Army Reserve taking the budget hit? - National Post

[brihard]

Since you were, quite obviously, involved with this unit, where were the troops?  Did the "5 NCOs, 2 platoon WOs,  CSM, RSM, 2 platoon commanders, 2 captains, additional senior staff" show up for the exercise expecting more than 7 troops to show up?  How many of these leaders were already deployed as part of the advance party and were also expecting more than 7 troops to show up?

So, rather than questioning the officers, WOs and NCOs who showed up to lead and execute the training,  the better approach would be to ask the question of why did only 7 troops show up?

I think you're reading what he posted differently from how he intended... I don't see him saying those people didn't have a reason to be present, but rather that in its totality, the package we're looking at here can fairly be described as poor bang:buck ratio within the scope of what the reserves are supposed to do. And I'm sure we're also all picking up that there's a bit of hyperbole present in presenting a genuine but rare 'worst case' for reserve attendance as somehow the norm. However this also isn't a set of circumstances unique to any one unit; I'm sure we've all seen smaller reserve regiments occasionally have abysmal attendance on one exercise or another.

The context of the discussion being money poorly spent, I think the example he cites remains valid, irrespective of what circumstances led to it being the case. And of course 'anecdote' doesn't pluralize to 'data', and one really bad showing isn't something I think any of us would generalize across a unit or the people therein.

 

[brihard]

This goes back to the initial question- if the reserves role now is to force generate people, than what higher training does a Coy Commander of a Reserve unit require aside from perhaps a reserve Combat team commander course? The Major will not likely lead troops on operation as an Inf Coy commander.  In A-Stan, the reserve OCs were all of units like the CIMIC or PSYOPS (I'm sure there''s exceptions...), so that higher level training had little value on operations.  If the job is to force generate for the Reg force, than focus on Coy commander DOWN, not up

Musing more on the points that I myself initiated earlier- one thing does come to mind. While I agree that generally speaking Coy down is the appropriate focus, at the end of the day the reserves DO need a chain of command all the way up. That chain of command will inevitably come into closer contact with their regular forces peers, and I can see merit in having reserve leadership with the training, and consequently more of the credibility and, hopefully the balls to fight to protect our organization and what we offer within the scope of the larger CF. On those grounds I'm certainly not going to argue against the need to have some higher command, though I still think we're 'command overweight' below the CBG level. What I don't have visibility over is how those brigade commanders are selected, and whether the size of the pool of COs we have now is necessary to achieve brigade Comds of sufficient quality and experience to be worthwhile. Way the hell above my pay grade.

 

[Jarnhamar]

So, rather than questioning the officers, WOs and NCOs who showed up to lead and execute the training,  the better approach would be to ask the question of why did only 7 troops show up?

This kind  situation has happened at at least 4 units that I know of but as Brihard said, I'm using a very worst case scenario with the numbers.

In my own experience I would say the primary answer to your question of why only 7 soldiers are showing up is that their immediate leadership, MCpls and Sgts, didn't really care. They were signing in for the weekend so who cares if troops show up or not?  I found the difference between a soldier attending an ex could be something as little as the section commander saying 'c'mon man I need you out on this ex'.


Using my example I can't decide if a solution is for the COC to tell extra leadership to go home OR if that would actually be unfair since they're doing their part by clearing their schedule and showing up for the ex.  If we're discussing ways to save money (and keep a regiment open) I'd lean towards the former.  But then that would of course likely push the very same leadership out the door.

I know as a section commander I would have tripled my efforts to get troops out on ex if there was a SOP that I could not attend a weekend ex if my section wasn't attending as well.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Everybody is "taking the budget hit."  This is not unique to the reserves; everyone is seeing cuts.  The title implies the PRes are taking a disproportionate hit, but that conclusion would require a comparing reserve brigade cuts to the being made against Reg F brigade operating budgets.  With the facts given, we cannot say that the reserves are taking more or less than their share of the hit.

That is the real question.  In the Army of the West, I have heard that 1 CMBG took a 50% cut to its O+M budget for next Fiscal Year, while its sister CBGs took cuts below 10%. 

The reality is that the manner in which the cuts are coming (brutal, but very incrementally) leads organisations into the inevitable shaving of the ice cube, vice a redesign of the force.

 

[brihard]

This kind  situation has happened at at least 4 units that I know of but as Brihard said, I'm using a very worst case scenario with the numbers.

In my own experience I would say the primary answer to your question of why only 7 soldiers are showing up is that their immediate leadership, MCpls and Sgts, didn't really care. They were signing in for the weekend so who cares if troops show up or not?  I found the difference between a soldier attending an ex could be something as little as the section commander saying 'c'mon man I need you out on this ex'.


Using my example I can't decide if a solution is for the COC to tell extra leadership to go home OR if that would actually be unfair since they're doing their part by clearing their schedule and showing up for the ex.  If we're discussing ways to save money (and keep a regiment open) I'd lean towards the former.  But then that would of course likely push the very same leadership out the door.

I know as a section commander I would have tripled my efforts to get troops out on ex if there was a SOP that I could not attend a weekend ex if my section wasn't attending as well.

Interesting point raised by this one, too... When we run an ex, there's quite a bit of close-to-fixed cost. The cost of the bus. Paying for blue rockets. The Cl A necessary for the advance party (which will likely not scale up very much as a larger PTA attends). So on the one hand this sort of mitigates in favour of collectivising training in larger numbers; not necessarily the brigade exercises many troops loathe (with good reason), but within two or three local regiments, in order to take advantage of economies of scale. On the other hand reserve units can be so damned clannish that sheer stubbornness can make it harder to work with other regiments even when it's to mutual advantage.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

This is a leadership failure. Plain and simple. Before leaving, the advance party should have a minimum forecast.

At D-30 min, the leadership should have cancelled the Ex and recalled the deployed pers.

Brigade should be doing a massive shit dump on the upper echelon of this unit and make them eat the cost for failure to plan and execute a simple weekend exercise.

If it happens twice with the same crew, pink slips should be handed out.

To paraphrase Colin Powell:

"Leadership is engaging your lower ranks. The day your soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you've stopped leading them. When they stop talking to you, bringing you their problems, it's because they have lost confidence that you can solve their problems, or they feel that you don't care. Both cases are a failure of leadership.

If this were a litmus test most CO's would fail. One, they build so many barriers to upwards communication that the very idea of someone lower in the hierarchy looking up to the leader for help is absolutely ludicrous. Two, the corporate culture they foster often defines asking for help as a weakness or failure, so people cover up their problems, and the organization suffers accordingly. Real leaders make themselves accessable and available. They show concern for the efforts and challenges faced by their underlings, even as they demand high standards. Accordingly, they are more likely to create an environment where problem analysis replaces blame."



edit: grammar

 

[Haggis]

The context of the discussion being money poorly spent, I think the example he cites remains valid, irrespective of what circumstances led to it being the case. And of course 'anecdote' doesn't pluralize to 'data', and one really bad showing isn't something I think any of us would generalize across a unit or the people therein.

I would wager that, in the context of OZ's "worst case", the unit in question, actually saved money on that exercise.  Nonetheless, it was still a failure of leadership that only 7 troops showed up.  Don't overlook that it was also a failure of followership, too, that only 7 troops showed up.

 

[dapaterson]

"A failure of followership" is an interesting concept.  Almost Boylian in its Orwellian nature.

Though I must say, having read the original article, anyone who goes to the wingnuts at Reserves 2000 for comment clearly knows now of what they speak.


Here's a brief thought exercise:  There are currently 51 Reserve Infantry "battalions" in the primary Reserve.  Assume a battalion is a modest 600 people.  That makes 30 600 infantrymen in the Army Reserves, according to the thought exercise.  But the Army Reserve has a parade strength, in total, of about 19 000.  Including all the other combat arms, combat support, and combat service support.  Somehow, the math doesn't work

It's clear that we have too many HQs in the Reserves - 19k sounds like 5-6 brigades, maximum, to me - and 5-6 brigades maps to 15-18 infantry Bns - in other words, if we culled 2/3 of the current Infantry Bn HQs we'd be at about the right level.  So, for example, put the RMR, Black Watch and CGG under a single command team in Montreal.  Put the SD&G, Brockville Rifles and PWOR under a single command team long the St Lawrence River.  Put both of those composite Infantry battalions under a single Brigade group. Lather, rinse, repeat across the nation.

 

[brihard]

I would wager that, in the context of OZ's "worst case", the unit in question, actually saved money on that exercise.  Nonetheless, it was still a failure of leadership that only 7 troops showed up.  Don't overlook that it was also a failure of followership, too, that only 7 troops showed up.

I'm not overlooking anything. We'd probably both be asking the same hard question of our troops in those circumstances, all the way up and down the chain. I'm right with you on that one. My regiment has in the past couple years had to cancel an exercise due to an atrocious attendance forecast the Thursday prior- particularly in a unit with the effective strength of mine, that occasioned some insistence on getting answers.

You've piqued my curiosity regarding money being saved in OZ's instance- do you mean 'saved' as in through achieving economy, and greater returns in training value being achieved for what was spent, or simply money 'saved' through not being spent (on that given weekend, at least) on the Class A pay and CLDA/FOA that would have been payable?

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I would wager that, in the context of OZ's "worst case", the unit in question, actually saved money on that exercise.  Nonetheless, it was still a failure of leadership that only 7 troops showed up.  Don't overlook that it was also a failure of followership, too, that only 7 troops showed up.

Failure of leadership is a defined known. Please explain what a "failure of followership" is.

As it stands, it sounds like exactly what it is.

A failure of leadership, where that 'leadership is trying to download the responsibility of their failure to the subordinates to make it followership''.

Take responsibility and ensure the welfare of your subordinates.

Is that too difficult a concept to engender with your leadership?

 

[Haggis]

"A failure of followership" is an interesting concept.  Almost Boylian in its Orwellian nature.

In this context, other words for "followership" would be "duty", "responsibility" and "loyalty".

We both know how much effort it takes to simply plan an exercise.  To do so and have only 7 troops come out from a unit of, say 150 on paper, is hugely demoralizing for the planners/leadership.  There is a duty on the part of the leadership to plan such training, but also a duty of the followers to come out and participate.

It's clear that we have too many HQs in the Reserves - 19k sounds like 5-6 brigades, maximum, to me - and 5-6 brigades maps to 15-18 infantry Bns - in other words, if we culled 2/3 of the current Infantry Bn HQs we'd be at about the right level.  So, for example, put the RMR, Black Watch and CGG under a single command team in Montreal.  Put the SD&G, Brockville Rifles and PWOR under a single command team long the St Lawrence River.  Put both of those composite Infantry battalions under a single Brigade group. Lather, rinse, repeat across the nation.

This is not a unique thought, but one that has been discussed here before and also in the halls of NDHQ.  That being said, the best time to innovate is during a recesssion and, maybe, this idea's time has come.

 

[Haggis]

Take responsibility and ensure the welfare of your subordinates.

Is that too difficult a concept to engender with your leadership?

The welfare of subordinates is not a factor in this discussion.  The duty of the subordinates to attend scheduled training is certainly a factor.  Since our Reserve employment model continues to rely on non-disciplinary coercion to compel attendance at unit training.  The responsibilty for the success of that training, in the whole, is shared (not equally) between the leaders and followers.

 

[Haggis]

I'm not overlooking anything. We'd probably both be asking the same hard question of our troops in those circumstances, all the way up and down the chain. I'm right with you on that one. My regiment has in the past couple years had to cancel an exercise due to an atrocious attendance forecast the Thursday prior- particularly in a unit with the effective strength of mine, that occasioned some insistence on getting answers.

The wisest COA in the case you describe would be to cancel the exercise, if attendance was forecast to be so low as to make the exercise aim unattainable.  However, if the troops commited to the exercise and then failed to attend, that's a whole different story.

You've piqued my curiosity regarding money being saved in OZ's instance- do you mean 'saved' as in through achieving economy, and greater returns in training value being achieved for what was spent, or simply money 'saved' through not being spent (on that given weekend, at least) on the Class A pay and CLDA/FOA that would have been payable?

I meant "saved" through money not being spent. And it was meant facetiously, as well.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

In this context, other words for "followership" would be "duty", "responsibility" and "loyalty".

We both know how much effort it takes to simply plan an exercise.  To do so and have only 7 troops come out from a unit of, say 150 on paper, is hugely demoralizing for the planners/leadership.  There is a duty on the part of the leadership to plan such training, but also a duty of the followers to come out and participate.

This is not a unique thought, but one that has been discussed here before and also in the halls of NDHQ.  That being said, the best time to innovate is during a recesssion and, maybe, this idea's time has come.

Then you have to go back to my previous post with credit to Colin Powell.

The leadership of this Unit failed.

To try, even remotely, to place the responsibility on the troops, shows your total disconnect with them.

Stop trying to pass the buck and accept responsibility for the failure.

The leadership failed because they could not convince the troops that the exercise would be worth while, active and fun. This was a culmination of  disappointing, useless and non effective exercises that occurred prior.

Your troops had lost interest and confidence in the leadership. They felt you could not provide what was needed.

They had come to the conclusion, quite rightly, that the leadership did not care for their welfare.

They voted with their feet, as Reserve units do.

You failed, they voted. Story ends. Anything else is just blubbering blame gaming.

Take off the skirt, cancel the manicure, grow a moustache and man the fuck up.

Instead of trying to justify the lack of participation, how about getting to the root cause and fixing the problem.

Fire some useless fucking sacred cows.

 

[Haggis]

You are, of course correct, recceguy.

My apologies to all for believing that ALL soldiers need to take and share responsibility for the success of their Unit/Army.  Leadership has failed the soldiers once again.

This has strayed off topic enough and I've said my piece.

 

[OldSolduer]

You are, of course correct, recceguy.

My apologies to all for believing that ALL soldiers need to take and share responsibility for the success of their Unit/Army.  Leadership has failed the soldiers once again.

There are some good points on both sides of the argument, but I think we all realize things need fixing.

Our unit is two regiments under one BHQ. Our numbers are about 260 on paper. Our leaders do what they can to get the troops out,however many are cops etc that cannot always be there.

We ruthlessly cull the herd. Don't parade  for a while and you will get the NES letter.  Don't bother to respond or parade? 5f release.

Start issuing some I/CSM or RWs.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

You are, of course correct, recceguy.

My apologies to all for believing that ALL soldiers need to take and share responsibility for the success of their Unit/Army.  Leadership has failed the soldiers once again.

This has strayed off topic enough and I've said my piece.

Please stop with the sarcasm and facetiousness. This won't end, because you've been backed into a corner and decided to toss the discussion aside.

We all know that attendance, whether weekly or exercise, is a percentage of responsibility on everyone's part.

People have jobs, school, exams, family problems, whatever. We understand that.

105 on paper and 7 on ex? You fucked up. Big time. Total circus with clown show fucked up.

To try and portray the lower ranks as the bad guys, for the failure, shows the complete lack of responsibility on the leadership and the full causation for the discussion of this thread.

You can lead a horse to water but you won't stop the pigs from feeding at the trough.

 

[MilEME09]

My unit is going through the same problem, now we are CSS but the last EX including Adv Party was a total of nine people from our FSG including 1 Major, 1 Sgt, 1 Mcpl, 3 Cpl, and 3 Pte. Fairly proportional however our unit on paper is 160 or so. Major problem when our other FSG maybe turns out 10-15 on an EX putting us at maybe 25 out of 160.  Leaderships been coming down on us for the poor turn out, but we've been telling them the problems for years and nothings done, because the Junior ranks have gotten fed up with our leaderships inability to fix the problems identified. 

 

[noneck]

Thank you Recce Guy!

Jim how many from the 38 Bde Inf Gp are LEO's? I ask because surely they can't be the only dudes holding it together.

Cheers
Noneck

 

[Infanteer]

Sounds like there is a need for Reserve terms of service that include mandatory attendance.  Maybe move to an American model of fewer, but more well attended, parade days and exercises.