Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

[a_majoor]

When you say Automatic - I hear 10 tonne truck.

Dragonfire !! weighed 1,565 kg in its towed configuration, and by removing the wheels could be fitted inside a LAV chassis. It is power operated and has a two man crew

 

[Kirkhill]

Dragonfire !! weighed 1,565 kg in its towed configuration, and by removing the wheels could be fitted inside a LAV chassis. It is power operated and has a two man crew

I was thinking more in terms of the rate of ammunition expenditure requiring heavy transport.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think you're right on that mark.

My biggest critique of the square combat team (the Square) is that it seems to run counter-intuitive to the notion of maximizing C2 nodes.  Much of the study I've done suggests that smaller tactical organizations tend to fair better.  For example, there is a good amount of literature on how a Squadron of four troops of 3 tanks performs better than a Squadron of three troops of four due to the extra C2 node (there is no increase in tanks, only one extra Troop Leader is added to the fray).  The Square seems to run counter to this - putting in excess of 35 armoured fighting vehicles under a single sub-unit commander.

So yes, it's but one tool in the box, but have we made it the shiniest tool when it may not actually be a very practical one?

Let's take your hypothetical Armoured Regiment example - two tank squadrons and an infantry company, combined with a recce squadron.  As opposed to having a Square plowing behind the Recce Squadron, would the CO be better served with two sub-units to manoeuvre behind the recce screen?  Although the Sqn/Coy will occupy roughly the same ground, I suspect having both OCs pushing forces forward would be much more nimble than having one of the OCs plod forward with the whole shebang.  One of the coolest exercises I saw was a BG Delay under a Armoured Regt HQ that had 2 Armoured Sqns and 2 Mech Coys.  However, the desire to "go Square" meant that the Infantry OCs weren't doing much.  I wonder if that limited what the BG could squeeze out of those resources.

Could make for an interesting bit of JCATS simulation - see what can be controlled by a BG Comd better and what is more responsive to changes on the battlefield.  A 4 Tp + 3 Coy Square or a 2 Tp + 2 Coy and 2 Tp + 1 Pl Cbt Team bounding together.

Infanteer,

I am not a fan of the three-tank troop. I would rather have three troops of four than four troops of three. A troop of three that loses a single tank is not a fire team. I recognize that the Brits operate with troops of three tanks, and I imagine that their studies would support their doctrine.

The comparison of the efficiency of two small combat teams under the CO vs one square combat team is an excellent topic! I will cop out by saying that my answer would depend on the situation. I have taken both Canadian and US Army company command courses. A US Army Battalion Commander would likely form two company teams: one with two tank platoons and an infantry platoon and the other with one tank platoon and two infantry platoons. On my US Army course we would send the tank heavy team against an enemy infantry platoon in an VEE formation, the tanks leading with the infantry trailing centre and clearing the enemy. We in the Canadian army are very hesitant to grant equivalent combat power ratios between arms. We see an enemy platoon position and think that we need a company of infantry to clear them out regardless of how many tanks are shooting at the enemy positions. We might send an infantry platoon to clear a defile, but not an enemy platoon position. As an infantryman, would you be comfortable sending a combat team with two tank troops and a single infantry platoon to destroy an enemy platoon position? This is not a rhetorical question!

The US Army force of two company teams would be commanded by the CO or perhaps the S3 if it was on a secondary axis. We would have the two Majors (the OCs) commanding the force with one designated as the Combat Team Commander and other supporting. I think that we need to expand to the Battle Group level to see which one makes sense.

In the Canadian armoured BG example that I floated, it could absolutely be valid to form two combat teams and advance two-up. One team could be armour heavy (three Troops or maybe a two Troop Sqn (-) with a single infantry platoon and the other based on the infantry company with two platoons and a single tank Troop or a half-squadron. The CO would place himself somewhere to command both, keeping the second tank squadron in reserve to either exploit success or be the decisive effort in a meeting engagement. The two combat teams could support each other in an attack on an enemy platoon sized outpost - one in the firebase and the other assaulting. You'd have to sort out breaching assets ahead of time, and it might be awkward if you realize that you need the third platoon to deal with the enemy position. They would have a hard time supporting each other on the advance, though, as the combat team frontages make it hard to mutually support across the entire front. In addition, the troop leaders will lack SA on each other as they are not on an all-informed combat team net. They could each destroy enemy outposts, although the one with a single infantry platoon might have issues.

I agree that it would be fun to try out in simulation or on exercise!

The square combat team is well suited to advance "in space" and destroy enemy platoon sized security positions. The tank troops can support each other under the control of the OC and are all-informed. The infantry company is concentrated on the centre of the axis ready to destroy the enemy position. The Sqn OC can juggle tanks around to have ploughs in the right place. I am not saying that the square combat team is the only solution in this case, but I could understand why the CO would go with that grouping for this instance.

It does, though, look like the CO is washing his hands of the fight and leaving it to the two OCs to figure out.  Perhaps lead with a sqn (-) with three troops and an infantry-heavy combat team following. The sqn (-) can advance with speed and aggression behind the recce squadron (or in front as the case may be), with the CO using the infantry combat team to destroy enemy outposts that cannot simply be bypassed. I could see this working.

For an attack on an integrated enemy company position by a BG, however, the square combat team can certainly create some issues. This situation, I think, calls for smaller combat teams task-organized for specific roles orchestrated and commanded by the CO.

As DS I suggest to my students that they solve tactical problems at the appropriate level. Some problems can be solved by a combat team commander, others need a battle group approach and other need a brigade solution. Speaking perhaps to your point on command, simply throwing addition assets without thinking about command is not a recipe for success.

 

[Infanteer]

I am not a fan of the three-tank troop. I would rather have three troops of four than four troops of three. A troop of three that loses a single tank is not a fire team. I recognize that the Brits operate with troops of three tanks, and I imagine that their studies would support their doctrine.

I've almost never seen a four tank troop, as some are always broken down!

I imagine this is similar to the debate about the optimal size of the section.  No matter what sized is selected, it probably won't fight that organization due to casualties.

We in the Canadian army are very hesitant to grant equivalent combat power ratios between arms. We see an enemy platoon position and think that we need a company of infantry to clear them out regardless of how many tanks are shooting at the enemy positions. We might send an infantry platoon to clear a defile, but not an enemy platoon position. As an infantryman, would you be comfortable sending a combat team with two tank troops and a single infantry platoon to destroy an enemy platoon position? This is not a rhetorical question!

It's a rule of thumb turned into a rule, which isn't always a good thing.

I would have no issues sending an infantry platoon to destroy an enemy platoon; studies on suppression and neutralization indicate that historically, assaults are more successful when the ratio of support:assault favours the elements delivering fire support.  2 up, 1 back actually isn't very effective, and is probably more a symptom of peacetime training than wartime experience.

 

[a_majoor]

We have seen discussion on how the Canadian and US Army use combat teams, can anyone chime in on how the Marines do this? I'd also be curious to see some discussion on the British (both army and Royal Marines) and the Germans do things to get some comparative analysis.

 

[RCPalmer]

We have seen discussion on how the Canadian and US Army use combat teams, can anyone chime in on how the Marines do this? I'd also be curious to see some discussion on the British (both army and Royal Marines) and the Germans do things to get some comparative analysis.

The USMC has a pretty different model built around the imperatives of amphibious operations which usually involve the infantry elements of Regimental Landing Teams (RLT) and Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) deploying through a combination of airmobile insertion from amphibious assault ships, and over the beach using Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV-7) and Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC). 

Their Infantry Battalion's are all light, and if all or a part of a force is required to be mechanized (which generally means they are moving across the beach), they are grouped with an associated AAV "Tractor" Coy or Pl. The AAVs are the closest thing the USMC has to an IFV or Infantry Section carrying APC, but it is quite a different beast as it holds 21 dismounts, and is not organic to the unit or sub-unit.  In both Gulf Wars the USMC tried to use these vehicles as conventional APCs, with fairly unsatisfactory results. 

BLTs and RLTs form Ground Combat Elements (GCE) task organized into Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), respectively. MEU and MEB also include their own Aviation Combat Element (ACE), C2 Element (CE) and Support Element (SE).  To summarize:

BLT/GCE+ACE+CE+SE=MEU

RLT/GCE+ACE+CE+SE=MEB

A typical BLT forming the core of an MEU would generally consist of 3xRifle Coys, a Wpns Coy, a Light Armored Recce Coy (LAV-25), a Tank Pl, an Artillery Battery (M777), an Infantry Recce Pl, a Combat Engineer Pl and a Mortar Pl.  In an RLT, you times that by 3 with the Tanks and Engineers becoming company sized, and  the Arty becoming battalion sized organizations.  Being relatively light on tanks and engineers, I would expect to see fewer combat teams as we understand them and more centralized tasking of supporting arms under the Bn and Bde Commanders. 

Given that the Royal Marines aren't in the business of employing tanks or AAV, I wouldn't expect to see any mechanized combined arms groupings with them, just rifle Coys with attachments.  I would love to get some dialog going on those and other light force combined arms arrangements, but that may be a topic for another thread.

 

[Kirkhill]

RC -

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/royal-marines/3-commando-brigade/armoured-support-group

Royal Marines Armoured Support Group - with Vikings - broadly comparable to the USMC employment of the AAV, I would suggest.

As for tanks

When and as necessary?

 

[RCPalmer]

RC -

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/royal-marines/3-commando-brigade/armoured-support-group

Royal Marines Armoured Support Group - with Vikings - broadly comparable to the USMC employment of the AAV, I would suggest.

As for tanks

When and as necessary?

Cool - I stand corrected.  I'm not sure the Vikings in the Armored Support Group provide the protected "from the boat and over the beach" capability as an AAV.  It looks more like a fording and water obstacle crossing "swimming" capability similar to M113, Grizzly, etc.  I was able to find a lot of photos of Vikings rolling off landing craft.  However, the employment appears similar in that it is a separate unit providing protected lift to a light force.

 

[Kirkhill]

Agreed on all points RC.

I have seen images  like this one of a Viking recovering on board HMS Bulwark

And this one of a Viking swimming to shore

But not sure that I would be wanting to be aboard when it did - I'd be much happier going most of the distance in an LCVP or LCU and driving off at the end.

 

[RCPalmer]

Infanteer,

I am not a fan of the three-tank troop. I would rather have three troops of four than four troops of three. A troop of three that loses a single tank is not a fire team. I recognize that the Brits operate with troops of three tanks, and I imagine that their studies would support their doctrine.

The comparison of the efficiency of two small combat teams under the CO vs one square combat team is an excellent topic! I will cop out by saying that my answer would depend on the situation. I have taken both Canadian and US Army company command courses. A US Army Battalion Commander would likely form two company teams: one with two tank platoons and an infantry platoon and the other with one tank platoon and two infantry platoons. On my US Army course we would send the tank heavy team against an enemy infantry platoon in an VEE formation, the tanks leading with the infantry trailing centre and clearing the enemy. We in the Canadian army are very hesitant to grant equivalent combat power ratios between arms. We see an enemy platoon position and think that we need a company of infantry to clear them out regardless of how many tanks are shooting at the enemy positions. We might send an infantry platoon to clear a defile, but not an enemy platoon position. As an infantryman, would you be comfortable sending a combat team with two tank troops and a single infantry platoon to destroy an enemy platoon position? This is not a rhetorical question!

The US Army force of two company teams would be commanded by the CO or perhaps the S3 if it was on a secondary axis. We would have the two Majors (the OCs) commanding the force with one designated as the Combat Team Commander and other supporting. I think that we need to expand to the Battle Group level to see which one makes sense.

In the Canadian armoured BG example that I floated, it could absolutely be valid to form two combat teams and advance two-up. One team could be armour heavy (three Troops or maybe a two Troop Sqn (-) with a single infantry platoon and the other based on the infantry company with two platoons and a single tank Troop or a half-squadron. The CO would place himself somewhere to command both, keeping the second tank squadron in reserve to either exploit success or be the decisive effort in a meeting engagement. The two combat teams could support each other in an attack on an enemy platoon sized outpost - one in the firebase and the other assaulting. You'd have to sort out breaching assets ahead of time, and it might be awkward if you realize that you need the third platoon to deal with the enemy position. They would have a hard time supporting each other on the advance, though, as the combat team frontages make it hard to mutually support across the entire front. In addition, the troop leaders will lack SA on each other as they are not on an all-informed combat team net. They could each destroy enemy outposts, although the one with a single infantry platoon might have issues.

I agree that it would be fun to try out in simulation or on exercise!

The square combat team is well suited to advance "in space" and destroy enemy platoon sized security positions. The tank troops can support each other under the control of the OC and are all-informed. The infantry company is concentrated on the centre of the axis ready to destroy the enemy position. The Sqn OC can juggle tanks around to have ploughs in the right place. I am not saying that the square combat team is the only solution in this case, but I could understand why the CO would go with that grouping for this instance.

It does, though, look like the CO is washing his hands of the fight and leaving it to the two OCs to figure out.  Perhaps lead with a sqn (-) with three troops and an infantry-heavy combat team following. The sqn (-) can advance with speed and aggression behind the recce squadron (or in front as the case may be), with the CO using the infantry combat team to destroy enemy outposts that cannot simply be bypassed. I could see this working.

For an attack on an integrated enemy company position by a BG, however, the square combat team can certainly create some issues. This situation, I think, calls for smaller combat teams task-organized for specific roles orchestrated and commanded by the CO.

As DS I suggest to my students that they solve tactical problems at the appropriate level. Some problems can be solved by a combat team commander, others need a battle group approach and other need a brigade solution. Speaking perhaps to your point on command, simply throwing addition assets without thinking about command is not a recipe for success.

This is a great discussion.  I think there is plenty of room in the doctrine to accommodate all of the options above and more based on a solid combat estimate.  My concern is more with how develop that flexibility of mind in our leaders. 

Our training system appears focused on encouraging highly templated solutions to very standardized tactical problems. 

For example, when I was going through phase trg, the law of the land for hasty attacks was frontals at the Sect level and and flankings at the Pl level. You deviated from that at your peril. On ATOC (and presumably CTCC), they teach you to employ a square combat team to crush an Inf Pl with maybe one tank on the posn (7:1 force ratio  8))and then break up a Pl sized counterattack which is easily done provided you do a decent consolidation.  There have to be some training scars. 

It is really a philosophical question on how we train and assess our leaders.  Do we look for the skilled execution of a standardized tactic, or the planning and decision making skills associated with more varied circumstances? 

I don't view this as a rhetorical question either.  Maybe we can use courses to teach the basics and develop that flexibility of mind in collective training.  In that case, I would ask you to consider the question, what is the best environment to innovate, experiment and make mistakes? 

 

[Old Sweat]

RC Palmer's comment triggered a response from someone who first encountered the prepare for an immediate counterattack as an 18-year-old recruit in the RCA Depot in Shilo in 1958.

This was based on two wars of fighting the Germans who had launched an automatic counterattack with whatever they could cobble together when they were forced off a position. They often succeeded until we learned to attack with "light" forces and then rush all sorts of firepower forward to massacre the response with direct and indirect fire.

Contrary to what the fans of the Germans in Normandy write, it was a tactical weakness in both wars and we learned how to defeat it.

 

[RCPalmer]

RC Palmer's comment triggered a response from someone who first encountered the prepare for an immediate counterattack as an 18-year-old recruit in the RCA Depot in Shilo in 1958.

This was based on two wars of fighting the Germans who had launched an automatic counterattack with whatever they could cobble together when they were forced off a position. They often succeeded until we learned to attack with "light" forces and then rush all sorts of firepower forward to massacre the response with direct and indirect fire.

Contrary to what the fans of the Germans in Normandy write, it was a tactical weakness in both wars and we learned how to defeat it.

Lots to unpack here. I'm not sure if that is an endorsement of our current training system and doctrine or an indictment. 

 

[MilEME09]

It is really a philosophical question on how we train and assess our leaders.  Do we look for the skilled execution of a standardized tactic, or the planning and decision making skills associated with more varied circumstances? 

I don't view this as a rhetorical question either.  Maybe we can use courses to teach the basics and develop that flexibility of mind in collective training.  In that case, I would ask you to consider the question, what is the best environment to innovate, experiment and make mistakes?

In my opinion, we should give leaders the basic playbook/ tools to do the job, then I think we then need to take off, and keep the training wheels off, and sharpen the sword so to speak by dynamic scenario after scenario. In this case all I mean by Dynamic is you give a very specific objective like capture hill X or area Y from OPFOR. OPFOR will try and hold at all costs and may even go on the offensive against you so be prepared to adapt quickly. I know our training budget may not allow for this currently but I think putting tactical minds against each other is probably the best way to learn in the most realistic, and yet safest two way range.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

This is a great discussion.  I think there is plenty of room in the doctrine to accommodate all of the options above and more based on a solid combat estimate.  My concern is more with how develop that flexibility of mind in our leaders. 

Our training system appears focused on encouraging highly templated solutions to very standardized tactical problems. 

For example, when I was going through phase trg, the law of the land for hasty attacks was frontals at the Sect level and and flankings at the Pl level. You deviated from that at your peril. On ATOC (and presumably CTCC), they teach you to employ a square combat team to crush an Inf Pl with maybe one tank on the posn (7:1 force ratio  8))and then break up a Pl sized counterattack which is easily done provided you do a decent consolidation.  There have to be some training scars. 

It is really a philosophical question on how we train and assess our leaders.  Do we look for the skilled execution of a standardized tactic, or the planning and decision making skills associated with more varied circumstances? 

I don't view this as a rhetorical question either.  Maybe we can use courses to teach the basics and develop that flexibility of mind in collective training.  In that case, I would ask you to consider the question, what is the best environment to innovate, experiment and make mistakes?

Want to teach leaders to apply logical decision-making in a timely fashion?  Have them play Advanced Squad Leader with a Chess Clock Timer.

All for the great price of $30.00.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This is a great discussion.  I think there is plenty of room in the doctrine to accommodate all of the options above and more based on a solid combat estimate.  My concern is more with how develop that flexibility of mind in our leaders. 

Our training system appears focused on encouraging highly templated solutions to very standardized tactical problems. 

For example, when I was going through phase trg, the law of the land for hasty attacks was frontals at the Sect level and and flankings at the Pl level. You deviated from that at your peril. On ATOC (and presumably CTCC), they teach you to employ a square combat team to crush an Inf Pl with maybe one tank on the posn (7:1 force ratio  8))and then break up a Pl sized counterattack which is easily done provided you do a decent consolidation.  There have to be some training scars. 

It is really a philosophical question on how we train and assess our leaders.  Do we look for the skilled execution of a standardized tactic, or the planning and decision making skills associated with more varied circumstances? 

I don't view this as a rhetorical question either.  Maybe we can use courses to teach the basics and develop that flexibility of mind in collective training.  In that case, I would ask you to consider the question, what is the best environment to innovate, experiment and make mistakes?

Col. Hackworth to Gen Johnson the Army Chief of Staff on putting combat experienced officers into the school system after their time in Vietnam...

-"Weren't just not putting our best and most recently experienced combat officers into the schools system, which is where I believe they belong. We're sending them everywhere else to get their tickets punched, as if their careers took priority over the war."

 

[Haligonian]

The two combat teams could support each other in an attack on an enemy platoon sized outpost - one in the firebase and the other assaulting. You'd have to sort out breaching assets ahead of time, and it might be awkward if you realize that you need the third platoon to deal with the enemy position.

Isn't this a case of what you mentionned earlier on equivalent cbt power ratios between arms?  Outside of concerns on having sufficient breaching assets either of the cbt tms you've described would have the cbt power to destroy a platoon outpost with IDF in support.

It does, though, look like the CO is washing his hands of the fight and leaving it to the two OCs to figure out.

This is one of my original points on the disadvantages of the square team.

I've almost never seen a four tank troop, as some are always broken down!

I imagine this is similar to the debate about the optimal size of the section.  No matter what sized is selected, it probably won't fight that organization due to casualties.

Doesn't this then beg the question that attrition should be built in?  Perhaps trps should be 5 x tanks understanding they are likely to be more like 4 or 3 tanks.  If you go with 3 x tanks in a trp then you are likely to spend your time regrouping due to maint and attrition.  On the section side, as we've discussed before, I think the magic number might be 11.  2 x fire tms of 5 and an independent comd.  The 5 man fire teams allow them to absorb a casualty or LOB and still maintain the magic number of four and they wouldn't have to consider reorganising before the fire team is attrited down to two personnel.

I would have no issues sending an infantry platoon to destroy an enemy platoon; studies on suppression and neutralization indicate that historically, assaults are more successful when the ratio of support:assault favours the elements delivering fire support.  2 up, 1 back actually isn't very effective, and is probably more a symptom of peacetime training than wartime experience.

I presume you mean sending an infantry platoon to destroy an enemy platoon while other elements, like two other platoons, provide support?

We have seen discussion on how the Canadian and US Army use combat teams, can anyone chime in on how the Marines do this? I'd also be curious to see some discussion on the British (both army and Royal Marines) and the Germans do things to get some comparative analysis.

I thought I brought this up in my original post.  RC Palmer has most of it right but I must emphasise that the Marines do make Cbt Tms.  Coy Tms in their parlance.  On Expeditionary Warfare School we spent plenty of time doing this.  They do it the same way the US Army does by cross attaching tank and infantry sub units and sub sub units to creat Tms Mech/Tank and TF Mech/Tank.

The Marines only have 2 Bns of tanks (and another reserve Bn) each owned by one of the Divs.

As per the briefing I received on CTCC from a British former mech inf OC who commanded a Cbt Tm in the second invasion of Iraq they are a bit more flexible in their approach than the Americans but generally do it the same way by cross attaching.  They do occasionally form square cbt tms but he emphasised that this was a very infrequent event.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Regarding your comment on the USMC school, here on AOC during Tutorial 2 students spend plenty of time considering different grouping options within a battle group.  Remember that ATOC and CTCC are courses aimed at the sub-unit/combat team level. ATOC gives the largest combat team possible to stretch the student in terms of span of control.

If we are willing to break up an infantry company for offensive options then the grouping options certainly open up. I think our desire to have an entire company to assault an enemy platoon regardless of the number of friendly tanks blasting away is based on the concern about casualties. A single platoon will culminate quickly from a fairly small number of casualties. Based on modern experience, though, four casualties can also culminate a company and even a battalion until the casualties are evacuated. Perhaps we are a firepower based army where two-thirds are in the firebase and one-third mop up?

 

[Kirkhill]

Regarding your comment on the USMC school, here on AOC during Tutorial 2 students spend plenty of time considering different grouping options within a battle group.  Remember that ATOC and CTCC are courses aimed at the sub-unit/combat team level. ATOC gives the largest combat team possible to stretch the student in terms of span of control.

If we are willing to break up an infantry company for offensive options then the grouping options certainly open up. I think our desire to have an entire company to assault an enemy platoon regardless of the number of friendly tanks blasting away is based on the concern about casualties. A single platoon will culminate quickly from a fairly small number of casualties. Based on modern experience, though, four casualties can also culminate a company and even a battalion until the casualties are evacuated. Perhaps we are a firepower based army where two-thirds are in the firebase and one-third mop up?

How different from "parkie's" army. 

https://army.ca/forums/index.php?action=profile;area=showposts;u=15861

"Culminate?" Does that mean cease to function? 

4 casualties is enough to stop a Company?  Is that what is considered as effective fire? 

What happened to "keep moving - leave him to the stretcher bearers"?

 

[Haligonian]

Regarding your comment on the USMC school, here on AOC during Tutorial 2 students spend plenty of time considering different grouping options within a battle group.  Remember that ATOC and CTCC are courses aimed at the sub-unit/combat team level. ATOC gives the largest combat team possible to stretch the student in terms of span of control.

If we are willing to break up an infantry company for offensive options then the grouping options certainly open up. I think our desire to have an entire company to assault an enemy platoon regardless of the number of friendly tanks blasting away is based on the concern about casualties. A single platoon will culminate quickly from a fairly small number of casualties. Based on modern experience, though, four casualties can also culminate a company and even a battalion until the casualties are evacuated. Perhaps we are a firepower based army where two-thirds are in the firebase and one-third mop up?

I think we certainly should be willing to break up the Coy.  This is what Infanteer was referring to.  The concern about casualties will be reduced if you have sufficient firepower on the objective.  Jim Storr talks a lot about this as does Killcullen.  It's about setting conditions for a successful attack with shock.  Shock is best achieved through HE.  Storr shows a number of studies where in cases where surprise and/or shock (surprise often leads to shock) is achieved the force ratios become drastically in favor of the attacker and generally the defenders will cease to participate.

I think a few casualties causing a coy to culminate is likely a reflection of Afghanistan TTPs where the fight literally stopped when casualties happened.  I would suggest that in these cases those units didn't actually culminate (the definition of culmination being that point at which a unit can no longer pursue offensive operations) but chose to cease operations in order to tend to their wounded.  We did Nine Liners over the Command net so in some cases it could be quite difficult to continue operations while a Nine Liner and MISTs were going out, further exacerbating the situation.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think we certainly should be willing to break up the Coy.  This is what Infanteer was referring to.  The concern about casualties will be reduced if you have sufficient firepower on the objective.  Jim Storr talks a lot about this as does Killcullen.  It's about setting conditions for a successful attack with shock.  Shock is best achieved through HE.  Storr shows a number of studies where in cases where surprise and/or shock (surprise often leads to shock) is achieved the force ratios become drastically in favor of the attacker and generally the defenders will cease to participate.

I think a few casualties causing a coy to culminate is likely a reflection of Afghanistan TTPs where the fight literally stopped when casualties happened.  I would suggest that in these cases those units didn't actually culminate (the definition of culmination being that point at which a unit can no longer pursue offensive operations) but chose to cease operations in order to tend to their wounded.  We did Nine Liners over the Command net so in some cases it could be quite difficult to continue operations while a Nine Liner and MISTs were going out, further exacerbating the situation.

The goal has to be worth paying the price for, and speaks to the ability of our highest level political and military leaders doing their jobs, and not committing ground troops (i.e., those who will take the most casualties) to weak causes in the first place.

National survival? Hell yeah...

Fiddling around in Wherever-istan in pursuit of fuzzy goals that change with the wind?

Meh....