C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Colin Parkinson]

Might as well throw in some 50 KW phase cannons and KE projectiles from manned orbital platforms as well, that will really make the enemy afraid.

 

[Kirkhill]

Correct me Old Sweat:

1900 need identified
1901 Statement of Requirement
1902 Catalogue Shopping
1903 Prototyping
1903 QF 18 pdr
1904 QF 13 pdr
1908 QF  4.5" Howitzer

1914 WW1

18 Pdr and 4.5 in service past 1940
13 pdr still in ceremonial service.

 

[CBH99]

I think it's important to remember that within the last 20 years, Army organizations have been far more reactive than proactive.  This, in my humble opinion, was excusable under the circumstanes.

In regards to our experience in Afghanistan, we found ourselves thrust into the middle of an aggressive COIN war that nobody planned for.  Even with budget increases and sole sourcing of various equipment, the resources that came with that HAD to go to support the war being fought.  And in that particular theater, air defense wasn't even remotely on the radar.  (Pun truly not intended.)


So the artillery got 37 new M777 guns.  Tanks were replaced with Leopard 2.  C-17's were bought.  A new fleet of C-130 was bought.  A fleet of interm Chinooks was acquired, and a new fleet of CH-147F models were bought and integrated into our force structure, when we realized how necessary they really are.  New MRAP vehicles, etc etc. 

The budget and sole sourcing of equipment had to go to support the war being fought at the time.



The military, especially the Army, is still a reactive organization.  It won't acquire what it needs until the balloon goes up, and the GOFO's go "Oh, hey, we need X of this and Y of that to be competitive in this battlespace."

We all know that having longer range artillery options for the Reg F, such as HIMARS or something similar, is going to be needed at some point.  The same way we all knew having Chinooks would be needed too.  The same way we knew that we were eventually going to have to get some C-17's.

But until the balloon goes up, those are all just things we all know we will need eventually, but there isn't any urgency behind it.  Once the shooting starts, the urgency starts, and that's when s**t gets done.



It's frustrating.  It's poor leadership.  But the Army has always been more reactive than proactive.  (Same goes with the US Army, British Army, etc etc.)

The only western ground-force that is truly planning 5 years down the road and IMPLEMENTING those changes now, is the USMC.


:2c:

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think it's important to remember that within the last 20 years, Army organizations have been far more reactive than proactive.  This, in my humble opinion, was excusable under the circumstanes.

In regards to our experience in Afghanistan, we found ourselves thrust into the middle of an aggressive COIN war that nobody planned for.  Even with budget increases and sole sourcing of various equipment, the resources that came with that HAD to go to support the war being fought.  And in that particular theater, air defense wasn't even remotely on the radar.  (Pun truly not intended.)


So the artillery got 37 new M777 guns.  Tanks were replaced with Leopard 2.  C-17's were bought.  A new fleet of C-130 was bought.  A fleet of interm Chinooks was acquired, and a new fleet of CH-147F models were bought and integrated into our force structure, when we realized how necessary they really are.  New MRAP vehicles, etc etc. 

The budget and sole sourcing of equipment had to go to support the war being fought at the time.



The military, especially the Army, is still a reactive organization.  It won't acquire what it needs until the balloon goes up, and the GOFO's go "Oh, hey, we need X of this and Y of that to be competitive in this battlespace."

We all know that having longer range artillery options for the Reg F, such as HIMARS or something similar, is going to be needed at some point.  The same way we all knew having Chinooks would be needed too.  The same way we knew that we were eventually going to have to get some C-17's.

But until the balloon goes up, those are all just things we all know we will need eventually, but there isn't any urgency behind it.  Once the shooting starts, the urgency starts, and that's when s**t gets done.



It's frustrating.  It's poor leadership.  But the Army has always been more reactive than proactive.  (Same goes with the US Army, British Army, etc etc.)

The only western ground-force that is truly planning 5 years down the road and IMPLEMENTING those changes now, is the USMC.


:2c:

Dude... the aircraft are RCAF assets... but I like how you think

 

[FJAG]

I think it's important to remember that within the last 20 years, Army organizations have been far more reactive than proactive.  This, in my humble opinion, was excusable under the circumstanes.
...
The military, especially the Army, is still a reactive organization.  It won't acquire what it needs until the balloon goes up, and the GOFO's go "Oh, hey, we need X of this and Y of that to be competitive in this battlespace."
...
But until the balloon goes up, those are all just things we all know we will need eventually, but there isn't any urgency behind it.  Once the shooting starts, the urgency starts, and that's when s**t gets done.
...
It's frustrating.  It's poor leadership.  But the Army has always been more reactive than proactive.  (Same goes with the US Army, British Army, etc etc.)
...
The only western ground-force that is truly planning 5 years down the road and IMPLEMENTING those changes now, is the USMC.
:2c:

One of the primary reasons that we have GOFOs is to plan for the future, while something like Afghanistan was benign enough that we had time to adapt. Some future conflicts don't give us that option. (For the Army the problem is that it's the Air Force and Navy's "turn" for "shiny" new kit.)
Here are a few thoughts from past GOFOs who in my mind had their crap together.

Simonds in the 1950s:

“No nation, not even the richest, can afford to maintain continuously ‘forces in being’ capable of meeting major unforeseen emergencies. There must be reserves of partially trained personnel which can be called upon in emergency.”
...
if Canadian soldiers were to fight in Europe, they would have to be there at the start of hostilities; shipping a large force from Canada to Europe was not an available option

Belzile in 2005:

... Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war. This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little. The Canadian Forces needs a plan. 

If the SSE can see the need for a credible force for providing deterrence and the ability to fight a peer enemy then at the very least the GOFOs should be working on bringing up our standards so that we actually are peers along side our allies against Russia.

Over and above the USMC, the US Army's Futures Command is doing some good things. Their whole focus is quite different from the USMC. In addition the Brit Army has done a major review in their Army 2020 (Refine) although I have some problem with it in that what was to be a major alignment with their Reserves (Future Reserves 2020) was mostly sidelined in the usual RegF/ResF nonsense we're all used to here (also I'm not sure I really believe in the concept of the Strike Brigade). Canada -- well, I'm still waiting for Waypoint 2019.

:cheers:

 

[daftandbarmy]

FYI.... October 2020


Taking Firepower Forward

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Long-range precision fires tops the US Army’s list of modernisation priorities, a reality that underlines the importance of artillery as a joint enabler within a multi-domain battlespace. As proliferating A2/AD technologies threaten to undermine NATO air superiority within a contested theatre of operations, artillery must be able to reverse longstanding deficiencies in range and mass. Forces are seeking agile, self-propelled capabilities that can exceed the conventional roles of suppressive fire and manoeuvre support to enable precision striking of strategic targets at long-range – whilst minimising vulnerability to counter-fire.

Future Artillery Online provides a unique platform to look not only at the systems themselves, but also at ongoing efforts to enhance digitisation, improving the interoperability of NATO joint fires and enabling the artillery user to exploit a networked battlespace. A related focus will be enhancing C2 in a contested theatre of operations by integrating with the joint force’s wider ISTAR enterprise.

Register now to join discussions on long-range fires, next-generation munitions, digitisation, ISTAR integration and training, with perspectives from forces deployed in Europe and as part of COIN operations around the world.

We look forward to seeing you online in October.

https://www.defenceiq.com/events-futureartillery-online/

 

[CBH99]

One of the primary reasons that we have GOFOs is to plan for the future, while something like Afghanistan was benign enough that we had time to adapt. Some future conflicts don't give us that option. (For the Army the problem is that it's the Air Force and Navy's "turn" for "shiny" new kit.)
Here are a few thoughts from past GOFOs who in my mind had their crap together.

Simonds in the 1950s:
Belzile in 2005:
If the SSE can see the need for a credible force for providing deterrence and the ability to fight a peer enemy then at the very least the GOFOs should be working on bringing up our standards so that we actually are peers along side our allies against Russia.

Over and above the USMC, the US Army's Futures Command is doing some good things. Their whole focus is quite different from the USMC. In addition the Brit Army has done a major review in their Army 2020 (Refine) although I have some problem with it in that what was to be a major alignment with their Reserves (Future Reserves 2020) was mostly sidelined in the usual RegF/ResF nonsense we're all used to here (also I'm not sure I really believe in the concept of the Strike Brigade). Canada -- well, I'm still waiting for Waypoint 2019.

:cheers:

Totally agree with you FJAG.

I think the British Army's '2020 Refine' is similar to our SSE.  Suggested reorganizations, equipment shopping list, etc.  And the US Army's Future Command is absolutely doing some good things in coordinating future capabilities better than they have, and trying to speed up the implementation of those capabilities in some creative & effective ways.

I think what set the USMC apart is they said "This is the role we need to play.  We can't just be a 2nd army, and duplicate it's capabilities.  We need to be fast, agile, dispersed, be able to reach out and kill enemy capital assets from far away, while minimizing our own risk.  This is a clear plan of how we intend to do just that." 

And boom, they got started immediately.  Within the last 2 months, tanks and artillery guns almost entirely gone from their units.  Marine units being aggressively re-roled, etc etc. 

They really seem to understand that the role they intend to play will be needed sooner vs. later.  For them, unlike us or the British, it isn't just an academic paper to be implemented as funds or willpower allows.  They seem to understand the 'Pacific Brawl' is on the horizon - and both China & the US openly discuss preparing for it. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

They really seem to understand that the role they intend to play will be needed sooner vs. later.  For them, unlike us or the British, it isn't just an academic paper to be implemented as funds or willpower allows.  They seem to understand the 'Pacific Brawl' is on the horizon - and both China & the US openly discuss preparing for it.

I'd be careful about lumping us in with the British on the 'theoretical' operational readiness requirement thing. I think the last time they had a year pass without a service member being killed in action was 1968. Regardless, their need for a viable commitment to, and capacity for, home and European defence alone, if only geographical, is significantly more pressing than ours, IMHO.

Their residual colonial and commonwealth commitments, which represent access to vast and untapped reserves of various natural resources, also require them to be ready to defend their national interests at short notice. Like the US and others with vulnerable supply chains, with the rise of China's Belt and Road, their commitments to alot of those relationships will be sorely tested. The 'Spratley's Spat' is just the start, of course.

 

[Ostrozac]

Taken directly from one of our own PAM'S,



A heavy general support regiment has three batteries of four large calibre guns, normally 203 mm or larger.

Or larger? Did any NATO country ever field a gun larger than the 203mm M110 that wasn’t attached to a battleship? I suspect that Pam could use some editing and cross-checking with reality.

 

[Old Sweat]

Or larger? Did any NATO country ever field a gun larger than the 203mm M110 that wasn’t attached to a battleship? I suspect that Pam could use some editing and cross-checking with reality.

During the Second World War and into the 1950s the Brits and the Americans, and probably some others, fielded 240mm guns. In fact, the first nuclear artillery round was fired from "Atomic Annie", an American 240mm. It, the gun, not the round, is now on display at the US Army Artillery Center at Fort Sill, OK. I remember as a young teen watching a clip of the fire mission on a television news broadcast.

However, your point is valid. At the time that the pamphlet referred to was written, in the 1980s, I don't think there was anything larger than a 203mm in NATO land forces service. As I alluded in a previous post, there was quite a bit of wishful thinking, if not outright fantasy in the pamphlet in mention.

Note: the 240mm was pretty cumbersome and difficult to move, and its ammunition expenditure was tightly controlled to preserve barrel life. Any gunner past the toddler stage may recall being told as part of a lecture on calibration, how the MV of very large calibre guns was adjusted for barrel wear during periods of prolonged firing.

 

[FJAG]

During the Second World War and into the 1950s the Brits and the Americans, and probably some others, fielded 240mm guns. In fact, the first nuclear artillery round was fired from "Atomic Annie", an American 240mm. It, the gun, not the round, is now on display at the US Army Artillery Center at Fort Sill, OK. I remember as a young teen watching a clip of the fire mission on a television news broadcast.

However, your point is valid. At the time that the pamphlet referred to was written, in the 1980s, I don't think there was anything larger than a 203mm in NATO land forces service. As I alluded in a previous post, there was quite a bit of wishful thinking, if not outright fantasy in the pamphlet in mention.

Note: the 240mm was pretty cumbersome and difficult to move, and its ammunition expenditure was tightly controlled to preserve barrel life. Any gunner past the toddler stage may recall being told as part of a lecture on calibration, how the MV of very large calibre guns was adjusted for barrel wear during periods of prolonged firing.

Small correction Old Sweat. Atomic Annie was a 280mm (11inch) calibre.

I had a Revell plastic model of Atomic Annie as a kid in the early 60s and they've just reissued a 60th anniversary edition of the kit.

https://www.cybermodeler.com/hobby/kits/rm/kit_rm_7811.shtml

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M65_atomic_cannon#/media/File:M65_Atomic_canon_1.jpg

:cheers:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Most of the long surviving Battleships in WWII had to get their guns relined part way through the war. When you read the ammo expenditures for the big guns it's quite surprising, I think it was the Bismark engagement, the Brit ship fired some 300 rds in total.

 

[Old Sweat]

Small correction Old Sweat. Atomic Annie was a 280mm (11inch) calibre.

I had a Revell plastic model of Atomic Annie as a kid in the early 60s and they've just reissued a 60th anniversary edition of the kit.

https://www.cybermodeler.com/hobby/kits/rm/kit_rm_7811.shtml

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M65_atomic_cannon#/media/File:M65_Atomic_canon_1.jpg

:cheers:

Absolutely correct. I looked it up last night, but decided to see who would catch me. The Americans did do some work on a 240mm round, but canned it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Small correction Old Sweat. Atomic Annie was a 280mm (11inch) calibre.

I had a Revell plastic model of Atomic Annie as a kid in the early 60s and they've just reissued a 60th anniversary edition of the kit.

https://www.cybermodeler.com/hobby/kits/rm/kit_rm_7811.shtml

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M65_atomic_cannon#/media/File:M65_Atomic_canon_1.jpg

:cheers:

I knew some guys in the nuke battery with the British army. I desperately wanted to acquire one of their T-shirt’s, which I think had a mushroom cloud and the motto: ‘Instant Sunshine’.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I knew some guys in the nuke battery with the British army. I desperately wanted to acquire one of their T-shirt’s, which I think had a mushroom cloud and the motto: ‘Instant Sunshine’.

Yep! They say that we, Canadians, are obsessed with the weather ... but if the joke refers to sunshine over rain, it has to come from the Brits. ;D

 

[Old Sweat]

In the late 60s, when 4 CMBG was still part of 2 (BR) Division in 1 (BR) Corps, each division had a missile regiment of two Honest John batteries, each of two launcher sections, and two gun batteries, each of two towed 8-inch (203mm) howitzers. Our nuclear delivery unit, 1 SSM Battery, had two troops, each of two launcher sections.

 

[FJAG]

In the late 60s, when 4 CMBG was still part of 2 (BR) Division in 1 (BR) Corps, each division had a missile regiment of two Honest John batteries, each of two launcher sections, and two gun batteries, each of two towed 8-inch (203mm) howitzers. Our nuclear delivery unit, 1 SSM Battery, had two troops, each of two launcher sections.

The 8-inch (203mm) was also nuclear capable.

For that matter there was a 155mm nuclear shell which could be fired from the M109, M114 and M198 howitzers at the time.

My understanding is that both the 155mm and 203mm rounds have been retired.

Yup. Back in the day our fireplans had a nuclear pulse component. I think Old Sweat and I are probably two of the very few nuclear target analysts left around.  ;D

:cheers:

 

[Old Sweat]

The 8-inch (203mm) was also nuclear capable.

For that matter there was a 155mm nuclear shell which could be fired from the M109, M114 and M198 howitzers at the time.

My understanding is that both the 155mm and 203mm rounds have been retired.

Yup. Back in the day our fireplans had a nuclear pulse component. I think Old Sweat and I are probably two of the very few nuclear target analysts left around.  ;D

:cheers:

The 8-inch was indeed nuclear capable. The British employment, in this regard, was similar to the Honest John, in that the section would be in a hide, prepared to deploy to a, perhaps one of several, prepared firing positions. When the deployment order was received, the section would move forward onto the position, after having received a prepared round from the resident US custodial detachment, deploy and at the pre-arranged time, fire the round, and then hopefully "scoot" back into another hide.

One of the most memorable occasions on my career took place, watching this procedure in Germany in Spring 1969. I was the second Canadian IG deployed to Europe to assist 1 RCHA, in this case at its Spring practice camp shortly after it converted to M109. (By the way, at this time the British gunnery staff considered 1 RCHA to be the best artillery regiment they had ever seen.)

Well, I was visiting an A Battery gun position when we noticed some odd activity off to one flank. It was a British 8-inch nuclear section preparing to fire a practice mission. The marker was placed, the instruments set up, and the gun was towed onto the position behind a monster of a truck. Down trails, and the detachment brought it into action. Unfortunately the towing vehicle broke down and there was a major panic of the "if in worry or in doubt, run in circles, scream, and shout" variety, but the recovery folks were able to drag the truck away from the gun platform. The lieutenant section commander commenced his sequence of orders, the projectile was rammed and  . . . nobody could find the propelling charge. Major panic number two, and by the way, forget anything you have ever heard about the British  being unflappable. Finally a little man dashed out of the woods with a large propelling charge in his arms, it was loaded, and "BOOM", away the round went. Now for the scoot, which it wasn't, with a REME wrecker towing the gun tractor onto the position, the detachment hooking the gun up, and the whole things lumbering off. Our troops had been quiet enough during all this, but as the section disappeared, a loud voice bellowed from the B Troop gun line, "looks like an A Troop quick action" and we all collapsed in hysterical laughter. 

 

[FJAG]

:rofl:

 

[tomahawk6]

Then there was the 175mm self propelled gun which was nuclear capable. It performed well in Vietnam and Israel.

http://www.military-today.com/artillery/m107.htm#:~:text=Only%202%20types%20of%20175%20mm%20ammunition%20were,2%20rounds%20are%20carried%20on%20the%20M107%20itself.