Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[Edward Campbell]

And here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Diplomat is a warning about Law of the Sea and Sino-American relations:

http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/28/the-folly-of-unclos/

The Folly of UNCLOS
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea is as much as anything else about fundamental disagreements between the U.S. and China. The U.S. shouldn’t sign up.

By Paul S. Giarra

May 28, 2012

UNCLOS is deeply flawed. The U.S. Senate should be deeply skeptical of claims that, because it’s an international agreement, we should therefore accede as a matter of course. One can be all for the rule of law, yet conclude that United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas has complicated rather than simplified maritime law and security.

UNCLOS enshrined customary maritime law, but it also contradicted it by extending national claims far to sea, well beyond traditional claims, in the form of sui generis Exclusive Economic Zones. By fiat, this creation of EEZs established new claims and conflicts that never before existed.  This strikes me not as smart lawyering, but rather as quite a bad idea.

Somewhere along the line, proponents of UNCLOS have adopted the argument that accession itself is the standard of behavior, and that having a seat at the table is of paramount importance.  This becomes particularly problematic where the United Nations is concerned.

Further, China has espoused the doctrine of strict enforcement of its self-perceived UNCLOS rights through military and political intimidation. Moreover, China has, based upon its unitary interpretation of UNCLOS, assumed rights in the EEZs that not only weren’t intended by the framers, but which are troubling in their implications. These rights would extend security as well as economic rights to the limits of the EEZ, and in so doing preclude even routine military surveillance. The widespread recognition of these fabricated rights would be the death knell of freedom of the seas, not its enablement. Furthermore, raising the ante of EEZ rights isn’t just problematic, but threatening in the old-fashioned sense – especially because, while the Chinese have prudently toned down their rhetoric in international fora, their aggressive operations in the maritime commons belie any notions that Beijing has moderated its opinions or policies regarding Chinese rights.

The particular issue of China within the UNCLOS accession debate has emerged only lately. I would suggest that earlier American endorsements of UNCLOS – every Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), for instance – are obsolete, and have been negated by new circumstances unimagined at the time of the convention's framing.

The trouble is that bad law drives out good law. My bottom line is first, that law is not always the answer; and second, that this isn’t the time to call for UNCLOS accession. It is time, instead, for a clear-eyed debate on the merits and demerits of UNCLOS, in the wider perspective of the rise of China, where we are headed with Beijing, and the role of international law in affecting the ambitions of rising powers.

Standing for the rule of law doesn’t mean signing up for every proposition tabled in debate. Nor does it mean passing every bill proposed in a legislature. That’s the whole point of politics.

Besides, this isn’t a rule-of-law issue: this is a contract issue. There are good contracts, and there are bad contracts. UNCLOS is a bad contract, and getting worse because the environment to which it pertains has changed dramatically since it was drafted. Fundamentally, its merits are debatable, and whether or not we sign up to it is an option, and should not be perceived as an obligation. Perhaps one way to express this is to say that what is acceptable with regard to UNCLOS is not new, and what is new isn’t acceptable.

Whether or not you think that the contract analogy works, there are good laws and bad laws. Our legal system, domestic as well as international, isn’t meant to be a suicide pact, and there are procedures for demurring and for opting out.  UNCLOS becomes a rule-of-law issue when we sign up to it.

Besides, we are adhering to UNCLOS. It’s the Chinese that are trying to redefine UNCLOS according to their own purposes, without re-negotiating the contract, and in so doing undermining customary law – the latter being not immutable, but one had better have a darn good reason for changing it.

At the tactical level, I don’t believe for a moment that acceding to UNCLOS is going to improve our negotiating position with the Chinese, or change minds in Beijing. The differences at issue are far too substantial for that.

Finally, I also don’t for one moment believe that adherents of accession to UNCLOS are prepared for, or even intend to join, the furor that would ensue if joining were followed by a strenuous defense of and insistence upon customary, and never more necessary, rights of free passage.

In the final analysis, the UNCLOS issue is as much as anything else, and more than most, the manifestation of the fundamental and systemic disagreement and contest now in place between the United States and China. We need to join that contest at times and places of our own choosing.

Paul S. Giarra is the president of Global Strategies & Transformation, a national defense and strategic planning consultancy.

Now, I happen to think that Giarra is wrong on almost every point - but I do agree that UNCLOS opens 'new' claims - but that doesn't mean that his opinion is not as, maybe more, valid as/than mine. We should also note that our Arctic claims are based on UNCLOS.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I'm not sure what this means, BUT:

1. Xinhua is as close as there is to an official news agency;

2. The CCP doesn't make announcements just to get its name in print; and

3. The Chinese Constitution empowers the Party in ways that are quite foreign to us, with our liberal, Anglo-Saxon cultural foundations.

Reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Xinhua.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-10/22/c_131922626.htm

CPC to amend Party Constitution

English.news.cn

2012-10-22

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• CPC is going to amend Party Constitution at the 18th National Congress scheduled for Nov. 8.
• The 18th CPC National Congress is a very important conference to be held at a critical time.
• The whole Party should hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

BEIJING, Oct. 22 (Xinhua) -- The Communist Party of China (CPC) is going to amend the Party Constitution at its upcoming 18th National Congress scheduled for Nov. 8, according to a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on Monday.

The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee decided to submit a draft amendment to the CPC Constitution to the 7th Plenum of the 17th CPC Central Committee for further discussion on Nov. 1, before it is tabled with the national congress.

Monday's meeting, presided over by Hu Jintao, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, also discussed a draft report to the 18th CPC National Congress, and decided to table it with the 7th Plenum of the 17th CPC Central Committee for further review.

The meeting heard two reports, respectively on the suggestions collected from CPC members to the draft amendment to the CPC Constitution and the suggestions solicited from CPC members and non-Party personages to the draft report to the 18th CPC National Congress.

The meeting will modify the two draft amendments based on Monday's discussion before submitting these documents to the 7th Plenum of the 17th CPC Central Committee for deliberation.

The Party will make a draft report to the 18th CPC national congress that complies with the common aspirations of the CPC and people of all ethnic backgrounds, meets the development needs of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and adapts to "new situations" and "new tasks," according to an official statement issued after Monday's meeting.

The meeting stressed the importance of making a draft amendment to the CPC Constitution that conforms to the needs of the CPC's theoretic innovation, practice and development and will also promote the CPC's work and strengthen its construction, the statement said.

The 18th CPC National Congress is a very important conference to be held at a critical time when China is building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way, deepening reform and opening up and accelerating the transformation of economic development pattern in difficult areas, it said.

The congress carries high significance in inspiring CPC members and people of all ethnic groups to continue to forge ahead with the building of a moderately prosperous society, the modernization drive, as well as the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The whole Party should hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, be guided by Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thoughts of the "Three Represents," and thoroughly carry out the Scientific Outlook on Development, according to the statement.

"(The Party should) emancipate the mind, continue reform and opening up, gather strength, overcome difficulties, forge ahead along the socialist path of Chinese characteristics unswervingly and strive for the full establishment of a moderately prosperous society," reads the statement.

The Party should thoroughly examine the general situation concerning the development of the world and contemporary China and fully understand the new requirements for the country's development and new expectations from the people.

It should deeply summarize the lively experiences the Party has gained in leading the people to advance reform, opening up and the socialist modernization drive, the statement said.

The Party should make best use of the key period of strategic opportunities facing China's development, advance innovation in theoretical terms, among others, and draw out the guidelines and policies that respond to the call of the times and the people, it said.

The congress will make strategic plans for China's reform and development, with focuses on the outstanding problems that are emerging during the country's development at its current stage and the issues that concern people's interests in the most immediate and realistic manner.

The congress will further socialist development in economic, political, culture, and social terms as well as in conservation culture, according to the statement.

It will carry forward Party building, scientific development and promote social harmony, and continue to improve people's livelihood and well-being, it said.

It's all typical Chinese bureaucratic gobbledygook - and Chinese gobbledygook is even less transparent than the Western variety - BUT I think it must mean something and I'm guessing that incoming Paramount Leader Xi Jinping wants to change direction; but I cannot guess in which direction, except that the reference to "The whole Party should hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, be guided by Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thoughts of the "Three Represents," and thoroughly carry out the Scientific Outlook on Development, according to the statement" might indicate a swing back to the right - free marketeer Deng overturned communist Mao's ideology and the "three Represents" is a Jiang Zemin idea and Jiang led the tooth and claw capitalist wing of the CCP.


Edit: spelling  :-[

 

[GAP]

More of the Chinese long view....

China inks 10-year potash supply deal with tiny American miner
Article Link
By Ernest Scheyder NEW YORK | Mon Oct 22, 2012

(Reuters) - A state-owned Chinese fertilizer company has signed a 10-year potash supply agreement with Prospect Global Resources Inc (PGRX.O), guaranteeing China a steady flow of the crucial fertilizer and helping it partially sidestep multinational suppliers like Potash Corp (POT.N).

The deal with Sichuan Chemical Industry Holding (Group) Co SICHAD.UL, worth more than $2 billion, is part of a Chinese trend to partner with small mining companies hungry for capital to develop their land.

Potash is one of the most-important fertilizers for farmers to apply, after nitrogen and phosphate.

"In China we've got a key customer who is really motivated by national food-security issues," said Devon Archer, the Prospect director who helped negotiate the deal. "And securing our first customer was really a breakthrough moment for Prospect."

Prospect's mine in Holbrook, Arizona, is estimated to have the largest potash reserves in the United States with nearly 40 years of supply, but the company has yet to obtain financing or regulatory permits to develop it. The mine is not expected to open until at least 2015.

The Denver-based company, which launched an initial public offering in July and has a market cap of roughly $160 million, can now use the agreement to secure financing to develop the mine. Archer declined to discuss funding amounts or potential financiers, but similar-sized projects have cost more than $1 billion to develop.

China has inked similar contracts with rare earth and uranium miners around the world. With the Prospect deal, the world's largest consumer of potash locks in some of its supply needs ahead of the once-in-a-decade change in Chinese leadership next month.

China has been aggressively negotiating for lower potash prices with Canpotex Ltd, the marketing agency that sells Canadian potash. Canpotex, owned by Potash Corp, Mosaic Co (MOS.N), and Agrium Inc (AGU.TO) (AGU.N), is one of the world's largest potash exporters.

So far neither Canpotex nor China has been able to agree on a price, and a deal isn't expected until the end of 2012 or early 2013. The Prospect deal gives China some leverage in negotiations as it will be less reliant on Canpotex for supply.

China buys potash through contracts that are generally renewed annually at prices used as a benchmark for spot sales. The country consumes more than 9 million tonnes of potash per year.

At current market prices, the Prospect deal is worth roughly $2.4 billion.

Archer, the Prospect director, declined to discuss the specific price per tonne in the China contract, though he said it was "very competitive and based off the world price."

North American prices at the Port of Vancouver, the main Canadian port for potash exports, hovered under $500 per tonne in September, according to market data released by Potash Corp last week.

China paid $470 per tonne under previous contracts with Canpotex and wants to pay less in future contracts, according to Lazard Capital Markets analyst Edlain Rodriguez.

MINE DEVELOPMENT

The Holbrook mine is expected to produce 2 million tonnes of potash annually when online, and China will take at least 500,000 tonnes of potash each year for ten years.

China, which produces some potash domestically but not enough to meet demand, has been buying more than 1 million tonnes of potash each year from Canpotex. It has signed supply deals in the past with producers in Belarus for roughly 500,000 tonnes.

In the contract with Prospect, China has the option to buy more potash, and the company is negotiating with other potential buyers for the remaining potash that will be produced, Archer said.

Prospect plans to hire roughly 700 workers to run the 90,000 acre site in eastern Arizona.

Unlike most potash mines, Prospect's Holbrook mine is relatively close to the surface with reserves roughly 800 feet to 2,000 feet deep.

The mine also is located in the warm Arizona climate, whereas most other potash reserves are in cooler climates in Canada or Russia. Given that Prospect has yet to open the mine, it's not clear what its cost per tonne to produce will be, though the company will have to do less digging.

For instance, Mosaic's Esterhazy mine in Saskatchewan, the world's largest potash mine, is roughly 3,700 feet deep.

Mosaic had to freeze an underground lake and drill through the ice just to reach its potash reserves.

"What we do have at Prospect, which is most important, is the geology," said Archer.
end

 

[Edward Campbell]

Sorry folks, had a hiccup this morning and may have lost some posts from the wee hours of the morning.

Amongst the lost posts was one (for which I could not find the original source report) in which I noted that just as Mitt Romney promised to "call out" China as a "currency manipulator" for keeping the RMB too low, the RMB rose to a new high (6.2 : 1) against the US dollar.

 

[Edward Campbell]

...

Eventually that idea will be taught in high school, then elementary school and it will be featured in popular entertainment. (The Chinese get a lot of information through long, semi-fictional, historical TV dramas - some of which have 50+ hour long episodes - which aim to establish a "common cultural norm.") Sun Yat Sen and Zhou Enlai will be treated a bit better: remembered as great social reformers with strange, muddled economic ideas. But it is Deng Xiaoping who will, eventually, be seen as the founder of the new (Republican) Dynasty ...

I'm not sure what this means, BUT:

1. Xinhua is as close as there is to an official news agency;

2. The CCP doesn't make announcements just to get its name in print; and

3. The Chinese Constitution empowers the Party in ways that are quite foreign to us, with our liberal, Anglo-Saxon cultural foundations.

Reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Xinhua.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-10/22/c_131922626.htm

It's all typical Chinese bureaucratic gobbledygook - and Chinese gobbledygook is even less transparent than the Western variety - BUT I think it must mean something and I'm guessing that incoming Paramount Leader Xi Jinping wants to change direction; but I cannot guess in which direction, except that the reference to "The whole Party should hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, be guided by Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thoughts of the "Three Represents," and thoroughly carry out the Scientific Outlook on Development, according to the statement" might indicate a swing back to the right - free marketeer Deng overturned communist Mao's ideology and the "three Represents" is a Jiang Zemin idea and Jiang led the tooth and claw capitalist wing of the CCP.


Edit: spelling  :-[

This, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, deals with something I missed ~ the lack of the customary reference to Chairman Mao:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/china-hints-at-reform-by-dropping-mao-wording-from-recent-statements/article4630711/

China hints at reform by dropping Mao wording from recent statements

SUI-LEE WEE BEIJING
Reuters

Published Tuesday, Oct. 23 2012

The subtle dropping of references to late Chinese leader Mao Zedong from two policy statements over the last few weeks serves as one of the most intriguing hints yet that the ruling Communist Party is planning to move in the direction of reform.

Mao has always been held up as an ideological great in party communiques, his name mentioned almost by default in homage to his role in founding modern China and leading the Communist Party, whose rule from the 1949 revolution remains unbroken.

Which is why the dropping of the words “Mao Zedong thought” from two recent statements by the party’s elite Politburo ahead of a landmark congress, at which a new generation of leaders will take the top party posts, has attracted so much attention.

Also absent were normally standard references to Marxism-Leninism.

The omission in the latest such statement by the powerful decision-making body, after a Monday announcement that the congress next month would discuss amending the party’s constitution, is seen by some as sending a signal about its intent on reform. One of the constitution’s key platforms is Mao thought.

“It’s very significant,” Zheng Yongnian, the director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore, said of the removal of a reference to Mao Zedong Thought and the implications of that for the direction leaders were taking.

The wording has in the past talked about “holding high the banner of Mao Zedong thought and Marxism-Leninism” in carrying out the party’s work, and is often included at the end of statements almost as a mantra.

But the latest two statements mentioned only that the party should follow “Deng Xiaoping theory”, the “three represents” and the “scientific development concept”.

Late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping introduced the idea that China can be both communist and have market-based reforms, while the “three represents” refers to former President Jiang Zemin’s policy which formally allowed capitalists to join the party.

The last idea is current President Hu Jintao’s thinking of promoting more rounded economic development.

Mao Zedong Thought adapted the original theories of Marxism that grew out of industrial Europe to the conditions of largely rural China when Mao took over in 1949.

“Before the fall of Bo Xilai, that direction was not so clear. But now it’s become quite clear. I mean, less Maoism, but more Dengism,” Mr. Zheng said.

Mr. Bo, a former high-flying politician supported by leftists, was ousted this year in China’s biggest political scandal in two decades.

By removing Mao Zedong Thought, the top leaders were signalling a push for reforms, Mr. Zheng said, in the same way Mr. Deng introduced landmark market reforms in the late 1970s that turned China from a backwater into an economic powerhouse.

There was also no reference made to Mao thought in a previous announcement on the date of the party congress.

Doctrinal differences between reformist and leftist factions reflect an internal debate about the direction of the new leadership whose taking up of the reins of power starts at the congress opening in Beijing on Nov. 8.

The debate has been under the spotlight since the rise and subsequent fall of Mr. Bo, who, as party boss of the southwestern city of Chongqing, drew support from leftists critical of aspects of the market-based reform agenda.

China heads into the congress with the economy heading for its slowest annual growth rate in at least 13 years, while social stresses, such as anger over corruption, land grabs and unmet welfare demands, stir protests.

The country named a new air force chief and reshuffled other top military positions ahead of next month's appointment of new Communist Party leaders.

State media, as well as experts close to the government, have made increasingly strident calls for bold reform to avoid a crisis, though nobody seriously expects a move towards full democracy.

This week, for example, the Study Times, a newspaper published by the Central Party School which trains rising officials, lauded Singapore’s form of closely managed democracy and its long-ruling main party for having genuine popular support.

“If you want to win people’s hearts and their support, you have to have a government that serves the people,” it wrote.

Despite his ruthless political campaigns in which tens of millions died, Mao, whose portrait looms large on Tiananmen Square, has always been largely revered as a charismatic ruler who stood up to foreigners and unified the country.

Mao’s legacy in China remains tightly guarded by a Communist leadership bent on preserving his memory to shore up their own legitimacy, which, unlike his, was not forged in war.

In 2003, on the 110th anniversary of Mao’s birth, Mr. Hu declared that “the banner of Mao Zedong Thought will always be held high, at all times and in all circumstances”.

An enormous slogan outside the central leadership compound in central Beijing, boldly states: “Long live invincible Mao Zedong thought!”

Some cautioned that it may be too soon to write off Mao.

“This is just not possible,” said Wang Zhengxu, a senior research fellow at University of Nottingham’s School of Contemporary Chinese Studies in Britain, on speculation that Mao thought and Marxism-Leninism would be removed from the party’s constitution.

Despite China’s all-pervasive Internet censorship – “Mao Zedong” and “Mao Zedong Thought” are both blocked on microblog searches – some users were able to discuss the issue, with opinions split on the possible removal of Mao thought.

“Mao Zedong Thought is the soul of the People’s Republic of China ... and it is a light leading people towards justice,” wrote one user.

Still, Singapore’s Zheng said Mao’s vision had become irrelevant as many Chinese were apathetic about him. The doctrine could be de-emphasised in the amendment to China’s constitution during the congress, he said.

“Only the left side cares about it,” he said. “For most people, for the young generation, they don’t care about it. The memory is gone.”

With a report from The Associated Press

Perhaps Bo Xilai's promotion of "neo-Maoism" has been enough to force the CCP leadership to move more quickly than Chinese politicians normally do to distance the country from Mao.

(Anecdote: A few years ago a friend too me to a Maoist restaurant in Beijing. It is situated on an important street between the Forbidden City and Zhongnanhai, the CCP HQ. It is a wildly popular place - popular with younger Chinese people. Originally the restaurant was opened by a fellow who had been one of Mao's personal chefs; he wanted to open a tourist trap - with ordinary food at high prices aimed at exploiting foreigners' desire to see something about the late 'monster' Mao. He was shocked when his restaurant became popular with younger Chinese who appeared to yearn for the "good old days." Now, a few years and a couple of moves later it is a very good Hunan style restaurant, but it still features some of Mao's favourite dishes (Mao was from Hunan province) and the servers wear old style "Mao suits." But it no longer caters to foreigners, none of the menus are in English nor do they have pictures; the food is wonderful - good Hunan cooks in the kitchen working with very fresh ingredients. Reservations are hard to come by; my friend was a university classmate of the original owner's granddaughter so we got in with only three day's notice. But China is, in some ways, like Russia; people who, generally, don't know better, wish for a return to the "good old days." In Russia you see posters of Stalin etc. < shudder > In Beijing it's more muted but still there.)

 

[The Bread Guy]

Amongst the lost posts was one (for which I could not find the original source report) in which I noted that just as Mitt Romney promised to "call out" China as a "currency manipulator" for keeping the RMB too low, the RMB rose to a new high (6.2 : 1) against the US dollar.

Something like this?

Mitt Romney renewed his pledge to label China a currency manipulator "on day one" in the final presidential debate, arguing that the US was losing a silent trade war with the world's second largest economy.

Experts have warned that such a measure could backfire by provoking retaliatory action.

Overall, the Republican candidate took a milder stance towards Beijing, telling viewers on Tuesdaynight: "We can be a partner with China; we don't have to be an adversary in any way, shape or form."

But asked if he was formally accusing China of manipulating the renminbi and sparking a trade war, he replied: "There's one going on right now, which we don't know about it. It's a silent one. And they're winning."

"We have to say to our friend in China … you can't keep on holding down the value of your currency, stealing our intellectual property, counterfeiting our products, selling them around the world, even to the United States."

The US has not labelled China a currency manipulator since 1994, though successive administrations have considered doing so. Some observers doubt whether Romney would actually follow through ....

 

[Edward Campbell]

That Premier Wen Jiabao and his family became obscenely rich as he worked his way to the top of the CCP hierarchy should not come as a surprise. "Working or milking the system" is as old as the system itself in China. Further, as I keep saying, the Confucian nature of Chinese culture imposes an obligation on a man to find ways to advance his whole family's status and, especially, prosperity.

Even in Singapore, which is almost frighteningly law abiding, people respect Ho Ching, the wife of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, for using her talents to gain great wealth by advancing from being a lowly engineer in the Ministry of Defence to CEO of Temasek Holdings, a $150+ Billion sovereign wealth fund even as they worry about the propriety of it all.

But we should also note that US politicians, thanks, in some part to the campaign financing laws, may begin their political careers as (relatively) poor men but very, very few end up that way - many, perhaps even most, retire as multi-millionaires because they are allowed to keep money donated to their campaigns.

 

[Edward Campbell]

An interesting factoid culled from an Economist report about Mexico: "In 2001 Mexican manufacturing wages were four times those in China; now the difference is trivial."

In fact Mexican wages have risen, quite dramatically, since NAFTA (1994) but Chinese wages have, quite literally soared. The Chinese are now facing wage pressures from Indonesia and the Philippines.

But readers must understand that there are "three Chinas:"

1. A modern, industrial, sophisticated, high wage China on the East Coast which has a burgeoning middle class and a relatively large upper class, too;

2. A developing or industrializing belt in the middle provinces where opportunities for moderate wage enterprises are still available - the jobs are moving here (and to Indonesia and Philippines) from the East Coast and from Japan and South Korea, too; and

3. A very large, very poor, undeveloped, still largely agrarian Western region which is, still, very much unchanged, in economic terms, from the 1970s. These poor people still flock to the rich East Coast, looking for jobs that are no longer available, and then settle in the cities and town of the central Chinese provinces.

One interesting feature of Chinese life: while mobility is now relatively free people still have internal passports which show the province in which they are entitled to work. The minimum wage laws - and all provinces have them - apply only to people from that province, thus the tens of millions of Chinese migrant workers in China are rarely paid the minimum wage in, say, Shanghai because they came from another province.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Get used to seeing Xi Jinping; he will replace Hu Jintao as the Chinese leader later this year. His position on the Chinese political spectrum remains obscure but, for better or worse, he will be here for many years, possibly ten.

I'm not the only one who finds Xi Jinping obscure as this article, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Diplomat, makes clear:

http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/29/just-who-is-xi-jinping/

Just Who is Xi Jinping?

October 29, 2012

By A. Greer Meisels

It is hard to know what a politician really thinks. Even in a country like the United States, which likes to bombard its electorate with an endless stream of campaign ads, when you scrape off their polished veneers, peel back the layers from their stump speeches, turn off their mics, and get right down to it, one would be hard pressed to find too many people who actually know what a politician thinks and feels. Sure people may claim to have deep insight into Candidate X or Candidate Y – the former schoolmates, teachers, employers, and drinking buddies like to come out of the woodwork to pontificate – but at the end of the day, it is hard to know what really makes the man or woman tick.

Multiply this phenomenon by a hundred or a thousand.

Now you are probably at the starting point when it comes to what we really know about the “would be” next generation leaders in China. In fact, aside from Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, it is hard to say with absolute certainty who will even be handed the reins of power in the upcoming 18th Party Congress.

Photo Credit: U.S. Department of Defense (Flickr)

Granted, few should be surprised by this – opacity and obfuscation seem, at times, to be part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) DNA. Lest we forget, it was just last month that the entire world played a collective game of “Where in the World is Xi Jinping” because the heir apparent cancelled a string of meetings (including one with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) and disappeared from the public eye. Should it then come as any surprise that we aren’t entirely clear about his policy leanings?

Yet understanding this does little to alleviate the frustration and sheer exhaustion felt by many a China-watcher who has undoubtedly been asked, on multiple occasions, to provide his or her opinion on “Just who is Xi Jinping?”

So what do we, as China-watchers, do? First, we try to draw conclusions based on what occurred in the leader’s past. This certainly has its merits. Not only does it provide some insight into how people like Xi might react in certain situations, but it also helps us begin to construct a map of potential patronage ties and factional allegiances. In China it is not just who you know, but how you know them.

For example, many believe that because Xi was the secretary to Defense Minister Geng Biao, he might have closer ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) than his predecessor, Hu Jintao. This could be important for a variety of reasons because the paramount leader’s relationship with the PLA can ultimately determine to what extent he can rely on the PLA to support policy initiatives, as well as the degree to which the military could exert leverage over the leader and influence the administration. But of course, the past is not a mirror to the future.

Another now common refrain about Xi is that he is more statesmanlike than his soon-to-be predecessor, Hu Jintao. For example, words like “confident,” “assured,” and “strategic” have been often used to describe the future leader. But what does that in turn tell us? It could mean that President Xi may be more difficult to work with, at least from an American perspective, because he may feel as if the U.S. should be more deferential to China and its core interests. On the other hand, he could be easier to deal with because he may have the confidence to make bolder moves on the foreign policy, political, and economic reform fronts.

Therefore, rather than simply theorizing about what a Xi Jinping administration may or may not do or what different personality traits might mean in terms of future policy shifts; perhaps, the best thing is to take a more “wait and see” approach. After all, it is important to understand that a leadership transition in China is a protracted process.

Further, the upcoming 18th Party Congress is only part of the overall transition. Throughout the process, a large number of Chinese officials and party members will shuffle positions both within and between bureaucracies as well as provinces. And though it is still quite important to understand who is at the top of the pecking order, it is equally important to understand that China still makes decisions by collective leadership. Therefore, it will be critically important to understand the overall mix of people on the Standing Committee – when the time comes.

Though let’s be honest, it will probably take a good 18 to 24 months before Xi is even able to shore up his position and has enough political capital to really begin to deal with the myriad tasks that confront China.

Xi has some very serious work ahead of him. He is inheriting slowing growth rates which will bring about new and potentially more dangerous social stresses, not to mention political challenges; relations with China’s neighbors are extremely strained; unequal growth and development within China’s borders has made significant segments of its population restive; and there are signs that the entire Chinese political and bureaucratic system have become increasingly ossified and sclerotic.

Actually after looking at that laundry list, perhaps the most important traits Xi could possess would be tenacity, the ability to multi-task, and a really good sense of humor.

But whether he has these traits or not… well, your guess is as good as mine.

A. Greer Meisels is the associate director and research fellow for China and the Pacific at the Center for the National Interest.

I have been reading everything I can find about Xi Jinping for the past eight months; I am more in the dark than Ms. Meisels admits to being. It is astonishing how little we know - or about which we can even make educated guesses - when it comes to the Chinese leadership. It's also dangerous because people who know as little as Ms. Meisels and I - like those surrounding the US President - must guess about his views and intentions.

 

[Edward Campbell]

My guess is that we are about to see another crackdown, of some sort, on the Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang, based on a report from the Straits Times' Beijing Bureau which says "Chinese Muslims fighting in Syria." The report says that "Chinese Muslim separatists from the far northwestern region of Xinjiang are fighting alongside Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups opposed to Syria's government."

Muslim separatism in Xinjiang is a festering sore which the Chinese seem to pick at in a haphazard manner - moving from carrot to stick at, apparently, random.

The Uyghurs are a Turkik people, even less Chinese than the Tibetans and they have not integrated very well. 1200 years the Uyghur Khaganate was a mighty steppe empire; over the centuries it was broken up and gobbled up by its neighbours, but Xinjiang has only been a Chinese province for 250 years. Islam and the modern, sophisticated and very, very secular Chinese culture do not coexist easily.

See, also, this from about nine months ago:

...
As to Xinjiang ~ a couple of years ago a mid level Chinese official put it to me that they, the (mostly) Han Chinese, plan to "f__k Xinjiang into submission." He meant that young men are encouraged to go to Xinjiang and marry a mostly relatively poor, attractive Uyghur girl and raise a totally secular, modern Chinese family. It may be the work of a few generations but my acquaintance was confident of the strategy.

(Parenthetically: the spelling of Uyghur, or Uighur or whatever remains unsettled between various style books.)

 

[Edward Campbell]

There's a bit of an interesting media battle going on in East Asia. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong is trying to promote the use of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) as a forum to mediate the various South China Sea disputes. Friendly media outlets (e.g. Straits Times, channelnewsAsia, etc) are going all out to publicize his efforts. Meanwhile, Beijing, without ever saying anything officially, is using mainland English language media, including CCTV-9, to pour cold water on the idea. It is interesting because:

1. It shows ASEAN trying to develop some common, reginal foreign policy muscle; and

2. It illustrates that the foreign language media* has a role in diplomacy.

_____
* But English is an official and the most commonly spoken language in Singapore - even if the local variant is tough for a newcomer to comprehend.

 

[Edward Campbell]

This is a long and fairly technical report from the respected Conference Board - it's too long to post here - but the message is "Economic activity may pick up a bit in short term, but downward trend in growth appears intact."

No one, no on in their right mind, anyway, ever thought that China could sustain 10%+ growth year after year and, indeed, decade after decade, but the questions are:

1. In the longer term ~ how low can Chinese growth go without losing the all important, for government, social harmony and, consequently risking a revolt? and

2. In the short term ~ hard or soft landing?

My guesses:

1. With better governance China can survive like most developed countries with modest growth (3-4%) in good years, punctuated by occasional recessions, but the "better governance" is a lot more complex and difficult than it looks; and

2. Soft landing ... this time.

BUT: if either of my guesses is wrong, and there is a very good chance that either or both will be, then revolution and civil war is the most likely outcome.

 

[Edward Campbell]

CIPS (Centre for International Policy Studies) at uOttawa runs an excellent public lecture series. This one, which at 35 minutes before the questions is not too long, is worth your attention.

It doesn't matter whether you or I agree with Prof Mearsheimer, he is a distinguished scholar and he has given this topic a lot of thought, and his views merit consideration.

Consider, if nothing else, his point at, about 19:00, that there cannot be a global hegemon - not even the USA circa the years 1950 - 2000 - 2050.

His point about the Chinese remembering the consequences of being weak is very important. China does want, in fairness needs to be the regional hegemon in East Asia. Plus, he's right that the Chinese want to have - will have - their own Monroe Doctrine; they want America out of Asia.

I think he's wrong about Singapore joining any form of coalition, however loose, against China. The Japanese and Indians will try to form such a loose coaliton but Singapore and maybe South Korea and even Taiwan, too, dislike and mistrust Japan (and, to a lesser degree, India) more than they fear China.

I agree with him on "tragedy of great power politics." (35:30)

A few of the questions are excellent, most are obvious, a few others are simply stupid, but, hey, it's a public forum.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here is an interesting Infographic from the Pew Research Centre:

Source: http://pewresearch.org/

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisons of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, is a very useful primer on the Chinese elite.

A note: Beijng and Tsinghua Universities are, roughly, the Harvard and Yale of China or, more accurately, the Harvard and MIT since Beijing University is best known for its Arts and Social Sciences programmes while Tsinghua University is renowned for its Science and Engineering departments. University entrance is one of the few (relatively) corruption free official processes in China - merit is, pretty well, the only deciding factor ~ in some respects it is more "fair" than in the West where race/ethnicity, financial need and non-academic attributes are very often used to achieve diversity. The Chinese system does, in fact, favour the nouveau riche and the children of party members, especially senior ones, who have easier access to the best high schools, middle and elementary schools and even the best kindergartens.

Second note: the CYL (Communist Youth League (共青团)) has been, for nearly 100 years a stepping stone to success in the Party. In recent decades the CYL has been, broadly, associated with the reform or moderate wing of the CCP led, right now, by HU Jintao.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/handicapping-the-leadership-race-in-china/article4898839/?page=all

Handicapping the leadership race in China

MARK MACKINNON
BEIJING — The Globe and Mail

Last updated Saturday, Nov. 03 2012

It has been hailed by China’s state media as “the most important meeting in the world in terms of its impact on the future,” and not without reason. Yet the rest of us will find out what happens at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China only when it’s over.

On Thursday, about 2,270 delegates from across China will enter the colonnaded Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square. After a secretive week (or more) of deliberation, a group of men in dark suits (although there could be one woman) will emerge and walk in a phalanx down a red carpet. Only then – by analyzing who stands where in the official photograph of the occasion – will the world find out who is to run this emerging superpower for the coming decade.

Not all the winners will come as a surprise: The man in the middle of the photo will be Xi Jinping, the current Vice-President, who has been chosen to succeed Hu Jintao as China’s paramount leader. Unless there’s a catastrophe, Mr. Xi will be made secretary-general of the Communist Party. He is then expected to become president next spring, and head of the Central Military Commission some time after that.

To his right will almost certainly be Li Keqiang. Tapped to succeed Premier Wen Jiabao as head of the country’s government, he is the only other member of the nine-man Standing Committee of the Politburo, China’s supreme decision-making body, not scheduled to retire this year.

But who else will be there? At least nine others are clearly in the running. However, with the congress just days away, even senior government officials profess not to know whether the Standing Committee will stay the same size – it may shrink to seven members – let alone who will get the nod.

As for what the candidates would do if chosen, more is known about their allegiances than the policies they advocate. Chief among the various factions are the “princelings” (sons and daughters of Communist heroes who feel entitled to rule), political reformers (many of whom came up through the Communist Youth League under Mr. Hu), and those loyal to previous paramount leader Jiang Zemin.

Which faction, and which ideas, gain the upper hand may have a remarkable impact on the affairs of the nation and, given China’s growing clout, the rest of the world.

THE INCUMBENTS

XI JINPING, 59

Background: Considered a princeling as the son of revered revolutionary Xi Zhongxun, joined the CYL at 18 and studied chemical engineering at Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua University. Served as governor of coastal Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, and briefly as Communist Party chief in Shanghai before being promoted to the Standing Committee in 2007.

Current posts: First secretary of the Communist Party, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, vice-president of the People’s Republic of China

Politics: Considered close to both Mr. Hu and Mr. Jiang, he appears to have risen by being a bridge between the rival factions. But China-watchers wonder whether he also embraces the politics of his father, a reformer who played a leading role in China’s economic transformation in the early 1980s (and one of few senior leaders to condemn the use of force against pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989).

LI KEQIANG, 57

Background: Born in Anhui province, rose through the CYL, studied law at Beijing University and has been tabbed for a leading role since 1998 when, at 43, he landed the top job in Henan to become China’s youngest provincial governor. As well, he has served as Communist Party chief in northeastern Liaoning province.

Current post: First-vice premier

Politics: A protégé of Mr. Hu, he was his fellow Anhui native’s chosen successor until Mr. Hu reportedly was forced to compromise with Mr. Jiang’s conservatives and accept Mr. Xi. He has repeatedly called the current system “unbalanced” and spoken forcefully about the need for further economic reform.

THE SHOO-INS

WANG QISHAN, 63

Background: Best known as Beijing’s mayor, during the 2003 SARS crisis and then the run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games.

Current posts: Vice-premier and representative to the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue

Politics: Seen as a princeling because his father-in-law, Yao Yilin, was vice-premier, he is considered a success as Beijing’s mayor because the Olympics were, but city residents have mixed feelings – Mr. Yao was in office during the Tiananmen Square crackdown.

LI YUANCHAO, 61

Background: Powerful figure within the Communist Party; has a PhD in economics from Beijing University; is a former party boss in his native Jiangsu province.

Current position: Head of the Organization Department, which controls appointments large and small within the Communist Party, from provincial governors to newspaper editors

Politics: Seen as close to Mr. Hu, he helped the President expand the influence of the CYL but has princeling ties (his father was vice-mayor of Shanghai in the 1960s) that make him a potential a bridge between factions on the next Standing Committee.

YU ZHENGSHENG, 67

Background: A graduate of the Military Engineering Institute in the northeastern city of Harbin, rose through the party ranks in the coastal city of Qingdao, served as construction minister in Beijing, and then party secretary in Hubei province.

Current post: Since 2007, Communist Party chief in Shanghai

Politics: Another princeling, he is seen as close to Mr. Jiang (also a former Shanghai party boss), but will serve just one term (the party’s unofficial retirement age is 68). His rise was slowed by the 1985 defection of his older brother, a senior intelligence officer, to the United States.

ZHANG DEJIANG, 66

Background: New standard-bearer for the left wing, studied economics at Kim Il-sung university in North Korea, often takes on difficult assignments requiring a firm hand (being the party’s “iron-fisted enforcer” according to the South China Morning Post).

Current post: Vice-premier and party chief of the southwestern city of Chongqing since the murder-and-corruption scandal that felled predecessor Bo Xilai (once a near certainty to make the committee) this year.

Politics: Another one-term appointment, he is considered a princeling (his father was a general in the People’s Liberation Army) and is particularly close to Mr. Jiang. Criticized while governor of Guangdong in 2003 for trying to suppress news of the SARS crisis, he also made waves in Chongqing by forcing civil servants who had served Mr. Bo pledge loyalty to him.

THE MAYBES

LIU YUNSHAN, 65

Background: Former teacher from Shanxi province; built his career in Inner Mongolia and spent seven years as a reporter at the official Xinhua news agency before rising to the Propaganda Department. Recently, he has overseen the international expansion of CCTV television and the China Daily newspaper.

Current post: Director of the Propaganda Department

Politics: Having risen through the CYL, he is seen as an ally of Mr. Hu, but also was close to Mr. Bo, the fallen leftist, and, as an opponent of political reform, has led government efforts to control conversations on the Internet.

WANG YANG, 57

Background: Like Mr. Hu, a native of Anhui who came up in the CYL; studied political economics and was Chongqing party boss ahead of Mr. Bo before moving to Guangdong.

Current post: Communist Party chief for Guangdong province

Politics: Mr. Wang is considered the leading reform candidate – the ideological heir to Premier Wen Jiabao. Under his rule, Guangdong has developed the freest media in China and even some independent (if closely monitored) non-governmental organizations. He surprised many with his laissez-faire handling of last year’s village uprising in Wukan, which saw protesters demand – and get – the right to elect local leaders. Given his age, he could still be a contender in five years if passed over this time.

ZHANG GAOLI, 66

Background: Trained economist born in coastal Fujian province; former party secretary for the southern city of Shenzhen and northeastern Shandong province.

Current position: Communist Party chief for Tianjin (a metropolis near Beijing)

Politics: He rarely says anything in public, so Mr. Zhang is hard to decipher. Considered close to the incoming leader (he frequently consulted Mr. Xi’s father while in Shenzhen), he is thought to be backed by the Jiang faction, keen to block the rise of Wang Yang.

LIU YANDONG, 66

Background: The only woman among the 25 members of the Politburo; former chemistry major from Beijing’s Tsinghua University who once headed the United Front Work Department, which strives to improve the party’s image abroad.

Current post: State councillor

Politics: A close ally of Mr. Hu, she has focused on building China’s ramshackle public health and education systems while in the Politburo. If elevated, she would end a Standing Committee tradition as an exclusive boys club that began with the creation of the Communist Party of China.

HU CHUNHUA, 49

Background: A native of Hubei and perhaps the party’s fastest-rising star; at 16, finished first in the national university-entrance exam and, in 2008, became China’s youngest provincial governor in Hubei. Has also spent significant time in Tibet.

Current post: Communist Party chief for Inner Mongolia

Politics: Dubbed “Little Hu” for his link to the President, he is an extreme long shot for the Standing Committee,but will likely join the Politburo, and be on track for promotion in 2017 and maybe even the presidency in 2022.

Mark MacKinnon is The Globe and Mail’s Beijing correspondent.

 

[Edward Campbell]

The Central Military Commission exercises political command and strategic direction over the PLA. It is, in a way, analogous to to one of our cabinet committees: you rarely hear about it or them but it and they execrcise great power behind the scenes. Bloomberg reports that two new Vice-Chairmen have been named:

Gen Fan Changlong

Gen Fan is commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s Military Command in Jinan

Gen Xu Qiliang

Gen Xu is commander of the PLA’s air force.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Washington Post, is David Ignatius' take on things.

In China, a guessing game
 
By David Ignatius, Published: November 2

As Election Day approaches, it’s useful to look at the murky political transition taking place in China this month. It’s a reminder of the benefits of America’s sometimes chaotic democracy.

The Chinese are facing a once-in-a-decade political shift as President Hu Jintao prepares to transfer power to Xi Jinping, his long-designated successor. But beneath this pre-cooked surface, many key issues are still bubbling, with a decisive Communist Party congress scheduled to start Thursday.

Imagine if the United States were deciding Tuesday not just on a president and members of Congress — but on the size and scope of the executive branch, oversight of the military and new constitutional rules. China’s leaders are still thought to be haggling over all these issues on the eve of the party congress and behind a curtain of secrecy that feeds rumors and gossip.

The coming political transition will replace most members of the country’s two key executive bodies — the standing committee of the party’s Politburo and the Central Military Commission. What’s amazing is how little even the best-informed U.S. experts know about how these personnel decisions will be made.

Given China’s lack of transparency, this arcane subject is left mostly to China-watchers in and out of government. But the political stakes in Beijing this month may be as important for the world as are those in the U.S. election. Here are some of the big “ifs” that experts are following:

●How big will the Politburo’s standing committee be? The rumor is that membership will be reduced from nine to seven — and that the two portfolios to be removed are propaganda and law enforcement. “The decision to eliminate those two positions and reduce the membership from nine to seven is closely linked to political reform,” argues Cheng Li, a leading China scholar at the Brookings Institution.

China will remain a police state, even if propaganda and law enforcement are less visible in the Politburo. And it may be a more decisive dictatorship, with a streamlined group that can reach consensus more easily on thorny topics. But the pressures for change are building. And this will be a group of new faces — with five or seven new members, depending on its size.

●Will the retiring president, Hu, keep his seat on the Central Military Commission? His predecessor, Jiang Zemin, kept his hand in military matters in the same way, and Hu may want this token of status and patronage, too — modestly reducing the power of the incoming president, Xi. But the story here is also of change. A large majority of the 12 members of the military commission are likely to be new. This represents a big turnover for a Chinese military that has been increasingly assertive on such issues as the South China Sea.

●Will the problems of corruption and patronage that exploded in the Bo Xilai scandal last February be manageable? So far, the Chinese have done a good job of containing the fallout from the purge of Bo, the charismatic former Chongqing party chief. But Li at the Brookings Institution sees a deep factional split between Hu (whose followers have roots in the Communist Youth League) and Jiang (whose elite supporters are often described as “princelings”). Jiang’s cosmopolitan supporters are said to favor continued rapid development, while the Hu group stresses party organization and domestic security to check the unrest that accompanies fast growth.

Xi’s challenge will be to bridge this gap, and so far he seems to be pretty deft. He’s certainly a princeling himself (his father was one of Mao Zedong’s close advisers), but he has also built bridges to the Hu camp.

●Will the party consider changes in its constitution, perhaps asserting that the party is subordinate to the state? Li predicts there may be edicts that “the party should be under the law rather than above the law.”

The volatility beneath the placid surface of Chinese politics was evident in recent exposés about the fabulous wealth party leaders have accumulated: Bloomberg News reported in June that Xi’s extended family has nearly $1 billion in assets; last month, the New York Times documented that the family of Wen Jiabao, the outgoing prime minister, secretly owns assets of $2.7 billion. Similar tales could surely be told about most of the top leaders.

Somehow, over the next two weeks, this corrupt, secretive leadership will have to chart the course of the world’s second biggest economy. Their challenge makes electoral democracy seem easy, by comparison.

It will be interesting to see if Hu Jintao holds on to the CMC.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Washington Post, is David Ignatius' take on things.

It will be interesting to see if Hu Jintao holds on to the CMC.

He will for about a year, if the past is precedent: long enough to both a) ensure that Xi Jinping, the next Paramlunt Leader, who is, currently, the third vice chairman of the commission, actually has the confidence of the Central Committee of the Party, and b) that Hu's faction is protected after the transition. All things being equal; Xi Jinping will take control of the Central Military Commission and, with it, absolute power, sometime next year.

 

[Edward Campbell]

This BBC Radio 4 report provides a good and, I think, fair and balanced biography of Xi Jinping.

It doesn't tell us much about his policy positions; the media is full of speculation about that but in my opinion that's all it is ~ speculation.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Wall Street Journal, is an article that I think sums up the challenges facing Xi Jinping et al over the next decade:

http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/11/05/so-much-for-stability-reality-catching-up-to-the-communist-party/

So Much for Stability: Reality Catching Up With the Communist Party

By Russell Leigh Moses

November 5, 2012

There’s an onrushing political reality facing the Chinese leadership when the 18th Communist Party Congress finally convenes this week – one far more important and complex than the backroom battle to determine which senior Party leader gets what portfolio in the Politburo.

The list of issues likely to land on the agenda during this Party Congress is long. If recent official media coverage is anything to go by, delegates can expect to argue over everything from how to handle the country’s aging population and growing urban-rural divide to how to define national culture and the role of law in the political system.

But the most pressing issue—and the one that could well play havoc with consensus among policy-makers at the Congress and beyond—is how to handle signs of creeping gloom in Chinese society and the sense among some cadres that shortfalls in Party governance are bringing it about.

For all the economic success and justified celebrations about national development, every senior leader looking for further promotion surely recognizes the shortcomings of Beijing’s efforts to construct a “moderately well-off society”—the one promised at the last Party Congress in 2007. Perceptions of malfeasance and misconduct across the system is such a concern now that even mainstream Party media is unafraid to talk about the defects in governance and oversight, as with the recent bizarre disappearance of farmer’s deposits from a mutual fund program in Jiangsu. As one essay put it recently, “sustained economic growth” is crucial, but “we must step up efforts to protect funds, spending them more wisely, and protect fairness and justice…to maintain social stability.”

Many cadres now see this securing of social stability as a far more complex problem —- especially where migrants are concerned — than they did at the last Party congress and in the years since. In 2007, social stability appeared as a crucial priority for the Party. As Chinese leader Hu Jintao noted in his work report at that year’s big meeting, social stability was an “important prerequisite” for reform and continued economic development — a signal to cadres that policies and promotions would rest on showing strength and keeping dissent off the streets. The truncheon-swingers soon had their way, and the budgets for social control soared.

But those policies of “stability maintenance” have been receding in recent months. Now, there’s an emphasis on “social management”—a multifaceted attempt to provide better help instead of better handcuffs from a newly-attentive government. There’s less blame being cast at residents from officials, and more critiques of cadres who aren’t supervising the society all that well. Some commentators think that the solution is recruiting and retaining more talented cadres. Others seem convinced that greater transparency is the key.

Whatever the case, there are strong voices in the Party that think that listening to the public satisfies the discontented in a crisis (as it did in with NIMBY protesters in Ningbo recently). Regular, genuine dialogue with residents is also gaining traction as a means of developing social happiness in the long term. Instead of hoisting shields when protests threaten, many in the Party are urging officials to talk softly, and carry a big notebook.

This leaning towards the softer side of state power isn’t just another tactical adjustment. Indeed, it has the makings of a deep-thinking discussion that will resonate at the Party Congress, in large part because heir-apparent Xi Jinping, while side-stepping talk of political reform, has been calling loudly for a focus on Party-building.

Cadres are already raising questions and seeking support. What sort of Communist Party does China need? Something stronger—a super-sized Singapore, say—run by elites and more of the same technocrats who think that engineering society is very much like managing irrigation projects? Or does this new China need a smarter, sharper Party — one that slides further away from economic development as the silver bullet to solve all social conflict and tilts towards genuine dialogue with the newly-discouraged?

The problem is that change in China is getting tougher: Too many economic interests are at stake, and there’s been a slew of self-congratulation about previous accomplishments that seems. Moreover, shortening the distance between state power and the public doesn’t really suit Party hardliners, who have built their political legacy on keeping advocates for social change at bay.

New leaders still matter in China, but new hopes matter just as much. The central struggle at the Party Congress will not be over who runs what within the Party, but what sort of direction the Party ends up adopting.

Russell Leigh Moses is the Dean of Academics and Faculty at The Beijing Center for Chinese Studies. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.

The big questuion, it seems to me, the questions which must be answered if China is to avoid another revolution is: "What sort of Communist Party does China need?" My guess is that the current leadership favours "Something stronger—a super-sized Singapore, say—run by elites and more of the same technocrats who think that engineering society is very much like managing irrigation projects," but I have no idea what Xi Jinping and his subordinates think. Whatever sort they pick it will have to address a key issue: how to determine what the people want. The 19th century French politician Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin gave us a wonderful political axiom when he (maybe) said "There go my people. I must find out where they’re going so I can lead them." In most Western democracies this is easy, thanks to freedom of speech, a free and aggressive media, lobbying, social media and, above all, elections. In China it is very difficult but it is a problem which must be solved.