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Artillery Logistics Lessons.

If it fits inside a NASAMs box and can be launched using the same kit I'm all for it.
Some more crossover potentiel as well:

The major components of the Sky Sabre include a Saab Giraffe Agile Multi-Beam (AMB) 3D medium-range surveillance radar mounted on an extending mast and with a range of up to 75 miles. Prior to being integrated within Sky Sabre, the same radar was already in use with the British Army for roles including air surveillance and counter rocket, artillery, and mortar.
Also: Weighing over 200 pounds, each CAMM is twice as heavy as a Rapier missile and has three times the range: MBDA claims a range of more than 15 miles for the CAMM, while the British Army attributes its latest Rapier FSC version with a range of just over 5 miles.
 
The supply of NATO shells is now up and running, Gressel said, but complicated by the array of systems now in Ukrainian hands. Not all 155mm systems can fire the same ammunition at the same rate, he explained, with the German PzH 2000 for example known for its sensitivity to heavy use.



WORLD

U.S. Weapons Causing 'Heavy' Russian Losses Amid Artillery Duels: Commander​

BY DAVID BRENNAN AND YEVGENY KUKLYCHEV ON 12/16/22 AT 9:09 AM EST


Ukrainian and Russian forces have reverted to punishing artillery duels across much of the front line as both sides wait for frozen ground that is expected to open a new window for fresh mechanized offensives.

As in the summer, both sides are facing intense ammunition pressures as artillery teams seek and destroy their rivals. Ukraine is in a unique bind; struggling to refill its stocks of Soviet-made 152mm caliber shells, while also trying to integrate a smorgasbord of NATO-donated artillery systems that largely fire 155mm munitions.

Weapons including the U.S.-made M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and its British and German counterparts; the American M777; the French Caesar; the Polish AHS Krab; and the German PzH 2000 are all now in regular use along the front.

Western systems and shells, one commander fighting on the southern front told Newsweek, have been instrumental in helping the Ukrainians inflict serious casualties on the invaders and erode their ability to defend occupied positions.

"The HIMARS have been a game changer over the summer period," explained Roman Kostenko—one of the famous "cyborg" Ukrainian troops who defended Donetsk airport in 2014, a veteran of the years-long fight against Russian-directed forces in the Donbas and now a member of Ukraine's parliament.

"Lately, the high-caliber stuff has been hugely helpful: the Excalibur, in particular, the 155mm, has shown itself to be very effective, destroying vehicles from a distance and dealing heavy losses to the enemy," Kostenko added, referring to the GPS-guided U.S.-made shell.
But Ukraine—hoping to launch fresh counter-offensives through winter while also guarding against new Russian operations—is in constant need of new arms, said Kostenko, who noted that his portion of the southern front around Kherson is under regular Russian artillery and air strikes.

"The main issue for us is securing the necessary resources, including weapons and ammo, because the fact is the Russians still have a huge advantage in terms of vehicles, missiles and ammo, even as our Western allies continue to provide support," he explained.

Winter Arms Race​

Artillery is a particularly pressing need. Ukraine has been lobbying partner nations to send more 152mm shells while also opening new domestic supply lines. But systemic limitations on production will take time to remove.

In countries like Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic, "there are certain existing production lines that have certain capacities, even if you let people work on the weekends and pay them through," Gustav Gressel—a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations—told Newsweek.

"The defense industries in these countries were basically producing shells for domestic consumption and a bit for exports. But not to sustain an army as large as the Ukrainian one in a full-scale war against a mobilized Russian army."

The supply of NATO shells is now up and running, Gressel said, but complicated by the array of systems now in Ukrainian hands. Not all 155mm systems can fire the same ammunition at the same rate, he explained, with the German PzH 2000 for example known for its sensitivity to heavy use.

The number of 155mm shells available is smaller than the 152mm, Gressel said, though somewhat compensated for by the precision of the more modern Western munitions. "They are actually quite happy with what they got from NATO," he said.

Tank rounds, Gressel added, are also vital, with the Ukrainians running low on 125mm ammunition to support the kind of mechanized advances that could seize momentum through winter into spring.

Ammunition is a problem for both sides. Russian guns appear to be firing less intensely than they were through the grinding summer offensive, an indication—Gressel said—that Moscow is seeking to conserve some resources to "stretch the stock."


The Kremlin has been receiving shells from Belarus and reportedly lobbying North Korea and Iran to help replenish its warehouses. Colonel Margo Grosberg, the head of the Estonian Defense Forces intelligence center, said this week Russia has used up around two-thirds of its overall ammunition stockpile.

Regardless of their well-documented logistics issues, Kostenko said, the Russians remain a potent threat committed to holding the line.

"If the Russians fully dig in and turn on the defensive, they will be very hard to kick out," Kostenko said. "So the type and quality of the military aid we receive really matters. Short range, long range, tanks, artillery; you name it, we need more."

"If we get it, we will finish the war. We have our eyes set on the victory, because we have nowhere to retreat. But you can't beat a well-resourced enemy like that with bare hands."
 
Speaking to logistics of ammunition production, here's a chart that I saw yesterday, and an accompanying article that's somewhat interesting. Recognizing that adding production facilities (ie Rhienmetall) will work to reduce the gap that appears to exist.

NS

 

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Anybody have any insight in PGK M1156 fuse availability, production and usage?

How about SDB GBU-39B and GBU-51B? Those are supposed to be available in numbers to be mated with surplus M26 rockets to supply HIMARS and the M270s with a 150 km GPS and Trimode capability.
 
Speaking to logistics of ammunition production, here's a chart that I saw yesterday, and an accompanying article that's somewhat interesting. Recognizing that adding production facilities (ie Rhienmetall) will work to reduce the gap that appears to exist.

NS

Several of the production line numbers are RTFO.
Which is why most OS analysis of this is terribly misleading.

There is FOUO PM Ammo data for the 155mm production from last year that was released OS at the last NDIA Firepower Conference that puts into question how much research that CSIS.Org actually did for that brief.

Also OS that more than 37 HIMARS have been transferred to Ukraine.

I can see at least 5 columns that are just blatantly wrong.

But, alarm bells are ringing as there is still a very very large delta between provided munitions and production
 
Build your own ammunition on demand

Thousands of solid rocket motors per seacan factory

100,000 Stingers or 3500 AMRAAM per container per year

 
I believe that the drastic budget cuts in the mid 1990s forced DND/CAF leadership to drastically reduce any type of reserve stock for many materials/eqpt. It costs money to store and maintain material/eqpt. Ammunition requires: specialized bunkers for storage; periodic inspections / maintenance; specialized disposal methods if required; may require HVAC buildings; specialize handling eqpt; trained pers to handle, maint and dispose of ammo and so forth. I do not know that exact figures but the elimination of reserve stock saved DND/CAF millions annually that were instead channelled into saving the teeth (ops & trg) while cutting the tail. They made the right decision however it came at the cost of having sustainable CSS pers, material and eqpt, which the DND/CAF is still reeling from.

The lack of a domestic weapons industry is due to the lack of defence spending.

Having reserve stock is a strategic decision made at the highest levels and it is primarily based on risk assessment, threats, the budget and so forth.

There is the question of what is adequate reserve stock? One day of bde arty (155 mm) rds for a low intensity conflict? Should it be for a high intensity conflict? How many Leopard MBTs should be in reserve? How days of spare parts for any number of eqpt/vehs/aircraft should be held? How many DOS of cbt clo should be held? What sizes for male and female? Batteries - rechargeable or not? How compatible should our Logistical system be with our closest allies? Shouldn't we just buy American kit?

Should we stock more aircraft and naval spares/eqpt than army spares because there two environments can have a more immediate effect than the Army?
Should we use stock being maintained for domestic (earthquakes, floods) to support ops and replace them when we have time and money? We only have so much money.

How should the Reg F and Res F be eqpt in terms for ops? If you give the Res F LAVs should their first line be equipped with HIABS or PLS? Why? What kind of B vehs should be the first line get? Should it be compatible with second line for ease of cargo transfer for replen under ops conditions?

Should all second line CSS units be equipped with PLS? Will the preferred method of replen be via pallets / 20 ft containers? Should first line should 20 ft containers? How are hard will it be for first line to carry 20 ft containers under an asymmetric warfare scenario like Afgh? What about the scenario with conventional F ech, A ech, B ech?

Logistics (including maintenance) is heavily resource intensive (pers, material, infrastructure and eqpt). DND/CAF leadership knows this but this must be balanced with current ops needs, trg, pers costs and so forth. How big should the tail be in comparison to the teeth? Remember the tail enables the teeth to fight, but a large tail is cumbersome and expensive.

These are just some of the most basic questions that Loggies, Maintainers, Signallers, Engineers and the Medical (any branch that support the operators) staff must deal with.
 
I believe that the drastic budget cuts in the mid 1990s forced DND/CAF leadership to drastically reduce any type of reserve stock for many materials/eqpt. It costs money to store and maintain material/eqpt. Ammunition requires: specialized bunkers for storage; periodic inspections / maintenance; specialized disposal methods if required; may require HVAC buildings; specialize handling eqpt; trained pers to handle, maint and dispose of ammo and so forth. I do not know that exact figures but the elimination of reserve stock saved DND/CAF millions annually that were instead channelled into saving the teeth (ops & trg) while cutting the tail. They made the right decision however it came at the cost of having sustainable CSS pers, material and eqpt, which the DND/CAF is still reeling from.
I'll take a stab at things here. Can one really say the "right decision" was made when you have all the negative consequences that have resulted and every one of them was fully foreseeable at the time it was made but made anyway because priorities were set in a different direction? I think one can say that if you make a decision that provides short term disruption for long term benefits then it's a good one. But a decision that provides short term benefits for long term disruption is anything but a good one.
The lack of a domestic weapons industry is due to the lack of defence spending.
In part. It's also a failure of our mind set on procurement. When we buy logistics vehicles we do it on a fleet replacement basis which requires the production of a large number of vehicles in a short time followed by a decades-long interval of ... nothing. If you bought them at a rate of say 200 a year over twenty years you could have a moderate scale manufacturing facility which would stay in business indefinitely turning out all the spare parts you need as required and providing factory level repair and refurbishment.
Having reserve stock is a strategic decision made at the highest levels and it is primarily based on risk assessment, threats, the budget and so forth.
Yes.
There is the question of what is adequate reserve stock? One day of bde arty (155 mm) rds for a low intensity conflict? Should it be for a high intensity conflict? How many Leopard MBTs should be in reserve? How days of spare parts for any number of eqpt/vehs/aircraft should be held? How many DOS of cbt clo should be held? What sizes for male and female? Batteries - rechargeable or not? How compatible should our Logistical system be with our closest allies? Shouldn't we just buy American kit?
All important question where we let budgets rule rather than a national security policy.
Should we stock more aircraft and naval spares/eqpt than army spares because there two environments can have a more immediate effect than the Army?
Should we use stock being maintained for domestic (earthquakes, floods) to support ops and replace them when we have time and money? We only have so much money.
Big disagreement although I know what you are saying. One of our most significant assets in the nature of government policy is to be part of an international deterrent force. We have one for NORAD which we are adequately (barely) if not generously covering. Our naval force is old and creaky but at least looks viable on paper. Our army, which sits in the storefront window in Europe is highly inadequate and recognized as such by both our allies as well as our enemies. Deterrence and credibility are immediate effects which we fail to pay enough attention to.
How should the Reg F and Res F be eqpt in terms for ops? If you give the Res F LAVs should their first line be equipped with HIABS or PLS? Why? What kind of B vehs should be the first line get? Should it be compatible with second line for ease of cargo transfer for replen under ops conditions?

Should all second line CSS units be equipped with PLS? Will the preferred method of replen be via pallets / 20 ft containers? Should first line should 20 ft containers? How are hard will it be for first line to carry 20 ft containers under an asymmetric warfare scenario like Afgh? What about the scenario with conventional F ech, A ech, B ech?
CSS needs to be a layered coherent whole that can scale up from a small task force to as big a force as the country intends to deploy operationally in a worst case scenario. The only difference between the RegF and the ResF and their equipment should be that the RegF holds and mans that equipment needed day to day during peacetime including minor operations while the ResF holds and mans the additional equipment and capabilities required for deployment in that worst case scenario.
Logistics (including maintenance) is heavily resource intensive (pers, material, infrastructure and eqpt). DND/CAF leadership knows this but this must be balanced with current ops needs, trg, pers costs and so forth. How big should the tail be in comparison to the teeth? Remember the tail enables the teeth to fight, but a large tail is cumbersome and expensive.
I've said this many times; our "operational" CSS tail is inadequate both for day to day operations and entirely incapable of supporting a worst case scenario and is challenged to support our day to day needs. It needs massive improvement. OTOH, our "administrative" (i.e. the bureaucracy of DND and the CAF) tail is far too large for a force of our size and must be curtailed and repurposed.
These are just some of the most basic questions that Loggies, Maintainers, Signallers, Engineers and the Medical (any branch that support the operators) staff must deal with.
I'll disagree again. These are questions that both the government and senior CAF leadership must deal with using the input from loggies etc. I think Conrad said it best in his book "What the Thunder Said".

… military logistics in the Canadian Forces is viewed as something less than merely non-elite. Military logistics in Canada is viewed with near disdain …
…The army has not been greatly interested in improving logistics support to the combat arms because it has not really been in the line of work where logistics was a life and death necessity. The focus of army leadership was on protecting the combat arms in a long series of budget cuts.[ Conrad, Lieutenant-Colonel John “What the Thunder Said”, Toronto, Dundurn Press 2009 pp. 40 and 68
That expresses my own views and hence the comment that I made above about the "right decision" made at the top of this post. The Army leadership made the wrong decisions and they made them for selfish reasons.

🍻
 
You will remember the 1990s. The most significant land operations that most senior CA leadership participated was Op SNOWGOOSE - Cyprus. The leadership based their ops experience on this peacekeeping mission and made the cuts accordingly with very little consideration given to CSS, since Cyprus was not a logistically challenging mission and all the necessary installations were in place, hence the CSS cuts. It was the RIGHT decision to save the teeth and cut the tail, in their mind, because the CAF needed teeth to give the government the ops effect they required even if was aval for a limited time due to lack of replen / sustainment.

It was the Somalia, Second Gulf war and the Balkan ops that proved to the senior CA leadership the importance of Logistics, Maintenance, Engineering, Communications and Medical systems. I was part of the many teams that developed CSS and movement plans to sp proposed land ops. The CA leadership were surprised in how long it would take to depl all the nec pers, eqpt, mat and vehs into theatre and the building of nec infrastructure to sp them. This experience saved the CSS from more drastic cuts. Still this was not enough for the CAF leadership to invest money into the Logistics / Maintenance systems.

I know John Conrad as a peer and friend. I agree with his comments, but, .... let us put some context to this. Most CAF GO/FOs have only a very limited understanding of Logistics and this is because of their very limited exposure to expeditionary ops. The Afg tour, after Roto 0, was essentially a relief in place. CSS replenish became routine and ops leadership was not really involved except when disagreements arose and they needed to deconflict. They are not the ones who goes into contract negotiations with the Host Nations or Allied Forces for sp although they have a vague idea that it must be done. The GO/FOs that do are the ones who were exchange Officers with US or UK forces that do depl large numbers of expeditionary forces. I served as a Exchange Officer with the US Force and their sr leadership do understand the importance of CSS. They have put the nec units, trg, stocks and infrastructure to conduct expeditionary ops.

The Ukraine - Russia conflict has again provided the need for a strong and viable replenish and sustainment system. The DND/CAF leadership understands this but it, they will continue to under fund the replen / sustainment systems because of their belief that somehow the Logisticians, Maintainers, Engineers, Signallers and Medics will be able to pull something out of the hat and while not understanding the long term negative consequences to existing pers and national systems.
 
I agree with virtually everything you say. However, I'm not as forgiving of senior leadership for the decisions they have made or the reasons for making them as you are.

Decisions that maintain bayonets at the expense of CS and CSS are basically a calculated risk. One gambles that the more serious circumstances that require robust CS and CSS will never occur on their watch so they happily keep their favourites and fluff up their administrative staff and put the issue of deteriorating CS and CSS over to the next watch.

One only needs to be a middling student of history to know that eventually a crisis will come that for whatever reason can no longer be ignored. In the past, each time there was time to build an army, navy and air force from scratch. We now believe that things will happen so rapidly that we will not have that luxury which is why in the 1950s we switched to a forces-in-being concept. At the end of the day, the military is the country's ultimate, no fail, last line organization. Unfortunately it takes more time to train a modern force and to manufacture the equipment and the armament's it needs. Having three partially equipped brigades without the armaments and a proper sustainment system behind them are worth less than nothing because it will have consumed vast amounts of the nation's treasure while offering only limited amounts of ongoing value.

A military that can not provide the required service in a time of ultimate crisis might as well be converted to a much cheaper constabulary force during peacetime. The problem is that we have national interests that need protecting. We have identified two major foes who have demonstrated time and time again that they have territorial ambitions as against other nations and have no hesitation to try to gather a low hanging harvest every time it shows itself.

I think Conrad was bang on when he said that "logistics is viewed with near disdain". Artillery is the same. It was nearly gutted before Afghanistan and while it proved itself a game changer on the battlefield with the few guns it sent over, senior leadership left it decimated and threw air defence under the bus (presumably because the Taliban never developed an air force and drones were in their infancy). Did we put any of those systems or additional logistics systems in reserve? No we did not. What kind of senior military leadership so ignores and divests such vital capabilities?

🍻
 
The Ukraine - Russia conflict has again provided the need for a strong and viable replenish and sustainment system. The DND/CAF leadership understands this but it, they will continue to under fund the replen / sustainment systems because of their belief that somehow the Logisticians, Maintainers, Engineers, Signallers and Medics will be able to pull something out of the hat and while not understanding the long term negative consequences to existing pers and national systems.
Realistically if we are in a position similar to what Ukraine is is we have most of those trades already here in Canada just in a civilian role right now.
That would change real quick if things went real bad for us.
The real issue is not having the fighting equipment required, armor, radar, ad, ammo, munitions etc.
 
I agree with virtually everything you say. However, I'm not as forgiving of senior leadership for the decisions they have made or the reasons for making them as you are.

Decisions that maintain bayonets at the expense of CS and CSS are basically a calculated risk. One gambles that the more serious circumstances that require robust CS and CSS will never occur on their watch so they happily keep their favourites and fluff up their administrative staff and put the issue of deteriorating CS and CSS over to the next watch.

One only needs to be a middling student of history to know that eventually a crisis will come that for whatever reason can no longer be ignored. In the past, each time there was time to build an army, navy and air force from scratch. We now believe that things will happen so rapidly that we will not have that luxury which is why in the 1950s we switched to a forces-in-being concept. At the end of the day, the military is the country's ultimate, no fail, last line organization. Unfortunately it takes more time to train a modern force and to manufacture the equipment and the armament's it needs. Having three partially equipped brigades without the armaments and a proper sustainment system behind them are worth less than nothing because it will have consumed vast amounts of the nation's treasure while offering only limited amounts of ongoing value.

A military that can not provide the required service in a time of ultimate crisis might as well be converted to a much cheaper constabulary force during peacetime. The problem is that we have national interests that need protecting. We have identified two major foes who have demonstrated time and time again that they have territorial ambitions as against other nations and have no hesitation to try to gather a low hanging harvest every time it shows itself.

I think Conrad was bang on when he said that "logistics is viewed with near disdain". Artillery is the same. It was nearly gutted before Afghanistan and while it proved itself a game changer on the battlefield with the few guns it sent over, senior leadership left it decimated and threw air defence under the bus (presumably because the Taliban never developed an air force and drones were in their infancy). Did we put any of those systems or additional logistics systems in reserve? No we did not. What kind of senior military leadership so ignores and divests such vital capabilities?

🍻

I think you're right @FJAG Logistics is looked at with disdain. And I think it comes from two lanes. Canada puts no prize on Logistics accomplishments, it's not cool. And it doesn't fit in either political/silo dynamic that makes up our vision of things.

The second is Logistics it's self. Current CAFCWO aside we have weak leadership. I saw it so many times coming up where out officers and Snr NCMs would get bullied or belittled by the operators. So our role gets pushed aside and left to clean up a mess that we are also blamed for.

I just finished my ALP paper on the effectiveness of the CAF Supply System, it wasn't a glowing paper.
 
Sex sells and our logistics have all the sex appeal of a traffic accident.Which by unhappy coincidence they happen to resemble anyway.
For example I would be amazed if there were more then a dozen people in the Forces who know how to charter aircraft,ship's and trains.
 
Sex sells and our logistics have all the sex appeal of a traffic accident.Which by unhappy coincidence they happen to resemble anyway.
For example I would be amazed if there were more then a dozen people in the Forces who know how to charter aircraft,ship's and trains.

Generally we're in agreement.

As for you contracting statement, the truth is very few people actually need to charter aircraft, ships and trains. That's a very specific skill set.

That's definitely more than we need to teach Sgt MMTs on their QL6.
 
Generally we're in agreement.

As for you contracting statement, the truth is very few people actually need to charter aircraft, ships and trains. That's a very specific skill set.

That's definitely more than we need to teach Sgt MMTs on their QL6.
Just had another thought does any one still know how to combat load a ship ?
Or even a seacan ?
 
Sex sells and our logistics have all the sex appeal of a traffic accident.Which by unhappy coincidence they happen to resemble anyway.
For example I would be amazed if there were more then a dozen people in the Forces who know how to charter aircraft,ship's and trains.

Just had another thought does any one still know how to combat load a ship ?
Or even a seacan ?
Or, dare I say it, a train?
Jesus wept....you folks love to talk about things you have no idea on. :ROFLMAO:
:ROFLMAO:
 
I think you're right @FJAG Logistics is looked at with disdain. And I think it comes from two lanes. Canada puts no prize on Logistics accomplishments, it's not cool. And it doesn't fit in either political/silo dynamic that makes up our vision of things.
The words are actually Conrad's and not mine. But I accept what he says. During my time in RegF regiments I dealt with a number of Regimental Quartermasters and Maintenance officers. I found all the MaintO I met to be great at their jobs. Loggies I found as a mixed bag on the small sample I knew. 1 was a plug, the rest really good folk. Strangely the further away they were from a unit position--like base staff--the less one had the impression that they were there to help you but more concerned about making their own life easier. I'm not sure if that's disdain but more like the typical we/them tribalism that's at the core of military structures. When you deal with battalions there's the battalion themselves and everyone else is just an enabler.
The second is Logistics it's self. Current CAFCWO aside we have weak leadership. I saw it so many times coming up where out officers and Snr NCMs would get bullied or belittled by the operators. So our role gets pushed aside and left to clean up a mess that we are also blamed for.
I know, I know, I'm showing my age again but IMHO it was a big mistake to create one overarching logistics system. Each service has different needs and needs specialists able to deal with those specifics. That applies to both supply and maintenance in a big way. Add to that the low priority for resources allocated to logistics because our experience base is peacetime where the role and need for logistics is significantly lower than for wartime and its easy to see where things go off the rails.

It's kind of funny actually (maybe not funny but sad). Artillery used to be classified a combat arm (along with Fd Engrs). When they were relegated to combat support I was pissed and felt devalued - and we probably were devalued. When there isn't a war going on a whole lot of people get shoved into the second and third tier category. People that I've interviewed for our book on Afghanistan are pretty universal in their views that the infantry battalions generally paid lip service to the gunners as a valuable asset but after the first danger close mission had a resounding change in attitude about their gunners.

I'm a bit that way about the logistics system. The Afghanistan NSE structure might have been PY efficient but wasn't an optimal logistics solution. It didn't endear itself to the end users and IMHO, while adequate for peacetime operations is unfit for purpose for real war. When I see what the Ukrainian log and main system are able to accomplish with the dog's breakfast of equipment and supplies they have to deal with, I'm flabbergasted. What really concerns me, and should concern every "operator" that we have, is whether or not our system is still capable of scaling up. If I was CDS that would be the one thing keeping me from sleeping at night.

At heart, I'm an optimist. I believe anything can be fixed but only if you put your mind to fixing it. Letting things drift is not a viable course of action.
I just finished my ALP paper on the effectiveness of the CAF Supply System, it wasn't a glowing paper.
In my days the supply system was made up of paper cards and stocktaking. In my mind I have troubles seeing why the supply system, with all the new warehousing concepts and computerization systems can't work like Amazon does. IMHO logistics is as due for a major transformation just like the ResF is.

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