Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

[Kirkhill]

While the idea of range bands makes fire control relatively simple, I think we are moving beyond that concept.

Consider the Javelin or Gill/Spike ATGM. Both systems are man portable (in theory, every section could be issued one), and each can allow the platoon to engage targets out to 3000m away. Tanks can fire through tube missiles like LAHAT with a range of 13 kilometres. The Korean K2 also fires top attack rounds from the main gun. The Cockerill CT-CV turret can drop in to a LAV-III carrying a 105mm cannon with a 420 maximum elevation and a 10 km indirect range.

And modern sight systems provide a huge increase in effective range for traditional weapons like the Carl-G, or .50 HMG.

How to manage these capabilities and integrate the various weapons effects in an offensive or defensive operation is a question that needs to be addresed.

In keeping with your earlier comment about the more lethal battlefield, does not this argue in support of smaller independent tactical groups?  It takes fewer people to defend a locality and the localities can be more distributed.  Together with 30 km Excaliburs and 70 km GMRLS and more unmanned sensors, fewer people can dominate a much larger area, or at least observe the ground and channel enemy forces over a larger area. 

That makes the mobile forces more effective in counter-strike.

 

[a_majoor]

I think it changes a lot, but in manners which are not clear to me.

Enhanced firepower will make attack and defense more difficult, while also enabling widely dispersed operations (mutual support from platoons or companies that are physically out of contact but can still share sensor data and are in range of each other's weapons).

Advanced sensors will make camouflage and cover far more important when static, while protected mobility will be very important for moving into position, doing the countermove or taking the offensive.

Smaller individual sub and sub-sub units may be the way to minimize casualties, but we may actually need more soldiers to ensure we can operate in this environment (a four rifle company battalion to have a company for rear area security or the countermove force, for example, or to have a "LOOB" pool for reconstituting battle casualties).

Some related thoughts here

 

[GnyHwy]

Kevin,

I think we agree on the end state than an Inf Bn/Coy Comd should have mortars in support whenever he needs them.  I also think we agree that they should be held at the bn. 

Where we differ is the means of accomplishing this.  You are stating that they should be permanently part of the bn i.e. organic, and I am saying they should be attached to the bn.  For me the deciding factor is the level of skill you will get with either option.  I will get to the organic part next paragraph.  I do not believe that an inf bn can train itself in indirect fire adequately enough to meet today's demands in precision and accuracy (danger close and collateral damage), and due processes (clearance of fires and ROE).  And even if they could, is adequate enough?

Now that I've got the old guy's blood boiling, I'll explain why the word organic doesn't change a thing.  Forget about the cap badge for a minute and let's just call them organic mortarman i.e. a mortar platoon (8 tubes) that will not should not leave the bn, ever.  Heck, let's beef it up to 16 tubes.  We can even beef it up to 24 tubes if we want and the result won't change much.  For that sake of this argument we will use 16 tubes, a robust and liberal amount of tubes. 

With the way we are conducting adaptive dispersed operations, 16 tubes only covers a tiny fraction of the AO, and that's even if there placed individually.  If the Bn Comd groups his mortars as a plt or coy, then they will spend there entire time driving all over hell's half acre to potentially be in position to meet the threat.  And when and if they do meet the threat, someone else that is not their priority will inevitably be going without.  The other option is to spread them out as best as possible, thus having a small amount of fires in more places (still not everywhere though).  This is not a good option as you are just diluting yourself to a point of very little effect.

Here is another quick scenario.  2 BGs adjacent to each other.  If one of the BGs is the Bde's main effort, do you think the secondary Bn Comd will offer his mortars up to the main effort?  You bet he will, leaving his own Bn without. This is no different than what an arty mortar bty would be doing; right place right time. 

In the end I think it comes to some sort of guarantee for the Bn Comd.  I am with you in the sense that the bn should have the mortars when they need them, but I am trying to bring the reality that it is impossible to bring effective fire everywhere all the time.  You need the persons that specialize in the tactics, techniques and logistics to pull it off with the best effect.  I just see it as putting the best persons for the job, on the job. 

Thucy,

I read the article and can't help but be cynical.  The writer states that we have to make some reasonable assumptions.  I guess that depends on your perspective of reasonable I guess.  The first bad assumption is that a section with a bag of tricks can somehow take care of itself, just because it has a diverse weapons package.  Another bad assumption that he makes is that several sections driving around in swarms each with a truckload of $80 000 missiles is somehow going to eliminate the need for many layers of C2.  But, the worst assumption he makes is that we should change our force structure and tactics to accommodate a weapon system that may or may not give us the effect that we need. 


 

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Gny- not too sure that I am following your argument.  Are you making the case for a Bde Mortar Coy?

 

[GnyHwy]

No, I am not, but that could be an option if the threat warranted it.  The debate boils down to who should man the mortars at the bn/BG level, even cbt tm. 

My main argument is that the mortars should come from the arty, where as others believe that mortars should be organic to the bn.  I think the word organic is a misconception and despite who mans them, the mortars will and SHOULD be moved around to meet the main effort, thus always leaving someone without fire support.  Having the arty organize this, with the Comd's intent as the priority, is the best way to meet the main effort with the most effect.

 

[Kirkhill]

With Respect Gunny - but how do you think we got to the structure before the current one (I am honestly not sure what the current one is, or if we have one)?

The structure before the current one (integral mors, pnrs, anti-tank, recce, snipers, logistics, transport, etc) were all based on accomodating the technology of the day, including comms and logistics, to the needs of the battlefield of the day.

The Canadian Army fought three campaigns of note:  the static one of WW1 with lousy comms;  a more mobile one in WW2, of short duration;  a repeat of WW1 in Korea with better comms.

Capabilities were held internally because once the balloon went up nobody could hear a thing, and just drove forward, or held on, until they couldn't any longer.  Every battalion, coy and platoon was fighting its own personal little war.  The guns were the play things of the Brigadiers and Higher.  As was the Air Force.  The more internal capabilities held at the lowest level then the longer the entity could fight and influence the battlefield.

I see Bruce's Schiltrons, Wellington's Squares, the Kaiser's Pillboxes, the Cold War's Defended Localities ("No Lads, you are not cut off, isolated and surrounded, you hold a strategically significant and tactically effective position in the enemy's rear) and Minefields in much the same light.


Bruce packed a few hundred men with sharp sticks into hedgehogs that he used to breakup the battle field into smaller fields and reducing the enemy's ability to manouevre.  Then his reserve could take the enemy apart in detail.  Wellington's squares did the same thing allowing his guns and cavalry to concentrate on a series of isolated threats.  The same for the pillboxes, the Defended Localilities and mines.


You don't expect that every step the enemy takes will cause him to stand on a new mine.  You expect that the presence of the mines will slow the enemy, break his cohesion, channel his forces into killing grounds and break his advance up into killable packets.


I could take 1000 men from a 4000 man brigade and give them Mel Gibson's tree trunks, Wellington's Brown Besses, or the CEF's Ross's and have virtually the same force.


Or I could take the same 1000 men, leave 100 back at depot, put 100 into comms and log,  and field 4 coys of 200 - split into 4 platoons capable of independent action.

Or I could take the same 1000 men and convert some into an organic arty platoon (mors), an organic engineer platoon (pnrs), an organic cavalry platoon (recce), and an anti-tank platoon (and we can continue the debate if they are gunner wannabes or cavalry wannabes).

I don't disagree with your notion of reverting to status quo ante 1917 and holding Infantry, Gunners, Engineers, Cavalry, separately.

I do argue that Mel Gibson's tree trunks can be effectively replaced with timberwolfs, CG-84s, Javelins, GPMGs, HMGs, GMGs, and even "light" mors (60 or 81mm) and thus create a "mine" with a 2 km range band / area of influence.  I also argue that 1000 PYs could translate into 20 to 40 of those "mines" and still leave a Brigade commander with 3000 PYs to find gunners, mech/mounted/ armd/cav, engineers and support.

 

[MikeL]

Would it be possible for the Infantry Battalion and Artillery too both have Mortars?  Inf BN could have it's own 60mm and 81mm mortars (81s in Mortar Pl, and 60s spread out in each Coy or everything in Mortar Pl).  The Artillery Reg't would also have their own Mortar Troop(s) with the 81mm that can be mobile and support the main effort along with their M777s.

 

[Petard]

This thread definitely has the risk of spinning its wheels again on "why don't the infantry have a mortar Pl anymore?"
At risk of throwing gas on that fire, here goes.

Most other Western powers do have indirect fire capability that remains at the Bn level, I think for no other reason than to keep at least that capability there if the other Bde level controlled assets are massed elsewhere.

I worked last year with a Stryker BG, and they are structured with their own 60's at Coy level, 120 (or 81's for dismounted) at Bn level, and supported by Bde M777 when needed.  The mortars remain under Bn control, but 120's are able to give supporting fire to massed higher calls for fire if needed. They have the ability to plug into the AFATDS, and resolve the clearance of fires that way, but for the most part that resource remains firmly planted with the Bn commanders control so that he doesn't have to worry about it being yoinked away by higher priorities unless it really needs to

It works well, and is proven. I have serious doubts about our method of FG indirect fire support to a BG, and misleadingly believe it is always available to that BG it deploys with. But then that's discussed at length elsewhere on these boards

 

[a_majoor]

And just to jump in as well:

Organic firepower means you can deal with issues immediately, while higher level assets allow the higher level commanders to mass fire and "effects" to support his plan. The most brutally effective example is from our Soviet friends back in the Cold War, each formation had its own artillery (from Company level mortars to the Divisional Artillery group). If the Company commander was having difficulty, he was expected to tough it out, since he had the tools available in his own hands to do so. If he was advancing, then the Battalion commander could throw his resources into the fight to force the position or exploit the breach. The Regimental commander, seeing one of his battalions advancing could then add his considerable resources (the Regimental Artillery Group and the Independent Tank Battalion) into the fight, and if the conditions were favourable the Divisional commander would be organizing his resources to blow open the hole and exploit the breach on a larger scale. (watching a "Fantasian" division creating a "fire corridor" in a wargame was perhaps one of the most impressive sights imaginable. Watching the game get "reset" because of that was not...).

As Kirkhill says, this construct was specific to the Soviets in order to overcome the disadvantages of poorly trained troops and generally lousy communications.

WRT a Canadian mortar platoon, the current issue 81mm's give you coverage to @ 7000m, which does support your argument, but improved ammunition, smart rounds and the addition of an integrated sensor network to identify possible targets and engage them quickly are all short and medium term possibilities that extend the effective range  (i.e. hitting targets at 7000m with a minimum expenditure of ammunition) should we wish to devote resources to them. Going to 120mm mortars extends the range considerably, and smart rounds already exist (STRIX) for that calibre mortar.

The clear advantage we do have is in sensors and communications, which has the potential to make the fire more effective, especially at longer ranges. Higher level commanders still have assets that can cover the entire AO, and be used to support the higher commander's plan (massing fire has a different meaning when a 155 round can strike with pin point accuracy at maximum range).

 

[KevinB]

I think that Gny was actually advocating Integral Gunners manning in the BN.

In all honestly I don't care who mans them, I just want the equipment organic to the BN.


My concern with cross posted hatbadges is that it often never works well for folks careers, and at that point they would not really be Inf Bn's but a Cbt Team of a sort.

  I would rather have gunners manning guns, than mortar tubes, having been both a gunner, and a Infantryman, I do not think than a 81mm Mortar is beyond the skill level of the Inf.  Now for FOO/FAC duties -- this is where I do think that a real FOO Party comes into its own, but there still is a requirement for the Inf and other Cbt Arm C/S to be able to process fire support calls.

 

[GnyHwy]

I think that Gny was actually advocating Integral Gunners manning in the BN.

Not permanently as I see the same issues as you do for career implications, and if you ever need someone to argue against the OBG, I'm your guy. 

But, an arty mortar plt/coy attached to BG on top of the gun bty makes sense to me.  Of course the situation would have to warrant it, and if the tubes weren't in demand the "extra gunners" could fill in on regular defensive duties.    Also, I don't want it to come across that I only think gunners can do the job.  Heck I can train pretty much anybody and make them sort of efficient in a short amount of time.  My argument is the inf already have enough things to do and learn.  I would put anti-armour and pioneer tasks well ahead of indirect fire.  All trades should specialize, and when it's time, they come together to form a team.

Kirk,

You asked about our structure and if we had one?  I say, that is it.  We have a regimental structure that is modular and able to att and det as necessary, or at least that's is the intent as I understand it anyway.  The word modular does carry a certain negative connation no doubt, but with the size of our army, we don't have much choice.

Which leads me to how this thread seems to drift to place where we are comparing ourselves to WWII or the US Army or even the Soviets.  Heck if money is no issue, and we can triple the size of our force and we are willing to play the game of sheer numbers vs quality then  I say #&*$  it!  Mortars for everyone!!!

 

[daftandbarmy]

Which leads me to how this thread seems to drift to place where we are comparing ourselves to WWII or the US Army or even the Soviets.  Heck if money is no issue, and we can triple the size of our force and we are willing to play the game of sheer numbers vs quality then  I say #&*$  it!  Mortars for everyone!!!

Especially 60mm MOR for 13 years olds!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTkjOz6W2ls

Jealous  :nod:

 

[a_majoor]

We're mostly drifting because no one has really defined the parameters of the debate. We can talk about exotic new weapons, mixing and matching past present and future capabilities, organizational models etc.

We can also look at other people's armies for analogies and examples of what works/didn't work and why.

Based on my own experiences and looking at how other people do things, the three models that really stand out in my mind as workable examples are the 80's era Canadian Mech Infantry Bn, the new Royal Marine Commando organization and the SBCT. The Canadian model was quite flexible, and could provide the core of a powerful Battle group when force multipliers like tanks, artillery and engineer assets were added to the mix. even without the force multipliers, it had its integral DF, IF and pioneer assets, so the commander could continue to operate if the force multipliers were tasked elsewhere. A modern "pure" Canadian Infantry battalion is really limited once the force multiplier assets are taken away to support someone or something else.

The Royal Marine Commandos have gone towards specialization by giving companies different roles (although they can regroup and change the organization when needed for flexibility), and the SBCT I think demonstrates how things might evolve as more and more powerful capabilites move to lower and lower levels. They have essentially made combat teams out of companies and created a small self contained battle group in a battalion sized package. The USMC had a similar "company as combat team" organization with the LAV companies; each company had three platoons of infantry, an integral AAP using TOW launchers on LAV 25 chassis and an integral mortar platoon with 81mm mortars carried in LAV mortar carriers (similar to Bisons). Personally I thought the Marine solution was much "neater" and had fewer span of command issues, but this is a view from an outside observer.

 

[KevinB]

and I still think the Inf should not have LAV's...

 

[a_majoor]

and I still think the Inf should not have LAV's...

So how do we achieve protected mobility? Even if we grant Kirkhill 100% on Infantry being for the defense, we still have to get there, and we have to deal with enemies with lots of ways to slow or stop us from getting into position.

 

[MikeL]

From my understanding of KevinB's position on the Infantry and LAVs, he isn't against the Infantry working alongside LAVs, they just wouldn't crew it. 

During mounted patrols/operations the Infantry would be the dismounts in the back, and the Armoured Soldiers would fill the roles of LAV Driver, Gunner, and Crew Commander.

 

[Kirkhill]

Skeletor:

I won't answer for Kevin but your statement of his position is certainly compatible with mine.

Thuc:

I believe in the past I have equated bullets to rain - just another environmental element to be overcome - the vehicles you use to cross terrain should supply appropriate protection against the environments likely to be encountered.  When physics interfere and the vehicle can't accomodate the appropriate level of protection then you are stuck with the advice of the doctor to the chap who said it only hurt when he laughed.  Don't do it.

You use each vehicle that is available to the limits of its capabilities.  If you want speed in all terrains you give up protection and hire a helicopter.  If you want protection in all terrains you give up speed and hire a tank.      I kind of liked your idea about handing the assault vehicles over to the engineers, including those necessary to transport troops over the last 600 m.

 

[KevinB]

100%

 

[daftandbarmy]

  I kind of liked your idea about handing the assault vehicles over to the engineers, including those necessary to transport troops over the last 600 m.

Really? I doubt there's an engineer out there who is dumb enough to cheerfully drive a thinly armoured vehicle at full speed into a wall of heavy enemy fire. That's a job for paratroopers!

Besides, I keep getting told that engineers are too valuable to waste on that kind of thing... mostly by senior engineer officers.  ;D

 

[Journeyman]

... mostly by senior engineer officers.  ;D

Ah, like the one who was aghast that the snipers were leaving cleared routes, and henceforth had to ingress behind a Flail or something?    :facepalm:


/tangent