Canada doesn’t matter to the rest of the world - and it’s our own fault

[Remius]

Which would you prefer? The RG31/Mamba or the TAPV? Or the Bushmaster?

Sorry was your initial question about what I saw or what I prefer?

 

[Kirkhill]

Sorry was your initial question about what I saw or what I prefer?

Too cryptic for my own good. Which would you prefer?

 

[Remius]

Too cryptic for my own good. Which would you prefer?

That would be out of my wheelhouse in terms of preference. I’m no expert on any of these other than a passing convo about the TAPV with the PM of that project and a frustrated director of the infantry about how the eff we use something that wasn’t asked for. and doubtful the ARES will even get any type of mobility platform beyond contracted school busses and cube vans. Sadly at this point anything would better than what we have which is currently nothing.

 

[Fabius]

Negatron.

NSE is theatre support for TFL. FLG is a Svc Bn minus that is providing integral Log support minus to the Bde.

Last I saw I thought the Svc Bn was being called the MLU, Mutinational logistics unit.
Is the FLG going to be the Cdn portion of the MLU?

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Last I saw I thought the Svc Bn was being called the MLU, Mutinational logistics unit.
Is the FLG going to be the Cdn portion of the MLU?

Yes. A Canadian subcomponent of the larger MLU

 

[KevinB]

Too cryptic for my own good. Which would you prefer?

For what????

All have uses, all have weaknesses when used outside their intended roles.

 

[Haggis]

For what????

All have uses, all have weaknesses when used outside their intended roles.

AVGP Cougar enters the chat.

 

[dapaterson]

Hopefully they don't get mixed in with some stolen cars from Toronto and end up in a Persian gulf state.

Blame the slackers at CBSA for that

 

[Kirkhill]

For what????

All have uses, all have weaknesses when used outside their intended roles.

Well, from where I sit, the RG-31 was adopted as an expedient patrol vehicle and troop transport. We still seem to be trying to figure out why the TAPV was adopted at all.

 

[FJAG]

We still seem to be trying to figure out why the TAPV was adopted at all.

The TAPV was part of a variety of programs instituted while Afghanistan was still a thing and we were settling into that type of conflict. Additional projects of the approximate time frame involved the close combat vehicle, the LAV upgrade to the LAV 6, the purchase of an additional 25 M777s and the Long Range Precision Rocket (aka HIMARS) project. Remember too that the Leo 2s were pretty new at that time as well. It was a short term era of some major equipment recapitalization for the army.

The stated purpose of the program was the following:

The TAPV is a wheeled combat vehicle that will conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, security, command and control, and armoured transport of personnel and equipment. The vehicle is highly mobile and provides a very high degree of protection for its crew.

The TAPV will replace the reconnaissance role currently carried out by the Coyote reconnaissance vehicles (LAV II), and the patrolling, liaison, and VIP transport roles formerly carried out by the Armoured Patrol Vehicle (RG-31). The TAPV will complement the Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled (G-Wagon).

High on the list of 'nice to have's' were vehicles with a good mine resistance which were a key cause of casualties in theatre at the time.

Not to get too cheeky about it but one might recall that the Coyote had its issues as well. It was originally purchased to phase out the Lynx family of reconnaissance vehicles and it took quite a few years for the armoured corps, through trial and error, to determine that while the Coyote made a poor reconnaissance vehicle it made a great surveillance vehicle. The search was on for a recce vehicle to complement the Coyote.

 

[Aper]

Not to get too cheeky about it but one might recall that the Coyote had its issues as well. It was originally purchased to phase out the Lynx family of reconnaissance vehicles and it took quite a few years for the armoured corps, through trial and error, to determine that while the Coyote made a poor reconnaissance vehicle it made a great surveillance vehicle. The search was on for a recce vehicle to complement the Coyote.

Having driven the Coyote in both domestic and outer-sea usages in Afghanistan, it was doing great in exercises in Gagetown and Wainwright. Not too much action, a little mast surveillance here, a little live training there, the Coyote was never pushed.

In A-Stan, with the extra armour added, the arid conditions, the non-stop driving due to demanding recce taskings, it was pure garbage and not ment to be deployed in these conditions and always broken or into the maintenance bays.

BUT ! Once stationned into an observation point for several days/weeks, it was doing great

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Well, from where I sit, the RG-31 was adopted as an expedient patrol vehicle and troop transport. We still seem to be trying to figure out why the TAPV was adopted at all.

We've been over this before, but you cannot seem to resist turning any thread into a TAPV discussion.

The TAPV was initially conceived as a replacement for a number of vehicles that were being used to move people around Afghanistan. The Canadian Army (CA) had all sorts of small elements (CIMIC/PSYOPS teams for instance) that needed protected transportation. In previous peacekeeping theatres these folks would travel in "jeeps." There were also convoys that had escort vehicles. Then we had infantry that did not have LAVs who were using two light vehicles for a section-sized patrol. We went from Iltis in Kabul to armoured GWagons supplemented by RG31 when it was apparent that the armoured GWagon was not going to stand up to larger IEDs. We'd initially had a limited number of Nyala as well.

The TAPV would replace the GWagon and RG31 with a single blast-protected vehicle type. By 2008/09, though, the Coyote was at its maximum weight and could not take more armour without a major rework. A number of casualties were suffered by Coyote crews and in 2008 the TAPV was expanded to include Coyote replacement. At this point the RCAC became very interested. After a while it was determined that the intended LRSS would not practically fit on the TAPV, so the idea shifted somewhat to mixed recce patrols of TAPV and LAV-LRSS. As the war ended for Canada the light infantry wanted nothing to do with the TAPV as a troop carrier and focused on other things. We had big TAPV barns built.

The TAPV is a vehicle with excellent blast protection, an RWS, good road mobility and better cross-country mobility than we expected in 2008 when we saw what was being offered. They would have been good vehicles in Kandahar for the intended roles (including convoy escort etc). Had Canada deployed a Battle Group to Mali in 2017 as part of a UN force, for example, the TAPV would have been a great vehicle that that theatre and role. If a light battalion had deployed to Mali (or some other UN theatre) I am sure they would suddenly gotten quite fascinated with TAPVs. I've seen similar vehicles in use by other nations (the Italians had a nice looking one) in peacekeeping missions with a mine/IED threat. Very useful vehicles in those theatres.

So we have a really good vehicle for our last war, that might still be really use for our next war since predicting the next war/operation is an inexact science. The TAPV can still have utility in a conventional conflict, but we need to remember that it was designed for blast protection above all else.

 

[KevinB]

It’s an excellent Airfield security vehicle…
A good MP escort vehicle.

It’s a shit Infantry vehicle regardless of theatre.

 

[Fabius]

Without spare parts available in the system to allow for maintenance it doesn’t matter what it’s good at or not. No matter what it is good for or not good for, if we can’t keep them serviceable with parts and tech hours it’s all kind of moot.

 

[OldSolduer]

When Bill Maher calls Canada out for extreme wokeness…..

 

[Kirkhill]

We've been over this before, but you cannot seem to resist turning any thread into a TAPV discussion.

The TAPV was initially conceived as a replacement for a number of vehicles that were being used to move people around Afghanistan. The Canadian Army (CA) had all sorts of small elements (CIMIC/PSYOPS teams for instance) that needed protected transportation. In previous peacekeeping theatres these folks would travel in "jeeps." There were also convoys that had escort vehicles. Then we had infantry that did not have LAVs who were using two light vehicles for a section-sized patrol. We went from Iltis in Kabul to armoured GWagons supplemented by RG31 when it was apparent that the armoured GWagon was not going to stand up to larger IEDs. We'd initially had a limited number of Nyala as well.

The TAPV would replace the GWagon and RG31 with a single blast-protected vehicle type. By 2008/09, though, the Coyote was at its maximum weight and could not take more armour without a major rework. A number of casualties were suffered by Coyote crews and in 2008 the TAPV was expanded to include Coyote replacement. At this point the RCAC became very interested. After a while it was determined that the intended LRSS would not practically fit on the TAPV, so the idea shifted somewhat to mixed recce patrols of TAPV and LAV-LRSS. As the war ended for Canada the light infantry wanted nothing to do with the TAPV as a troop carrier and focused on other things. We had big TAPV barns built.

The TAPV is a vehicle with excellent blast protection, an RWS, good road mobility and better cross-country mobility than we expected in 2008 when we saw what was being offered. They would have been good vehicles in Kandahar for the intended roles (including convoy escort etc). Had Canada deployed a Battle Group to Mali in 2017 as part of a UN force, for example, the TAPV would have been a great vehicle that that theatre and role. If a light battalion had deployed to Mali (or some other UN theatre) I am sure they would suddenly gotten quite fascinated with TAPVs. I've seen similar vehicles in use by other nations (the Italians had a nice looking one) in peacekeeping missions with a mine/IED threat. Very useful vehicles in those theatres.

So we have a really good vehicle for our last war, that might still be really use for our next war since predicting the next war/operation is an inexact science. The TAPV can still have utility in a conventional conflict, but we need to remember that it was designed for blast protection above all else.

Mea culpa.

 

[Brad Sallows]

It’s an excellent Airfield security vehicle…
A good MP escort vehicle.

It’s a shit Infantry vehicle regardless of theatre.

It's better than a truck, if trucks are the alternative.

 

[KevinB]

It's better than a truck, if trucks are the alternative.

Yes and no, most trucks can be exited quickly, and have room for actual dismounted troops. Sure it’s got armor for EID’s and some splinter protection- but it’s not anything to fight from, or get into a fight in.

 

[MJP]

Without spare parts available in the system to allow for maintenance it doesn’t matter what it’s good at or not. No matter what it is good for or not good for, if we can’t keep them serviceable with parts and tech hours it’s all kind of moot.

It is such a weird conundrum as the TAPV actually has one of the best methodologies for getting spare parts compared to all our other fleets. When a work order stock demand reaches the depot and they don't have the part it is automatically pegged against TEXTRON and they have contractual obligations to fulfill in getting the parts to us within a certain timeline.

It would be an interesting study to see the stats, processes and pain points that is causing delays. I suspect that while parts availability plays a large role, our own ineptitude with a complex Defence Supply Chain and how the contract is managed likely plays a significant role as well.

 

[Kirkhill]

It is such a weird conundrum as the TAPV actually has one of the best methodologies for getting spare parts compared to all our other fleets. When a work order stock demand reaches the depot and they don't have the part it is automatically pegged against TEXTRON and they have contractual obligations to fulfill in getting the parts to us within a certain timeline.

It would be an interesting study to see the stats, processes and pain points that is causing delays. I suspect that while parts availability plays a large role, our own ineptitude with a complex Defence Supply Chain and how the contract is managed likely plays a significant role as well.

When the TAPV was adopted how many points of use were there supposed to be? 3 Light Battalions, 5 Recce Squadrons and a handful of training areas?

Now the fleet appears to be more broadly distributed among elements that never expected to own TAPVs. Has that changed the support imperatives?