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Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

Don't need to go south of Magellan for that. I know ships have gone through Magellan though. Heard it was an interesting Pilotage.


So you can become a member of the Loyal Order of the Penguin of course. To go with my Loyal Order of the Polar Bear. (Note there is no proper ceremony for crossing into that Antarctic Polar Circle, but I suspect Neptune will have a second visit to any ship that does it from Canada, I can hear his crashing voice now "Didn't you learn your lesson from two weeks ago!!!")
have to go south of Magellan for Antarctica?
 
I would not be surprised that this might be something that happens. Also its going to really poke a hole into the AOPS "this ship is garbage" crowd particular in the Senate. You know the folks who said it was a slush breaker... when now its proven that it goes through more then 2m of ice.

I wonder if this trip came out of their discovery of its amazing fuel mileage? And better seakeeping then expected with the stabilizers out. Lots of problems with the ship but certainly lots of good news as well.
Polar class 5 hull with a PC 4 hull is no slouch. I don't think people realize how few PC 1-3 icebreakers there are in the world. The AOP's are about the same level of icebreaker as the CCG 1100 Class icebreaker when they were new.
 
This is why Canada and other Western countries need to sail in the South Atlantic, near Antarctic and through the straights of Magellan, regularly:


China has, as you all know, a “maritime militia” composed of technically sophisticated trawlers embedded with huge deep sea fishing fleets that ravage stocks sometimes even within the claimed protected waters of other maritime nations, including Argentina, Chile, and Central American countries:


Only a gullible fool would think there is any underlying peaceful intentions in Peace Ark missions:


“Chinese naval expansion, facilitated by the acquisition of new ports, can be interpreted as a reflection of historical trends in which emerging powers challenge established hegemonic powers. For example, China’s commercial activities in the Indian Ocean point to investments that may foreshadow China’s intention and capability to be able to operate high-end military missions. The allocation of Chinese resources towards port infrastructure development may potentially yield significant military capabilities. These investments include naval deployments that exceed the necessary capabilities for countering piracy or engaging in humanitarian activities. They also involve the development of advanced platforms for gathering intelligence at sea against state adversaries. Additionally, efforts are being made to enhance the resilience of logistics networks that play a crucial role in conducting operations during times of conflict.”


If China was able to gain a general purpose naval base at the tip of South America that can support surface ships and submarines and especially a facility with an airstrip nearby, they will have in large part asserted control over the Atlantic interface to the Antarctic to facilitate unhindered exploitation. They can co-opt Chile and Argentina because they are both economically vulnerable and perhaps naively think that the US and in particular the USN can wrest back control if either South American country decides to boot China out.

The closest similar base for the US and Western Allies in the South Atlantic would be in the Falkland Islands, which would require significant development even at the RAF new(ish) airbase. I don’t believe there are adequate facilities in existence in the Falkland’s locate (permanently) a fleet of surface ships and submarines, and that needs to be done ASAP.

So, at least 4 things need to happen:
1. Diplomatically and economically steer South America away from China;
2. Create an Allied surface fleet permanently stationed in the South Atlantic with a well protected air base;
3. Assist Argentina and Chile in driving away the PLAN maritime militia from the South Atlantic
4. Protect the Antarctic from what would almost certain environmental destruction through unfettered resource extraction.

Deploying AOPS in a top to bottom circumnavigation of North and South America multiple times per year, would demonstrate Canada’s commitment to deterring the PLAN maritime militia, support countries we are allied with (Britain >Falklands), support countries we wish to see succeed without China controlling them (Argentina, Chile), demonstrate resolve to protect the environment, and finally provide the RCN with a quite useful international tasking for AOPS, and eventually CSC and JSS sailings.
 
We have had RCN sailors transit the Drake Passage in the past. Just not on RCN ships.
HMCS Kootenay rounded Cape Horn in 1995 during her UNITAS deployment but that was as close to Antarctica as the RCN has come I believe. That was probably one of my favorite deployments on my favorite skimmer. We had 5 more days along side then we did at sea in total.
 
HMCS Kootenay rounded Cape Horn in 1995 during her UNITAS deployment but that was as close to Antarctica as the RCN has come I believe. That was probably one of my favorite deployments on my favorite skimmer. We had 5 more days along side then we did at sea in total.
Yep and other ships as well. Halifax did both horns in the 90s.
 
Depending on what "real terms" means it's honestly just geographical. China gives no craps about AOPS doing a south pacific/antarctic trip. But would probably give a crap about AOPS sailing in the South China Sea.

Chile and NZ who are allies and friends of the RCN (remember Chile kept our tanker expertise going for us with cross pol while we waited for Asterix) it does matter in real terms. NZ in particular sends sailors all the time to Canada for training and cross pol, and we of course had them living in Victoria while we refit their ships. A ship visit is always at least a minor diplomatic event particularly if we haven't visited in a long time.
 
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Depending on what "real terms" means it's honestly just geographical. China gives no craps about AOPS doing a south pacific/antarctic trip. But would probably give a crap about AOPS sailing in the South China see.

Chile and NZ who are allies and friends of the RCN (remember Chile kept our tanker expertise going for us with cross pol while we waited for Asterix) it does matter in real terms. NZ in particular sends sailors all the time to Canada for training and cross pol, and we of course had them living in Victoria while we refit their ships. A ship visit is always at least a minor diplomatic event particularly if we haven't visited in a long time.
I’m sure the Kiwis loved their time in Victoria.
 
Polar class 5 hull with a PC 4 hull is no slouch. I don't think people realize how few PC 1-3 icebreakers there are in the world. The AOP's are about the same level of icebreaker as the CCG 1100 Class icebreaker when they were new.
Just like how many "commentators" have trouble grasping the fact that Navies operate ship types not designed for direct combat, these same people have issues grasping that not every "icebreaker" or "ice strengthened ship" is suited to sail directly through the North Pole in the dead of Winter. Nonsensical comments referring to the designs as "slush-breakers" were continually repeated by people in the media (Thanks Jack Layton) and it was part of the biased screed against the AOPS that existed prior to its public Wikipedia page seeing a more balanced rewrite. Expecting these sort of outrage mongers to actually compare the AOPS to existing similar vessels beside Svalbard on cost is a lost cause. A lot of people have had a bone to pick with AOPS for the longest time and they have been amusingly absent from anything positive surrounding the class, crawling out to regurgitate the various issues the class is having/had before disappearing.
 
Just like how many "commentators" have trouble grasping the fact that Navies operate ship types not designed for direct combat, these same people have issues grasping that not every "icebreaker" or "ice strengthened ship" is suited to sail directly through the North Pole in the dead of Winter. Nonsensical comments referring to the designs as "slush-breakers" were continually repeated by people in the media (Thanks Jack Layton) and it was part of the biased screed against the AOPS that existed prior to its public Wikipedia page seeing a more balanced rewrite. Expecting these sort of outrage mongers to actually compare the AOPS to existing similar vessels beside Svalbard on cost is a lost cause. A lot of people have had a bone to pick with AOPS for the longest time and they have been amusingly absent from anything positive surrounding the class, crawling out to regurgitate the various issues the class is having/had before disappearing.
I am a big fan of the AOP's and their role generally. But I am not a fan of the RCN belief that only Frigates/DDE/DD need proper defensive suites and armaments. I hear all sorts of arguments, but really it boils down to the Government of Canada being incredibly cheap and shortsighted. Just like the armies are finding out that there are no "safe rear areas", I think Navies are starting to realize that as well.
 
I am a big fan of the AOP's and their role generally. But I am not a fan of the RCN belief that only Frigates/DDE/DD need proper defensive suites and armaments. I hear all sorts of arguments, but really it boils down to the Government of Canada being incredibly cheap and shortsighted. Just like the armies are finding out that there are no "safe rear areas", I think Navies are starting to realize that as well.

AOPS is great in that they are new and providing sea days, and updated creature comforts.

But they offer not a lot more than that, and unless they are 'upgunned' don't offer much when the ball drops. A solid training platform basically.
 
HMCS Kootenay rounded Cape Horn in 1995 during her UNITAS deployment but that was as close to Antarctica as the RCN has come I believe. That was probably one of my favorite deployments on my favorite skimmer. We had 5 more days along side then we did at sea in total.
That was a great trip!!!
 
AOPS is great in that they are new and providing sea days, and updated creature comforts.

But they offer not a lot more than that, and unless they are 'upgunned' don't offer much when the ball drops. A solid training platform basically.
If the 'ball dropped' and we were in the thick of it, would they even leave the pier?
 
I am a big fan of the AOP's and their role generally. But I am not a fan of the RCN belief that only Frigates/DDE/DD need proper defensive suites and armaments. I hear all sorts of arguments, but really it boils down to the Government of Canada being incredibly cheap and shortsighted. Just like the armies are finding out that there are no "safe rear areas", I think Navies are starting to realize that as well.
Ships should be armed according to their designated roles, feature creep is a very real concern and what combat value you can fundamentally get out of a ship not designed for it is limited. What exactly is a "proper defensive suite and armaments"? I could see AOPS getting upgraded with a new cannon like the 30mm dual purpose system for CSC, remote weapon station machine guns and perhaps some limited EW suites against unmanned systems however, I don't particularly see the need for anymore than that. Once you start getting involved with decoys, ECM, missiles, torpedoes, larger guns, etc, you start requiring additional crew, additional space, additional funds, additional weight, etc. Return on investment capability wise is not there in my opinion.

At the end of the day, trying to turn AOPS into something it is explicitly not designed to do is a waste of time and resources.

AOPS is great in that they are new and providing sea days, and updated creature comforts.

But they offer not a lot more than that, and unless they are 'upgunned' don't offer much when the ball drops. A solid training platform basically.
Looking at everything from the perspective of a shooting conflict surely skews the value of a ship that is not designed to operate as a combatant. Navy's require a variety of platforms, not all of them are well suited to wartime operations or peacetime operations.

AOPS are great in that they provide a platform that is cheaper to run than a CPF but far more seaworthy and capable of a variety of missions versus an MCDV. They have great boat handling facilities, ample space for embarked forces, cargo space aboard, the ability to onload/offload cargo themselves, a great operational range and aviation facilities for future developments. Besides their designed role as a Northern capable OPV, there is great value in these ships for operations like drug interdiction, providing support to government agencies like the RCMP/DFO/CCG for their duties domestically, humanitarian assistance, security in regions like Africa, etc.

Just like how a CPF is a poor ship for many peacetime duties, AOPS is a poor ship for many wartime duties. That does not mean there is not a place within the RCN for either platform.
 
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