C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Kirkhill]

Until they are needed - which is the sole point of having a Peacetime Army - deterrence and the ability to deploy to support Government Policy.

Somalia the CAR had AVGP's not technically dismounted (and you'd have been swallowed up as a dismounted entity under BN size there)

I fully agree the CA doesn't know what it wants to be when it grows up.


I won't disagree with you there.
My point is more that Canada needs to be practical with it's acquisitions - right now it have a plethora of LAV hulls - which has seemed to breed a need for more (again I am a tad confused for all the CP variants and lack of a lot of common sense variants).

You can split off a smaller force from a well equipped larger force for certain operations - but you cannot make a smaller entity be a larger entity easily.

I don't see any future in a 105mm Howitzer, be it towed or SP Wheeled or Tracked, in a Modern Military prepared to fight a High Intensity Conflict.
The Government of Canada have given that mandate to the CA - so preparing to fight a low intensity war isn't doing the mission the GoC has given it.

One needs tanks (ugh) true Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (not a LAV), SPG's, SHORAD, MRAD, Long Range Precision Fires, ATGM's etc.
Oh and an ability to support them.

If you don't see a need for a 105 I would counter I don't see a need for a LAV mounted 81 or 120. I will take the 105 over either one of those, IF, I get to direct its fire and how it is split up and used.


So let me step back a bit

My current artillery support configuration for a LAV Battalion of 3 Companies of 3 Platoons or a LAV Regiment of 3 Squadrons of 3 Troops. (I wont argue the number of LAVs or GIBs)

16x MSHORAD - 4 per company with one per platoon and one per company HQ.
8x SPG/H organized as per the 81mm mortar battery - 2 groups of 4 split into 2 sections of 2. Available for intimate support of a pair of companies while keeping a group and a company in reserve for support.
4x LAM at battalion

Fire Control
9x Forward Observers
4x FiSTs (One extra for Battalion HQ and Recce)
1x Fires Cell (FSCC)
1x TACP

Now does that get permanently, habitually, routinely, occasionally or theoretically attached to, or integrated with, an infantry battalion or a cavalry regiment?

None of this precludes forming GS regiments of 155s, MLRSs and ISR batteries. Nor GBAD regiments. Both of those can be built on a high technology low manpower base.

 

[FJAG]

4 CMBG never fired a shot until it was broken up and despatched to Yugoslavia.

You say that likes that's a failure.

A credible deterrence, which 4 CMBG was a part of in those days, prevented a war for over thirty very tense years. In my books that's a win-win.

The difference of opinion being expressed in these threads is based on those who believe that a credible deterrence trough alliances is once again needed and those who believe that we can solely concentrate on defence of the homeland. I'm firmly embedded with the former.

 

[Kirkhill]

I didn't say that 4 CMBG inactivity was a failure. I simply say that if you don't use it expect to lose it. And we tend not to use it.

A defence source close to the plans told The Telegraph: “If you only have 148 tanks and 22 of them are stuck in Canada, that’s 22 tanks that are not at readiness and not available to do anything operational.

“If they are training in Poland or Duqm, the logic is that they are having a more operational and deterrent effect.”

British Army to leave Canada after 50 years for new base in Middle East

Modernisation plans will include developing training area in Oman, which will also position British hardware closer to potential adversaries

www.telegraph.co.uk

Especially if we "are stuck in Canada".

 

[FJAG]

If you don't see a need for a 105 I would counter I don't see a need for a LAV mounted 81 or 120. I will take the 105 over either one of those, IF, I get to direct its fire and how it is split up and used.


So let me step back a bit

My current artillery support configuration for a LAV Battalion of 3 Companies of 3 Platoons or a LAV Regiment of 3 Squadrons of 3 Troops. (I wont argue the number of LAVs or GIBs)

16x MSHORAD - 4 per company with one per platoon and one per company HQ.
8x SPG/H organized as per the 81mm mortar battery - 2 groups of 4 split into 2 sections of 2. Available for intimate support of a pair of companies while keeping a group and a company in reserve for support.
4x LAM at battalion

Fire Control
9x Forward Observers
4x FiSTs (One extra for Battalion HQ and Recce)
1x Fires Cell (FSCC)
1x TACP

Now does that get permanently, habitually, routinely, occasionally or theoretically attached to, or integrated with, an infantry battalion or a cavalry regiment?

None of this precludes forming GS regiments of 155s, MLRSs and ISR batteries. Nor GBAD regiments. Both of those can be built on a high technology low manpower base.

KevinB and I agree on a lot of things including the problem issues with the LAV as an IFV. Where he and I differ on that issue is that I recognize that we have a lot of LAVs and TAPVs and they're pretty new and we won't get them replaced anytime soon so we better figure out how to use them.

Like him I'm disgusted by the fact that we've bought tons of variants of these things but not an ATGM variant nor a mortar variant nor an AD variant. Not that I've got anything against armoured administrative vehicles - I quite like them - but I dislike intensely what it says about our priorities. I don't for a minute think that not having 50 mortar carriers was a decision that the government made. It was made by the Army.

So, having said that I'd accept to work with the LAVs and TAPVs how do I see using them.

Firstly I'd never, ever, ever use SHORAD as a dual ADAT system. I'd use it exclusively for AD and keep it out of the platoons and companies so that it creates an umbrella air defence around whatever force or facilities it is being deployed to protect.

Within the companies I would have anti armour capability under armour probably by re-equipping TAPVs for that purpose. That would be over and above man portable ATGMs within the platoons.

Within the companies I would also have a very short range anti-drone capability, again probably in specially equipped TAPVs.

The battalions integral indirect fire asset would be 8 and ten 120 mortars mounted inside turretless LAVs. I'm open to whether to have 2 per company plus a 4 mortar platoon like the SBCT or just stay with an 8 tube mortar platoon for the battalion. I'd like to use TAPVs for this as well but I think sufficient on board ammo storage would probably be an issue.

I do wonder whether we need four turreted LAVs per platoon or whether we would be better off to increase internal space in some of them for more GIBs/dismounts and replace the existing turret with an RWS of a more appropriate mixture. I'll let a grunt make the arguments for that.

There is no distinction in our systems as between a FOO det and the US concept of a FIST. A FOO det comes with a Captain, a sergeant and three to four bombardiers/gunners. All should be trained to fire mortars and guns and the Captain and Sergeant at a minimum should be qualified JTACs and fire planners. (Now that the war is over JTAC certification is once again a problem because of the heavy use of air for both dry and live certification runs - planes and bombs cost money and we tend to cut corners in peacetime) The team also comes with a highly specialized LAV OPV with a suite of target acquisition equipment. The team can be split up for short durations so that observers can be sent out to ride along with a platoon. So, one FOO Det per company is optimum although in certain circumstances that can be augmented - for example during a company sized attack, on FOO det may move with the company while another occupies an anchor OP. Its very flexible.

An FSCC cell at a bn TOC is essential. The TACP not so much. TACPs generally exist at brigade level although in Afghanistan many TFs put a TACP det with the bn. I'm not against that but you need to remember that a bn TOC is supposed to be a small lean element that is highly mobile and leaves a small signature. One tries to keep things out of it unless absolutely necessary. I would leave the TACP at brigade but with an ability to spin off a det to a bn where necessary. In a circumstance of a wholly independent bn such as you are suggestion a forward deployed TACP would be necessary.

Back to the TLAVs. I'm not really sure why we ever bought them. They strike me as a marginal recce tool ... but ... they could be put to a lot of good use as weapon platforms for weapons that have a small detachment and a reasonable ammo load. My guess is they would make a good drone and rocket launch platform amongst the other things I mentioned above. That would save LAVs for carrying the larger people and equipment loads. We should exploit the hell out of those hulls.

Re your last post - damn paywall.

 

[Kirkhill]

And I will reiterate

I don't see how you can sell Canadians on the need for National Defence spending if your first focus is not on Defending the Nation. Once you sort that out THEN you can figure out how you are going to defend the rest of the world.

Homeland first - preferably with as little expenditure as possible. But we at least need to make an effort. And frankly I don't see an infantry-centric solution beyond small unit airmobile operations in the north and October Crisis / Oka Crisis / VP in the south.

On the other hand local GBAD manned by reservists makes all the sense in the world to me.

Which leaves the question of what to do with all those rubber tired LAVs acquired so that we wouldn't have tanks in the streets the next time the War Measures Act was proclaimed.

 

[Kirkhill]

Here you go! Cheers. ​

​

British Army to leave Canada after 50 years for new base in Middle East​

Modernisation plans will include developing training area in Oman, which will also position British hardware closer to potential adversaries
ByDominic Nicholls, DEFENCE AND SECURITY CORRESPONDENT23 November 2021 • 9:05pm

A member of the Royal Engineers guides a tank at the British Army Training Unit Suffield in Canada CREDIT: Cpl Russ Nolan RLC/Crown Copyright

The British Army is to leave Canada after 50 years, with its biggest training base set to move to the Middle East.

The British Army Training Unit Suffield (Batus) in Alberta, western Canada, has been in operation since 1972, training thousands of British soldiers in live firing exercises.

More than 1,000 vehicles, including tanks and helicopters, are regularly used by regiments for weeks at a time at the 2,700 kilometre-square base, seven times the size of Salisbury Plain. However, Ben Wallace, the Defence Secretary, is expected to announce later this week that plans to modernise the Army will include developing a training area in Oman.

The move to use the Omani desert, near Duqm airbase and port, as the main training ground for tanks and other armoured vehicles will mean the Batus camp, home to more than 400 permanent British staff, and the smaller Wainwright training area nearby, will close.

Defence sources said the shift to the Gulf would enable British forces to position hardware closer and more visibly to partner nations, such as Ukraine and Bahrain, and potential adversaries, such as Iran. This would reduce the time necessary to respond to any crisis in the region and allow the Government to showcase British military technology to boost potential arms sales.

A defence source close to the plans told The Telegraph: “If you only have 148 tanks and 22 of them are stuck in Canada, that’s 22 tanks that are not at readiness and not available to do anything operational.

“If they are training in Poland or Duqm, the logic is that they are having a more operational and deterrent effect.”

Big tank exercises planned for the next two years​

An MoD spokesman said Batus would not close before 2023, as big tank exercises were already planned over the next two years.
Beyond that, small numbers of military personnel would still be located in Canada, as defence attaches, liaison officers and on exchange with Canadian units.

The announcement is set to form part of a broader plan outlining how the Army will adapt to take advantage of digital technology while still maintaining forces available to Nato for battlefield scenarios. Soldiers have been told to expect an announcement imminently about new structures and unit roles.

The announcement will include an update on the Ranger Regiment, detailing which units will form the new force and the selection and training courses required to join. The Rangers were announced in March, and will be formed from four existing battalions before recruiting more widely from the Army. Ben Barry, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the new Rangers would be described as a special operations brigade and modelled on the US Green Berets. As with their US counterparts, Mr Barry said the British troops could “work with resistance forces”, for example operating for months alongside Syrian or Afghan fighters against terrorist groups.

Risk in shrinking the Army​

They will be supported by a security force assistance brigade, another new formation to be made up of existing units and designed to train and advise partner forces, but not be as exposed to as much potential harm as the Special Operations brigade.

However, Mr Barry said there was a risk in shrinking the Army and making it more specialised at the same time.

“If this Special Operations brigade becomes another elite organisation requiring people to compete to be selected into it like Airborne Forces and the Army component of 3 Commando Brigade, this becomes yet another elite force which, by definition, will compete against the other elite forces for highly motivated, self-starting people in an Army that’s getting smaller.

“There’s a danger it will be difficult to find the people it needs, and if it does find the people it needs it will suck out of the conventional units the self-motivated people that are so important to keeping the unit going.”

The Army plans to reorganise to enable it to fight a major war, after decades in which it became specialised in fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 forced defence chiefs to refocus on building a “heavy metal” warfighting division of tanks and armoured vehicles.

British forces are stationed in Poland as part of Nato’s mission to deter Russia, and training with tanks already takes place there.

The announcement of the move of the training base to Oman comes amid increasing tensions with the Kremlin as a result of the migrant crisis on the Polish border with Belarus.

 

[Kirkhill]

Now if you can convince the politicians to rebuild 4 CMBG in Oman or Poland, or even Australia, and buy you some Big Honking Ships at the same time then I am all for it.

 

[blacktriangle]

So let me step back a bit

My current artillery support configuration for a LAV Battalion of 3 Companies of 3 Platoons or a LAV Regiment of 3 Squadrons of 3 Troops. (I wont argue the number of LAVs or GIBs)

16x MSHORAD - 4 per company with one per platoon and one per company HQ.

I’m not sure that integrating something like M-SHORAD into every Mech Inf Pl would be the best use of resources. I’d rather have GBAD assets dispersed as needed to provide the most efficient coverage, within a greater IADS. To do so would also take one turret out of the fight, and increase the odds that a valuable asset is exposed to direct fire. I would make the same argument for EW assets and dedicated ATGM vehicles (if any existed)

Also, I think the CAF will be unlikely to procure enough M-SHORAD or equivalent to support your idea at scale. Finally, proper resourcing of Mech Inf/Cav with a combination of mounted/dismounted ATGMs would negate the need for a dedicated vehicle at the Pl/Tp level.

 

[Kirkhill]

Edit - I posted this to FJAG while Blacktriangle was posting - sorry BT.

To clarify the following I am envisaging a battle field where the platoons are operating independently and fully exploiting the range of weapons like the 8 km Spike ER and Hellfire, or at very least the 4.75 km Javelin.

And if you don't like the MSHORADs pushed forward to the platoons, despite them being widely dispersed, then at least have them form a separate platoon at the company level.

And I know by now your love of order. So I shall refrain from engaging on the multimission possibilities. We disagree.

Moog Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform (RIwP®)​

In what way in a Hellfire an Air Defence weapon?

But, again, I am not engaging!

 

[Kirkhill]

As for scale - I am anticipating 16 for each of 6 LAV Units - a total of 96. I am sure we could afford to sacrifice that many CPs to mount a MOOG RIwP RWS on them.

 

[FJAG]

I don't see how you can sell Canadians on the need for National Defence spending if your first focus is not on Defending the Nation.

The way that we have done since 1899 - by telling them, factually, that the defence of Canada is done through alliances and starts by stopping hostile aggression before it gets to our shores.

Here you go! Cheers. ​

Thanks - interesting. How to capitalize on that?

I'm actually a great fan of the RIwP turret systems and would be even more so if they could be adapted to a TAPV which should be entirely possible since they have them on the JLTV. I think most of our TAPVs should be armed with one or another of these systems. As I said I think we could use less of the existing LAV 25 turrets and replace them with some of these (especially the antitank ones) at the platoon level

In what way in a Hellfire an Air Defence weapon?

The argument is for engaging attack helicopters at longer ranges but I think that's a bit of a red herring. My view on the AT/AD in one system argument is that AD is a full time job as is AT and employs different tactics and command and control system and operator skills.

Just because you can hang a Stinger and a Hellfire from the same turret doesn't mean you should. We tried that with ADATS and it spent all but one year of its service life as an AD system and one year experimenting on being a DFS which never really worked out. For AT I'd see a Javelins pod with maybe thermobaric rockets pod.

 

[MilEME09]

And I know by now your love of order. So I shall refrain from engaging on the multimission possibilities. We disagree.

View attachment 67281

​

So essentially the yanks made the MMEV concept work, and then expanded on it, every TAPV, and what ever they replace the G-wagon with should have these in some form.

 

[suffolkowner]

Can the TAPV handle the AD or AT turrets? Would it not be even more top heavy? For the TAPV you'd go with a 50 cal and the 4 ATGM?

Can we expand on the difference in opinion/value of the 105 howitzer vs 120 mortar?

 

[Kirkhill]

I see nothing wrong with loading the MSHORAD with the right missile mix to meet the threat. Maybe you don't put a mixed load on each of four MSHORADs. Maybe you put Stingers on one, or two and APKWS or Hellfires on the rest. Or you create an AT Platoon. Or a pure AD platoon.

All you need is enough LAVs with RIwPs and sufficient missiles.

After all the AH-64 mixes and matches according to the mission.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Can the TAPV handle the AD or AT turrets? Would it not be even more top heavy? For the TAPV you'd go with a 50 cal and the 4 ATGM?

That would be like putting ear rings on a pig, I'm guessing

 

[FJAG]

So essentially the yanks made the MMEV concept work, and then expanded on it, every TAPV, and what ever they replace the G-wagon with should have these in some form.

I think it is very premature to say they made the Multi-mission Effects Vehicle work because a) only 2 of the turret configurations are termed MM and b) the one in use -M-SHORAD - is called an air defence system and employed solely in an air defence role. The fact that the Hellfire has to this point been used as an air to ground system is incidental - the system is designed to be used as a ground to air weapon to be used at long range against slower air threats like attack helicopters.

There is zero value in having two such different weapon systems, with different technologies, command and control, tactical employment and training systems multi-roled on a whim. What makes sense is to buy one common turret for a class of vehicles (I favour the TAPV but a LAV will do nicely) and then buy different weapon pods, target acquisition and control systems and communication systems for each of the AT role and the AD role and then organize and train the crews appropriate to the role they are to fulfill. Believe me guys, its hard enough to build an effective air defence capability without saying "oh yeah, in your spare time when you don't see any airplanes we want you to go hunting tanks." And vice versa - the solid tactical employment of anti armour defence isn't simply a factor of handing out hundreds of Javelins to everyone who can walk and chew gum at the same time.

Can the TAPV handle the AD or AT turrets? Would it not be even more top heavy? For the TAPV you'd go with a 50 cal and the 4 ATGM?

Not sure. Anytime you mine proof a vehicle you end up V hull which pushes stuff upward. One weight saving would be to get that spare tire off the roof plus you'd remove the existing RWS in exchange. both of which would offset the RIwP cupola but in the full tradition of this tread I'm just guessing here.

Can we expand on the difference in opinion/value of the 105 howitzer vs 120 mortar?

I'm a fan of mortars as being integral to the infantry battalion as a dedicated way of laying down a guaranteed rapid volume of covering fire. On top of that if a weapons locker system is used like in the SBCT then the 120mm mortar det also has an 81mm mortar in its vehicle which can be used for dismounted operations far away from the vehicles. Guns have their roles - big roles - but mortars and guns are complimentary resources and not competing ones. That's a lesson the Canadian Army lost at the beginning of its most recent transformation when infantry PYs were being shaved. The silly solution at the time was to allocate 81 mm mortars to the artillery which, in fact deployed to Afghanistan with both M777s and mortar tubes and would on occasion engage targets with mortars. Afghanistan taught us very many bad lessons along with the good ones. The worst lesson was that a few guns or mortars are good enough. They truth is they aren't.

There's a brief discussion here:

Mortar (weapon) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

That would be like putting ear rings on a pig, I'm guessing

Yeah but they're pigs we already own and we've got some 500 plus of them so let's give them a bigger role. Hell, we ran Blowpipe and Javelin detachments out of 5/4 to trucks and TOWs out of Iltis. We could run dozens of different small detachments, UAVs, LCMRs, you name it - anything with a three to four man det that needs light armour and mine protection. Why waste a LAV on such teams? All you need is enough space for a basic load of ammo and the crews gear and there's a bit of reconfigurable space available especially if the weapon station is a remote one.

Gibbs rule #5 is "You don't waste good"; FJAG's rule #5A is "You don't waste good enough, either"

 

[FormerHorseGuard]

I am no longer serving but all this fancy new kit but reality and the current status has to be taken into consideration.

I will pick on 33 Brigade Group as an example.

Made up of 3 Units,
30th FD RCA, 42nd FD RCA and 49th FD RCA

Covers a large chunk of Ontario Geographically units are Spread out from Ottawa to Sault Ste Marie

Guns are wearing out, and soon most will be in need of new barrels, and other parts. 60 plus years old now.

So what ever guns that are working and not shot out of barrel life. Are becoming the main issue. Roughly 100 guns in various stages of life in the Canadian Forces.

In reality you have to look at who requires the guns and who does not require working guns. Non working guns for dry training ( boring stuff )

In Ontario you have 2 Regiments on paper who fire the salutes and ceremonial roles. 7 Toronto and 30th FD.

If it comes down to physical working guns, those units are the ones to get the guns and spare parts to keep the role of gun salutes.

Other units are going to lose their guns or be given non serviceable guns to do dry training on, limiting their roles are effective gunners and crews.

So the other units become ineffective as no guns to fire. What happens to the other units who are not gunless? I know some units have been lucky to get gunners uptrained to crew the M777 but not everyone can do that. ( 37 guns in the CF now) Takes 3 guns to do a 21 gun salute so removing 3 guns out for ceremonial roles does not seem very logical to me.

The CF has been working on a solution and after reading a news story dated 18 May 2014 ( not allowed to quote or link to the story for copy right issues) The replacement program back then was consider to take over 2 decades to do.

Picatinny Arsenal engineers were to evaluate the life-span of the Canadian World War II-era C3 Howitzer. They were suggesting the M119 as the gun of choice as it the 105mm howitzer being used by the US Army and Saudi Arabian Army. Been in service since 1989. Rough cost of $2.5 million US for each gun. Plus spare parts etc. 2016 dollars.

If Canada was to purchase 100 guns and replace gun for gun, 25 to 35 million dollars could do it , until we add in the make it Canadian Unique and have the right amount of Canadian Made content. So maybe 50 million in todays money should do it. Retraining gun crews and updating courses are all extra.



Re role all the non gun units to 81mm Mortars or back to infantry units ( most likely the cheapest answer besides closing the units down or reducing the number of units making some Reserve units become sub units of a bigger unit) Air Defense units as a Total Force Unit was tried and found to be very costly. So most likely that will not happen again, training areas are too small for live fires, and costly to do, requires massive equipment for simulators to be installed.

I think you will see a lot of Reserve Arty units being moth balled, rerolled or made in to sub units.

 

[OldSolduer]

Homeland first - preferably with as little expenditure as possible. But we at least need to make an effort. And frankly I don't see an infantry-centric solution beyond small unit airmobile operations in the north and October Crisis / Oka Crisis / VP in the south.

There in lies the issue, doesn't it? This current GoC and indeed past GoCs see military spending as a detriment to social programs.

 

[Kirkhill]

There in lies the issue, doesn't it? This current GoC and indeed past GoCs see military spending as a detriment to social programs.

A tradition that goes back to Sir John A. and his first social program - the Canadian Pacific Railway.

 

[FormerHorseGuard]

A tradition that goes back to Sir John A. and his first social program - the Canadian Pacific Railway.

My family lost millions on that program, ( Sir John was the family lawyer and he talked what ever great great great grandfather it was into investing the family money into the great building of the railway. Not once but twice and the money was gone )