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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

Generally China's history is a collapse from within, then a slow recovery. My guess is a slow collapse which stifles growth and forces China to be consumed with domestic issues, with minimal foreign adventures as long as they can access resources.
 
A former Canadian executive at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Beijing turned whistleblower tells his story.

 

Sounds like rumours at this point but time will likely tell.



...and from the original source:

same sub?

 
Who says there's no private sector in China? ;)

Big Chinese state-owned enterprises setting up army-linked militias​

A major government-backed developer in Shanghai is the latest to launch its People’s Armed Forces department.

Major state-owned companies across China are setting up corporate militias under the direct management of local garrisons of the People’s Liberation Army, according to official reports.

Shanghai Municipal Investment Group, a major property and infrastructure developer affiliated with the city government, held a formal opening ceremony on Sept. 28 for its new People’s Armed Forces department, which will be run by the People’s Liberation Army’s Shanghai garrison, according to reports in The Liberation Daily News and The Paper.

The People’s Armed Forces departments were set up at every level of government, in schools, universities and state-owned enterprises to strengthen ruling Chinese Communist Party control over local militias, guard weapons caches and find work for veterans, all as part of China’s national defense mobilization strategy, according to Wikipedia.

After decades of relative invisibility throughout the post-Mao economic boom, they are once more mobilizing to build militias in big state-owned companies and consolidate party leadership over local military operations.

The new department at Shanghai Municipal Investment Group, also known as Shanghai Chengtou, came after similar moves in the central city of Wuhan and in the eastern province of Jiangsu, according to official statements and media reports.

 
Good article in Foreign Affairs:

Over the last 45 years, China has transformed from one of the world’s poorest and most isolated countries into the heart of the global supply chain. That economic rise, however, was built on a system of financial repression that prioritized investment and exports over domestic household consumption, leading to harmful stagnation on the demand side of the economy ... When Xi became president, in 2013, he had an opportunity to focus on domestic demand-side economic reform by shifting government policy to promote consumption over investment and by developing a more robust social welfare system. Instead, the cumulative policy shocks of Xi’s first two terms worsened the structural challenges that were dragging down—but not yet crashing—China’s economy. They also badly weakened the confidence that undergirded Deng’s opening-up era.

China’s stepped-up military activity around Taiwan, which also predated the pandemic, has stoked a gloomy perception in China that armed conflict is inevitable. China’s one-child generation would shoulder the weight of such a conflict, an immense threat that few families are prepared to cope with. Many China watchers underestimate the degree to which the souring of Western confidence in China has negatively affected Chinese people’s willingness to spend and to take economic risks. Pessimism from abroad contributes to the Chinese population’s mass loss of confidence, which James Kynge of The Financial Times has aptly characterized as a “psycho-political funk" ... In essence, Xi did not assemble China’s economic time bomb, but he dramatically shortened its fuse.

The problems facing the Chinese economy are not the consequence of recent policy shifts; they are the almost inevitable result of deep imbalances that date back nearly two decades and were obvious to many economists well over a decade ago. They are also the problems faced by every country that has followed a similar growth model.

In the past two decades, investment in China has continued to rise as rapidly as ever, even as it has progressively generated less and less value for each dollar invested. Overall growth has increasingly been driven by asset bubbles, especially in real estate, and an unsustainable rise in debt. Worse, over this period, business investment has become constrained by China’s extraordinarily low consumption rate, as shaky domestic demand discouraged private businesses from expanding production ... At the same time, the locus of Chinese economic activity shifted away from sectors of the economy constrained by hard budgets and a profit imperative, mainly the private sector, and toward sectors that are not so constrained, such as the public sector and those parts of the private sector with guaranteed access to liquidity—real estate, for example. The turn against the private sector was not the result of Xi’s particular ideology. It may have been accommodated by his rhetorical and policy shifts, but it was driven by something deeper: the growing imbalances in China’s economy and Beijing’s need to maintain high GDP growth rates.
 
On the other hand Xi still seems to struggle with his military.

China has officially removed its defense minister, state media reported today, the latest high-level shake-up for the Asian giant’s military and diplomatic corps. It’s also a move a Pentagon official indicated could lead to opportunities for improved military-to-military relations between Beijing and Washington.


This Al Jazeera article appeared on Friday.

 
This part of the article:
At the same time, the locus of [...] economic activity shifted away from sectors of the economy constrained by hard budgets and a profit imperative, mainly the private sector, and toward sectors that are not so constrained, such as the public sector and those parts of the private sector with guaranteed access to liquidity—real estate, for example.
...sounds familiar.
 
On the other hand Xi still seems to struggle with his military.




This Al Jazeera article appeared on Friday.

I'm wondering if:
  1. Xi is feeling the internal pressure and is further consolidating his own power by ridding himself of prospective opponents? or
  2. Xi is learning a bit from Russia about the natural propensity of autocrats to surround themselves or to be (it seems almost organic, doesn't it?) to be surrounded by "yes men" and wants to get better quality advice in the Zhongnanhai?
 
I'm wondering if:
  1. Xi is feeling the internal pressure and is further consolidating his own power by ridding himself of prospective opponents? or
  2. Xi is learning a bit from Russia about the natural propensity of autocrats to surround themselves or to be (it seems almost organic, doesn't it?) to be surrounded by "yes men" and wants to get better quality advice in the Zhongnanhai?

When was the last time that the CCP ganged up on a leader and replaced him? I know you are pretty well versed on the internal machinations of that body.
 
When was the last time that the CCP ganged up on a leader and replaced him? I know you are pretty well versed on the internal machinations of that body.
1970s, actually* ... I could look up the date if anyone's relay, really curious ... Mao decided to purge Soong Ching Ling, the widow of Dr Sun Hat-sen. He made th mistake of not keeping it quiet enough. Zhou En-lai got wind of the plot and, using Deng Xiaoping, who commander great loyalty in the PLA, he ordered Mme. Soong's mansion to be guarded and directed that any attempt to interfere was to be met with immediate, massive, deadly force. Mao's Red Guards appeared and were seen off very quickly.

Mao was furious, he purged Deng but could not get rid ion Zhou or Mme Soong.

---
* Not true, of course, there were other, later incidents, like when Deng purged the Gang of Four, bit it's one of my favourites. The point is that China, like all autocracies, does have an internal position and it is, now and again, effective. Mao, like most successful autocrats, was careful and ruthless, especially at containing opposition ... but autocrats have weakness, too, and sometimes, as in the case of Zhou and Deng, even the most powerful autocrats cannot overwhelm personal loyalties built up over the years.m Mao was feared, Deng and Zhou were respected, even loved by many.
 
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1970s, actually ... I could look up yore date if anyone's relay, really curious ... Mao decided to purge Soong Ching Ling, the widow of Dr Sun Hat-sen. He made th mistake of not keeping it quiet enough. Zhou En-lai got wind of the plot and, using Deng Xiaoping, who commander great loyalty in the PLA, he ordered Mme. Soong's mansion to be guarded and directed that any attempt to interfere was to be met with immediate, massive, deadly force. Mao's Red Guards appeared and were seen off very quickly.

Mao was furious, he purged Deng but could not get rid ion Zhou or Mme Soong.

Do you think the current group has the temerity to try something like that on for size?
 
Dunno ... but there is an internal opposition and I think Xi has overpromised and is underdelivering and that may be a serious weakness.

I can't imagine continually firing the guys with the guns is a procedure that can last indefinitely in that environment.
 
I can't imagine continually firing the guys with the guns is a procedure that can last indefinitely in that environment.
Well, I go back to why Xi may have fired him ... and there's a potential third reason: maybe he just wasn't doing a very good job, maybe the "remake" of the PLA which began under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s, isn't being done as efficiently for as effectively as it should be.
 
Well, I go back to why Xi may have fired him ... and there's a potential third reason: maybe he just wasn't doing a very good job, maybe the "remake" of the PLA which began under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s, isn't being done as efficiently for as effectively as it should be.
But in the ‘accountability game’ wouldn’t/shouldn’t that rest on Xi’s shoulders?
 
Well, I go back to why Xi may have fired him ... and there's a potential third reason: maybe he just wasn't doing a very good job, maybe the "remake" of the PLA which began under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s, isn't being done as efficiently for as effectively as it should be.

Following on from that thought - If the PLA had been continuing to develop along the lines of "The World's Second Best Army" who would carry the can if the model was found to be wrong?
 
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