CANADA UNDER ATTACK

[Griffin]

CANADA UNDER ATTACK:

How Government Policies Threaten Canada's
Military, Public Safety, Sovereignty, and National Unity

Is free for downloading from the Internet in Acrobat Adobe PDF format.  The testimonial for the book was written by Major General (retired) Clive Addy. 

You will find it at:

http://members.shaw.ca/canadaunderattack

 

[Colin Parkinson]

"cough" Manifist Destiny "cough"  Sort of predates Bush don't you think?

Good luck implementing it.

 

[spud]

Whats even more scarey is this North American Union that we've been hearing about. Bush is going ahead without even without approval of Congress or the people.

http://www.chuckbaldwinlive.com/Lou_Dobbs_transcript.html
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxCeWQ9Ge38

Love all those comments on youtube about the NWO running everything.

Please store your containers in the overhead compartment and take advantage of the "tinfoil helmets" in the seatback in front of you.

potato

 

[George Wallace]

Well.  A quick scan of this book shows that the author seems to have done a lot of research here on Army.ca in the Armour and other Combat Arms forums.  Most of his arguments have been posted in these forums before.

 

[paracowboy]

hey Grif, buddy, bubalah...you wouldn't perchance be involved with the selling of this book in some way, shape, or form, and are using Mike's site as free advertising, now wouldja? 'Cause that'd be shady. And rude.

 

[Cloud Cover]

I think P Cook is a frequent poster over at CCS21.org.

Cheers

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Well, his comments on the BC fires (p. 112) are utter tripe.  If they're indicative of the quality of his research, the book isn't worth the paper it's written on (given that's its electronic, that's saying something).

 

[Griffin]

Well, his comments on the BC fires (p. 112) are utter tripe.  If they're indicative of the quality of his research, the book isn't worth the paper it's written on (given that's its electronic, that's saying something).

Considering you give no evidence to support your statement, while the author used extensive research throughout the book, I wonder what your hidden agenda is here.  I know you  would like to ignore the fact that in developing this submission numerous resources were used ranging from DND news releases, to the Commission of Inquiry that followed, and extensive news coverage.  The book alone has over 300 footnotes relating to research reports, etc.  Maybe you think the senior officers of the CF who supported the project were also without merit or just maybe a Liberal government apologist has just been uncovered.

 

[Griffin]

hey Grif, buddy, bubalah...you wouldn't perchance be involved with the selling of this book in some way, shape, or form, and are using Mike's site as free advertising, now wouldja? 'Cause that'd be shady. And rude.

How about re-reading the original post.  Tell you what, I will repost the relevant part.  Note the FREE part of the comment.

"CANADA UNDER ATTACK:

How Government Policies Threaten Canada's
Military, Public Safety, Sovereignty, and National Unity

Is free for downloading from the Internet in Acrobat Adobe PDF format."

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

OK:

I was G3 Ops LFWA for the BC fires and received the first phone call from the province (on the August long weekend) requesting assistance.  I drafted and sent the order activating the Area IRU and dealt with the first 24 hours of the IRU's deployment.  I then performed all subsequent staff action that resulted the deployment of seven further task forces to six different locations throughout southern BC and coordinated the deployment of both CFB Esquimalt's volunteers and those from 4 Wg Cold Lake.  Further, I was heavily involved in the transition of PEREGRINE from an Area operation to one run by the DCDS.

Finally, I led the R Group that deployed, for the first time ever, LFWA HQ on operations.  I established the forward command centre and took my duty staff in by helicopter to Vernon, setting up the ops centre in the BCD armoury there.  We worked on the fire for over a month, including B Coy 1 PPCLI's actions in Southern Kelowna that resulted in a unit commendation and multiple deployments of Recce Sqn LdSH(RC) to virtually every major fire location.

Hidden agenda?

His comments are tripe.  Full stop.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Line by line, from the "book":

The army was unable to deploy in a timely manner with the necessary numbers of troops,

Troops were deployed against the initial Provincial request for 75 from 1 CMBG with 24 hours.  There were, IIRC, five subsequent requests, all met within hours of being received.  Before actually fighting fires, soldiers had to undergo Provincially required firefighter training in Merritt and Vernon, which created a 24 hour delay to their deployment on the line.

heavy and medium lift helicopters, and other equipment that could have been used to stop the massive forest fires that imperilled Kelowna and other BC commuities

These were never requested by the province.  We deployed Griffons, which were requested to act in a liaison role.  How would helicopters "stopped" the fires?

The manpower of the army was so overdeployed and short of numbers that sailors an force personnel had to be thrown into the breech

Completely incorrect.  There were still units in LFWA capable of being deployed.  We used Esquimalt's and Cold Lake's people near the end of the operation, largely to give our deployed Army forces some respite and to give them a chance to participate in the operation.  Further, the DCDS had warned many other units off - some as far away as Atlantic Area - for deployment should they have been required.

Had the navy not been on an operational pause, many of those sailors would not have been available.

Most of the naval personnel deployed were volunteers from CFB Esquimalt.  We didn't raid any ships for firefighters.

Again, the remarks on the BC Fires are laughably off base and lack even a modicum of proper background or research.  It reflect very poorly on the remainder of the document.

 

[Griffin]

Line by line, from the "book":

Troops were deployed against the initial Provincial request for 75 from 1 CMBG with 24 hours.  There were, IIRC, five subsequent requests, all met within hours of being received.  Before actually fighting fires, soldiers had to undergo Provincially required firefighter training in Merritt and Vernon, which created a 24 hour delay to their deployment on the line.

In BC there was something in the order of 70-80 fires operating at the peak of the season that ranged from the Kootenays to north of Kamploops and in between.  The comments made indicated that the numbers of troops deployed initially and for weeks thereafter were inadequate considering the scope of the problem.  I also note that the author was quite complimentary about the CF personnel responding to the fire, but indicated the numbers where inadequate to deal with the crisis.  There was no dispersions placed on the military; rather an example of how the gutting of the CF was having real world impacts on Canadians at home. 

These were never requested by the province.  We deployed Griffons, which were requested to act in a liaison role.  How would helicopters "stopped" the fires?

The Griffons did not have the lift capacity that a Chinook has, whether that is in terms of moving personnel, carrying equipment, or in dropping large fire retardant or water on fires as other military can perform.  Again this was not a negative comment on the military, but another example of how governments in the past have so denuded the forces of capability that it has negative impacts on how the military can respond at home and abroad.

There were still units in LFWA capable of being deployed.  We used Esquimalt's and Cold Lake's people near the end of the operation, largely to give our deployed Army forces some respite and to give them a chance to participate in the operation.  Further, the DCDS had warned many other units off - some as far away as Atlantic Area - for deployment should they have been required.

Check out the press releases from DND as to the manning levels during the crisis.  When they finally reached the higher numbers - towards the end - 3 weeks after it hit the fan - a lot of damage had occurred including considerable numbers of people losing their homes.  To be sure the province was not at its best either in terms of requests for manpower, or in how the various provincial and municipal fire agencies responded, but the fact is if the CF had been called on to supply heavy lift helo's and up to a brigade to fight these fires it couldn't have met that challenge.  Again this was not a local fire but a series of interface fires that scorched huge amounts of real estate across and area bigger than some of our Atlantic provinces. 

Most of the naval personnel deployed were volunteers from CFB Esquimalt.  We didn't raid any ships for firefighters.

The comment was in terms of having additional staff available as the naval was on an operational pause at the time and their personnel were available to boster the numbers the army and air force could supply. 

 

[RangerRay]

In those conditions, nothing would have stopped the fires, except for nature.  With the high winds and temperature, low relative humidity, almost 0 duff moisture content, and 100 years of ladder fuels building up under the canopy (due to 100 years of fire suppression), it is beyond human capacity to stop these fires.  These large fires create their own weather, that end up making the fire stronger, creating more wind.

To blame CF or Forest Service actions for those fires is ludicrous in the extreme.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

The comments made indicated that the numbers of troops deployed initially and for weeks thereafter were inadequate considering the scope of the problem.  I also note that the author was quite complimentary about the CF personnel responding to the fire, but indicated the numbers where inadequate to deal with the crisis.

You obviously have no idea how domestic operations work.  The CF cannot do anything unless requested to do so by a provincial government.  The CF, in this case, delivered exactly what was requested.  Moreover, soldiers can only be trained to tackle certain types of forest fires - the more dangerous ones are left to professionals.

There was nothing from BC asking for more troops or for soldiers to fight additional fires.  As it was, we were engaged throughout S. BC and provided - at one point - the bulk of the assets engaged against the fires in Kelowna.

The Griffons did not have the lift capacity that a Chinook has, whether that is in terms of moving personnel, carrying equipment, or in dropping large fire retardant or water on fires as other military can perform.

Which is irrelevant to this "discussion".  Heavier aircraft were never requested.

Check out the press releases from DND as to the manning levels during the crisis.  When they finally reached the higher numbers - towards the end - 3 weeks after it hit the fan - a lot of damage had occurred including considerable numbers of people losing their homes.

I know exactly how many soldiers were deployed and when.  During the first week of September 2003, we were the largest CF operations - including those overseas.  We deployed exactly what was requested by the Province of BC exactly when they requested it.  Again, soldiers can only fight certain types of fires - structural fires are left to professionals, although B Coy 1 PPCLI found itself fighting structural fires in Southern Kelowna.

The comment was in terms of having additional staff available as the naval was on an operational pause at the time and their personnel were available to boster the numbers the army and air force could supply.

There was no requirement for additional numbers.  NDHQ had warned units across Canada for deployment, but they were not required.  As it was, our units on the ground spent the last week of the operation "cold trailing" - a waste of CF resources - and we withdrew shortly thereafter.

I will state this again, categorically:  the Army met every request for soldiers from the Province, which employed them as required against fires in the Okanagan and Barriere/McClure with great effect.  I have never heard one word of complaint from any quarter about the numbers deployed or the equipment utilized - and I attended the Provincial Fire Symposium in the Fall 2003 where the entire season was revisited; the operation was described by the DCDS as "textbook".

If the "author" is using OP PEREGRINE as an example of a "failed" domestic operation, he is being intellectually dishonest.

PS:  I happen to be from Kelowna and would have heard an ear-full from my parents should the operation have been the least bit inadequate.

Edited to clean up some abysmal punctuation.

 

[KevinB]

And for what its worth B Coy wanted to keep fighting the structural fires...

I had some cool pic of us riding on the top of fire trucks that first night.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Yup.  I actually had one complaint from the BCFS:

"Your guys want to run towards the fire, even when we tell them to run away from it!"

 

[STONEY]

Of all the weighty subjects covered in this book, BC forrest fires, it would seem to me to hardly rate even a mention but that ,like the rest of the book is only the authors opinion and many points made are open to dissagreement but that maybe the authors intention , to foster discussion.
Cheers.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

I understand, but the author uses the fires as a primary example of the Army's inadequacies.  I would suggest that if his first analogy is so seriously flawed, the remainder of his arguments are open to question as well.

 

[Brad Sallows]

There are large numbers of fires in BC every year.  As to the effectiveness of large quantities of military manpower and equipment, one should explore the question of why California loses so many homes to fires.  Tool.

 

[Griffin]

Of all the weighty subjects covered in this book, BC forrest fires, it would seem to me to hardly rate even a mention but that ,like the rest of the book is only the authors opinion and many points made are open to dissagreement but that maybe the authors intention , to foster discussion.
Cheers.

Stoney, thank you for the reasoned comments. 

How anyone could suggest that pointing out government failures to support the CF was an attack on the troops is utter nonsense.  Indeed by the time any reader had reached that portion of the book should have readily seen the support being given to the CF by pointing out government failures to properly fund, equip and man the CF. The suggestions of dishonesty, etc. are in exceptionally poor taste.  I guess they think Major General (retired) Clive Addy who wrote the testimonial for the book doesn't know squat, Major General (retired) Lew MacKenenzie who reviewed at least one draft and encouraged the author to proceed doesn't know his stuff, Col. (retired) Howie Marsh who supplied some graphs on funding for the book is not to be trusted either, nor does Jack Granatstein and many others who saw the drafts before it was published for FREE on the Internet as a public service.

I will move to other topics, and hope that repetition of this behaviour isn't the norm.  Oh yes, to some of the doubting Thomas's, I started viewing this board when I joined.  That is how I have worked on the Internet in military, police, and other forums since the late 1980's, including being on various forum staff.  If I have used words that may have offended some through miscommunication, then I apologize.  Enough said.