Black Hawk Down

[enfield]

I think the events of Somalia have been reciewed and studied extensively by the Americans, and have no doibt that many SOP‘s and other issues were changed or reviewed. The entire Somalia mission was the learning ground for many doctrine that is used todya in peace support missions, as well as the ‘Three Block War‘.

It‘s fairly obvious that that TF Ranger required more support than it had for the overall mision it was assigned. However, this support was limited for political reasons. Thye knew what they needed and wanted, and akse dfor it, but it was denied. Personally, I think arty and MBT‘s is too hevay for the environment. Apaches, Spectres, and mechanized infantry were the key, and well within the rules of force application.

Given the political restrictions placed on them, I don‘t think there‘s any quick and easy solution to what happened. In retrospect, given the mission TF Ranger was sent to accomplish with the support they had, something was bound to happen - given the facts we know now.

Here‘s a question.. Canadian vests, the current Bosnia ones and the new LBV‘s, carry 4 mags, plus one on the rifle. How long do you think that would have lasted?

 

[Recce41]

The Ranger and Delta did non- Sp OPs too. The Movie was about the second Raid. the first sucked too. In Somalia everything was F***up from the start. So you have to take the movie as a flag waver. I know I was there in Somalia.

Sgt J CD,CDS com

 

[portcullisguy]

Originally posted by Hodie Non Cras:
[qb]Indulge me if you will and let me throw my two cents in.
First, I would have inserted Delta Force operatives to do their snatch-and-grab operation under cover of night. While they were doing their thing, I would have created a *big* diversion in the Bakara Market. Something big enough to draw the hornets
far far away from their nest, to speak.[/qb]

While, certainly I am sure this would have been their preference as well (given their NVA‘s and training), clearly the mission was also time-sensitive and had to be done when they knew the bad guys were in that specific spot. The intel wasn‘t quite as bad as the movie made it out to be, according to the book, it had been confirmed by other sources.

[qb]If things really got hairy, I would have had lots of helos armed with MG‘s and 2.75" rockets going into the are to provide fire support. If that wasn‘t sufficient to allow the snatch teams to exfiltrate, then (and only then) would I have dropped in QRF teams to try to create a cordon around the snatch team, with helos on the ground, on standby to allow a successful exfil. These cordon groups would only engage if fired upon.[/qb]

Probably the Deltas wouldn‘t have minded operating without the massive (comparitavely) security force which guarded the perimeter, assuming of course they could have done the mission at night.

Once the sh** hit the fan, the more men on foot was probably not a detriment. Certainly with so much equipment in operation, something was bound to happen.

[qb]If the QRF teams proved insufficient - then bring in
a few battalions of infantry and heavy armour and artillery.[/qb]

I really don‘t think the U.S. even seriously considered a failure. According to the book, the first Black Hawk going down to an RPG on Sept. 25, just over a week earlier, was seen as a one-in-a-million shot and there was no way Sammy could do it again, especially with so many up in the air and such a big ground force. Their thinking negated any use of "battalions of infantry..." and certainly ruled out armour and arty.

Allow me to play armchair general for a moment:

One option could have been to spend a few months beforehand with special operations units training and indoctrinating a smaller clan rival to Aidid. This, of course, would have upset the power sharing... but hear me out -- like the SAS have done for years, you send a small unit of your guys to train their guys in your ways and get them on your side. Then, with your guys acting as "advisors" you slip in a few of your new-found friends in beat up old trucks and shiny new armaments, snatch your targets, and extract with choppers standing by 3-5 minutes away in the air.

Or another option would have been to do what was actually done, but to scramble the Black Hawks right after the insertion and have them on station a few miles away. They are no longer targets, and Sammy isn‘t blowing them out of the sky. By the time Super Six One went down, the mission was almost over. Most of the casualties were suffered in getting bogged down after trying to rescue the downed helos. You still have the Hummers on stand by for the exfil, and the helos are ready to support the ground exfil from the air.

Or, you make a political decision as President Clinton that Somalia is not the place to be messing about, and to bail. They did that anyway, 2 weeks after the October 3 raid.

 

[Spr Earl]

Having not seen the film or read the book and my only knowledge being the U.S. and world press resulting in the opinion I present here is that :

The Yank‘s under estimated thier enemy thinking Adid was just another 3rd world hillbilly, quite the opposite he was well educated in military matter‘s
I have been trying to find his Bio again ,it‘s a good read ,

Russian trained in tactic‘s ,also trained by another country ( for the life of me I can‘t remember which one ) Adid was no fool he was very well educated and knew the American mind set when it came to body bag‘s!Ergo they left with thier tail‘s between their leg‘s!

He got the result he wanted !


So who won?

 

[portcullisguy]

Originally posted by Spr Earl:
[qb]The Yank‘s under estimated thier enemy thinking Adid was just another 3rd world hillbilly, quite the opposite he was well educated in military matter‘s
I have been trying to find his Bio again ,it‘s a good read ,

Russian trained in tactic‘s ,also trained by another country ( for the life of me I can‘t remember which one )[/qb]

Since Sept. 11, there has been hinting in the open media that bin Laden‘s al-Qaeda had some level of involvement in training the Somali rebels under the various warlords, Aidid in particular, in tactics to defeat helicopters specifically.

In fact, the book itself mentions in one of the opening few chapters, in a story told to the author by a participant, how some of the militia the warlords employed had in fact trained in Sudan and "other countries" and mentions the Afghanis in particular, noting their tactics used against their war with the Soviets years prior.

[qb]Adid was no fool he was very well educated and knew the American mind set when it came to body bag‘s!Ergo they left with thier tail‘s between their leg‘s! He got the result he wanted ! So who won?[/qb]

You couldn‘t be more right. Aidid remained in power until 1995 I believe. The Americans left Mog only two weeks after this incident. Clearly, Somalia shamed the Americans straight out of their capital.

I don‘t believe the U.S. is repeating their mistake in Afghanistan in the present conflict (although I do accept there are many major differences between Somalia in 1993 and Afghanistan in 2001/02). Their heavier reliance on special forces, and less focus on larger operations, seems to be working in their favour.

 

[Recce41]

Most of you have good points. I got slamed big time on the US Army site. I stated what I know when I was there and about the US there. Damn they said they were the winners. And kicked *** in Somalia. And brought out Canada should not be in Afganistan, and we were loosers, for Unprofor failed.
I said with 10,000 troops total, and about only 4000 cbt troops. no country could have done it. They think they saved the Balkins. One other Canadian brought up about, where were they during Rwanada. They said they had no need to be there. But wasn‘t Rwanada like Somalia.
You better all keep your comments on a Canadian site, because if you done. every American will snap.
Sgt J. CD,CDS com

 

[enfield]

I have ahard time calling Oct3/4 a "Victory" for the Americans.
The plan got screwed, and resulted in unacceptable losses. Certainly the capture of those lieutenants of Adid‘s was not worth 18 dead Americans, and if Garrison had know that the mission would cost that many lives he never would have allowed it.
The actions that resulted in the lose of 2 helicopters and 18 soldiers were not random, they were not accidents. They resulted from a failure to adequatley prepare and know the enemy and situation.

However, it was not a defeat. The mission objectives were met, and the kill ratio (which I‘m not sure is a good way to measure victory vs defeat) was overwhelmingly in American favour. Of course, the incredible actions of the soldiers involved provide the best argument for American vitcory. WHne the intelligence and plan failed, the guys on the ground accomplished everything that could be asked of them.

pyyrich (Sp??) Victory at best. Thermopylae was a victory for the Persians, but it doesn‘t take away from what the Spartans did.

 

[Disturbance]

Funny how if the americans took on and killed over a thousand taleeban and alkayda fighters with only a lil over a hundred troops and still managed to catch some top lts and other guys with only loosing 18 lives, everyone would be cheering ‘Victory‘.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The Germans allegedly had a favourable kill ratio in Russia 1941-45 and I‘ve never heard the Germans claim they won.

[I realise that‘s not exactly a fair comment. The snatch mission was achieved so the mission itself was successful. But that was the only success achieved, and had anyone "wargamed" out that enemy course of action one has to wonder if the mission would have gone ahead in the first place.]

 

[Garett]

Ways TF Ranger stepped on their ****s according to Major John D. Lock:

Rogers‘ Ranger‘s Standing Orders

#1on‘t forget nothing
-The force left NODs and water behind, believing the raid would be quick. Yet it was past 1530 when the raid was launched-not much of a window of daylight left should anything go wrong.

#4: Tell the truth about what you see and what you do-don‘t ever lie to a Ranger or officer.
-It has been reported that SSG Eversmann, leader of Chalk 4, was unable to obey an order to move though he acknowledged that he would do so. Only by luck and accident were he and his men discovered by LTC McKnight when he drove by the squad‘s position with his convoy. If it weren‘t for the fortuitous moment, there would certainly have been an additional twelve Rangers added to the KIA total.

#11 Don‘t ever march home the same way.
-Take a different route so you won‘t be ambushed. Can also be interpreted as never conduct an operation the same way twice; avoid following the same template.

#11 Don‘t ever march home the same way.
-Take a different route so you won‘t be ambushed. Can also be interpreted as never conduct an operation the same way twice; avoid following the same template.

 

[Gordon Angus Mackinlay]

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I deliberately have not said anything on this subject until it appear that everyone had said their fill.

Bowden‘s book "Blackhawk Down" is described as being by the only person who pieced together the whole incident."

Unfortunatly that is not so, there is much that has not been told about this incident. For instance:

Some time after the incident in Washington DC, the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso presented to five US Navy SEALs, the Silver Star medal. In his speech thanking these men from SEAL Team Six (which according to the US Government does not exist)for their actions in Mogadishu; "As a result of the courage, commitment and utter professionalism of these men, many other brave comrades serve today, who might otherwise have been lost." General Wayne A. Downing, the US Special Operations Command commander, also present stating "You men did your duty, for your country, for your units and your comrades." Bowden makes mention of a SEAL in the operation, but, nothing on the involvement of a SEAL detachment. These obviously did perform in combat to have received five Silver Stars - the third level American gallantry award.

Bowden makes no mention of the refusal of the Italian UN contingent commander to assist the American force.

He makes no reference to the sheer lack of preparation the USSF/Rangers did in anticipation of urban raids;
a. no large scale maps of the area of operations,
b. no "mud" maps nor photos,
c. no attempt to put in situ OPs to observe the Somali milieu,
d. no ongoing training in FIBUA,
e. no structured operation plans; with alternative options with the built in ability to improvise when things went wrong,
f. no planning to retrieve troops when aviation assets could not evacuate,
g. absolutely no thought made to use the flat roof milieu of Mogadishu for entry or exit on operations, h. zero knowledge on their enemy,
i. most importantly - no back up ready reaction force, with the necessary weapons and equipment for heavy FIBUA.

It goes on and on. Such as simple things, as brought up before in another post - no water bottles.

My personal feelings on this revolve around the tragic waste of the two DELTA snipers who went down to protect CWO Durant (both receiving the Medal of Honor), neither men carried a ammunition load which would equate to FIBUA. According to different accounts they only carried 40-60 rounds of 7.62mm for their rifles, their superb shooting accounted for the bulk of the Somali clan fighters killed that day.

The majority of the one thousand Somali‘s killed were just the ordinary citizens of that tragic city. This is well documentated by the UN and NGA‘s.

Whilst the Somali‘s, hold in their eyes, American‘s in justifiable contempt, the two snipers were considered by these violent people to be real warriors!

By no stretch of the imagination can two units (DELTA and the 75th Ranger Regt) which in their own opinion are these best in the world, claim that their actions that responded to the events of 3-4Oct1993 be of any degree of competence or ability. 18 men lost their lives, many more wounded, and the image of America went down dramatically in the eye‘s ot the third world.

To finish, the New Zealand UN contingent to Somalia, was a air transport (3 Andover aircraft), movement control and other technical personnel (67 all ranks), with a close protection element drawn from the RNZAF ground defence organisation and the NZSAS.

The men of Task Force Ranger in the hangar area used to jeer at the Kiwi‘s for standing to at dawn and dusk, and during the day carrying out conjoint training for their own protection. Their opinion voiced to the Kiwi‘s being that the Somali‘s offered no threat to a first world fighting force, they were just "Skinnies".

Yours,
Jock in Sydney

 

[portcullisguy]

Mackinlay weighs in...

Originally posted by Gordon Angus Mackinlay:
[qb]Bowden‘s book "Blackhawk Down" is described as being by the only person who pieced together the whole incident."

Unfortunatly that is not so, there is much that has not been told about this incident. For instance:[/qb]

Noted. It is, however, the only comprehensive study of that incident - which as we know, only received a breif mention for a day or two in the papers and CNN at the time. It at least attempts to see the incident from all sides: The U.S. commanders, the U.S. troops, the Somali militia, and the Somali civilians.

[qb]He makes no reference to the sheer lack of preparation the USSF/Rangers did in anticipation of urban raids; [/qb]

Not being a military man, one could hardly expect him to delve into a full study of what was _missing_ when he was trying to report what had _happened_. I won‘t fault him for this.

Clearly, judging by the way the events played out, there was some serious lack of contingency planning, and miscalculated judgement. My bone of contention is the old "everyone goes home" philosophy. It‘s a very nice thought. I wonder, however, if the Brits, particularly the SAS, would have readily wasted their human resources attempting to rescue injured/killed personnel? I would think the more practical approach: Do what you can now, but the mission takes priority - would have been the choice of any force except the Americans.

[qb]It goes on and on. Such as simple things, as brought up before in another post - no water bottles.[/qb]

This was mentioned ... as was the lack of NVGs. The Amercians were convinced they would only be out of the base "for an hour". Somebody forgot to tell the Somalis.

[qb]The majority of the one thousand Somali‘s killed were just the ordinary citizens of that tragic city. This is well documentated by the UN and NGA‘s.[/qb]

Neither the book, nor the movie, attempt to hide this fact. Clearly in any populated city, you are going to have civilian casualties during a large gun fight. However, my sympathy ends for "innocent" civilians when they leave the relative safety of their homes to actively seek out and participate in the conflict, whether as combatants, or spectators.

If 100 Rangers suddenly arrived on my street and did battle with dozens and dozens of armed militia, I‘d be sitting in my basement praying to God it all went away, not rushing outside for a better look, or to hurl insults at either side.

[qb]To finish, the New Zealand UN contingent to Somalia, was a air transport (3 Andover aircraft), movement control and other technical personnel (67 all ranks), with a close protection element drawn from the RNZAF ground defence organisation and the NZSAS.

The men of Task Force Ranger in the hangar area used to jeer at the Kiwi‘s for standing to at dawn and dusk, and during the day carrying out conjoint training for their own protection. Their opinion voiced to the Kiwi‘s being that the Somali‘s offered no threat to a first world fighting force, they were just "Skinnies".[/qb]

In reading Andy McNab‘s autobiographical books, Bravo Two Zero and Immediate Action, I am left with the impression that - for the SAS at least - this has always been the M.O.

The Rangers themselves, a unit based somewhat on the famed, historical "Roger‘s Rangers", claim to adhere to Major Robert Roger‘s standing orders, which include the rule "stand to at dawn and dusk, dawn is when the French and the Indians attack" (paraphrased).

Is this also the standard in the CF (asking as someone who is still going through the recruiting process)? If not, should it be?

 

[OLDRUPERT]

An answer to the "Stand TO" question...

Yes the Unit on the position "Stands To".. Though it is really more for the beginning or ending of daily ablutions .. then for preparing for the Indian Attack.

The fact that there is no darkness on the battlefeild (just fog), kind of dispells the old idea of a fixed schedule of any expected attack.