C3 Howitzer Replacement

[MilEME09]

What about a short term solution of bolt on stinger pods for our LAVs?

 

[Kirkhill]

You've all heard my previous opinions on multi-mission effects systems. It's not the fact that the weapon system can't do it, its that air defence and anti-armour are employed and deployed differently. The operator skill sets are different. It can be done but not without an unnecessary complexity which will degrade combat efficiency. I'd say the probabilities are high that in a serious fight you'd need the air defence capability exactly when you are engaging tanks to your front.

One Gunner. One Line of Sight. Many Targets. Do we need to have a separate ticket to engage each target?

 

[FJAG]

What about a short term solution of bolt on stinger pods for our LAVs?

Honestly, I'd be happy if we formed an anti-aircraft battery equipped with over and under shotguns if it got us thinking about air defence doctrine and started developing procedures and a core of expertise again.

Even better if we were able to borrow a mothballed Avenger battery from the US Army's National Guard.

 

[Kirkhill]

Kidding aside FJAG I think we see different things when we look at that same MOOG RWS that Gr66 posted.

Is it backgrounds?

I see it in the same light as I see carrying a couple of hand grenades, a smoke grenade, an M72, a rifle, 150 rds of ball, 10 rds of tracer and toting a couple hundred rounds of link and a 60mm mortar bomb or a CG84 round. Maybe a slab of C4 or a Claymore.

Something for every occasion and at my disposal, or more likely, at the disposal of my section or platoon leaders. I see the same logic in that RWS. A heavy weapons section in the hands of a single operator. Capable of dealing with anything within the gunner's arcs.

 

[FJAG]

Kidding aside FJAG I think we see different things when we look at that same MOOG RWS that Gr66 posted.

Is it backgrounds?

I see it in the same light as I see carrying a couple of hand grenades, a smoke grenade, an M72, a rifle, 150 rds of ball, 10 rds of tracer and toting a couple hundred rounds of link and a 60mm mortar bomb or a CG84 round. Maybe a slab of C4 or a Claymore.

Something for every occasion and at my disposal, or more likely, at the disposal of my section or platoon leaders. I see the same logic in that RWS. A heavy weapons section in the hands of a single operator. Capable of dealing with anything within the gunner's arcs.

I think it is background - both training and experience.

The MOOG RWS is a comprehensive weapon system which can be configured in many ways to include anti-air, anti-armour and a combination. The M-SHORAD configuration includes both a Stinger and Longbow Hellfire. The Stinger is basically IR with a range just under 5 km and a ceiling of just under 4 km. The Longbow Hellfire costs roughly four to five times what a Stinger costs and has a range out to 11 km and is laser or radar guided.

Let's ask the big question: why mount an expensive 11 km missile on a Manoeuvre-Short Range Air Defence system (especially a $150,000 missile). The stock answer is to be able to guide it on attack helicopters and attack aircraft which are employing countermeasures and against targets beyond the range of the Stinger. It's not to use against ground targets because you'll rarely have a line of sight from a ground based system that would exploit the range of the Hellfire. You can do it if push comes to shove but if that was the intent the system would have been called M-SHORADAT.

I'll add another possibility: you mount the Hellfire because you can. You could have mounted dual Stinger pods, like on an Avenger, but this gives you a bit further reach and sells some pricey missiles to boot which is always a contractor's aim.

An M-SHORAD firing a Hellfire needs to remain exposed for line of sight control (unless there are remote controllers deployed to hand the missile off to) which is not a great idea when in contact with folks that shoot back. On the other hand a Javelin (which is comparable in cost with the Hellfire) can easily engage most things within typical ground terrain ranges which are generally within the missiles envelope of just under 5 kms and is fire and forget. A terrific advantage.

The point though is that neither AD nor AT is a system that depends on a single operator acquiring a target and engaging it like a tank does.

AD in particular depends on a complex system of systems that acquire targets far out through multiple radar systems, vectoring and allocating gun or missile systems against the targets (which usually come in multiples) and exercising engagement control. Even self-defence missiles such as the AD Javelin type or MANPADS are generally "netted" into the system for early warning if nothing else. Essentially they are sighted to provide area defence and against likely air threats and generally not mixed in with the front line troops because most front line are generally avoiding exactly the places that AF systems needed to be sighted to be effective (high and open ground).

Anti-armour systems are likewise netted into the anti-armour plan which concerns itself with ground threats and is deployed in a layered system which focuses on axis of ground advance and channelized killing zones. Different people develop the anti-armour plan and the air defence plan based on quite different criteria and quite different, albeit complementary, command and control measures. Quite frankly if I'm reading the tea leaves right, our anti-armour plan in the future will depend more on specialized anti-armour units employing drones and loitering munitions well forward of the main defensive line probably as part of a cavalry regiment.

It's kind of like machine guns. Any moron can fire a machine gun but it takes an expert to create a proper integrated defence plan capable of exploiting the maximum killing power of a number of machine guns properly sited to be mutually supporting.

It takes even more training and practice to develop a good anti-armour platoon or an air defence troop. Even more for an anti-armour company and air defence battery or regiment.

When we rebuilt air defence in the 1970s it was roughly a five year job before we got our officers and Snr NCOs to the point where they had developed the skills and competency at their jobs to be effective and the batteries became sustainable. Manning and operating the weapon is probably the easiest part of the job. Deploying the systems and controlling them to maximum effect is the hard part.

We trialed ADATs in a direct fire system in the mid 2000s when Hillier was dumping the tanks. We mixed it in with TOW and notional MGSs and the end result was that it was a dumb idea which only served one purpose - to try to justify a bad decision to divest the tanks and to try to justify why we should continue to spend money maintaining ADATS and its associated PYs (and the speculative MMEV) Eventually the geniuses the running the Army figured we'd never need to shoot down another airplane ever again and ash caned the thing. (although we deployed it at Kananaskis at the G8 in 2002 while 9/11 was fresh on everyone's mind).

Note as well that GBAD's SOR requires the system to be also capable of engaging projectiles such as mortars, rockets and artillery. Add to that the proliferation of UAVs and you can see that AD resources will be full-time employed keeping all natures of pesky airborne things off the manoeuvre unit's back.

I'll add one more thing - AD elements are magnets for all kinds of incoming crap. You don't really want it mixed into your anti-armour defence where it gives away your presence and draws all manners of unwanted shyte down on your positions.

So. My final thoughts. I actually like concepts like the MOOG system. I think it gives you the ability to have a common chassis (with everything that entails in ease of maintenance. It gives you a remote weapon station where much of the mechanics are interchangeable (again with ease of maintenance) and the flexibility to tailor specific weapon systems to specific missions. Quite frankly I wonder why we still have a manned turret on the LAV. Even better when you have a common configurable system that would operate on the LAV and the TAPV and any other armoured vehicle we might purchase.

Do I see some need for some type of self defence system against things like UAVs within a manoeuvre unit? Possibly depending on what the full capability of GBAD will be. My gut tells me that there will be gaps which will need to be filled. Whether that's something like a MANPADS det or a TAPV with a directed energy weapon or a hand portable laser or whatever and who operates it, I'm not sure. Again, my gut tells me if its directed at an air threat it will probably be an attachment to a manoeuvre unit like a FOO is now (possible even as an element of the FOO party) and not an organic element.

 

[Kirkhill]

I see what you are saying about AD plans, AT plans, MG plans. I understand your position I think. And we share a common appreciation for the advantages of a common platform that can be modified to suit a variety of needs, a variety of plans if you will.

But what happens when you run out of time to plan? Prep for battle. (Advance to Contact.) React to Effective Enemy Fire. Locate the Enemy. Win the Fire Fight.... Breathe .... Approach. Assault. Consolidate.

While reacting you're observing and discovering you are taking rifle and rpg fire, HMG fire from technicals, Mortar fire from 2 km away and there is a drone buzzing around the horizon directing fire with an armoured troop in the offing or a helicopter. All of those targets are in your line of sight. I'm kind of thinking access to a variety of assets such as you find on that RWS would be appreciated. Especially if they are sited in pairs.

I have been given to understand that the ability react quickly and effectively on making contact has always been a major issue for infantry and cavalry recce troops.

I can only think that on the distributed battlefield, a 6400 mil 3D battlefield with no clear lines, that meeting engagements are going to be more frequent and more challenging.

 

[GR66]

...

The US uses the 30mm because that's the same for their Stryker Dragoon while we use the same M242 as is currently on the Bradley. My guess is that if you wanted to substitute the 25 mm for the 30 mm you'd double the price of the turret because of the physical and software changes needed to tie it into the other on-board electronics. (There's a 30% parts difference and 50% increased hitting power at longer ranges and with an air burst capability with the Mk44 which is not available with the M242). It might well be worth having both calibres (at least until we upgrade the LAV 6.0 turrets).

I can't say with certainty, but I don't think you'd have a huge cost increase from changing from the 30mm to 25mm IF you wanted to. The RWS is called the "Reconfigurable Integrated-Weapons Platform" because it is designed to accept a wide variety of weapons on a common structure. According to the brochure it can be offered with the following guns: XM914, M2, M240, M249, M242, Mk44/XM813, M134.

That being said, I think that the 30mm probably is the better option for an AD version anyway with the availability of airburst ammo which would be more effective against UAVs, etc. If we have to add an airburst round to our inventory I'd prefer to go with the common 30mm round that the US is already using on their IM-SHORAD rather than adopting an orphan 25mm airburst solution. For a Canadian version of a SHORAD turret I'd also drop the dual Hellfire and instead replace it with a 2nd quad-Stinger launcher. Gives you a 30mm airburst gun and 8 x Stingers for short-range air defence. After giving it some thought instead of mounting this on three different platforms (LAV, TAPV and Light Vehicle), I'd limit it to just the LAV-based version for Heavy/Medium Reg Force Brigades and an easily air-deployable (air drop capable?) wheeled vehicle like the JLTV for the Reserves and Reg Force Light Brigade.

For larger targets (like fast air, missiles, etc.) I'd have a separate AD Regiment or Battery/Batteries using the CAMM Land-Ceptor system to provide a layered AD system with missile commonality with the RCN's CSCs.

 

[Kirkhill]

MOOG Reconfigurable Integrated Weapons Platform



Before FJAG and I get too far away from each other on this subject...

The first thing I would note is the same thing that GR66 noted. The turret is reconfigurable. To be more exact, according to this video, it is reconfigurable in theatre. And it is vehicle independent.

My read is that the platform can be employed, and changed, to suit the vehicle and the vehicle's mission, with some advanced warning and planning. So it can be reconfigured to meet the needs of units at risk of meeting engagements and differently configure to meet the needs of the AT Plan, the AD Plan and even the MG Plan. Not to mention the ISR Plan. It would be a different load out for those operating close to FEBA, or in Depth, or with Light Troops, or with Heavy Troops. But it would be the same kit with different systems.

The mix of guns on offer seem to be

5.56mm M249
7.62mm M240 and M134
12.7mm M2
25mm M242
30mm MK44/XM813 and XM914
40mm Mk19

To be mixed and matched as need be. All to be reloadable undercover.

The mix of missiles on offer seem to be

70mm Hydra 70, DAGR, TALON and LGR
70mm Stinger
127mm Javelin
152mm TOW
180mm Hellfire

And then there is the Coyote Family of Loitering Munitions for ISR, Kinetic Kills and Soft Kills that is available in both electric propeller and jet powered modes. It is considered for anti-swarm duties.

Army Buys Small Suicide Drones To Break Up Hostile Swarms And Potentially More

Raytheon's Coyote is an inherently modular system that the United States has already tested as a possible weapon and a scientific tool.

www.thedrive.com

And other capabilities include

Smoke Grenades
Projectile Grenades
Acoustic Hailer
Laser Dazzler

And, of course, Laser Rangefinders and Designators.

The way that I see this system is as equivalent to the Picatinny Rail - simply a means of mounting kit in an accessible fashion. It makes the platform as versatile, and reconfigurable, as a helicopter or a fighter. It would mean that, in theatre, as the threat changed, and the environment changed, necessitating changes in plans, then the units available could be retasked and retrained to meet the situation.

In WW2 40mm LAA Regiments were reconfigured to join the MG Battalions in providing indirect fire on fixed lines during the Rhine Assault.

And, demonstrating that MOOG isn't the only player out there

The John Cockerill CLWS - which weighs 600 kg minus weapons.

Cockerill® CLWS 25 & 30 turret : Defense - John Cockerill

John Cockerill Defense is expanding its product range with its new Cockerill® CLWS (Cockerill Light Weapon Station) turret.

johncockerill.com

As usual, I don't think we're that far apart.

Slainte.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I always take "reconfigurable in the field" or swap to another vehicle in theathre with a large grain of salt. I suspect if you have a large well equipped workshop, then yes, otherwise no.

 

[Kirkhill]

How are you making out with those Landie bushings?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Waiting for REME to arrive to bodge them on

 

[NavyShooter]

A bolt-on capability? Neat.

Problem with that concept is that Canada would buy from the Lowest Compliant Bidder, and we wouldn't actually buy all of the possible upgrade options. Kind of like buying a SOPMOD M-4 kit with just the rifle and magazine - who needs an optic or a NV system?

 

[MilEME09]

A bolt-on capability? Neat.

Problem with that concept is that Canada would buy from the Lowest Compliant Bidder, and we wouldn't actually buy all of the possible upgrade options. Kind of like buying a SOPMOD M-4 kit with just the rifle and magazine - who needs an optic or a NV system?

Or when we leased the Isreali made PRC710G radios and didn't get the man pack, vehicle mounting kit or the GPS transmitter?

 

[Kirkhill]

So what you're all suggesting is we would buy Picatinny rails but no rifles?

 

[MilEME09]

So what you're all suggesting is we would buy Picatinny rails but no rifles?

I think we need to determine the force we want first, then the kit to make it happen

 

[Kirkhill]

I think we need to determine the force we want first, then the kit to make it happen

I don't disagree. I just think we need to keep one eye on what is possible when making our decisions.

Tercios didn't arise without consideration of the weapons available to them. And it was the rise of a better firelock and the bayonet that finally defeated their hedgehogs of pikes.

The difference between an army transforming in peacetime and the same army transforming in wartime is not just the money that gets thrown at the problem. The Crimean war, the 1915 shell crisis, the rise of the tank, the defense of Britain after Dunkirk, the need for MRAPs - all of them are examples of times when no expense was spared but realities of logistics intruded denying available technologies. But the mission had to continue. The fight had to continue. And it had to continue with the tools available. Or else give up and surrender.

For a peace time army it is easy to contemplate giving up when the enemy is the bureaucrat holding the purse strings.

For an army at war, defending the homeland, like Latvia, it is another prospect entirely. It is one thing to surrender in Singapore or Hong Kong. It is another thing entirely to surrender at Hastings, or Dover, or London.... or Ottawa. Some people might even be inclined to take on tanks with wine bottles filled with gasoline.

What can you do with what is available to you? And keep in mind that that includes not just the people you have and the kit you have but, within your budget, what you can buy.

So, when looking at Force Structures - 2025, 2030 or 2050 - you have to consider the technologies available to you and how they could improve your structures to make them more effective.

Many of you argue, effectively, for starting from 40,000 ft and building based on what is needed. I counter by suggesting that we need to, concurrently, keep in mind what the world looks like among the weeds and build based on what is possible.

Both approaches are necessary to build a credible structure, an effective, affordable structure. Together they reveal the Gaps that need to be filled and offer the opportunity to review the technologies that might assist in filling some of those gaps credibly, effectively and affordably.

In Canada we have the luxury of chasing perfection.

In many countries, Azerbaijan, the Panjshir, Kashmir, Ukraine, Mali, for example, the requirement is to keep doing, to keep fighting, with whatever you can lay your hands on.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think it is background - both training and experience.

The MOOG RWS is a comprehensive weapon system which can be configured in many ways to include anti-air, anti-armour and a combination. The M-SHORAD configuration includes both a Stinger and Longbow Hellfire. The Stinger is basically IR with a range just under 5 km and a ceiling of just under 4 km. The Longbow Hellfire costs roughly four to five times what a Stinger costs and has a range out to 11 km and is laser or radar guided.

Let's ask the big question: why mount an expensive 11 km missile on a Manoeuvre-Short Range Air Defence system (especially a $150,000 missile). The stock answer is to be able to guide it on attack helicopters and attack aircraft which are employing countermeasures and against targets beyond the range of the Stinger. It's not to use against ground targets because you'll rarely have a line of sight from a ground based system that would exploit the range of the Hellfire. You can do it if push comes to shove but if that was the intent the system would have been called M-SHORADAT.

I'll add another possibility: you mount the Hellfire because you can. You could have mounted dual Stinger pods, like on an Avenger, but this gives you a bit further reach and sells some pricey missiles to boot which is always a contractor's aim.

An M-SHORAD firing a Hellfire needs to remain exposed for line of sight control (unless there are remote controllers deployed to hand the missile off to) which is not a great idea when in contact with folks that shoot back. On the other hand a Javelin (which is comparable in cost with the Hellfire) can easily engage most things within typical ground terrain ranges which are generally within the missiles envelope of just under 5 kms and is fire and forget. A terrific advantage.

The point though is that neither AD nor AT is a system that depends on a single operator acquiring a target and engaging it like a tank does.

AD in particular depends on a complex system of systems that acquire targets far out through multiple radar systems, vectoring and allocating gun or missile systems against the targets (which usually come in multiples) and exercising engagement control. Even self-defence missiles such as the AD Javelin type or MANPADS are generally "netted" into the system for early warning if nothing else. Essentially they are sighted to provide area defence and against likely air threats and generally not mixed in with the front line troops because most front line are generally avoiding exactly the places that AF systems needed to be sighted to be effective (high and open ground).

Anti-armour systems are likewise netted into the anti-armour plan which concerns itself with ground threats and is deployed in a layered system which focuses on axis of ground advance and channelized killing zones. Different people develop the anti-armour plan and the air defence plan based on quite different criteria and quite different, albeit complementary, command and control measures. Quite frankly if I'm reading the tea leaves right, our anti-armour plan in the future will depend more on specialized anti-armour units employing drones and loitering munitions well forward of the main defensive line probably as part of a cavalry regiment.

It's kind of like machine guns. Any moron can fire a machine gun but it takes an expert to create a proper integrated defence plan capable of exploiting the maximum killing power of a number of machine guns properly sited to be mutually supporting.

It takes even more training and practice to develop a good anti-armour platoon or an air defence troop. Even more for an anti-armour company and air defence battery or regiment.

When we rebuilt air defence in the 1970s it was roughly a five year job before we got our officers and Snr NCOs to the point where they had developed the skills and competency at their jobs to be effective and the batteries became sustainable. Manning and operating the weapon is probably the easiest part of the job. Deploying the systems and controlling them to maximum effect is the hard part.

We trialed ADATs in a direct fire system in the mid 2000s when Hillier was dumping the tanks. We mixed it in with TOW and notional MGSs and the end result was that it was a dumb idea which only served one purpose - to try to justify a bad decision to divest the tanks and to try to justify why we should continue to spend money maintaining ADATS and its associated PYs (and the speculative MMEV) Eventually the geniuses the running the Army figured we'd never need to shoot down another airplane ever again and ash caned the thing. (although we deployed it at Kananaskis at the G8 in 2002 while 9/11 was fresh on everyone's mind).

Note as well that GBAD's SOR requires the system to be also capable of engaging projectiles such as mortars, rockets and artillery. Add to that the proliferation of UAVs and you can see that AD resources will be full-time employed keeping all natures of pesky airborne things off the manoeuvre unit's back.

I'll add one more thing - AD elements are magnets for all kinds of incoming crap. You don't really want it mixed into your anti-armour defence where it gives away your presence and draws all manners of unwanted shyte down on your positions.

So. My final thoughts. I actually like concepts like the MOOG system. I think it gives you the ability to have a common chassis (with everything that entails in ease of maintenance. It gives you a remote weapon station where much of the mechanics are interchangeable (again with ease of maintenance) and the flexibility to tailor specific weapon systems to specific missions. Quite frankly I wonder why we still have a manned turret on the LAV. Even better when you have a common configurable system that would operate on the LAV and the TAPV and any other armoured vehicle we might purchase.

Do I see some need for some type of self defence system against things like UAVs within a manoeuvre unit? Possibly depending on what the full capability of GBAD will be. My gut tells me that there will be gaps which will need to be filled. Whether that's something like a MANPADS det or a TAPV with a directed energy weapon or a hand portable laser or whatever and who operates it, I'm not sure. Again, my gut tells me if its directed at an air threat it will probably be an attachment to a manoeuvre unit like a FOO is now (possible even as an element of the FOO party) and not an organic element.

Been thinking more about this

And I keep circling back to the role of the Infantry and the oft-made observation that the infantry is the jack of all trades, even if they master none. And that, to me, seems to have a direct bearing on the Combat Support Company and its utility to the infantry, and why it is a keeper as far as organization is concerned.

Because the infantry is engaged in the close battle, belt buckle to belt buckle if you like, by design it finds itself in situations where it has to react and has limited opportunity to plan. Accordingly it finds itself using the tools it has to hand, even it doesn't use them in the most effective manner.

It is my understanding that the Engineers were not fully impressed by the manner in which infantry Pioneers tackled some of the same jobs the Engineers tackled. Procedures had to be adjusted. The same is true for the Mortar platoons when integrated with the Artillery. Something similar happened with the Anti-Tank Platoons. In the absence of tanks then $100,000 missiles were used to blow up rock sangars on the Falklands and grapehuts in Afghanistan. I can fully see the likelihood of a Hellfire being suboptimally expended on a target simply because it was available when the need presented itself and nothing else was on hand at the time. The 70% solution was adopted and lives were saved.

So.

Back to the notion of the "Infantillery" Company - Gunners taking over the Direct Fire Support and Close Support roles of the Combat Support Company.

Perhaps not such a great idea.

We needs Jacks of All Trades.

But we also need Masters.

So, better to let some folks focus on mastery? And at the same time give the infantry access to some, if not all, the same tools to use as they see fit?

An argument to keep the Combat Support Company in the hands of infanteers that learn just enough about engineering and fire support to be dangerous? Hopefully more dangerous to the enemy than their trusting mates.

 

[FJAG]

Been thinking more about this

And I keep circling back to the role of the Infantry and the oft-made observation that the infantry is the jack of all trades, even if they master none. And that, to me, seems to have a direct bearing on the Combat Support Company and its utility to the infantry, and why it is a keeper as far as organization is concerned.
...
It is my understanding that the Engineers were not fully impressed by the manner in which infantry Pioneers tackled some of the same jobs the Engineers tackled. Procedures had to be adjusted. The same is true for the Mortar platoons when integrated with the Artillery. Something similar happened with the Anti-Tank Platoons. In the absence of tanks then $100,000 missiles were used to blow up rock sangars on the Falklands and grapehuts in Afghanistan. I can fully see the likelihood of a Hellfire being suboptimally expended on a target simply because it was available when the need presented itself and nothing else was on hand at the time. The 70% solution was adopted and lives were saved.
...
An argument to keep the Combat Support Company in the hands of infanteers that learn just enough about engineering and fire support to be dangerous? Hopefully more dangerous to the enemy than their trusting mates.

I keep looking at the US and UK (probably because more is written about them than other modern armies although I do occasionally look for things in German on the German army)

What strikes me about the US infantry is that the mortars have their own MOS. All riflemen (including the previous 11M Mechanized Infantry 11H Heavy Anti-armour are now 11B infantrymen while all infantry mortarmen are 11C Indirect Fire Infantryman.) They basically go from a common Army 10 week Basic Combat Trg (BCT) to a specialized Advanced Individual Trg (AIT) in separate streams.

Whether or not our engineers aren't impressed with pioneers isn't the issue. The issue is were the battalions satisfied with the pioneer product. That's what I see as a problem with handing pioneering and mortars over to the engineers and artillery. Pretty soon you have the "centre of excellence" try to turn everyone into engineers or gunners when you don't need all that.

Surely the role of the combat support company is not to have pioneers and mortarmen trained "just enough ... to be dangerous". That is being a tad condescending to the infantry in general. The aim of the training of the combat support companies is to be "trained to be effective in their role". Trying to produce a common engineer product and a common indirect fire product across the Army ignores the fact that both these skills exist on a spectrum and not a fixed point. We need to stop overthinking and overtraining folks - this is how we end up with manpower shortages in critical jobs.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This looks good!


South Korean firm Hanwha Defense will join with UK suppliers to compete for the UK’s ‘Mobile Fires Platform’ programme, the project to replace the AS90.

“The K9 is operationally proven and will be put forward by Hanwha Defense for the UK’s Mobile Fires Platform programme to equip the British Army with a world-leading artillery capability.”

More than 600 units of the K9 artillery system have been sold to nations around the world. The K9 self-propelled howitzer was developed jointly with the South Korean Agency for Defense Development in 1998.



Hanwha pitch K9 howitzer to UK as AS90 replacement

 

[MilEME09]

Would be nice if we could piggy back on this, we could use the SPGs