CFL and recceguy:
I think you both may be on to something (although I am waiting to hear from our Marine friend...). Personally (and this is just my own take) I regard Unification as a hideous disaster that did more institutional damage than we can begin to imagine. One of the most brutal and stupid things it did was to teach support people that they were "specialists" first and soldiers second (or...third.. or,welll....whatever).
It is worth remembering the historical perspective of the advent of Unification. The Glassco Report, which led to it, was written at a time in the 1960's when the nuclear threat had raised serious doubts about the actual value of ground troops at all. This misguided line of thinking had already led, among other things, to a disaster in our Army Reserve which was subjected to an attempted conversion to a civil defence force, since the theory of the day held that nuclear war would render mobilization pointless. Instead Reserve soldies were to be trained as psuedo-fire/rescue people, but with utterly inadequate kit (ie: zero IPE) This was the infamous "Snakes and Ladders" period, during which Reservists, many of them still with WWII or Korea experience, quit in droves. It was also, IMHO, the opening salvo in the nasty little war that has raged between the two parts of our Army until very recently.
Concurrent with the nuclear fixation was the obsession with technology and "systems" as the solution to everything. This was, in my opinion, the beginning of a period that has lasted until probably about the last decade or so, in which the human aspects of soldiering were neglected or minimized. The US went down that road but IMHO they have learned a few lessons, especially here in OEF and in OIF. Unification brought with it an approach that service in the military was really just another job, and that the real purpose of military service was to learn a saleable skill of some sort. The result of this fixation was an elevation of the technician above the warrior.
We have lived with this institutional atrocity for well over 30 years now, and I believe that it is only just now, as a result of our recent operational expreiences (as well as those of our Allies) that we may be realizing that the "purple tradesman" is an outdated luxury who can actually be a liability on the battlefield. The US has learned in no uncertain terms that supporters must be able to fight, and that their Army needs more Infantry. In fact, I had a conversation in my office today with two US Air Defense Artillery officers who were complaining about how their units were being disbanded to create more Infantry. This is apparently happening in the Field Arty too.
Now, let me pause to say that I have had the great privelige to command the Administration Company of a mech battalion. And I do mean privelige: I was very proud of almost every one of those support people. Overall, they worked harder and longer than the guys in the rifle coys did, both in garrison and in the field. It sure as hell wasn't Admin Coy knocking off at 1430, and lots of times we didn't take part in sports on Fridays because we had to get the bn ready for a deployment, or an ATI, or whatever. The folks I detatched out to the rifle coys, like the MRTs, the amb teams and the cooks busted their asses, and in most cases they enjoyed a close relationship with their companies. But, again in my opinion, these people were good in spite of the purple CF system, not because of it.
I believe that we must pursue an Army model very similar to that of the USMC: everyone a soldier first, with a total Army orientation instead of bouncing our support folk from one environment to the next. As well, I believe we might want to look very seriously at the issue of how we instill confidence, pride and toughness. Not in a BS way, and not in a stupid way that beats everybody to a snot, but in a way that strenghtens us all. How do we do that? What do you guys think? Cheers.
