Collective Training in the Army

[Webgear]

I would like to discuss Collective Training (CT) in the army, here are some initial topics I would like to look at:

a. Is the army providing realistic training for soldiers deploying overseas?

b. Is the Road To High Readiness (RTHR) effective?

c. Is RtRH to long?
   
d. Are the army's training scenarios effective?

e. Are training centres such as CMTC and CTC worth the manpower costs?

f. Are we conducting enough joint training with the air force and navy?

g. Are we capturing lessons learned from our current operations effectively?

h. Are these lessons being successful past to the soldiers that require them?

i. Should there be one Common Contemporary Training Scenario (CCTS) for the army or should individual units design and write their own scenarios?

I would like to hear you thoughts and experiences.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Let's hear what you think first, in response to your own questions.

 

[Webgear]

Okay, here are my thoughts.

a. The army is not providing realistic training overall.

b. The RTHR is only partial effective.

c. In most cases the RTHR is too long.

d. The army's training scenario is  decent however it is lacking in some areas.

e. The manpower costs of CTC and CMTC are worth the products and exercises they produce, and their manning should be increase.

f. We are not conducting enough joint training with the air force or navy.

g. We are not capturing lessons learned effectively.

h. We are not passing information off in a timely or effective manner.

i. I do not believe there should be a CCTS. Individual units should be writing and designing their own scenarios.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Now, back up your statements with fact and documented research points. Tell us what led you to those conclusions.

Also, in the military, as in life in general, if you present a problem, you should at least try offer a solution.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

So I'm guessing that you are an Int O or Planner working at CTC....or perhaps 2 RCR

You have asked too many questions to engender a useful discussion, and I believe you have missed the most critical question of all: if one accepts that the training budget is finite (if not fixed), do we have the balance between IT and CT right?  A corollary to that question would revolve around PRes IT standards - is it reasonable to expect a part-time soldier to be trained to the same standard as a full-time soldier?

With respect to the CT / IT balance, I believe that we have it all wrong.  In the period 96-03, we stopped doing large scale CT.  The result was that we increased IT to counter the lack of experiential learning.  Once we started doing large scale CT again (BTE 03 was the largest exercise conducted by the Army since RV 95), we failed to scale back on the IT.  Somehow, we have got it into our heads that the best way to train a Recce Patrolman is to add another two weeks to the Basic Recce course.  The alternative is to take the time, money, eqpt and ammo required to extend the IT and use it to go on a Battalion exercise, where the Recce Patrolman can actually employ his new found skills.

The war hasn't helped either.  Leaders at all levels have continually expanded the list of things that must be taught on a formal course and have not had to pay the opportunity costs of those decisions, as pre-deployment training (and specifically CT) is paid for from a central (read non-Army) budget (SDOA).  Now that the SDOA is starting to dry up, we are stuck with a Cadillac IT system on a Pontiac budget.  I firmly believe that we need to completely re-visit our training model if we are to retain our current level of proficiency and expertise.

The PRes training standard question is also a large topic.  Suffice to say that for RegF infanteer will undergo 360 days of formal IT from Rct to MWO - and a reservist will do 320 days.  Given that this represents about 23 years of vacation time, and that our R2HR is ludicrously long, it would appear that we might have this wrong....

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Do I smell a training needs analysis?

Here is my take- give soldiers/sailors/airmen the basic skills that they need to function, on course.  After that, it is a matter of providing the supervised OJT opportunities (whether that comes by way of exercises or live Ops) to cement those skills.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

You guys are making it too easy. Make him explain his stance so we have a base line to work with. He started it. He should have to flesh it out into reasonable discussion points.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

You guys are making it too easy. Make him explain his stance so we have a base line to work with. He started it. He should have to flesh it out into reasonable discussion points.

I have moved waay past the original poster.  Do you have anything to add to the discussion?

 

[Webgear]

Recceguy

I came to my conclusion through years of experience both within the training system and numerous deployments. You are correct from now on I will provide proper footnotes and bibliographies of all facts that I present.

I was not aware it was custom on army.ca to go such lengths when postings a topic.

PPLCI Guy

Sorry, I thought that a large number of questions would have provoke a more lively debate. The balance between IT and CT is a critical issue, that should be address. I know for a MG serial that over several hundred  laptops and other pieces of electronic equipment is used to control and  conduct the exercise (1).

I know that several PRes Trades like INT, for example take over two years to complete the basic qualification (2). 

I agree that the war has not helped in a lot cases, money was thrown at several problems because that was the easier solution (3).  We need to correct the system as the SDOA budget is now almost gone, exercise budgets are becoming increasing smaller (4).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.  http://www.commelec.forces.gc.ca/inf/new-bul/vol54/article-14-eng.asp

2.  http://www.2intcoy.org/recruit1.shtm

3.  Ex Southern Bear, Fort Bliss, January/February 2008

4. MD 1101, MPC, 28-29 March, 2011

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I'm not saying you have to have footnotes etc, however, it's customary that if you want discussion on a point, you need to state the point and give an opinion, on it, so we have somewhere to start.

I have moved waay past the original poster.  Do you have anything to add to the discussion?

Just trying to find out how he comes to his conclusions. I think the discussion has merit. Please feel free to take the lead.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

I must be thick  I don't see the relationship betwen this:

The balance between IT and CT is a critical issue, that should be address.

and this:

I know for a MG serial that over several hundred  laptops and other pieces of electronic equipment is used to control and  conduct the exercise (1).

Am I missing something?

As to this:

We need to correct the system as the SDOA budget is now almost gone, exercise budgets are becoming increasing smaller (4).

Unless of course we re-visit the question of the right balance between IT and CT, and then the loss of SDOA could (but probably won't) lead to shorter periods of IT.

 

[Webgear]

Sorry PPLCI guy, are you referring to IT as individual training or information technology?

I was referring to IT as information technology, thus maybe the confusing between our posts.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Okay, here are my thoughts.

a. The army is not providing realistic training overall.

So what do you think is lacking and how do we implement this training?

b. The RTHR is only partial effective.

Too much redundancy? Improper subject material? Lack of SME's? Lack of funding? All of these? How do we fix it and how do we fund it?

c. In most cases the RTHR is too long.

You likely won't get much argument here, but why do you think so?

d. The army's training scenario is  decent however it is lacking in some areas.

Where? How do you suggest we fix it and who pays for it?

e. The manpower costs of CTC and CMTC are worth the products and exercises they produce, and their manning should be increase.

To what level pers and equipment wise, and at what cost to line units?

f. We are not conducting enough joint training with the air force or navy.

How do you suggest we break this glass ceiling? What training should we jointly persue? Who takes the lead and who funds it?

g. We are not capturing lessons learned effectively.

Is this from lack of submission from the field or lack of action from the Centre? How do we fix it?

h. We are not passing information off in a timely or effective manner.

How do we improve that and at what cost?

i. I do not believe there should be a CCTS. Individual units should be writing and designing their own scenarios.

Can this end up having an effect on interoperability and confusion to replacement pers?

One common point I've been making is "Show me the Money!!" Ideas are all well and good and troop safety, education, training and survivability should never take a place in line behind funding, or anything else, but we have to be realistic. We ran along on a pretty good gravy train while we were fighting in Afghanistan, but that sugar daddy is about to expire. Along with the funding. We're going to be cinching up some belts around here.

 

[Webgear]

Here are my answers to your points Recceguy:

a. One area the army is lacking in, is a realistic COEFOR, there are too few soldiers in the training system, the soldiers we have lack the knowledge of the people they are portraying in most aspects.

To correct this error in the training system, we need to place more soldiers with mission experience into these COEFOR companies. These soldiers need to be properly educated in their roles and allotted the freedom to act like the people they are portraying.

b.  I think all the points you have made are valid and is why the system is only partial effective. To correct the issue we need to properly fund the training system, there needs to be one central point for controlling training and funding. To much money and money is being spent on redundant exercises at all levels.

Maybe LFTDS takes more responsibility for training than they have in the past, force brigade commanders to give up their own individual exercises.

c.  Yes, RTHR is too long. The average TF trains roughly 8 to 10 per rotation, I believe TF 3-08 trained for 18 months for their deployment (this included several PCF cycles). Most of the training becomes overly redundant because it covered in several exercises.

d.  The training scenario is lacking in joint operational capabilities/roles and again the COEFOR component (see my points in para a). I believe LFTDS should take the lead on this issue however needs to supported by CEFCOM and CLS.

e.  I am not sure about CTC manning however I know that CMTC is sitting around 65% of its manning slate. There is no depth in the most positions, and many key positions are not filled (Lessons Learned cell for example).

In terms of equipment, CMTC will shortly only have a handful of A vehicles and the B fleet vehicles are going to reduced by several hundred. There is no one at CMCT to maintain all these vehicles.

f.  We need to aligned the training cycles, especially of the air force and army. Maple Flag and Maple Guardian should be held at the same time to allow for the joint training. The lead for this should be CLS and CAS and heavily monitored by VCDS (?). 

g. Lessons learned is a mess for a lot of different issues in my view. There is a lack of information from theatre of operations, there is not enough action at the centre likely due to manning in both cases.  Again manning needs to be addressed.

h. The poor passage of information goes back to individual and collective training, the proper people are not being trained jointly. When was the last time your patrol report was given to a member of the INT shop, did you receive any feed back from them?

i. I suppose it could have an effect on interoperability, however the new and upcoming CCTS is crap and will likely need to re-written again in a few years (however this is another topic).


Many of these issues have a common themes, funding/manning/who is responsible for what. 

Does this mean we reduce the number of battalions in the army and increase the manning and fill the vacancies in our learning to various schools and institutes? Tough questions. 

 

[CombatDoc]

Sorry PPLCI guy, are you referring to IT as individual training or information technology?

I was referring to IT as information technology, thus maybe the confusing between our posts.

My understanding of PPCLI Guy's comments were that IT was individual and CT was collective training.  For example, there is always a balancing act to ensure that soldiers have the individual technical skills to do their job (the IT) while also being able to survive/fight/move on the battlefield as part of a larger team (the CT).  Furthermore, all of this training requires funding, and this funding is undoubtedly going to be greatly diminished with the end of our combat role in Afg. 

As you point out, many of your concerns relate to insufficient funding & manning levels.  I do not believe these are going to be resolved anytime soon. If anything, these will likely get worse as funding gets cut, the demographic baby boomer bulge moves to the right, and people with combat theatre experience who are dissatisfied with garrison life leave the CF.  I hope to be proven wrong.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Sorry Webgear, I had responses typed and my browser crashed. Too late to do it again tonight, but I'll respond tomorrow, if required.

Cheers,
rg

 

[daftandbarmy]

I lost track of the IT system once they started confusing me with decimals e.g., DP 1.1

Maybe they did that on purpose just to confuse the infantry... it's working!  :camo:

 

[vonGarvin]

i. Should there be one Common Contemporary Training Scenario (CCTS) for the army or should individual units design and write their own scenarios?

Bottom Line Up Front.  There must be one common Training Scenario for the army.  This includes individual, collective and continuation training.  This is not to say that all elements must face the exact same situation, but rather must have a common base from which they can tailor their events to meet the needs as assessed by the chain of command.  If every unit (including all the reserve units, of course) had their own "scenario", then some Cold Warriors may be fighting Soviet divisions barrelling through Fulda, others will be fighting drug runners in Colombia and others still fighting variations of Afghanistan.

Training is under the authority of Commander, LFDTS.  Let him sweat the details in order to meet all the needs of the army, and units and formations can draw from this Common scenario in order to meet the needs.  A "CTS" already exists, and provides the ability to fight any type of "fight", be it combat, stability, COIN, humanitarian, etc.  It also allows units to speak a common language and have a common denominator.

 

[Kalatzi]

Hey RG.

Comapred to the brits - The workup times for our troops for deployment

dont speak very well about either collective OR Individual training

Feel free to call me on this

we may be dinosaurs but the idea of a 6 month workup for europe in the cold war was just not on, then.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

g. Lessons learned is a mess for a lot of different issues in my view. There is a lack of information from theatre of operations, there is not enough action at the centre likely due to manning in both cases.  Again manning needs to be addressed.

h. The poor passage of information goes back to individual and collective training, the proper people are not being trained jointly. When was the last time your patrol report was given to a member of the INT shop, did you receive any feed back from them?

The Int shop can seem to be a black hole, where the door to that shop is an Event Horizon that information goes into but never comes out. Having said that, by training together (even just at BG level) we work through it.

Regarding information from theatre, I worked at Lessons Learned for three years. Lots of observations get passed to the army, and quite a bit of work goes on with those observations. The centre is quite small, but it is more of a clearing house. They identify key themes and pass them to the subject matter experts on the Army Staff who then conduct the analysis. Reports come from theatre all the time, and they go to pretty much the entire chain of command. They are not all actioned, though, because the Army does need to conduct some validation on observations.

I spent a year looking after Qualification Standards. We incorporated CIED lessons from theatre into all of our DP courses. I see these skills and knowledge in the soldiers in my squadron that now come off of DP1. I have seen equipment changes conducted as a result of observations from theatre, along with changes to tactics, techniques and procedures.

Bottom Line Up Front.  There must be one common Training Scenario for the army.  This includes individual, collective and continuation training.  This is not to say that all elements must face the exact same situation, but rather must have a common base from which they can tailor their events to meet the needs as assessed by the chain of command.  If every unit (including all the reserve units, of course) had their own "scenario", then some Cold Warriors may be fighting Soviet divisions barrelling through Fulda, others will be fighting drug runners in Colombia and others still fighting variations of Afghanistan.

Training is under the authority of Commander, LFDTS.  Let him sweat the details in order to meet all the needs of the army, and units and formations can draw from this Common scenario in order to meet the needs.  A "CTS" already exists, and provides the ability to fight any type of "fight", be it combat, stability, COIN, humanitarian, etc.  It also allows units to speak a common language and have a common denominator.

I don't think that we need to be that dogmatic. This year I've trained with a pure conventional enemy in Europe, another pure conventional enemy in the desert, a very mixed enemy in Africa, a conventional/guerrilla force and we will soon be exercising against another mixed bag of enemy. We don't know who we will be fighting, so let the commanders build the training for their troops. LFDTS certainly has a role to play, particularly with the Battle Task Standards, but lets try to stay a little loose. Fighting a variety of enemies keeps us on our toes. In addition, lets allow people to use initiative and their own brain power instead of waiting for one place to do all that thinking.