C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Colin Parkinson]

You can run both a towed and truck mounted version of the same 105mm gun in the Reserves. The towed is where you learn your trade and then expand on the mobility side with the truck mounted ones. The Brigade HQ is going to hate dedicated gun trucks as the other units can't borrow the truck. The 105 and 155 can use the same FCS as well. The 105 still outranges the 120mm mortar and the tractor can carry more stowed rounds than a 155. Mobility and ROF is nice, but if you go back and reload every 20 or so rounds, that's going to impact your tube availability. 20 rds of 155 is a bit over 2,000lbs. With a mounted gun you need a 10 ton truck to carry crew, equipment, gun and ammo. A mounted M777 is likley in and around 4 tons by itself. whereas a 105mm mounted gun can get away with a 5 ton or as small as a Humvee except you need two trucks. The EVO-105 system from Korea appears to have about 27-30 stowed rounds and room on the deck for more. The Archer has 21 stowed rounds.

 

[FJAG]

The idea of pooling guns at training centres isn't new, it just doesn't work very well for IT throughput, this has more to do with availability of staff and students, as well as conflicting task priorities during the summer (ceremonial guard tasks having higher priority for example)
In the past six years, the P Res Arty units in 4 Div went from centralized training at RST to a dispersed IT model running year round. The results after just the first four years were very positive (which can be seen in this example of 56 Fd alone). They are now running DP 2 and 3 NCM and Officer courses within their own armouries. Incredibly, there are critics of this approach, but it's hard to argue against success. Whatever the solution looks like, it's clear it needs to be able to work within the context of dispersed IT, as that certainly seems to be the best model to adapt to build the mass needed.

I tend to favour decentralized training myself but think that the future for the reserves needs to be training parity with the RegF to allow for seamless component transfer. My opinion is also influenced by the fact that IMHO ResF units should use their restricted time to be more concerned with collective training rather than individual training.

Our present decentralized training system is too susceptible to the lack of critical mass for both instructors and students, non-rigorous enforcement of training standards and lack of resources.

I don't think that centralized training centres by themselves solve these problems. As you point out, they become a choke point for throughput. I favour local training wherever possible but I would like to see a centralized training structure made up of both RegF and ResF staff that sets standards and controls programming executed both by full-time summer schools and by part-time winter programs. I've described these before as depot battalions functioning through instructor companies and platoons functioning year round and located at both regional training centres and at the armoury floor.

Once the replacement shows up, instead of "divesting" the C3, as is the habit when new kit arrives, it should be kept for ceremonial purposes. For Avcon they should look at doing that with the LG1, which although it has problems too, it does have OEM support, the C3 does not. (BTW, the LG1 was used for Op Palaci temporarily in 2011 when the C3 fleet was grounded)

Couldn't agree more. To keep the C3 wouldn't even require a course of training. Detachments trained on another system could be taught the fundamentals of working a C3 as a saluting gun in as little as a day or two. Very few of the points of failure on the C3 would prevent its use for moving it to and from a saluting base and firing blank rounds.

As to the LG1, I wouldn't even write it off as an operational gun either. We originally bought some 28 of them and that's enough to equip and keep serviceable one or two light batteries. There are things that a light 105mm howitzer can do that you can't do with a 155mm (I really do wish we had a helicopter other than the Chinook that could lift it) and the US IBCT artillery battalion structure of two M119 batteries and an M777 battery does have some sense behind it. Personally I'd prefer to see a Canadian Light Brigade equipped with two six-gun 30/70 LG1 batteries and one 6-gun 70/30 M777 battery rather than two four-gun 100/0 M777 batteries.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Need to find a wishing well to throw a bucket of pennies into so we can get some as well

US Army orders more M109A7 Paladin howitzers

The U.S. Army has awarded BAE Systems a contract to produce and deliver additional Paladin howitzers. As noted by the company, Army awarded BAE Systems a $299 million contract for the production and delivery of 40 sets of M109A7 Self-Propelled Howitzers and their companion M992A3 ammunition...

defence-blog.com

 

[FJAG]

That would be just about right for us to support two mechanized brigades properly.

 

[Kirkhill]

What Canada doesn't need is YET another 105mm towed gun...
Distance from a range is an issue with any platform.


If one is looking at potentially making Petawawa the Lt Bde area - then Ontario Res units are the only ones that makes sense for the 777, the rest need to make do with what they have until a SPA/Rkt option can be acquired.
Pet isn't huge - but it can shoot 155mm, your going to need Wx and Suffied for any rocket systems.

I would suggest that HIMARS be a good system for most Res Arty units -- as it is very easily trained on - and there are advanced simulators so Units without easy access to ranges can still conduct Individual and Collective Training.



I will reiterate my opinion that the 105mm Artillery has gone the way of the 105mm tank gun.

M109A7 SPA
HIMARS
M777

Color the box checked.

I think the FFAR 70mm has a role at the battle group level together with 1he 120mm mortar and Loitering Munitions of similar caliber.

The Combat Team could be armed with the 81mm mortar, the 84mm CG84, NLAWs and Javelins as well as UAVs in the 40mm to 60mm range

 

[KevinB]

I think the FFAR 70mm has a role at the battle group level together with 1he 120mm mortar and Loitering Munitions of similar caliber.

The Combat Team could be armed with the 81mm mortar, the 84mm CG84, NLAWs and Javelins as well as UAVs in the 40mm to 60mm range

Honestly I don’t see the FFAR for anything but AH’s at this point.
I’m convinced that the 120mm Mortar is impractical outside a mounted system.

GL and Mortar Launched UAV’s I’m not a fan of these days as dedicated quad cooter systems can do the job better in easier recoverable platforms.

Loitering Munitions have a lot of issues to work out that require a dedicated Air/Ground cell, and I think need to be viewed as an Arty only system. Further more they can’t be viewed as an ISR system as they don’t offer any sort of recovery and need to be used or lost.

I’m not a NLAW fan, if one retains the Carl G, and has Javelin. It is duplication of effort and overlaps both systems in a manner I think causes additional burdens.
While theoretically most cost effective, I think it will actually just drive costs as one needs to acquire and supply them too. No one is going to chose NLAW over Javelin unless in a very close fight - that close fight gives too much away to the enemy, as they are more effective in close.


Outside of SOF, I am a fan of thinking by Brigade, I think that structuring around a Battle Group or Cbt Team either gets too bulky or gives up too many enablers (unless you are talking about a Brigade Combat Team, not the company sized one)

 

[Kirkhill]

Kevin.

I don't want to take your ground. I want to stop you taking my ground.

I'll take the Scandinavian organization over the US organization. Even you lot can't afford more than one Penetration Division these days.

Dispersion and attrition.

 

[Kirkhill]

As to the NLAW

I consider it a great Panzerfaust that should be stocked in large numbers for Territorials/Militia along with M72s and AT4s.

The Javelin and CG84 can go to the regs.

As for weapons needing vehicles. I agree. I am satisfied with 1 tonne vehicles though.

 

[KevinB]

Kevin.

I don't want to take your ground. I want to stop you taking my ground.

I'll take the Scandinavian organization over the US organization. Even you lot can't afford more than one Penetration Division these days.

Dispersion and attrition.

The only folks who can realistically come to take your ground are me and my countrymen.
I don’t see that as a realistic occurrence anytime soon, and quite frankly if we did come, an Army 4x the current CA size won’t stop us.

Unlike Europe we don’t have significant concerns about invasion, and as a result have expeditionary forces, not self defense forces.

 

[OldSolduer]

The only folks who can realistically come to take your ground are me and my countrymen.
I don’t see that as a realistic occurrence anytime soon, and quite frankly if we did come, an Army 4x the current CA size won’t stop us but the glorius militia y'all possess has a chance!!

FTFY - you are very welcome - tongue in cheek of course

 

[Kirkhill]

FTFY - you are very welcome - tongue in cheek of course

Only problem

Name a war that was won without the Militia.

Russia is running into that now. Ukraine has raised its Militia. Russia has not.

 

[KevinB]

Only problem

Name a war that was won without the Militia.

Russia is running into that now. Ukraine has raised its Militia. Russia has not.

At a certain point there is no difference between Reg/Res/CIV when a war is going on.

 

[Kirkhill]

At a certain point there is no difference between Reg/Res/CIV when a war is going on.

That is true.

Heartening for the Curries, Monashes and Smuts of the world, as well as the Maos, Minhs, Washingtons, Morgans, Castros, Cavaliers and Wallace's... among others.

 

[KevinB]

That is true.

Heartening for the Curries, Monashes and Smuts of the world, as well as the Maos, Minhs, Washingtons, Morgans, Castros, Cavaliers and Wallace's... among others.

IMHO most Militias would be better off training on small arms, explosives, AFV/AC recognition, and most importantly comms.

Not enough effort is put into guerrilla communications. Because standard comms methods for most industrial nations will be compromised in the even of an invasion.

Any idiot can make IED’s and run ambushes / but coordination takes real effort, and significantly more effort to run a clandestine system that is effective.

 

[Kirkhill]

IMHO most Militias would be better off training on small arms, explosives, AFV/AC recognition, and most importantly comms.

Not enough effort is put into guerrilla communications. Because standard comms methods for most industrial nations will be compromised in the even of an invasion.

Any idiot can make IED’s and run ambushes / but coordination takes real effort, and significantly more effort to run a clandestine system that is effective.

Agree completely

That is why, for the Canadian Militia, I like the Company/Squadron as the primary organizational element. Small arms and light vehicles for effective local training.

I am starting to think the RRCA reserves should be organized separately from the TBGs by the RRCA.... after the fashion of the RCAF and the RCN

 

[KevinB]

Agree completely

That is why, for the Canadian Militia, I like the Company/Squadron as the primary organizational element. Small arms and light vehicles for effective local training.

I am starting to think the RRCA reserves should be organized separately from the TBGs by the RRCA.... after the fashion of the RCAF and the RCN

Very few governments want an effective guerrilla force inside their borders.

Having been a R021 back in the day, the PRes Arty can do pretty much any gun line job seamlessly with the Regular force. The CP, Recce, and OP tasks require more training - and some can do it as good, but very few - so I think the RRCA Res portion is best used filling M777 positions, and later hopefully M109A7 and HiMARS/MLRS BTY’s.

Leave the STA, Met, etc to the Reg’s.

The guns don’t necessarily need to be collocated with the troops, and some areas aren’t conducive to generating Arty BTY’s if they aren’t within a few hours drive of a range/support base.

Identification of logical hubs to place/relocate units to is key.
Wainwright, Suffield, Shilo, Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown can all support Artillery, and units beyond 4-6 hours of a bus move probably don’t fit the mold for an Artillery unit.

Places like BC probably should have their Arty units rerolled into Light/Mountain Infantry units.

 

[Kirkhill]

Very few governments want an effective guerrilla force inside their borders.

The question for Canada is if it wants an effective army inside its borders.

 

[NavyShooter]

Interesting thing I came across (and I'll find a link from home later) is that on many warships, they often had a practice/drill gun position. Particularly on large ships - ie battleships.

This was a fixed position, non-firing breech mechanism with all the space/equipment around it to enable a gun crew to practice their loading drills and get their speed up.

This is what enabled US WW2 ships to get fast rates of fire (20+ rounds per minute) from their 5" dual purpose guns.

I think that a key aspect to helping train new troops might be the return to this kind of drill equipment.

If you're looking at building skills at the gun-line level, I would think it sensible to have a 'simulated' M777 howitzer body capable of being used not for shooting, but simply for practicing setting up the gun position, and loading drills.

Having these simulated guns at the PRes unit level would enable the troops at the gun line level to be able to practice weekly, while keeping the guns themselves situated in locations that they can actually be fired.

So....my suggestion -

1. Keep the 105s for ceremonial only
2. Standardize on M777 for all
3. Supply all PRes Arty units with 2 'training' guns for positional setup and loading drill practice

But what do I know...

 

[FJAG]

Most of my Militia artillery days were spent doing dry deployments within the confines of the CNE grounds in Toronto. The only substantial difference between that and live fire is that the gun recoils during live fire.

My take on the M777 is that it's a great gun for a light brigade and in my view of the world the first purpose of a light brigade is to be a quick reaction force during peacetime which basically tilts it toward the RegF with perhaps extra reserve batteries for follow up rotos.

The artillery's big problem right now is that we have one fleet of M777s already and the Army's mentality is that the artillery won't get a new gun until the M777 is clapped out and needs either major refurbishment or replacement. In reality the artillery needs two fleets - a light fleet capable of supporting light forces and a mechanized fleet capable of supporting medium and heavy forces (and, as an aside, precision rockets and armed UAVs)

Until the Army comes to grips with that understanding (as they did when we had the light LG1 and the heavy M109 simultaneously) we're dead in the water.

We definitely need to do much better with simulators, both stationary, as you suggest, and subcalibre devices/simulation munitions that let us practice live fire in heavily restricted range areas.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Well we could add Rocket troops to the reserves cheaply with this system on some milcots

Arnold Defense : New Thales 2.75-inch Rocket (FZ275) certified for firing from Arnold Defense LAND-LGR4 Launcher

Arnold Defense, the St. Louis based manufacturer of 70mm/2.75-inch rocket launchers, together with Thales, has achieved formal certification to fire the new Thales FZ275 70mm/2.75-inch Laser-Guided Rocket (LGR) from the Arnold Defense LAND-LGR4 rocket launcher, during recent testing in Sweden...

www.arnolddefense.com