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Army Reserve Restructuring

Experience suggests that grouping UAS capabilities together is more effective than spreading them amongst an organization. Your proposed Regiment may be more effective with two or three gun batteries and a separate UAS battery.
 
Experience suggests that grouping UAS capabilities together is more effective than spreading them amongst an organization. Your proposed Regiment may be more effective with two or three gun batteries and a separate UAS battery.
Yeah. That's another issue that I've been wrestling with. Earlier versions of a CS regiment that I had did have a separate UAV battery. I then started to looking at the "dispersed operation" concept and started thinking about how best to do operations. As a start point I look at the guns.

Technology is now at the point where guns can deploy and manoeuvre pretty much independently. The limiting factors are security and logistics. From a technical gunner point of view a single command post can easily control three or more dispersed guns. I use three because one TSM and troop recce party can easily manage the deployment and logistics of three guns running independently. Security is degraded by single gun deployments which means a level of risk and guns being within (as much as possible) mutually supporting gun positions. That does make them a bit more vulnerable to special ops interdiction but increases safety from counter battery and UAVs.

One battery's logistics system can support three troops handily with its own BK, BSM, ammo party, and CSS troop.

My rationale behind having a UCAV troop with a battery parallels the DS concept. It provides a supported battalion with guaranteed gun and UCAV support increasing the precision munition availability to the battalion without any additional logistics support requirement for the regiment. It also simplifies the allocation of manoeuvre areas for both guns and launchers in DS of a battalion. I see better coordination of resources if one Bty FSCC commands and controls all the indirect fire coming into its supported battalion's AO. If greater resources are needed in one particular AO, a gun or launcher troop from a different battery can be attached in a reinforcing role to a given battery.

Pooling the UCAVs in one battery would, IMHO, not increase the overall effectiveness or availability to the brigade as a whole but would require and increase in both the regiment's manning requirement and logistics burden by way of an additional battery headquarters structure and CSS troop. I'm not sure if I see any advantage in having a UCAV FSCC at bde level which is where it would end up (or merged into the bde FSCC). Would the UCAV troops ordinarily be kept centralized or attached to batteries? If the latter than there is nothing gained by centralization.

I'd be interested in looking at some of the experience behind grouping UCAVs. I can't say that I've actually come across any papers or discussions on how its done - I presume in Ukraine - and if that is a "war specific" experience. If you have anything on that, I'd be happy to see it and rethink the issue.

As an aside, has your branch, or you, given any thought of the division of UCAV capabilities within the company and battalion level? I'm a believer in redundant and layered systems.

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Experience suggests that grouping UAS capabilities together is more effective than spreading them amongst an organization. Your proposed Regiment may be more effective with two or three gun batteries and a separate UAS battery.
Ok. I doubly concede on this since hearing this podcast.

I remain of the view that the artillery logistics system is the appropriate one for the handling of UAVs of all sorts as a matter of expendable ammunition rather than equipment even if launcher and control teams are located at the troop within a CS battery level.

It's the rate of innovation and counter-counter measures reaction that made me rethink things. That reaches beyond the basic command and control linkages and requires a solid tech net that is designed to rapidly identify enemy counter measures and develop and disseminate effective solutions rapidly. In my mind that needs a specialized det/troop that is dedicated to that task and that task alone. It should actually deploy with whatever headquarters is our lead tactical headquarters for a given deployment so that issues across the deployed force and their solutions can be managed by technical experts as they happen.

That leads to the next question which is: what is the maximum sized force that we intend to deploy?

If it's a brigade then such a function could still operate within a given CS regiment and it becomes less of an issue as to whether launcher troops exist within a CS battery or are grouped into a launcher battery within the regiment. One simply adds a tech solutions det to either the regt's sigs troop or maint troop. As an aside tis also raises the additional question of whether an SUAS troop should be integral to the CS regiment rather than as an attachment from a GS regt. SUAS is already considered a brigade resource but remains in GS due to its specialized technical nature. This argument has less merit once UAVs of many natures become common CS resources. Adding SUAS to the CS regiment increases the merits of having a dedicated UAV launcher bty in each regiment rather than dispersed troops.

If we wish to doctrinally operate on the theory that we should plan on divisional deployments then perhaps the launcher and tech resources should be within a GS regiment (whether UAV or UAV/LRPRS combined). It could go either way in that case. One either leaves the launcher resources within the CS regiment but places a tech net solutions organization within the GS regiment, or we group all arty UAV launcher resources in UAV launcher batteries within the GS regiment to be allocated and attached to CS regiments as the situation demands. I think either solution is acceptable but in my mind it should be based on the likelihood of whether we deploy a bde routinely or a division routinely.

I think the answer is that more probably than not, we deploy bdes routinely. That means to me that we should have the UAV launcher resources, including SUAS, at the CS regt level, most probably in a specialized launcher battery. There should be both a centralized tech net solution at the GS regiment (not to mention the RCAS), to coordinate the army overall, but also a tech net solutions det at each regiment within the launcher bty.

Whole new issue. Should arty UAV operators be part of a separate MOS? Or should they run through the usual artillery career structure with UAVs as a sub specialty. I'm not going to try and answer that here as gunners are already wrestling with the career model consequences of gun line, STA and the soon to return AD systems. Let it suffice to simply say that my gut reaction is that there ought probably to be three specialized career paths - gun line/FSC; STA/UAV; and AD. The problem is the small size of the RegF artillery and the practicality of doing so.

I'm still of the view that the coord and control function, regardless of the projectile/resource delivery, should remain integrated at the CS regiments at the CO FSCC/BC FSCC/FOO levels.

Interested in hearing @markppcli thoughts as to whether forward control/piloting of UAVs is practical at the JTAC level or whether that needs to be an additional operator(s) in the FOO parties.

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@FJAG which podcast? Driving back to Manitoba tomorrow so I’d love something to put my wife to sleep with.

As for your question I’d suggest another member operate it for a few reasons. Firstly is breadth of tasks / kit: you can’t realistically expect one person to be the drone operator and also manning a target designator all while controlling air space one two - three nets. Opportunity to get sucked into the feed and not being tracking the overall picture is too high. Secondly we have equipment that will let me piggy back of feeds anyway, so i can see what the drone operator is seeing, system dependant of course. That means the advantages are already present without the cognitive and tool load downsides. Lastly in a FOO party we already have room for some efficiencies that would turn the driver / signaller into more of a systems operator position frankly.
 
@FJAG which podcast? Driving back to Manitoba tomorrow so I’d love something to put my wife to sleep with.
This one: Drones, Automation, and how ARSOF is Adapting - Irregular Warfare Initiative
As for your question I’d suggest another member operate it for a few reasons. Firstly is breadth of tasks / kit: you can’t realistically expect one person to be the drone operator and also manning a target designator all while controlling air space one two - three nets. Opportunity to get sucked into the feed and not being tracking the overall picture is too high. Secondly we have equipment that will let me piggy back of feeds anyway, so i can see what the drone operator is seeing, system dependant of course. That means the advantages are already present without the cognitive and tool load downsides. Lastly in a FOO party we already have room for some efficiencies that would turn the driver / signaller into more of a systems operator position frankly.
Roger. My thoughts kind of turned on the fact that, in Ukraine at least, the traditional air support is almost entirely absent due to the air-hostile environment. The result is that JTACs probably see a lot less employment then they did, for example, in Afghanistan. That leaves highly-skilled individuals manning sentry posts.

There are some similar skill sets involved and, of course, some completely different ones and the last thing I want to see is yet another job being piled on one individual. On top of that there will continue to be a need for JTACs if for no other reason than for operations in a more air permissive environment.

There are a lot of options as to how one controls the close support of what is now becoming an ever expanding group of munitions available to do do STA and strike functions. It's been two years since this latest dustup has been ongoing and there should have been some fairly clear doctrinal development about how to a) employ those resources and b) continuously examine and update the doctrine.

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This one: Drones, Automation, and how ARSOF is Adapting - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Roger. My thoughts kind of turned on the fact that, in Ukraine at least, the traditional air support is almost entirely absent due to the air-hostile environment. The result is that JTACs probably see a lot less employment then they did, for example, in Afghanistan. That leaves highly-skilled individuals manning sentry posts.

There are some similar skill sets involved and, of course, some completely different ones and the last thing I want to see is yet another job being piled on one individual. On top of that there will continue to be a need for JTACs if for no other reason than for operations in a more air permissive environment.

There are a lot of options as to how one controls the close support of what is now becoming an ever expanding group of munitions available to do do STA and strike functions. It's been two years since this latest dustup has been ongoing and there should have been some fairly clear doctrinal development about how to a) employ those resources and b) continuously examine and update the doctrine.

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Depends on how you look at it, the UTAC guys post of lot of them directing Hinds and Hips in loft rocket deliveries.

I don’t see. Whole lot of cross over between what I do and piloting a drone frankly, so I suppose it’s all about what you define as “control.” Holding a joy stick - no, controlling ingress egress and strikes sure. Right now Russia is using glide bombs to apply a lot of pressure on Ukraine, they could probably be even more effective with those stand off munitions if they could get terminal guidance at the last stage
 
That leads to the next question which is: what is the maximum sized force that we intend to deploy?
Personally I would suggest the Division is the force that Canada should expect to deploy for a LSCO, at least in the early period.

With the Brigade being the absolute minimum for any deployment period, and it should be turn key with a US Army Division.
If it's a brigade then such a function could still operate within a given CS regiment and it becomes less of an issue as to whether launcher troops exist within a CS battery or are grouped into a launcher battery within the regiment. One simply adds a tech solutions det to either the regt's sigs troop or maint troop. As an aside tis also raises the additional question of whether an SUAS troop should be integral to the CS regiment rather than as an attachment from a GS regt. SUAS is already considered a brigade resource but remains in GS due to its specialized technical nature. This argument has less merit once UAVs of many natures become common CS resources. Adding SUAS to the CS regiment increases the merits of having a dedicated UAV launcher bty in each regiment rather than dispersed troops.

If we wish to doctrinally operate on the theory that we should plan on divisional deployments then perhaps the launcher and tech resources should be within a GS regiment (whether UAV or UAV/LRPRS combined). It could go either way in that case. One either leaves the launcher resources within the CS regiment but places a tech net solutions organization within the GS regiment, or we group all arty UAV launcher resources in UAV launcher batteries within the GS regiment to be allocated and attached to CS regiments as the situation demands. I think either solution is acceptable but in my mind it should be based on the likelihood of whether we deploy a bde routinely or a division routinely.

I think the answer is that more probably than not, we deploy bdes routinely. That means to me that we should have the UAV launcher resources, including SUAS, at the CS regt level, most probably in a specialized launcher battery. There should be both a centralized tech net solution at the GS regiment (not to mention the RCAS), to coordinate the army overall, but also a tech net solutions det at each regiment within the launcher bty.

Whole new issue. Should arty UAV operators be part of a separate MOS? Or should they run through the usual artillery career structure with UAVs as a sub specialty. I'm not going to try and answer that here as gunners are already wrestling with the career model consequences of gun line, STA and the soon to return AD systems. Let it suffice to simply say that my gut reaction is that there ought probably to be three specialized career paths - gun line/FSC; STA/UAV; and AD. The problem is the small size of the RegF artillery and the practicality of doing so.

I'm still of the view that the coord and control function, regardless of the projectile/resource delivery, should remain integrated at the CS regiments at the CO FSCC/BC FSCC/FOO levels.

Interested in hearing @markppcli thoughts as to whether forward control/piloting of UAVs is practical at the JTAC level or whether that needs to be an additional operator(s) in the FOO parties.

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While not Mark, I’ve come to the opinion that the FOO Party should probably be a min of 6 people at this point.

FOO
FOO Tech
JTAC
Signaler/Driver (ideally FOO Tech qualified)
Signaler/Driver
UAS Op/Controller.

Which for a Medium (LAV) Bde allows 1 Vehicle and the ability to dismount a portion of the FOO Party without abandoning the Zulu Vehicle. For a Light Bde’s Arty it ends up being a 2 vehicle (ISV or MRZR) entity - and still allows for the vehicles to be ready for use and a dismounted element. In the case of Airborne or AirMobile operations it provides more bodies for equipment carrying.


I’m of the opinion that some SUAS and ISR UAS should be Brigade assets, while smaller SUAS systems (or limited range larger payload systems be at the BN level, and coordinated by the attached FOO Party.

*I say BN not Bty as the BN will be closer to the fight than the CS Battery and that depth difference could mean 20min more loiter time, but I’m not wedded to that.
 
While not Mark, I’ve come to the opinion that the FOO Party should probably be a min of 6 people at this point.
It already is and has been that way in Afghanistan since around 2007.

@markppcli can update the current info as I do not know the current establishment as well as I know the historical. The 2005 arty transformation resulted in a big boost to FOO numbers. The establishment gelled in 2009 with the new FOO battery and at that point settled. Each regiment has one Bde level FSCC established with 8 in the FSCC and 5 in the CO's rovers. There are three BG level BC parties with 7 in the FSCC and 6 in the BC's det/rover. There are nine OP Dets of 6 each and 3 JTAC dets of 4 each as per establishment. In reality most are routinely undermanned but were brought up to strength for deployments in Afghanistan. There may have been some minor tweaking to these establishments.

While there are separate JTAC dets, the intent was that within each FOO det the FOO or his tech were JTAC current. My understanding is that while it was that way in Afghanistan, it is rarely achieved these days. Again, @markppcli would know the numbers much better than I, but its not the real numbers we're talking about here but the doctrinal establishment. As per the doctrinal establishment there appear to be enough dets so that every BG in the brigade would have an FSCC and BC rover with 13 all ranks; 3 x 6 man FOO dets and 1 x 4 man JTAC det to fulfil forward coord and fire control/engagement functions.

I'm going to ignore the battalion level mortars and whatever organic UAV resources go in the battalion. In short, I firmly believe that every battalion needs organic UAV resources from the section right up to bn. Mostly those are surveillance assets but some attack munitions (let's call them OWUAVs for the time being) as well. These should be of a size and range commensurate with whatever area of influence we wish to give to the battalion. Whether these are established within the mortar platoon or anti-armour platoon or some new hybrid organization within the battalion is immaterial so long as the battalion's logistics and C&C structure is commensurate with it.

My concern is with what the artillery brings to the table that not only augments the BG's organic systems but extends them. This is where, IMHO, the Canadian army has an issue as for the last two decades plus it has thought principally with the battalion/battle group level. This is why, for example, the batteries FSCC and BC teams are larger than the regimental CO's FSCC and rover team is smaller than the batteries'. The overriding army philosophy, as demonstrated in the expeditionary lines of operations it has, looks at generating one single composite battery on a mission with possibly a separate smaller scale simultaneous expeditionary mission. It does look at force generating a bde/TF level FSCC but not one that would control multiple Canadian batteries in any one given theatre. Hopefully, Latvia will change that thinking albeit the MNBde's command structure will be a bit of a stepchild, because of its international nature.

I'll bet dollars to donuts that whatever we look at as the "arty" UAV resources, we'll be PY neutral. That means finding "terminal weapon controllers" within the existing FSCC/FOO/JTAC/supported arm manning and finding "launcher operators" within the existing gun and STA battery manning.

Speaking of STA. As at 2009 the CS regt's STA bty had a weapon locating (radar and acoustic) tp and two MUAV troops. The latter of which was to provide close UAV support to the companies. The going forward concept was that the two MUAV troops would become two SUAV troops each with a CP and three launchers. The changeover to SUAS at the CS regt did not come about and the CS regiments went forward equipped with LCMR, AWLS, and MUAV. 4 AD Regt converted to 4 Regt RCA (GS). As of 2009 it was supposed to transform to one GBAD battery and one LRPRS battery plus an ASCC group providing up to five dets. Other than the continuation of the ASCC, the GBAD disappeared and the LRPRS was cancelled and 4 GS went to three batteries of SUAVs, MRRs and ASCCs. Personally I find the MUAV class as too restricted in range and flying time to be a proper bde level surveillance devise and should be replaced at the CS STA battery level with SUAVs as contemplated in 2009 (That may happen just as soon as GBAD and LRPRS become available to 4 GS and some PYs need to be freed up)

So, where does that leave us. Like you, I think we need to think div but need to be capable of doing independent bde and BG deployments. The artillery needs to bring a UAV capability to the table that can augment a BGs organic surveillance and fire support (whatever they decide that needs to be) and be the bde and div's deep surveillance capability for starters. Similarly it needs a strike capability that can support everything from a precision danger close mission for a company to deep strikes for the division. Strikes can be accomplished by traditional or precision guns, OWUAVs or LRPR as appropriate.

We already have a control system in the FSCC structure. We also have a model for delivery in the gunline batteries which can be replicated as launcher batteries and LRPRS batteries all tying into the same logistics system. What is slightly different is the terminal guidance system. Currently it is based on a FOOs call for fire or a JTACs mission control. There is also radar guidance but all too often it is exceedingly complicated through ROEs. Neither of the former actually "flies" the projectile onto the target. With OWUAS, there needs to be a "pilot" from launch to terminal effect (at least until AI can do some of that). The question is whether that is done from the "forward" position (i.e. at an FSCC or FOO/JTAC or supported arm) or the "launcher" CP or a combination of the two?

In my mind there is a need for a "pilot" within the "launch battery" who takes the OWUAV from launch to either a handoff to a forward located "pilot" such as a OWUAV operator in the FOO party or alternatively, flies the OWUAV all the way to the target under the guidance of a terminal observer who can be either a member of the FOO party, a JTAC, a CS or GS regt SUAV operator, or a supported arm observer such as a member of bn recce platoon or a bde recce squadron. In all cases the mission is coordinated through the appropriate level FSCC.

Again, IMHO, there are enough people who are already available in the system. What really matters is having: the appropriate command and control system that can cater to all the desired usage models; a proper training system to be able to effect any of the multiple guidance solutions; and the appropriate equipment, deployed and operational for all the desired guidance solutions. We've never been particulalry good at doing all of the foregoing. We're particulalry poor at building systems that bridge the various arms involved. We tend to work in independent stove pipes until reality forces integration. I'm not sure if you Yanks are any better at it. IMHO proper UAV usage (both surveillance and OWUAV) requires total integration from platoon to division from square one.

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I think the issue is for UAS it really depends on what they are. There are Squad systems for ISR and Platoon level attack systems. The larger they get the more control they need and the further back their launch requires (some just for logistics reasons, others for a security aspect). Many smaller OWUAS don’t require much to launch, some are literally just open the box and they are ready to launch.

What is needed is a logical framework that is also flexible to the situation and advancements in technology.

I don’t think the current US or NATO UAS classifications are sufficient at this point for what is needed.
 
Personally I would suggest the Division is the force that Canada should expect to deploy for a LSCO, at least in the early period.

With the Brigade being the absolute minimum for any deployment period, and it should be turn key with a US Army Division.

While not Mark, I’ve come to the opinion that the FOO Party should probably be a min of 6 people at this point.

FOO
FOO Tech
JTAC
Signaler/Driver (ideally FOO Tech qualified)
Signaler/Driver
UAS Op/Controller.

Which for a Medium (LAV) Bde allows 1 Vehicle and the ability to dismount a portion of the FOO Party without abandoning the Zulu Vehicle. For a Light Bde’s Arty it ends up being a 2 vehicle (ISV or MRZR) entity - and still allows for the vehicles to be ready for use and a dismounted element. In the case of Airborne or AirMobile operations it provides more bodies for equipment carrying.


I’m of the opinion that some SUAS and ISR UAS should be Brigade assets, while smaller SUAS systems (or limited range larger payload systems be at the BN level, and coordinated by the attached FOO Party.

*I say BN not Bty as the BN will be closer to the fight than the CS Battery and that depth difference could mean 20min more loiter time, but I’m not wedded to that.
That’s essentially what we’re deploying. To @FJAG ‘s comments I’m honestly not sure what the establishment is beyond the 9 parties. The Bde is supposed to have 16 JTACs, but I don’t think those exist in seperate positions and there’s only 3 ( as far as I’m aware) independent JTAC positions. I know 5 CMBG is staffing a briefing note to correct this but we shall see.
 
That’s essentially what we’re deploying. To @FJAG ‘s comments I’m honestly not sure what the establishment is beyond the 9 parties. The Bde is supposed to have 16 JTACs, but I don’t think those exist in seperate positions and there’s only 3 ( as far as I’m aware) independent JTAC positions. I know 5 CMBG is staffing a briefing note to correct this but we shall see.
Going back to 2016, the army commander directed that each brigade be able to force generate 16 JTACs; that each JTAC remains as a combat ready (CR) JTAC for a minimum of 4 years, and that, for the time being, they remain as part of the arty regiments.

For a number of reasons that was difficult to do and most brigades were falling short and the duration was reduced to three years but since the bulk are still arty offrs or NCM doing JTAC as a secondary duty, the 3-year minimum posting really only affects the non-arty combat arms JTACs and for them some of that time can be as limited combat ready (LCR).

I'm not sure if there is a national mandate as to how the 16 brigade JTAC positions are to be distributed other than 3 of them are non-arty combat arms and 9 are one each in each of the 9 FOO parties. I expect that of the remaining four, there should be one in each of the three bty FSCCs (there certainly were in Afghanistan) and possibly one in the bde FSCC/TACP. I think recalling you saying some time ago that there weren't any JTACs in 1 CMBG's TACP at that time. In any event, one would think that there would be some merit in having one JTAC in either the Regt'l FSCC or TACP if a bde HQ deploys. I also expect that the actual number of CR or LCR JTACs in each bde falls short of the 16 so that the Regtl FSCC/TACP isn't an issue anyway.

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Going back to 2016, the army commander directed that each brigade be able to force generate 16 JTACs; that each JTAC remains as a combat ready (CR) JTAC for a minimum of 4 years, and that, for the time being, they remain as part of the arty regiments.

For a number of reasons that was difficult to do and most brigades were falling short and the duration was reduced to three years but since the bulk are still arty offrs or NCM doing JTAC as a secondary duty, the 3-year minimum posting really only affects the non-arty combat arms JTACs and for them some of that time can be as limited combat ready (LCR).

I'm not sure if there is a national mandate as to how the 16 brigade JTAC positions are to be distributed other than 3 of them are non-arty combat arms and 9 are one each in each of the 9 FOO parties. I expect that of the remaining four, there should be one in each of the three bty FSCCs (there certainly were in Afghanistan) and possibly one in the bde FSCC/TACP. I think recalling you saying some time ago that there weren't any JTACs in 1 CMBG's TACP at that time. In any event, one would think that there would be some merit in having one JTAC in either the Regt'l FSCC or TACP if a bde HQ deploys. I also expect that the actual number of CR or LCR JTACs in each bde falls short of the 16 so that the Regtl FSCC/TACP isn't an issue anyway.

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I think the intent is that the JTAC - E is at 9-5 / Regt FSCC. Which is just another reason they should be WOs but that’s probably a seperate debate.

At present there’s exactly 1 RCAF TACP that’s a JTAC. We shall see if that changes with the course that’s tuning right now but I have my doubts
 
I think the intent is that the JTAC - E is at 9-5 / Regt FSCC. Which is just another reason they should be WOs but that’s probably a seperate debate.
Honestly, with the posting cycles for arty officers at the captain level, all arty and combat arms JTACs should be NCMs.
At present there’s exactly 1 RCAF TACP that’s a JTAC. We shall see if that changes with the course that’s tuning right now but I have my doubts
Shows you how much the RCAF cares. You'd think that there should be a large pile of RCAF officers on "no fly" status that could do the job. My guess is that their "lessons learned" from Ukraine is "stay home."

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Not to derail the arty talk but FJAG's last line could be a good start to conversation, how can lessons learned from Ukraine be effectively applied to the Army Reserve? An obvious starting point is drones should be massively proliferated through all sub-units in the reserve, it's such a cheap and easy to maintain no-brainer as long as people keep the air-crew medical good idea fairy at bay.
 
Not to derail the arty talk but FJAG's last line could be a good start to conversation, how can lessons learned from Ukraine be effectively applied to the Army Reserve? An obvious starting point is drones should be massively proliferated through all sub-units in the reserve, it's such a cheap and easy to maintain no-brainer as long as people keep the air-crew medical good idea fairy at bay.

How about starting with this?

1. Confirm a role for the Army Reserve, train and resource it appropriately, and stick to the plan for longer than a hummingbird's heartbeat.

2. Other stuff

;)
 
Honestly, with the posting cycles for arty officers at the captain level, all arty and combat arms JTACs should be NCMs.

Shows you how much the RCAF cares. You'd think that there should be a large pile of RCAF officers on "no fly" status that could do the job. My guess is that their "lessons learned" from Ukraine is "stay home."

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You can’t force some one to pass the course, and given the internationally audited nature of the program it’s one of very few places in the green army where they won’t push someone through to be make up numbers.


As a note in the status of the army Reserve I spoke to an officer I put through BMOQ-A about Western Sabre. Across the division they got 450 people out in one rifle company and one squadron plus CSS. The artillery was occupied running a foo course in Shilo. So roughly a Bn out of the Div.
 
How about starting with this?

1. Confirm a role for the Army Reserve, train and resource it appropriately, and stick to the plan for longer than a hummingbird's heartbeat.

2. Other stuff

;)
At least stuff is tangible so it catches the eye of a politician for photo ops haha. Good luck getting anyone to give a fuck about reserve reform, which I agree must take place. Small steps since that's all we're realistically taking in the foreseeable future. I don't disagree though.
 
As a note in the status of the army Reserve I spoke to an officer I put through BMOQ-A about Western Sabre. Across the division they got 450 people out in one rifle company and one squadron plus CSS. The artillery was occupied running a foo course in Shilo. So roughly a Bn out of the Div.
Exercises like Western Sabre are DoA in the reserves as things currently sit. The biggest problem is lack of legislation forcing employers to give their employees time off and the second biggest is demographic shift in the reserves towards older and more established people. While a Bn out of a Div is pitiful, it isn't surprising given that a lot of reservists have a hard time getting a weekend off for exercises, nevermind 2 weeks. I can think of several of my guys who weren't able to get that time off from their employers and couldn't risk their mortgage to go do some Sqn ATCs. I also had some older reservists who couldn't line up childcare due to the duration of the exercise. All in all though, shit showing.
 
Exercises like Western Sabre are DoA in the reserves as things currently sit. The biggest problem is lack of legislation forcing employers to give their employees time off and the second biggest is demographic shift in the reserves towards older and more established people. While a Bn out of a Div is pitiful, it isn't surprising given that a lot of reservists have a hard time getting a weekend off for exercises, nevermind 2 weeks. I can think of several of my guys who weren't able to get that time off from their employers and couldn't risk their mortgage to go do some Sqn ATCs. I also had some older reservists who couldn't line up childcare due to the duration of the exercise. All in all though, shit showing.

Scheduling conflicts with career courses, OP LENTUS commitments, bad planning/prep/battle procedure and communications usually cut into the attendance numbers as well, as I recall ...

As an enlightened soldier once told me "No one wants to be part of a fuck up... " ;)
 
How about starting with this?

1. Confirm a role for the Army Reserve, train and resource it appropriately, and stick to the plan for longer than a hummingbird's heartbeat.

2. Other stuff

;)
Was listening to a podcast yesterday on a way too long of drive talking about the myths of the British Army in WW1.

One of the key points brought forward was that the platoon became the organizational focus of assault and that adaptive, flexible tactics were key to avoiding some of the fixed battle issues of places like the Somme on July 1 1916.

More and more, when looking at the realistic size of the reserve unit manning levels....I think of the role of Platoon tactics and low level leadership roles. Moving the larger unit formation exercises becomes a Reg. Force role....but somewhere in there there needs to be the cross training occurring and/or formed unit mobilization into other units.

But that platoon needs to be independent too - mobile, fully equipped with proper communications, gear and weapons, and should be focused on squad integration tactics to support each other in a dispersed battle front. To get there:
Yes...add at least 2 drone operators/platoon for front line intelligence.
Yes...add full night vision tactics.
Yes...practice the heck out of concealment/cover drills.
Yes...practice long distance sharpshooter/sniper tactics.
And yes...include Ground to Air and Ground to Ground missile defense.


But this is only practical with a solid, consistent core of regular attendees to a training day/weekend. How to achieve that is way tougher.
 
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