- Reaction score
- 146
- Points
- 710
AG's very damning report is here:
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201010_06_e_34289.html
Cyclone was sold by DND as off-the-shelf when in fact it was a completely new aircraft. Won't have operational version until 2012. Chinooks also supposedly off-the-shelf but turned, because of "Canadianization", into effectively a completely new version, won't be delivered until 2013. Acquisition risks and capital costs of both greatly underestimated, and in-service support costs way off.
AG's summary:
The ACAN sole-sourcing of the Chinook Foxtrot is criticized, though not that sternly. Mainly for technical abuse of details in the ACAN process itself.
As for the F-35, a piece by the National Post's John Ivison:
Helicopter shenanigans increase doubts on F-35 purchase
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2010/10/26/john-ivison-helicopter-shenanigans-increase-doubts-on-f-35-purchase/
Mark
Ottawa
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201010_06_e_34289.html
Cyclone was sold by DND as off-the-shelf when in fact it was a completely new aircraft. Won't have operational version until 2012. Chinooks also supposedly off-the-shelf but turned, because of "Canadianization", into effectively a completely new version, won't be delivered until 2013. Acquisition risks and capital costs of both greatly underestimated, and in-service support costs way off.
AG's summary:
...
The total project cost of 28 Cyclone helicopters, together with initial set-up, training, provision of spare parts and long-term maintenance, is now estimated at $5.7 billion. Delivery of the first fully capable Cyclone, initially expected in 2005, was delayed to 2008 and is now expected to occur in 2012. The total project cost of 15 Chinook helicopters, together with initial set-up, training, and long-term maintenance, is now estimated at more than $4.9 billion. The first fully capable helicopter is scheduled for delivery in 2013, five years later than planned...
* National Defence underestimated and understated the complexity and developmental nature of the helicopters that it intended to buy. Both helicopters were described to internal decision makers and the Treasury Board as non-developmental, using “off the shelf” technologies. On that basis, overall project risks were assessed as low to medium. In each case, however, significant modifications were made to the basic models. For the maritime helicopter, this will result in an aircraft that never existed before. For the medium- to heavy-lift helicopter, this will result in a new variant of the Chinook. Ultimately, these modifications led to schedule delays and cost increases beyond original plans.
* The medium- to heavy-lift helicopter acquisition was a directed procurement using an advance contract award notice (ACAN). National Defence had initially planned to proceed rapidly to contract award by spring 2007; however, its needs and priorities were not precisely defined at the outset, evolved over the course of the acquisition, and were not finalized until 2009. The manner in which Public Works and Government Services Canada used the ACAN did not comply with the letter or intent of the applicable regulations and policies and, consequently, the contract award process was not fair, open, and transparent.
* National Defence did not develop full life-cycle plans and costs for these helicopters in a complete or timely way. In addition, total estimated costs were not disclosed to decision makers at key decision points. Some costs have yet to be completely estimated and some elements needed for the capability are not in place. Without adequate cost information, National Defence cannot plan to have sufficient funds available for long-term operation and support of the helicopters. Moreover, without sufficient funds, National Defence may have to curtail planned training and operations.
* National Defence did not fully comply with the oversight and approval framework established in its Project Approval Guide. For the maritime helicopter project, boards provided appropriate oversight at the preliminary project and effective project approval stages. However, neither the Senior Review Board nor the Program Management Board met to challenge and approve the information in the 2008 revised effective project approval that was related to the contract amendment approval of $262 million. For the medium- to heavy-lift helicopter, there was an absence of timely meetings, challenge, and approvals by senior boards at all key decision points in the acquisition process and before seeking Treasury Board approvals.
The entities have responded. The entities agree with all of our recommendations. Their detailed responses follow the recommendations throughout the chapter.
The ACAN sole-sourcing of the Chinook Foxtrot is criticized, though not that sternly. Mainly for technical abuse of details in the ACAN process itself.
As for the F-35, a piece by the National Post's John Ivison:
Helicopter shenanigans increase doubts on F-35 purchase
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2010/10/26/john-ivison-helicopter-shenanigans-increase-doubts-on-f-35-purchase/
...
This kind of Sir Humphrey Appleton-like manipulation of the politicians by public servants still has the power to shock. Ms. Fraser called the deliberate understatement of risk as “totally inappropriate”. But amid the mendacity, there was evidence of old-fashioned incompetence...
None of this inspires confidence in procurement at a department that is currently making the biggest military purchase in Canadian history. The Opposition is entitled to demand that the entire process for the new jets be laid bare before Parliament, not only to ensure that the Conservatives have been open and transparent but also to check the Department of National Defence has been giving the government the real goods this time. As Ms. Fraser said in her press conference: “Let’s hope nobody is assessing them [the F-35s] as low risk [emphasis added]...”
Mark
Ottawa