And here I was about to get set to watch Colbert when I get given the bait to tuck in again.
I think our obsession with trying to match a country with a 10x larger population and far greater population density than ours is not a path to success...
There is absolutely no "obsession with trying to match a country with a 10x larger population" - density or otherwise. The overarching issues are two-fold: 1) getting the right gun(s) for the army for our current mission - Latvia and Russia deterrence; and 2) taking a branch which has a low peace-time deployment requirement and restructuring it properly in an affordable RegF/ResF mix.
Systems like the M109A7 require large training areas to use them/store them, and lots of specialized techs to keep them running.
Every modern gun capable of actually being used in combat, and not merely as a training aide, needs specialized techs to keep it serviceable. It also needs a guaranteed parts supply which means we shouldn't buy something that comes in small lots from some overseas supplier. We should have learned from the L5, the LG1 and the C3 conversion by how well that went with guns were/are very uncomplicated. I'm not saying our "war gun" needs to be an M109A7, but from a serviceability, reliability and maintainability assurance, it rates very high compared to several other comparable contenders.
These guns do not need large training areas. That's the nice thing about a variable propellant charge system. You can fire at close targets at charge 1; you do not need the full 35-60km range to train a gun crew. Simulators for the M109s exist and can be mounted on armouries' floors. Don't impose limitations on systems based on 50 year old concepts - organize how we keep and maintain the systems and how we train on them to meet modern concepts. Gunners do not need to put their hands on the full gun every weekend but can maximize their use during the summers at regional training centres.
If we wanted a couple of ResF batteries in Brandon/Winnipeg, Ottawa/Pembroke, and Quebec/Valcartier, they make a fair bit of sense, but if we want ResF batteries in places like Victoria, Nanaimo, Vancouver, Halifax, St John, etc...
The first bunch makes sense of course and Montreal is not too far away from Valcartier. The Maritime units have ready access to Gagetown. Victoria/Vancouver have always been a problem and because of this shoot in Yakima. Guess what - they can use US guns already there or become loitering munitions batteries. Guns aren't the only tool in the artilleries inventory - there are UAVs, radars, forward observers etc etc.
We used to train with tanks at Meaford; we can store and train on M109s there if we put our minds to it.
Again, one needs to get their head out of the idea that the gun has to be at the armoury every day of the week.
We need systems that are useful, and require less continuous maintenance and specialized technicians.
Hundred percent agree with useful. That's why I'm dead set against "training aide guns." I think every nickel needs to go into weapons the reserves will go to war with. Disagree completely on the "continuous maintenance and specialized technicians" issue. There are no modern guns that do not require "continuous maintenance and specialized technicians." What you need are the specialized technicians and the maintenance system that keeps this gear humming. That's critical. The army has to stop underestimating the need for such folks. It's absolutely ridiculous to keep insisting the reserves can't do it so lets get them something that's "good enough for training."
Realistically the Canadian army, RegF and ResF, have the numbers (and the army probably has the need) to form and equip approximately seven artillery regiments that are war capable. (Anything more would require Stage 4 mobilization). That can easily be achieved by forming and maintaining one unit in the Maritimes (Gagetown), two in Quebec (both with equipment in Valcartier), two in Ontario (Petawawa, Meaford), two in the west (Shilo, Edmonton/Wainwright) Concentrate the equipment and maintainers in those six centres.
Alternatively, we need systems that are able to move themselves to the training areas in a reasonable time frame, and that can be maintained alongside the other trucks a units needs to function.
Why move the guns to the training area. Leave the guns at the training/maintenance centres and move the troops to them - by bus by service flight - whatever. We used to do this in 2 RCHA for all Ontario units for years. Our guns and equipment, their troops by bus for weekend exercises and summer concentrations. We flew batteries from Toronto to Shilo for the annual RCAA competitions.
Looking at this through the lens of someone who helps manage a small specialized occupation spread out across the country in small dets, it is a massive personnel drain to try to maintain those small dets. Not just in money for postings, but also for retention and morale. People either hate where they are and want out, or love where they are and never want to leave. That works when you have a lot of room for a member to move and get promoted locally, but when you have 1 x MS 1x PO 2 per location, it inevitably leads to people getting angry/frustrated and leaving, or becoming a poison in the section.
I agree to an extent. I don't want to get back to the reason why I think that the US BSB/FSC system is superior for a tech net system. (I got beat up enough on that one) But that's why I firmly believe the armoury-based field gun system is out of date. We need to adjust to one that works much better - simulations and training centres.
We have to stop trying to make an archaic system work. It won't. It needs to be reformed in many ways so that it functions. We no longer have 303s or 18pdrs. We need to equip as a modern army and adjust to the equipment.
The less complex the system, while also keeping it effective, the more likely we are to have enough functional systems(and the pers to use and fix them) when needed.
Therein lies the rub. You can't have "less complex" and "effective." Let me simply say that our M777s are at the low end of effective artillery systems and that, IMHO, the proper place for them, in any event, is with the high readiness, light air transportable forces. We can properly equip one light brigade with an 18 gun M777 regiment and that's it.
I'll add in a low-end system that is also simple and that's loitering munitions. We don't have these but, again, IMHO, there should be a battery of these in every close support regiment we filed. I'll add a third low-end system: HIMARS. Dead simple to maintain and operate. Heck, even MLRS is simple to operate - a bit harder to maintain - and both systems are operated by many countries' reserve forces. I won't even get into air defence systems operated by reservists.
The problem - and, one more time, IMHO - the idiotic problem, is that Canada is contemplating 120mm mortars for the reserve artillery because they are so simple to maintain. I have no idea as to whether we'll contemplate mounting them in ACSVs or some attachment to the ISVs but we're not adding artillery - we're using gunners to provide infantry battalions with organic mortar support rather than a system of artillery. The infantry should definitely have 120mm mortars - but manned by infantrymen.
I've argued the gunner as a mortarman issue many times before and I'll spare everyone a repeat the arguments here - I'll just bottom line it as tremendously short sighted.
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