C3 Howitzer Replacement

[dapaterson]

Reserve unit roles should be determined, in part, by proximity to training areas and equipment. Some roles don't require much and can be done almost anywhere; others need equipment and space to train.

The Army's history too often interferes with its operational outputs.

 

[MilEME09]

Reserve unit roles should be determined, in part, by proximity to training areas and equipment. Some roles don't require much and can be done almost anywhere; others need equipment and space to train.

The Army's history too often interferes with its operational outputs.

The Reserves also needs facilities that can work with what the army demands of it, don't ask a PRes CSS unit of it can support LAVs in a building that can barely support milcots.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Reserve unit roles should be determined, in part, by proximity to training areas and equipment. Some roles don't require much and can be done almost anywhere; others need equipment and space to train.

The Army's history too often interferes with its operational outputs.

Clearly, this is why the CAF once assigned the role of 'Armoured Infantry' to the CScotR and issued 4 x Grizzlies.

Being based on Vancouver Island, 90% of which is a mountainous rain forest, they got to save alot of wear and tear on those vehicles as they were mainly driven forwards and backwards on paved roads.

I'm sure they did it only as a joke on the RCN maintainers at CFB Esquimalt who had to look after our 'tanks' in a naval shipyard.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

By all means get simulators into all of the Reserve units, but that stuff gets old after awhile and nothing beats live fire exercises to work out the kinks. I recall when they airlifted my unit from Vancouver to Shilo. It was our first experience at being airlifted and dealing with the amount of ammo we expended on Black Bear was a big bit of learning for our ammo party and each gun crew. all in all we learned a lot and it energised the unit.
I am a big fan of the 105mm for the Reserves, it offers a lot of flexibility to them and means they can do a lot more organically than with a larger gun that will likely have to be low bedded everywhere. I don't agree it's day is done. I suspect that the 105mm gun/howitzer will be viable for a long time to come.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Reserves also needs facilities that can work with what the army demands of it, don't ask a PRes CSS unit of it can support LAVs in a building that can barely support milcots.

Back in the 80's it was suggested that we buy the small chunk of land at the end of our building to make the building more useful, that was turned down as the DND was only interested in shedding land and not acquiring it. For most urban Reserve units, there is little options to expand their footprint or even move.

 

[MilEME09]

Back in the 80's it was suggested that we buy the small chunk of land at the end of our building to make the building more useful, that was turned down as the DND was only interested in shedding land and not acquiring it. For most urban Reserve units, there is little options to expand their footprint or even move.

Calgary is a good example of that right now, during the redevelopment of the former CFB calgary, plans were laid out for us to eventually be gone too, the developer wanted the land. To the point there is a exit in a traffic circle that goes into our fence line. However with no interest in finding land or building a new armoury DND won't move us, so they had to build around us. Even wild rose brewery is rumored to be being asked to move out.

 

[FJAG]

For those more informed, if we filled in all the gaps (specifically in artillery/GBAD/UAV) - no matter how cheaply - how many more people would that take? How many SHORAD people would it take to effectively maintain the capability? At what level? How many more people would we have to recruit to fill the gaps left by those SHORAD people?

I gave you some numbers above but let me just zero in on the AD issue.

Before it was converted into a general support regiment in 2014 (or thereabouts) 4 AD Regt had some 450 Reg F gunners in it which formed the core of the command and control element and three batteries which manned out ADATS and Oerlikon gun systems. The Res F 1 AD Regt, 18 AD Regt and 58 AD Bty (before being converted back to field artillery units in 2011) had a total of around another 450 people with some Reg F which formed the brigade Air Support Coordination centres and had the responsibility to augment 4 AD with 5 troops of man portable Javelin surface to air missiles.

On average a regiment of artillery has roughly 600 people. Each battery has roughly 130 people. You need one close support artillery regiment (which should have three batteries totaling 18 guns and FSCC, FOO and light STA capabilities) to support each manoeuvre brigade. You need one AD regiment (of three batteries with ASCC capabilities) to support a manoeuvre division (or three brigades). You should have one long range precision rocket regiment (of three batteries or 18 launchers and medium range counter weapon STA capabilities) as general support artillery to support a manoeuvre division (or three brigades).

There is no formula for armed UAS systems so far. In Canada, 4 GS Regt (RCA) has all the ASCC capabilities, the MRRs and one Blackjack launcher with five aircraft for surveillance). For simple planning purposes I would allocate one regiment of armed UAV systems to a brigade and I would integrate them with a cavalry regiment which provides a generous dose of recce, anti-armour and some infantry.

So, long story short for an army like ours right now, which has three brigades equipped for going to war, you should have three close support regiments, an AD regiment, an LRPR general support regiment and (IMHO) an armed UAV regiment for a total of some 3,600 gunners plus. If we ever start equipping our reserve manoeuvre brigades and making them capable of deployment regardless of role, each will need an additional close support regiment and should have an additional 1/3 slice of the others (so roughly 1,200 gunners plus gear per additional manoeuvre brigade).

Why not get more M777? Give Res Reg 2 each - and 1 to separate Bty's.
The C3 doesn't seem to offer anything but using u old stock of 105mm Arty ammo.

I like the M777. It is a good gun for its role which is supporting light brigades. The US also uses them for Stryker brigades but I don't think this is a good idea because the M777 is movement limited. A more mobile brigade such as the Stryker one and our mechanized CMBGs need an SP, probably a wheeled SP, that is armoured and automated so that it can shoot quickly, and reposition rapidly under counterfire. I think the Stryker brigades will convert to something else in the not to distant future. We have enough M777s that we can equip about four batteries fully and still have spare and training guns. That means we can fully equip one artillery close support regiment for one light brigade and have an additional reserve battery. Our mech and heavy brigade's close support regiments need an SP system.

I have no idea why we haven't built sub-calibre devices to fit into 155mm weapon systems which would allow full gun troop and observer training on small ranges with smaller safety distances and using much cheaper ammunition; we could save millions every year. We already do "dry" training with 105mm guns which can take place on any parking lot or vacant field near the armouries. Such dry training can take place with M777s or wheeled SPs as well. 80% - 90% of the artillery reserves' training is dry training anyway. For the 20% that requires live fire, most artillery armouries (sorry BC) are within several hours driving time from a range anyway - whether you take your own guns there or "borrow" some Reg F guns already there.

For those that think armouries limit equipment, you'll have to remember that a lot of the old armoured corps armouries kept Sherman tanks on the premises back in the 50s. Yes its an issue but it has solutions. Buying a gun that fits existing armories is not a wise criteria to put into the statement of requirements because you'll automatically eliminate 95% of the systems available and end up with another LG-1.

 

[MilEME09]

Hate to say it but we need to start letting go of facilities built when they were designed when Cavalry meant horse back, and tanks were a work of science fiction. If we want our reserves to be relevant they need facilities to reflect the capabilities we want them to have

 

[Kirkhill]

Lets crunch some numbers.

I've just counted up the number of gunners in the Res F artillery from the 2020 Gunners of Canada. There is a total of 2,124 (give or take a counting error or two) including bands in sixteen regiments and three independent batteries. Regiments vary in strength from a low of 55 to a high of 184. Independent batteries from 27 to 82. An average of 122 per regiment and 54 for the independent batteries.

So what do we do with those gunners? Well I'd say you can probably discount the numbers by 15% for bandsmen and those unfit for service (and I think I'm undercounting those) which leaves roughly 1,800.

What do we need to fill out the regular force regiments? Each regiment has 2 batteries of 4 guns each when it should have three of six guns. At roughly 35 pers for each of the six two-gun troops needed (210) and 130 pers for each of the three missing six-gun batteries (390) we need 600 reservists just to round out the three Reg F regiments - plus 30 guns and all the associated gear (lets not complicate things by wondering where the trained weapon and radio and veh mechs come from)

So that leaves 1,200. What else do we need for an army the size of Canada's? - air defence - we need air defence. That's around another 5 - 600 folks. Many of these need to come from the Reg F but every one which comes from one of the three Reg F regiments needs to be replaced by a reservist in whatever job he held somewhere else. So let's say 600 for air defence.

That leaves 600. So what else should we need? - a general support regiment? a precision rocket regiment? a few weaponized UAV batteries? more STA?

So where am I going with this rambling?

Simple - there is no room for light guns or mortars or whatever you might consider.

To properly plump out the Reg F regiments will take 30 guns and a third of the reserve force - all of these should be trained on whatever weapon system the Reg F units own. Specific Res Regts need to be trained and designated to fill those roles and be equipped to fill the equipment shortfalls that currently exist. (and yes IMHO we need an SP, either tracked or more probably wheeled for two of the brigades - which means buy appx 40 new guns and concentrate the M777 in a light brigade)

Adding an air defence role to the artillery should require a full regiment (it probably won't be because we'll probably want to make do with a battery - but it used to be a regiment and, IMHO, needs to be to properly support a three brigade army) That will eat up the second third of the reserves - many of whom will become air defence specialist and the remainder, those replacing the Reg F air defenders will, like the first third, need to specialize on whatever equipment their Reg F unit holds.

The issue is the same for the last third. They need to specialize on, be equipped with and be organized to form those general support or STA or rocket or UAV systems that are required.

Take good notice of something here. There simply aren't enough Res F gunners in the system, as it is, to fully man the weapon systems that we have and the few additional ones that that we need which are critical capability deficiencies. We do not have enough to make mortar platoons for infantry battalions or light gun batteries to support light brigades (other than whatever the Reg F might field). The Reg F artillery is critically understrength. We can hope that more modern weapon systems will be able to require less crews but I wouldn't count on it. An automated SP with a three gun crew needs a good ammo det in support to keep the beast fed.

We can continue to function with the system we have where our deployments commit no more than two gun batteries per year in six month rotations. Remember though that every one of those years ate up a large part of two entire regiments augmented by a whack of a lot of volunteer reservists all of whom went through lengthy predeployment training cycles that allowed the reservists to integrate. If, however, we are faced by a situation where we need to commit more than that and keep it sustained, or are required to deploy rapidly then our current system is sadly lacking. It makes me think of the homeowner who for years has not paid any premiums on fire insurance because - well so far - there's been no fire. With every year he gets by without a fire he becomes more and more convinced he doesn't need the policy. Canada's artillery (and its armoured corps) is a lot like that.

FJAG

What happens it we take the 2 Division construct a little further and ditch the Brigade Group concept completely?

Suppose that we work with CJOC having available to it CANSOFCOM, a Light Division and a Heavy Division.

I propose that the Light Division have two pure infantry brigades with 3 equally manned infantry battalions of about 432 Infantry FTEs each. 2 Battalions would be Light Battalions and one Battalion would be a LAV Battalion.

The Heavy Division would have a single pure infantry brigade of 2 LAV Battalions and a Light Battalion. The Light Battalion could be used as a heliborne blocking force, for D&D or to plus up the LAV Battalions.

All three brigades have a single operational focus (light or heavy) but have the internal assets to continue training in the other field.


Now, as to the RCA and the RCAC.


The RCA has 4 Regiments. What happens if each Division gets 2 Regiments - one for a Close Support Fd Regiment and one for a General Support Regiment.

The GS Regiments are fully manned Regular force units with all the specialty kit including GBAD and LRPR. The CS Regiments in both divisions have the ability to add Fd Batteries from the Reserves to Reg Force Co-ordination, STA and FOO/FAC elements and ready Fd batteries.


The RCAC, with 3 Regiments adds a 4x 19 tank Regiment to the "Heavy" infantry bde. In addition it adds a Lt Cav ISR Regiment to both the Lt and the Heavy Division as Divisional Troops.

The Infantry and the RCAC can then sort themselves out into Combined Arms Teams, long term, short term or permanent, as is seen fit.


That results in 2 deployable div HQs
3 deployable Bde HQs
5 LIB battalions
4 LAV battalions
2 Lt Cav ISR Regiments
1 Tank Regiment
2 CS Arty Regiments
2 GS Arty Regiments

Add in the 1x Cdn Cbt Spt Bde
Service Spt and Sigs assets
TacHel assets

And everybody's ox is suitably gored while creating a functional force.

Reserves to flesh out the body at the platoon/troop level.

 

[daftandbarmy]

FJAG

What happens it we take the 2 Division construct a little further and ditch the Brigade Group concept completely?

Suppose that we work with CJOC having available to it CANSOFCOM, a Light Division and a Heavy Division.

I propose that the Light Division have two pure infantry brigades with 3 equally manned infantry battalions of about 432 Infantry FTEs each. 2 Battalions would be Light Battalions and one Battalion would be a LAV Battalion.

The Heavy Division would have a single pure infantry brigade of 2 LAV Battalions and a Light Battalion. The Light Battalion could be used as a heliborne blocking force, for D&D or to plus up the LAV Battalions.

All three brigades have a single operational focus (light or heavy) but have the internal assets to continue training in the other field.


Now, as to the RCA and the RCAC.


The RCA has 4 Regiments. What happens if each Division gets 2 Regiments - one for a Close Support Fd Regiment and one for a General Support Regiment.

The GS Regiments are fully manned Regular force units with all the specialty kit including GBAD and LRPR. The CS Regiments in both divisions have the ability to add Fd Batteries from the Reserves to Reg Force Co-ordination, STA and FOO/FAC elements and ready Fd batteries.


The RCAC, with 3 Regiments adds a 4x 19 tank Regiment to the "Heavy" infantry bde. In addition it adds a Lt Cav ISR Regiment to both the Lt and the Heavy Division as Divisional Troops.

The Infantry and the RCAC can then sort themselves out into Combined Arms Teams, long term, short term or permanent, as is seen fit.


That results in 2 deployable div HQs
3 deployable Bde HQs
5 LIB battalions
4 LAV battalions
2 Lt Cav ISR Regiments
1 Tank Regiment
2 CS Arty Regiments
2 GS Arty Regiments

Add in the 1x Cdn Cbt Spt Bde
Service Spt and Sigs assets
TacHel assets

And everybody's ox is suitably gored while creating a functional force.

Reserves to flesh out the body at the platoon/troop level.

And don't forget the 'Drums of the Fore and Aft', or the modern equivalent

 

[Kirkhill]

And don't forget the 'Drums of the Fore and Aft', or the modern equivalent


View attachment 66275

Need someone to blow your horn?

 

[KevinB]

I gave you some numbers above but let me just zero in on the AD issue.

Before it was converted into a general support regiment in 2014 (or thereabouts) 4 AD Regt had some 450 Reg F gunners in it which formed the core of the command and control element and three batteries which manned out ADATS and Oerlikon gun systems. The Res F 1 AD Regt, 18 AD Regt and 58 AD Bty (before being converted back to field artillery units in 2011) had a total of around another 450 people with some Reg F which formed the brigade Air Support Coordination centres and had the responsibility to augment 4 AD with 5 troops of man portable Javelin surface to air missiles.

On average a regiment of artillery has roughly 600 people. Each battery has roughly 130 people. You need one close support artillery regiment (which should have three batteries totaling 18 guns and FSCC, FOO and light STA capabilities) to support each manoeuvre brigade. You need one AD regiment (of three batteries with ASCC capabilities) to support a manoeuvre division (or three brigades). You should have one long range precision rocket regiment (of three batteries or 18 launchers and medium range counter weapon STA capabilities) as general support artillery to support a manoeuvre division (or three brigades).

There is no formula for armed UAS systems so far. In Canada, 4 GS Regt (RCA) has all the ASCC capabilities, the MRRs and one Blackjack launcher with five aircraft for surveillance). For simple planning purposes I would allocate one regiment of armed UAV systems to a brigade and I would integrate them with a cavalry regiment which provides a generous dose of recce, anti-armour and some infantry.

So, long story short for an army like ours right now, which has three brigades equipped for going to war, you should have three close support regiments, an AD regiment, an LRPR general support regiment and (IMHO) an armed UAV regiment for a total of some 3,600 gunners plus. If we ever start equipping our reserve manoeuvre brigades and making them capable of deployment regardless of role, each will need an additional close support regiment and should have an additional 1/3 slice of the others (so roughly 1,200 gunners plus gear per additional manoeuvre brigade).

Between this and the Army restructuring thread - I continue to cringe.
Not because what you write - but because the extend of the capability gaps in what Canada "Should have" versus has.

Why even have AD Regiments? Why not take the MANPADS role - and give that to the 031 trade (get a fairly easy idiot proof F&F system)
The ADATS can get attached to the Armored units, with the UAV Scout role?

I like the M777. It is a good gun for its role which is supporting light brigades. The US also uses them for Stryker brigades but I don't think this is a good idea because the M777 is movement limited. A more mobile brigade such as the Stryker one and our mechanized CMBGs need an SP, probably a wheeled SP, that is armoured and automated so that it can shoot quickly, and reposition rapidly under counterfire. I think the Stryker brigades will convert to something else in the not to distant future. We have enough M777s that we can equip about four batteries fully and still have spare and training guns. That means we can fully equip one artillery close support regiment for one light brigade and have an additional reserve battery. Our mech and heavy brigade's close support regiments need an SP system.

I picked the 777 simply as it is a currently field gun with the CF -- no 105 it really useful for operations, so it makes zero sense to buy more.
No disagreement on the SPA aspect - but I would put a higher priority to long range precision fires (rocket/missile) battery over getting the M109 again (or similar).

I have no idea why we haven't built sub-calibre devices to fit into 155mm weapon systems which would allow full gun troop and observer training on small ranges with smaller safety distances and using much cheaper ammunition; we could save millions every year. We already do "dry" training with 105mm guns which can take place on any parking lot or vacant field near the armouries. Such dry training can take place with M777s or wheeled SPs as well. 80% - 90% of the artillery reserves' training is dry training anyway. For the 20% that requires live fire, most artillery armouries (sorry BC) are within several hours driving time from a range anyway - whether you take your own guns there or "borrow" some Reg F guns already there.

Again - I think the CF is miles behind the US Army - and specifically Nation Guard to Reserve comparison when it comes to simulators.
There is zero point to a live gun at most Militia armories - as gun crews can train on non gun system - and the CP and FOO aspects can be done via sim (with a decent sim)

For those that think armouries limit equipment, you'll have to remember that a lot of the old armoured corps armouries kept Sherman tanks on the premises back in the 50s. Yes its an issue but it has solutions. Buying a gun that fits existing armories is not a wise criteria to put into the statement of requirements because you'll automatically eliminate 95% of the systems available and end up with another LG-1.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Hate to say it but we need to start letting go of facilities built when they were designed when Cavalry meant horse back, and tanks were a work of science fiction. If we want our reserves to be relevant they need facilities to reflect the capabilities we want them to have

Easier said than done, the cost of buying new land and buildings will outweigh the funds of selling the old land which has to be cleaned and then offered first to the local FN. Then is there land nearby that has a population to support the unit, tranist, services? Plus will the municipality allow for the zoning changes? Sometimes they are success stories, like the move of 12 Service Battalion to Richmond, onto if I recall correctly unused Federal land. The moving of units to new buildings/lands should have taken place in the 80's when there was a greater abundance of urban Federal land to choose from, now new land is very expensive and rare.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG

What happens it we take the 2 Division construct a little further and ditch the Brigade Group concept completely?

Just briefly you have to remember that I'm a product of the Cold War. It's not that I can't think outside the box but I tend to take a look at fresh ideas and say ...Okay. Does this really improve things? What are we gaining? What are we losing? I generally tend to find, especially when I look at how we transformed after 2000, that what we gained in flexibility, we lost in our ability to grow the force in an emergency and that we lost a coherent doctrine which greatly complicated training, equipment acquisition, and future force development.

There's a concept amongst university professors called "publish or perish" which means you have to be continuously churning out fresh concepts or disappear into obscurity. I tend to think that a similar thing exists amongst military leaders who tend to reinvent the wheel every time they take on a new posting in order to demonstrate their value to the system and their potential for promotion. Too often we throw out the baby with the bath water in order to "improve things"

That said, the US moved to BCTs (ie brigade groups) around 2000 for the express purpose of creating a formation smaller than a division capable of self sustainment on deployment. The Brits are just doing it now (to the point of calling these organizations BCTs as well.) Heck. Even the Russians have gone there. Obviously there also needs to be a theatre sustainment system for a BCT to link into, but the BCT/bde gp is the smallest entity with all the necessary integral combat support and sustainment for combat and around which combat doctrine is built. I'd need to see a really compelling argument to throw that system over.

Suppose that we work with CJOC having available to it CANSOFCOM, a Light Division and a Heavy Division.

I propose that the Light Division have two pure infantry brigades with 3 equally manned infantry battalions of about 432 Infantry FTEs each. 2 Battalions would be Light Battalions and one Battalion would be a LAV Battalion.

The Heavy Division would have a single pure infantry brigade of 2 LAV Battalions and a Light Battalion. The Light Battalion could be used as a heliborne blocking force, for D&D or to plus up the LAV Battalions.

All three brigades have a single operational focus (light or heavy) but have the internal assets to continue training in the other field.

Just a point. CJOC and 1 Div are force employers of whatever is allocated to them for a particular operation. 2 to 5 Div are force generators only. We have one "deployable" Div HQ and four static HQs. We don't need more deployable Div HQ then we have "Divs" to deploy. We only have equipment for the deployment of one Div if we scrape everything we own together so I see one force employment Div HQ and two force generating static Div HQs.

I see the concept of a single heavy and a single light division and have bought into that some time ago albeit in my concept the 2 Div has both a light brigade and a medium mech brigade amongst other things while 3 Div has a heavy brigade amongst other things.

I do not like mixing light, medium and heavy battalions within a single brigade. While mixing them increases flexibility in deploying independent tailored battle groups, it takes away from being able to deploy the entire brigade as a coherent entity fully trained in the doctrine appropriate for that kind of brigade. Each of these three brigades operates in specific ways commensurate with the equipment it has and the way its personnel have been trained. Once you start mixing things around the way Canada does, we gain the fiction of "agile and flexible" which in reality means "we don't know what we might need so we'll hedge our bets" (Oh. And keep the three infantry regimental mafias happy that no one is better than the others.)

Now, as to the RCA and the RCAC.


The RCA has 4 Regiments. What happens if each Division gets 2 Regiments - one for a Close Support Fd Regiment and one for a General Support Regiment.

The GS Regiments are fully manned Regular force units with all the specialty kit including GBAD and LRPR. The CS Regiments in both divisions have the ability to add Fd Batteries from the Reserves to Reg Force Co-ordination, STA and FOO/FAC elements and ready Fd batteries.

Artillery is a bit more generic and could be treated differently. A key point is the FOO/JTAC batteries. It is very important that the FSCC and FOO/JTAC teams integrate strongly with their supported battalions/brigade HQ (This is why the US separates the FSE and FSOs from the gun batteries and attaches them to manoeuvre battalions/BCT HQ - something we're pretty close to now.)

If that is done then the various fire units can be allocated around as necessary. I'm somewhat tied to the one CS regt per brigade, one GS regt per division ratio. The key question in my mind isn't so much how these fire units are allocated in peacetime, but how many manoeuvre brigades do you intend to deploy in a) day to day operations and b) in a worst case scenario. For the situations in a) there should be enough Reg/Res organizations available on a full time or short notice basis and for the b) scenario there should be enough regiments of the appropriate type for the 3 and 1 ratio both equipped and trained to deploy. So if we create a force capable of deploying three brigades at a given time we need the equipment and trained personnel for 3 CS regiments and 1 GS regiment.

The RCAC, with 3 Regiments adds a 4x 19 tank Regiment to the "Heavy" infantry bde. In addition it adds a Lt Cav ISR Regiment to both the Lt and the Heavy Division as Divisional Troops.

The Infantry and the RCAC can then sort themselves out into Combined Arms Teams, long term, short term or permanent, as is seen fit.

I keep mulling over whether a squadron really needs to be 19 tanks. The Russians use 10, the Americans use 14. All that aside I see a tank regiment in the heavy brigade but a cavalry squadron with each brigade as well. The differences in light medium and heavy brigades probably dictates we need a cavalry regiment tailored for each different type of brigade albeit there need to be some similarities as to how these regiments are equipped and operated as in large part they will perform the same functions.

I don't think I would leave this to the infantry and armour to sort out. I'd put all the best minds on the problem and then impose a structure because otherwise regimental shit will clog the development of the best solution. (The US and the Russians - which have less vested interest in cap badge crap - have already gone to combined arms battalions/battalion tactical groups while I expect the Brits won't because - cap badge crap) I personally like the concept because it facilitates integration of troops, facilitates their training, and negates the need to reorganize during the course of operations. There is a little lack of flexibility but I think it is offset by doctrinal stability.

That results in 2 deployable div HQs
3 deployable Bde HQs
5 LIB battalions
4 LAV battalions
2 Lt Cav ISR Regiments
1 Tank Regiment
2 CS Arty Regiments
2 GS Arty Regiments

Add in the 1x Cdn Cbt Spt Bde
Service Spt and Sigs assets
TacHel assets

And everybody's ox is suitably gored while creating a functional force.

Reserves to flesh out the body at the platoon/troop level.

I think it works with the plug and play battle group concept Canada has worked out for itself but in the paraphrased words of the immortal Lou Grant " I hate plug and play". Like I said. I'm a Cold War guy. I like solid doctrines and to me "plug and play" is the antithesis of solid doctrine. I like organizations where everyone has a place, knows his job and knows where the other guys fit in. If you organize and train for that in peace then it becomes second nature in war. If you try to ad hoc your way through a war, like we did in Afghanistan, then the other guy will roll over you while everyone is trying to figure out their next move.

 

[FJAG]

Need someone to blow your horn?

Doesn't the drummer carry a bugle?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Easier said than done, the cost of buying new land and buildings will outweigh the funds of selling the old land which has to be cleaned and then offered first to the local FN. Then is there land nearby that has a population to support the unit, tranist, services? Plus will the municipality allow for the zoning changes? Sometimes they are success stories, like the move of 12 Service Battalion to Richmond, onto if I recall correctly unused Federal land. The moving of units to new buildings/lands should have taken place in the 80's when there was a greater abundance of urban Federal land to choose from, now new land is very expensive and rare.

I like the old buildings. They remind me of other famous 'last stands', like the Alamo and Beau Geste:

 

[FJAG]

Between this and the Army restructuring thread - I continue to cringe.
Not because what you write - but because the extend of the capability gaps in what Canada "Should have" versus has.

I've always been a cynic, Kevin. I worked in Ottawa for three years and watched sausages being made albeit from a legal branch view which is often twice removed from reality. Since I started working on this book about the artillery in Afghanistan and started interviewing folks from gunners to 3 stars who were at the coal face I've started learning things which makes me realize that my cynicism was actually my living in Pollyanna land. There are a few folks on this forum who you already know who are far more knowledgeable about these things and even more cynical than I am.

Why even have AD Regiments? Why not take the MANPADS role - and give that to the 031 trade (get a fairly easy idiot proof F&F system)
The ADATS can get attached to the Armored units, with the UAV Scout role?

There's quite a bit of discussion on this above but in short the issue is command and control over the air space to ensure friendly air elements (of which we still have quite a few) can operate safely and effectively and that there is a coordinated effort to knock everything hostile down rapidly.

Air defence has been a complicated system and with the development of new small and semiautonomous systems it is even much more complex. There is a major technological arms race going on right now to develop more effective attack systems and faster and better (and equally semiautonomous) defence systems.

Leaving aside the command and control aspect, I'd prefer the 031 become and stay an expert at all things 031. Keeping and managing an air defence system is a full-time job which still requires a certain amount of line of sight and advance warning. The best way to provide protection to a given rifle company or tank squadron may be with a Manpad from somewhere a few kilometres away which acts as part of a layered defence that reaches far to the front.

I don't doubt that, like Trophy active defense systems, there will in the future be semiauto systems for manoeuvre forces (both mounted and dismounted) that will provide protection against airborne threats.

Quite frankly, much of our current Manpads technology would very likely be swamped even by the first generation systems deployed by Azerbaijan. Your in the consultant field - my advice is hop on board with this - it's going to be a big moneymaker for the guy that develops the right kit.

I picked the 777 simply as it is a currently field gun with the CF -- no 105 it really useful for operations, so it makes zero sense to buy more.
No disagreement on the SPA aspect - but I would put a higher priority to long range precision fires (rocket/missile) battery over getting the M109 again (or similar).

I agree. We actually had a long range precision rocket system on active projects back in the 2010 (give or take a few years) timeframe - it would likely have been HIMARS - but it was scrapped amongst many other useful projects because - infantry mafia. It would have needed very few PYs because reservists can run these systems easily. The trouble is the rockets are pricey and you know Canada - we don't go to real wars anymore.

I'm a big fan of M109s but quite frankly prefer a wheeled, armoured, automated SP. On the other hand all of the US's long range precision fire bucks are going into the ERCA M1299 project (which is essentially a further development of the M109A7). There is talk about something for the Stryker brigades (which would work for us) as part of the Mobile Howitzer program (shootout) which is looking at existing foreign systems. I'd be a bit cautious about it because like the Stryker itself, this is an interim project which will have long lasting consequences. Whatever they go with will be better than what we have ... but ...

Again - I think the CF is miles behind the US Army - and specifically Nation Guard to Reserve comparison when it comes to simulators.
There is zero point to a live gun at most Militia armories - as gun crews can train on non gun system - and the CP and FOO aspects can be done via sim (with a decent sim)

Can't help but agree. I've for some time thought that we need to break the FOO/JTAC - gun line relationship. Our reserve regiments (batteries mostly) still function the way that they did back in the fifties (although there is some new technical gear there).

Basic gunline is simple but varies from gun to gun to rocket launcher. FOOs and JTACs have a much more complex and demanding job than ever before especially if they need to operate out of LAV OPVs which also requires the basic ability to operate the LAV turret as well as the gunner specific gear - and then there is JTAC certification and recertification. STA is just a whole different ball of wax what with operating radars and UAVs. Then there is the whole new field of armed UAVs and other systems of that nature - they're artillery-like in that you deliver munitions indirectly but again are a whole new skill set. Then there's the whole command and control element that goes with fires coordination and delivery. ... And then there is air defence. We need to organize; divide up the tasks and set up specific units/armories to turn out the special skills that we need. We need to think well beyond the C3 training gun replacement paradigm. When we converted two reserve regiments and a battery to air defence, it worked for many years and in fact sustained the branch for a while when 4 AD went on hiatus.

Long story short. These are not optional systems. As long that the SSE says we need to be capable of full spectrum warfare including a peer-to-peer relationship then, unless you consider that peer to be Guatemala, (I had to check if we could actually take them on and I think that we could - although they do have air defence) we need to plan for a better more capable reserve and for the incorporation of these types of systems.

Personally I tend to think that for all of this we should go with US systems so that we can incorporate ourselves into their sustainment system in a pinch. My guess is that our use of these types of systems probably will not happen in anger unless we are part of an alliance with NATO and quite frankly I'd rather get me armament and spare parts resupply from the US than from Sweden or even Germany (more specifically we should have US subsidiaries turning out munitions and equipment here in Canada).

We could do awfully worse than restructuring the Res F into a ARNG model (without all that State stuff). (I always say, only half jokingly, that if we converted our Res F into three ABCTs and an artillery brigade, and prepositioned the gear for one of those ABCTs in Poland, the US would happily give us all the equipment for them. It wouldn't be their newest stuff but it would be better than anything that we have now. )

 

[KevinB]

I've always been a cynic, Kevin. I worked in Ottawa for three years and watched sausages being made albeit from a legal branch view which is often twice removed from reality. Since I started working on this book about the artillery in Afghanistan and started interviewing folks from gunners to 3 stars who were at the coal face I've started learning things which makes me realize that my cynicism was actually my living in Pollyanna land. There are a few folks on this forum who you already know who are far more knowledgeable about these things and even more cynical than I am.

There's quite a bit of discussion on this above but in short the issue is command and control over the air space to ensure friendly air elements (of which we still have quite a few) can operate safely and effectively and that there is a coordinated effort to knock everything hostile down rapidly.

Air defence has been a complicated system and with the development of new small and semiautonomous systems it is even much more complex. There is a major technological arms race going on right now to develop more effective attack systems and faster and better (and equally semiautonomous) defence systems.

Leaving aside the command and control aspect, I'd prefer the 031 become and stay an expert at all things 031. Keeping and managing an air defence system is a full-time job which still requires a certain amount of line of sight and advance warning. The best way to provide protection to a given rifle company or tank squadron may be with a Manpad from somewhere a few kilometres away which acts as part of a layered defence that reaches far to the front.

I don't doubt that, like Trophy active defense systems, there will in the future be semiauto systems for manoeuvre forces (both mounted and dismounted) that will provide protection against airborne threats.

Quite frankly, much of our current Manpads technology would very likely be swamped even by the first generation systems deployed by Azerbaijan. Your in the consultant field - my advice is hop on board with this - it's going to be a big moneymaker for the guy that develops the right kit.

I agree. We actually had a long range precision rocket system on active projects back in the 2010 (give or take a few years) timeframe - it would likely have been HIMARS - but it was scrapped amongst many other useful projects because - infantry mafia. It would have needed very few PYs because reservists can run these systems easily. The trouble is the rockets are pricey and you know Canada - we don't go to real wars anymore.

I'm a big fan of M109s but quite frankly prefer a wheeled, armoured, automated SP. On the other hand all of the US's long range precision fire bucks are going into the ERCA M1299 project (which is essentially a further development of the M109A7). There is talk about something for the Stryker brigades (which would work for us) as part of the Mobile Howitzer program (shootout) which is looking at existing foreign systems. I'd be a bit cautious about it because like the Stryker itself, this is an interim project which will have long lasting consequences. Whatever they go with will be better than what we have ... but ...

Can't help but agree. I've for some time thought that we need to break the FOO/JTAC - gun line relationship. Our reserve regiments (batteries mostly) still function the way that they did back in the fifties (although there is some new technical gear there).

Basic gunline is simple but varies from gun to gun to rocket launcher. FOOs and JTACs have a much more complex and demanding job than ever before especially if they need to operate out of LAV OPVs which also requires the basic ability to operate the LAV turret as well as the gunner specific gear - and then there is JTAC certification and recertification. STA is just a whole different ball of wax what with operating radars and UAVs. Then there is the whole new field of armed UAVs and other systems of that nature - they're artillery-like in that you deliver munitions indirectly but again are a whole new skill set. Then there's the whole command and control element that goes with fires coordination and delivery. ... And then there is air defence. We need to organize; divide up the tasks and set up specific units/armories to turn out the special skills that we need. We need to think well beyond the C3 training gun replacement paradigm. When we converted two reserve regiments and a battery to air defence, it worked for many years and in fact sustained the branch for a while when 4 AD went on hiatus.

Long story short. These are not optional systems. As long that the SSE says we need to be capable of full spectrum warfare including a peer-to-peer relationship then, unless you consider that peer to be Guatemala, (I had to check if we could actually take them on and I think that we could - although they do have air defence) we need to plan for a better more capable reserve and for the incorporation of these types of systems.

Personally I tend to think that for all of this we should go with US systems so that we can incorporate ourselves into their sustainment system in a pinch. My guess is that our use of these types of systems probably will not happen in anger unless we are part of an alliance with NATO and quite frankly I'd rather get me armament and spare parts resupply from the US than from Sweden or even Germany (more specifically we should have US subsidiaries turning out munitions and equipment here in Canada).

We could do awfully worse than restructuring the Res F into a ARNG model (without all that State stuff). (I always say, only half jokingly, that if we converted our Res F into three ABCTs and an artillery brigade, and prepositioned the gear for one of those ABCTs in Poland, the US would happily give us all the equipment for them. It wouldn't be their newest stuff but it would be better than anything that we have now. )

Years ago as a wee Reserve Gunner - I waited (technically wine stewarded - but we did a lot of meal carrying) dinners at the Ottawa Army Officers Mess, one of the gunner functions had D Arty and it was going over Div Arty and the most recent (to be ignored) White Paper about a GS Reg't with heavy guns (beyond 155mm) and rockets - even then I wondered what color the sky was in someones world.

Have now/can get, versus want, versus should have, generally in my experience kills a lot of programs in the CF.


FOO doesn't equal JTAC - while any idiot can be a FOO (I am proof) - and unfortunately we have seen the results of inexperienced attempts at Combat Controlling with resultant 'friendly' fire casualties from legitimately one of the easiest AC to guide onto a target.
*having a tan beret and dinner plate doesn't immediately make one a JTAC either -- and reference burning building while fighting in a city isn't a good target reference point.
IMHO the Army should stay the F out of the JTAC role - and leave it to US Air Force, or whoever else's zooms are in support).

UAV's - I am all for ISR feeds - but armed UAV work needs 2 things 1) Experienced "Pilot" and an experienced Targeting assistant - someone with ground experience - I understand that CANSOFCOM adopted the same sort of setup that JSOC does down here - and put a shooter in the seat beside the pilot with the ability to No Go releases depending on the ground situation.
Armed UAV's have massive potential for Blue on Blue - and while a massive enabler - need to be controlled in the close battle with very delicate application.
** I say this, as I honestly don't see the CF conducting targeted killings like we do down here with drones, and I expect they will be a battlefield support tool - a tactical versus strategic strike asset.



Getting back to the AD aspect -- while AD like GS Arty is usually a Div asset - the fact that Canada never deploys (and can't really deploy) a Div Operationally means that it needs to be kicked down to a BCT Level - the Armored "Recce" aspect is where I think it fits best (and the UAV's), as it will be working with the Highest CDN deployed command HQ (ignoring the fact a NCE will probably come to add senior officers who can get a medal and extra pay) Whatever JOC it runs - will need to be the co-ordinator for that aspect with the Allies and RCAF (wait who am I kidding there, outside the TacHel guys no one is showing up)



Any imbecile can operate a MANPAD system - I don't view them as part as any actual AD plan - they are more self defense systems -
The range and most current versions have a decent IFF system that it will not let you lock on a friendly (I have seen people try though).
It really needs to be viewed like a Javelin (the AT one) - and a section enabler - to be employed as needed.


-- and edit - none of this gets the Res Arty units closer to a new gun

 

[Kirkhill]

So you prompted me to go have a look at what the Royal Artillery has been up to.

As near as I can figure the 105 mm is primarily employed by the Paras and the Marines in their specialty roles. It is also employed by two other regular regiments and three associated reserve regiments. A total of 4 regular and 3 reserve units.

The 155mm AS90 SPH is employed by 2 regular units.

26 RA is the Div Spt Regt with the MRLS/GMRLS and the NLOS-Spike (Exactor 2). The Exactor has a 25 km range and the GMRLS is being upgraded past 150 km with Lockheed's PrSM missile heading past 500 km. 26 RA is supported by 101 (Res) who also fire the MRLS but don't own any.

12 RA, supported by 106 (Res) RA are equipped with Stormer MRL vehicles and ManPad Light Weight Launchers capable of launching both the 130mm 7 km Starstreak Anti-Air missile and a new 76mm 8 km Martlet Surface to Surface precision missile. 106 still calls itself a CSAD regiment but 12 has dropped the AD and just refers to itself as CS or close support. Although both, along with 16 RA are part of 7th Air Defence Group.

16 RA has been re-equipped in its SHORAD role, turning in its 8 km Rapiers for 25 km LandCeptors - the same CAMM missile purchased for the RCN's CSCs.

5 RA continues its role in STA with MSTAR, HALO, LCMR and MAMBA and in Long Range Observation Posts (100 km ahead of the FEBA). It is joined in Observation by 32 RA's 4 kg Desert Hawk MUAS and 11 kg Puma 2 SUAS as well as 47 RA's 450 kg Watchkeeper. Although 47 RA has joined the Army Air Corps and, along with a Wildcat and 2 Apache regiments serves in 1 Aviation Brigade wearing the light blue beret.

 

[Kirkhill]

'Special Observers': Meet The Soldiers The Enemy Never See 5 Regiment Royal Artillery are midway through a 13-week course. www.forces.net

British Army’s new air defence system completes firing trials.

Land Ceptor, the Army’s new air defence missile, was recently tested on a Swedish test fire range close to the Baltic Sea, launching from its launcher vehicle and intercepting and destroying an aerial target in a display of the weapon’s accuracy.

www.army.mod.uk

Martlet (missile) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org