IMHO, these need to be properly equipped, efficient, 'high speed' and deployable (not sure exactly how to define deployable, but whatever) HQs that can properly lead/command/support Brigade activities in a defined geographical area - and force generate for domestic and overseas Ops. The fact that we currently need to ADD a Bde HQ HQ (CMBG) to this geographically defined mix shows how inadequate both the CBGs and CMBGs are at doing the 'full Monty' right now.

Let's have one CBG (or whatever you want to call it) and include everyone in it, reseve and reg, under one 'one star' commander, in each geographical area. Would a reservist ever be able to command such a formation? Who knows, maybe not, but who cares.. really. Get over it boys and girls. But there would certainly be lots of opportunities for them to fill in the various staff positions. Regardless, the Bde Commander could shift resources around as required to meet the Div Comd's intent, just like in a real army.

What about the Area HQs? Meh, get rid of them and have the CBGs report direct to 1 Can Div: a 2 star. At least that would clean up the spider web matrix of command relationships that mess things up right now.

Oops, the soapbox is teetering.... gotta jet  :)
 
daftandbarmy said:
Let's have one CBG (or whatever you want to call it) and include everyone in it, reseve and reg, under one 'one star' commander, in each geographical area.

The CMBGs are already at their limit for span of control, with 4 maneuver units (3 Inf, 1 Armd) and 3 Combat Support units (Engr, Arty, Sig) each.  Adding an additional 3,000 reservists to a CMBG Comd's plate would hardly do the Comd's C2.
 
Infanteer said:
The CMBGs are already at their limit for span of control, with 4 maneuver units (3 Inf, 1 Armd) and 3 Combat Support units (Engr, Arty, Sig) each.  Adding an additional 3,000 reservists to a CMBG Comd's plate would hardly do the Comd's C2.
Maybe time to reevaluate the geographical areas? This might go under "fighting the last war," but is there an expectation that CMBG X will ever deploy as a unit? If not, would it make more sense to gather those Reg and Res units in the same region under the same command, as all are functionally in a force-generation role?
 
quadrapiper said:
Maybe time to reevaluate the geographical areas? This might go under "fighting the last war," but is there an expectation that CMBG X will ever deploy as a unit? If not, would it make more sense to gather those Reg and Res units in the same region under the same command, as all are functionally in a force-generation role?
The CMBG HQs have deployed as the nucleus of various Task Forces in Afghanistan.  I think they are usefull and largely functional formations.  There may be room for slight efficiencies or improvements.

However, those savings are negligible in the big scheme of what we should be able to do with a rationalization of HQs at the next level up as well as with various non-operational formations and some bases - ie: L1s, L2s, non-operational L3s, and a few bases.  From the Army perspective, this means 1 Cdn Div, LFDTS, the LF Areas, CTC, ASGs and a few others.

Tinkering with the Army field force (while it may be closer to more people's comfort area) is not the way to significantly cut-fat; that is already a comparatively lean organization.  There are also other threads for that topic - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25365.0.html
 
MCG said:
The CMBG HQs have deployed as the nucleus of various Task Forces in Afghanistan.  I think they are usefull and largely functional formations.  There may be room for slight efficiencies or improvements.
Not the HQ deploying as a unit, but the CMBG itself taking the field as a unified force.
 
quadrapiper said:
Not the HQ deploying as a unit, but the CMBG itself taking the field as a unified force.
Where we've seen a CMBG as a collective form the nucleus of a TF HQ, a BG, a PRT, and an assortment of supporting elements - your answer is very close to yes ... and that TF HQ will not sponaneously appear if it is destroyed for peace time effeciencies.

But, again, there is a whole other thread you should be joining if you want to tinker with the field force: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25365.0.html
 
DND bulks up on suits, not troops 
Ranks of bureaucrats swell nearly four times as fast as those of soldiers

Bruce Campion-Smith
Toronto Star
15 August 2011

Canada's defence department bulked up during war - but not where you think.

Since 2004 - as the country's mission in Afghanistan was ramping up - a Star analysis shows dramatic growth in the department took place far from the front lines, with more civilians, more contractors and a ballooning headquarters staff.

Military experts say the numbers tell the tale of a bureaucracy run amok, even as the department's uniform ranks - especially the navy - remain stretched for manpower.

And it comes at a time when a radical plan to transform the defence department has been put in the hands of Defence Minister Peter MacKay and Gen. Walt Natynczyk.

At its heart, the goal of this still-secret blueprint is to trim the size of defence headquarters, pushing thousands of military personnel out of Ottawa and on to the country's air force bases, naval ports and army bases.

The transformation of Canada's Afghanistan mission to training from combat and a home-front budget crunch are putting pressure on the defence department to enact big reforms to cope with government-wide belt-tightening.

Defence expert Douglas Bland says the Canadian Forces have become more capable in recent years but at "great costs.

"The Ottawa HQ is just continuing to grow and grow and grow," said Bland, who holds the chair in defence management studies in the Queen's University School of Policy Studies. "There's just an expanding of an organization that is carrying out principally the same functions it has for many years."

The Star's analysis shows:

The number of civilian employees has grown by 31 per cent - from 22,710 in 2004 to 29,843 - almost four times the growth of the uniform ranks. In the same time, the navy has lost 1,100 full-time sailors since 2004, threatening its ability to fully staff its fleet. "There's no question the front lines, the sharp end, is woefully under strength," said retired colonel Brian MacDonald, a senior analyst at the Conference of Defence Associations.

Uniform ranks have grown by 8.5 per cent, from 87,653 in 2004 to 95,123.

Another 5,000 civilian contractors work for the defence department, mostly in the Ottawa area.

In fiscal year 2009-2010, the department spent $2.8 billion on professional services, consultants and outside contracts, up almost $1 billion since 2004. That's $1 billion more than the next biggest spender, the Department of Public Works and Governments Services.

Eyes are turning to the defence headquarters' offices sprawled across the Ottawa region where some 20,000 military and civilian defence staff work, about the same number as in all the Canadian Navy.

But it's believed a new blueprint prepared by Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, the military's chief of transformation, puts the headquarters in the crosshairs. Leslie, former head of the army, was tapped to probe how the department could be made "cheaper, better, faster, leaner."

His report was submitted in early July. The defence department is refusing to release it. Leslie declined to comment for this story.

However, speaking at an Ottawa conference in February, he sketched a vision of transformation while warning there is a "need to change.

"The status quo will not meet the defence interests of tomorrow based on the resource allocations of today," Leslie told the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security. "Quite frankly, we need to take folks from headquarters and put them back in the field units.

"I hope a whole bunch of them go back out to the field units. And there are thousands," he said.

Still, he conceded he was facing "significant" resistance within the department as he poked at staffing levels and how jobs were done.

"Nothing will defend itself so vigorously ... as a headquarters which is threatened with being shut down," Leslie said.

During the preparation of his report, Leslie crunched numbers on the growth in staffing in all areas of the department. And he probed the rise in spending on contracts and consultants. The Star obtained much of that analysis under the Access to Information Act, but the detailed tables had been censored.

Still, numbers that are publicly available reveal sharp increases in the civilian staffing and the spending on professional contracts and consultants, including $339 million for business services, $1.2 billion for engineering and architecture services and $549 million in contracts lumped under the vague category of "other services." Nearly $50 million went to management consulting and $43 million to temporary help.

"The Auditor General of Canada or somebody should be looking at the contracting system," Bland said. "It's a flag that indicates some difficulties in management over time but also in the almost uncontrolled development of the bureaucracy. Maybe it's a symptom of what's going on in the rest of government."

The defence department pins the sharp rise in civilian employees and spending on professional contracts on the efforts in Afghanistan.

"In order to support Canadian troops in Afghanistan, civilians were hired and professional services contracted so that military members could focus their efforts on operational matters," said Jay Paxton, spokesperson for MacKay.

"Just as Canadians have been tightening their belts during a fragile economic recovery, so too will this government manage our resources to ensure continued value for taxpayers' money," he said.

Still, defence watchers are carefully taking note of what the department does with Leslie's report.

Senator Colin Kenny, former chair of the Senate committee on national security and defence, doubts Leslie's recommendations have been well-received, noting the transformation office has been closed.

"I suspect they don't much like what (Leslie) has to say," Kenny said. "They shut down his office ... Transformation isn't a one-time event. Transformation should be an ongoing culture."

But Kenny also said the majority mandate won by the Conservatives on May 2 gives Ottawa a window to make tough decisions, such as closing military bases he argues are only kept open for political purposes.

"Nobody talks about base closures because all it does is cause grief for politicians ... and so you guarantee the perpetuity of bases that are redundant and not necessary for military purposes," Kenny said, citing Goose Bay and North Bay as two bases that could be shuttered.

Many are pointing the finger at MacKay, saying only he can drive the reforms needed to enable the defence department to carry out its mandate with fewer resources.

"It will be interesting to see what sort of traction it will have inside the building and whether the minister will get personally involved in implementing recommendations," said Alain Pellerin, executive director of the Conference of Defence Associations. "In the past, if you look at the success stories in reorganizing the forces or headquarters, you have to go back to a proactive minister who put these measures into place, whether the uniform people or the civilian people liked them or not."
It will indeed be interesting to see where this goes.  From the perspective of one who has already watched L2s sustain (or expand) their bloat by cannibalizing SWE from L3 and L4 orgs, it will also be interesting to see what mechanisms are put in place to ensure HQs and higher staffs do not protect their own size by instead attriting the units underneath.
 
MCG said:
...
It will indeed be interesting to see where this goes.  From the perspective of one who has already watched L2s sustain (or expand) their bloat by cannibalizing SWE from L3 and L4 orgs, it will also be interesting to see what mechanisms are put in place to ensure HQs and higher staffs do not protect their own size by instead attriting the units underneath.


But, now that we have the RCN and RCAF who is going to sweat the details about HQ bloat?
 
MCG said:
It will indeed be interesting to see where this goes.  From the perspective of one who has already watched L2s sustain (or expand) their bloat by cannibalizing SWE from L3 and L4 orgs, it will also be interesting to see what mechanisms are put in place to ensure HQs and higher staffs do not protect their own size by instead attriting the units underneath.

And therein lies the rub - there is nobody to stand watch over the organizational integrity of the CF.  What mechanisms can prevent unwarranted growth of organizations.  "A few Captains here an a Major there" doesn't seem like much, but it adds up quickly, and pretty soon we have to bounce troops around the fill up a battalion.  I read a CANFORGEN from a few weeks back that just authorized 19 additional CWO positions for various reserve formations.
 
That same CANFORGEN also authorized backpay for MWOs in CWO positions who were promotable from their COS date.... lotta cash spent with one message.
 
Infanteer said:
  I read a CANFORGEN from a few weeks back that just authorized 19 additional CWO positions for various reserve formations.

Those postions have been there for years. They are now formally recognized, and most are Class A.
 
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