More, from The Economist, on US-China and ASEAN's worries:
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Young, motivated and connected: South-East Asia today is probably the world’s most dynamic region. Its nearly 700m people are disproportionately youthful. They are keen to learn, innovate and apply themselves. And, more than anywhere else in an increasingly protectionist world, they see their future prosperity as part of a global economy, supporting open trade and exchange much more often than opposing it. (The tragedy of Myanmar, in the grip of a ruthless, inward-looking junta, is the exception that proves the rule.) As the region emerges from the pandemic, the interest of outside investors is piqued, above all in Indonesia. In the past, South-East Asia’s most populous country has
underperformed. But under President Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, a new drive for growth is under way, one that is more open to foreign investment than previously, including in new areas such as electric-vehicle (ev) batteries."
"South-East Asian leaders might be expected to relish all the attention on their region. Instead, the summitry finds many in a nervous, even unhappy, mood. One reason is President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. Most South-East Asians do not feel that it is their fight, and only a minority of the region’s governments have openly condemned Russia’s aggression. But Asian leaders have to grapple with the consequences of the war, like disrupted food supplies and rising prices. Though neither Mr Putin nor President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine are attending the summit, Jokowi tried hard to bring them there and get them to talk. As he stressed in an
interview with The Economist on the eve of the summit, dialogue is the essential precondition for progress on any thorny issue."
"... to all leaders in Asia, the faraway war in Ukraine offers a bracing lesson—about the signal importance of peace in their own region. As the prime minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, bluntly put it at a national-day rally in August: “Look at how things have gone wrong in Europe. Can you be sure that things cannot go wrong in our region too? Better get real, and be psychologically prepared.” Last week Cambodia’s strongman, Hun Sen, whose turn it was to host the annual round of summitry staged by the ten-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (
asean), said that the region was “now at the most uncertain juncture” even as it desired peace, security and sustainable growth. Mr Hun Sen referred vaguely to the “strategic challenges we all face”."
"In public, Asian policymakers are rarely more forthcoming about what those challenges are. In private, they are clear: a downward spiral in relations between China and America. President Xi emerged all-powerful from the Chinese Communist Party’s five-yearly congress. He packed the Politburo Standing Committee with loyalists and spoke of a titanic struggle with an American-led West. For his part, President Biden announced in early October draconian controls to stop Chinese companies benefiting from American technology, notably in the fields of chip design and artificial intelligence. This year he has also broken with a decades-long policy of rhetorical obfuscation in which America refused openly to commit itself to defending
Taiwan, the self-governing island whose eventual unification with the mainland is the Communist Party’s most sacred tenet."
"Technology and Taiwan: of the two, Taiwan is of more existential concern to South-East Asian policymakers. They have long worried about a superpower clash. But in the past, the speculation was more about a conflict in the South China Sea, where China’s vague but expansive “nine-dash line” encompasses nearly the whole sea and where it has built military installations on offshore reefs. Now, says a regional diplomat, the worry is all about Taiwan. “The nine-dash line,” the diplomat says. “That’s not a red line. [For China] Taiwan is the real red line.”"
"In that context, regional strategists are alarmed by the American shift in rhetoric. They deplore the
visit to Taiwan in August by Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic speaker of the House of Representatives, as needlessly provocative. China responded with live-fire military exercises all around the island. They are nervous about the consequences if Ms Pelosi’s
potential Republican replacement, Kevin McCarthy, follows through on his promise to visit Taiwan too. Regional policymakers think, as do some analysts and business types in America, that the Biden administration has gone too far ... [and] ... They are also worried that a shortage of trust acts as an obstacle to communication. Mutual disdain only grows. A South-East Asian who talks to both sides says that Chinese officials look at America’s political polarisation as proof of great-power decline. The Americans assume that, with Mr Xi’s dominance, their counterparts are merely “messenger boys”, with no authority of their own. Both sides complain that conversations are superficial. What is missing, says the diplomat, is that officials are not pulling their counterparts aside for frank discussions over how to defuse tensions. “The quality of conversations [needed] to help prevent crisis are just lacking,” he says. The pandemic, in reducing face-to-face meetings, has not helped."
"As for the weaponisation of technology against China, even America’s closest friends in South-East Asia worry that the Biden administration is leading the region down a dangerous road. Its overwhelming desire to keep China down, they say,
forces countries to take sides in ways that make them highly uncomfortable. Singapore has already accepted that in a bifurcated world where technology is “friend-shored”, the city-state will end up hewing to American-led supply chains. But what if America extends sanctions to tech-heavy Chinese firms operating outside China? This, says one Singaporean official, would create an enormous dilemma for a place whose reputation is built on being a safe, predictable and open business jurisdiction. As for Indonesia’s budding ev industry, will America one day force it to choose between it and China?"
"Mr Biden and his team are aware of some of the region’s concerns. Arriving in Cambodia straight from the climate summit in Egypt, the American president assured ASEAN it was “at the heart” of his policy in the Indo-Pacific region. He promised a “new era” of co-operation. Certainly, says one political leader, South-East Asians want engagement with America to be within a more “balanced” framework. So where, he asks, are the carrots? ... [but] ... Mr Biden’s new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, America’s proposition for economic engagement in the region, provides not much investment and next to no new access for Asian firms to American markets. Areas where America could make a big difference, such as helping finance the region’s transition to a low-carbon economy, remain largely unexplored. Only a few pockets of his administration, such as the Department of Commerce, are pushing for more openness. Much of the administration’s Asia policy, say many in South-East Asia, is driven by anti-China ideology."
"There, too, Mr Biden is aware of such concerns. After all, some analysts and business leaders back home also believe he badly needs to stabilise ties with China. Acknowledging the worries is a key point of his meeting with Mr Xi on November 14th in Bali. Mr Biden’s officials suggest the meeting will help put a floor under relations between the two countries. Few in Asia think it is a floor that relations cannot before long crash through."