Applying Ukrainian Lessons to US Army Training

[Kirkhill]

Assuming the facts are right....

“The thing we struggle the most with is this business of a transparent battlefield,” said Brig. Gen. Curtis Taylor, head of National Training Center, or NTC, in California. “We've all got to learn how to operate in that context.”

Back to Clausewitzian warfare. He could see the entire battlefield and every man on it.

Might as well go back to the Scarlets and Crossbelts.

Lessons from Ukraine: U.S. Army using conflict in Europe to prepare soldiers for the next war

Chief concerns are drones, electronic surveillance, and artificial intelligence.

www.defenseone.com

But....

“The things that Ukrainians are doing are very, very hard,” Taylor said. “It requires generations of practice. And so, if anything, it reaffirmed our commitment to the combined arms maneuver,” he said, referring to coordinating between different combat branches.

 

[KevinB]

Take a look at the CSA’s MDO document.
It deals with a lot of that at least in theory.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

The problem we wrestle with is that most of our experience over the past 30nyears has been either PSO or COIN operations where we owned the skies and most of the terrain (and movement within it).

Ukraine doesn't have that level of control and neither do the Russians. I would reckon neither would the U.S. if things kicked off in Taiwan or elsewhere in the Pacific. Add to it that AD is no longer about targeting that hypersonic, multi-million, massive heat signature... but a $500 cardboard bomb with wings... it's a problem and one any modern military would face.

At the tip of the spear, I don't think much will change from "Closing with and destroying the enemy." Our armoured/cavalry will still support in a Combined Arms fight... where I see a huge shift coming is in our Combat, Combat Service, and HQ Support elements in how they support the fight.

The BSA is no longer a thing. Not when precision strikes can hit 300nm behind the FEBA. The sprawling, static TOCs of yore are death sentences. Shoot and scoot needs to be on the mind of every gunner from now on.

IMHO, those things will impact how we plan the fight more than what dudes are seeing on the other end of their C79 optical in the forward areas.

 

[KevinB]

The F-22 still has no peer in the skies, and the F-35 isn’t exactly a slouch either.
The USAF has the ability to operate in air supremacy worldwide with some platforms.
Other platforms need to be a lot more cautious about operating envelopes, but realistically the concern about air parity is a garbage argument used to fund NGASF and the B-21.

I have zero concerns about enemy hypersonics, my concern is more about quantity of allied AD Networks.

WRT the drone concerns, EW units and C-UAS abilities in at least US formations are fairly robust with more coming on line.

I’m not concerned about EMP aspects and hardening items for that.

 

[KevinB]

Edit: that should have read ‘I am concerned about EMP’

 

[Eaglelord17]

Minefield drills have never been more important. As well as OP sec

 

[daftandbarmy]

Mass mobilization of the resources of the modern nation state, and the associated political and logistics considerations: a couple of topics you don't see on the agenda of your average TEWT.

 

[KevinB]

Minefield drills have never been more important. As well as OP sec

It’s not so much Minefield drills, it’s the understanding that the largest minefield that one may encounter isn’t just a 400mx400m box.

Way to often the exercise is situated to not press Engineer resources, which the idea that ‘in war either it won’t happen or more resources will magically appear.

OPSEC, honestly outside of SOF it’s nearly missing from most NATO armies.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You better have a lot of bridging assets as well, because the bridges supporting your front will be hit repeatedly, as will the replacement bridging. Defending a bridge should be a exercise in itself, camouflage, decoys, smoke, and AD.

 

[Kirkhill]

You better have a lot of bridging assets as well, because the bridges supporting your front will be hit repeatedly, as will the replacement bridging. Defending a bridge should be a exercise in itself, camouflage, decoys, smoke, and AD.

Or you could make sure that your light vehicles have winch and can swim.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Also protecting the movement of goods and vehicles

via: Sarcastosaurus

A target such as a train loading vehicles cannot be effectively camouflaged and it was attacked by an MPK glide bomb, not a drone. Trains are the best way to move vehicles over long distances (particularly tracked vehicles), because it is faster and saves wear and tear on the tracks and other components. The problem is that a train is a very obvious and so-called ‘high value target’. If it is detected and there is a weapon in range, then it can be attacked. This attack occurred just over 40 km from the front lines. That’s within the range of Russian reconnaissance drones. It’s also in range of MPK/UMPK glide bombs.

Since neither side has the capability to completely prevent each other’s drones from travelling behind each other's lines, Ukraine has a couple options. One is to load and unload their trains quicker. The problem is that with a well-organized operation it will still take about an hour for the train to arrive and load and secure this many vehicles. If spotted early enough, that’s enough time to call for an airstrike. The key is to minimize the time they can be spotted while stationary.

The other option is to unload them out of range of Russian drone detection and airstrikes. This is similar to the effect HIMARS had on Russian supply dumps. The bigger dumps had to be moved back out of range of HIMARS and the forward dumps had to be dispersed into smaller depots so not as much would be lost to a single round. Ukraine also has to move its bigger operations out of range of airstrikes and make sure their personnel and equipment that are in range are dispersed so they won’t lose as much in a single strike.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Or you could make sure that your light vehicles have winch and can swim.

We have learned over the years, that amphibious vehicles have to give up some armour and weapons to work and must be well maintained to protect their watertight integrity. There is likley value to keep a portion of your equipment amphibious to give you more options, but not a significant amount. For a army like the US and perhaps a combined NATO force, you need a unit like the WWII 79th Armoured Division, made up of specialist vehicles that have been modified/built for particular tasks.

 

[Kirkhill]

Basic triangles

Cheap - Fast - Good
Mobile-Protected-Firepower

Two out of three

If you want mobile firepower that goes anywhere you are going to have to give up protection. If you wanted protected firepower you will give up mobility.

The problem can be solved by having some of each type of compromise.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Meanwhile on the equipment side our government seems to be taking the Russian approach of letting things rot out.

 

[FormerHorseGuard]

I asked this question months ago on another post on this site.

NATO is teaching the Ukrainian forces how to fight the Russian forces and the Ukrainian forces are having some success. Now it is because of they are using NATO doctrine or because they are using a blend of NATO training and a blend of Ukrainian training and battle field experience?

No one has defeated the modern day Russian army on the field ever. The Ukrainian forces are regaining land back and pushing the Russian lines back. But that is not full military victory, no mass retreat or surrender yet.

Only power that has defeated the Soviet army was the Afghanistan rebels and that was war based on economic losses and numbers of Soviet troops killed or wounded. Unpopular at home etc. China and Russia have border issues but not an all out war.


So my question has always been if the Ukrainian side is victorious and Russian forces surrendered or a full blown retreat back to Russian land. When does the Ukrainian force open up school and teach the teachers how to use the equipment, the low tech and high tech toys to defeat an enemy force?


Canadians have not seen a tank on tank battle since Korea , we train to fight a tank battle but no one has done it outside of an exercise since Korea, or as exchange officer in Gulf War 1. ( most are retired now I suspect )

Canadians have not had to clear a Russian trench ever nor as the rest of NATO forces. We have trained, have watched endless power points, or practiced it but never done it.

if the Ukrainian forces win or even force a stalemate and there are peace talks they will have the knowledge and the experience to teach NATO troops the facts and lessons learned in battle.


They have already learned weakness points in NATO equipment and weakness in Russian equipment but also learnec how to make it work.

So lessons learnec and shared will change how the US fights their next war of a peer or equal force. If the US changes all of NATO must change to the new reality

 

[KevinB]

I asked this question months ago on another post on this site.

NATO is teaching the Ukrainian forces how to fight the Russian forces and the Ukrainian forces are having some success. Now it is because of they are using NATO doctrine or because they are using a blend of NATO training and a blend of Ukrainian training and battle field experience?

No one has defeated the modern day Russian army on the field ever. The Ukrainian forces are regaining land back and pushing the Russian lines back. But that is not full military victory, no mass retreat or surrender yet.

Only power that has defeated the Soviet army was the Afghanistan rebels and that was war based on economic losses and numbers of Soviet troops killed or wounded. Unpopular at home etc. China and Russia have border issues but not an all out war.


So my question has always been if the Ukrainian side is victorious and Russian forces surrendered or a full blown retreat back to Russian land. When does the Ukrainian force open up school and teach the teachers how to use the equipment, the low tech and high tech toys to defeat an enemy force?


Canadians have not seen a tank on tank battle since Korea , we train to fight a tank battle but no one has done it outside of an exercise since Korea, or as exchange officer in Gulf War 1. ( most are retired now I suspect )

Canadians have not had to clear a Russian trench ever nor as the rest of NATO forces. We have trained, have watched endless power points, or practiced it but never done it.

if the Ukrainian forces win or even force a stalemate and there are peace talks they will have the knowledge and the experience to teach NATO troops the facts and lessons learned in battle.


They have already learned weakness points in NATO equipment and weakness in Russian equipment but also learnec how to make it work.

So lessons learnec and shared will change how the US fights their next war of a peer or equal force. If the US changes all of NATO must change to the new reality

The issue with taking Lessons Learned at point blank is that Ukrainians are fighting their war with the assets they have.

If V Corps was fighting the war, it would have been over, a week or two after the start. Simply because the US Military can exert a level of firepower and coordination that no other force on the planet can, and wouldn’t need to fight like Ukraine has had to.

As well NATO Armies constantly train in combined arms. Ukraine is a blend of WP and NATO doctrine with a lot of ‘get it done’ slid into the mix.
The AFU has had some significant issues with combined arms coordination, their Bde’s generally conduct attacks with a Bn as lead and only using a few ‘good’ platoons from 2 Companies -> So realistically that is a Coy plus.

I’m not saying this as a knock on Ukraine, just the fact that their Army hasn’t had the time to develop, and they suffered horrid casualties in their NATO training forces early on.

MTF

 

[GR66]

No one has defeated the modern day Russian army on the field ever. The Ukrainian forces are regaining land back and pushing the Russian lines back. But that is not full military victory, no mass retreat or surrender yet.

Only power that has defeated the Soviet army was the Afghanistan rebels and that was war based on economic losses and numbers of Soviet troops killed or wounded. Unpopular at home etc. China and Russia have border issues but not an all out war.

The 1st Chechen War enters the conversation...

 

[KevinB]

It is very important when conducting Lessons Learned Collation to ensure that one takes as much data as one can. That data can then be sorted for relevance, and prioritized.

NATO aims to fight with Air Supremacy, so in a conflict with Air Parity, and only brief local superiority, some of the lessons aren’t as relevant. However they could be relevant in certain situations and those need to be identified, and planned for, and planned as well so that doesn’t happen.

Fires are available at very low levels for NATO forces, both in terms of formation integral ones like Mortars, to Artillery, and Air Support (fixed wing or AH). This is why AFU attacks are somewhat odd, as they don’t have the FOO and JTAC’s at lower levels, and so fireplans are generally a Bde thing, and their ability to conduct Bde attacks isn’t there yet, so one ends up with a Bde supported Coy level attack, which doesn’t allow for the focused mass to be brought to bear like a NATO Bde attack would be conducted.

Night Operations: The night is out friend and we hunt at night, right now UKR SOF and some western equipped AFU units are able to conduct night operations, but by and large the AFU isn’t equipped for night operations.
Furthermore even most of the AFU units with western vehicles are limited to vehicle operations at night, as the don’t have NoDs suppressors, MFAL’s and IFF at individual levels to allow for seamless night fighting.

Tactical Combat Casualty Care, GWOT gave the Western Militaries excellent experience in dealing with casualties on the battlefield, but not in the scope that Ukraine is dealing with, and due to fairly unfettered air support, cas evac was done exceptionally well (with some outliers), but while Western Armies can afford to send troops on 3 week TCCC courses and incorporate it into larger training, the AFU has limited resources in terms of training, medical supplies and logistics capabilities for Medivac.

Outside of digging deep into Classified reports, I think the above is a fairly decent idea of why some lessons from Ukraine are important and others entirely irrelevant.

 

[FormerHorseGuard]

I do not think your victory lap would be a week or 2.


"If V Corps was fighting the war, it would have been over, a week or two after the start. Simply because the US Military can exert a level of firepower and coordination that no other force on the planet can, and wouldn’t need to fight like Ukraine has had to."

The last time the US forces fought a land battle yes it was over fairly quick but it took time to build the forces and put boots on the ground.

Gulf War,

Iraq invades Kuwait, 02 August 1990
US Air Force starts to deploy 08 August 1990
US ground forces starting arriving on 09 August 1990
UN authorizes use of Force 29 November 1990
US Congress authorizes use of Force 12 Jan 1991
Air operations starts 16 Jan 1991
Coalition forces claim air supremacy 27 Jan 1991
Ground War operations start 24 Feb 1991
Ground operations cease and cease fire in place 28 Feb 1991

You could argue that some equipment and troops are already in place and prepared for a ground action in Europe. So that shaves some time off the time line.
But moving the troops and equipment since this would be an all out war, not a zone conflict, the Russian Navy and Airforce would be doing their best to stop the movement of ships and aircraft across the Atlantic Ocean, and across Europe by any and all means. Biggest issue would be getting all of NATO to agree that it is in the best interest of all members to actually follow the agreement. Russia would have time to prepare defences and run combat operations before the NATO force was even authorized to move. That is the one perk Russia would have over NATO forces, they are one country and one army, one government compared to the 30 some nations that make up NATO.

Biggest issue would be trading land for time to deploy NATO forces, unless some one actually got the intell right and was able to have the NATO leadership agree and they were pre deployed to meet the threat well in advance.

But what do I know besides reading history and only being a Pte in the infantry a long time ago. Maybe lessons were learned and they can deploy and get everyone to agree in a few days.

 

[Kirkhill]

The issue with taking Lessons Learned at point blank is that Ukrainians are fighting their war with the assets they have.

If V Corps was fighting the war, it would have been over, a week or two after the start. Simply because the US Military can exert a level of firepower and coordination that no other force on the planet can, and wouldn’t need to fight like Ukraine has had to.

As well NATO Armies constantly train in combined arms. Ukraine is a blend of WP and NATO doctrine with a lot of ‘get it done’ slid into the mix.
The AFU has had some significant issues with combined arms coordination, their Bde’s generally conduct attacks with a Bn as lead and only using a few ‘good’ platoons from 2 Companies -> So realistically that is a Coy plus.

I’m not saying this as a knock on Ukraine, just the fact that their Army hasn’t had the time to develop, and they suffered horrid casualties in their NATO training forces early on.

MTF

If V Corps could solve this war in a week or two, lets allow them until Christmas and then assume that it is only a matter of marching, how do we explain the hesitancy of the west to grapple with Russia prior to the Ukrainians exposing the Russian's weaknesses and depleting the Russian force?

A2AD was a big thing back then. S400 and S500 presented problems that the F35 might or might not have negated. Air Superiority might or might not have been achievable. Could a successful campaign be waged without Air Dominance? Were the Swedes right and the Russian Army was a hollow, rusted out force that while dangerous, was only a shadow of the Cold War Red Army? What was plan B? etc.

The West developed a game plan based on their appreciation of the situation. They then had the luxury of refusing battle until they perceived the best opportunity for the success of their plan, ie the situation matched their appreciation. The Ukrainians, lacking that luxury, had to kick, scratch and claw while adapting and innovating. Their best course of action was the one that resulted in the fewest dead Ukrainians and the most dead Russians. That is still their best course of action.

I continue to see public commentary from people not in the field, reputable commentators, often the same ones that claimed this would all be over in three days two years ago, saying "if only". If only this or that was done then....

In August 1914 nobody was predicting that by April 1917 the look of the world's armies would change completely from men in blue tunics, red pants and shining bayonets advancing in columns to men in khakis scrabbling in the mud with tanks, mortars, machine guns, grenades and aircraft.

Armies invest a lot in a particular course of action. That investment tends to be self-preserving. New things are tried, new equipment is added, but the basic, underlying structure does not change until it is challenged in the field. Then the "if onlies" stop.

....

The Ukrainians have learnt. They have innovated. They have exposed the Russians. They have changed the Russians. The situation has changed. The appreciations must change.