dapaterson said:
The same ones who, in the 1990s, decided to keep bands and eliminate fitness instructors in the CAF.
Priorities...
Incorrect. The demise of the Ground Based Air Defence is almost entirely a self inflicted wound by the artillery branch. The decision to divest the Javelin and 35mm was driven by the desire of the branch to re-roll reserve AD units and focus resources on the ADATS, as the intent (2005/2006) was to have the ADATS moved to the direct fire squadron. Once the DFS met its fate, the intent for the ADATs changed to use the system as a low level air defence radar and integrate it into the Local Air picture via Link 16 and the ADSI for use in Afghanistan. However, the technology used for this (which was from the MMEV project) couldn't push the local radar feed to the ADSI due to issues with the ADATS radar.
At the same time, 4 AD started to focus on ASCC and UAS deployments (Sperwer and Scan Eagle) as a means of deploying soldiers. The addition of the UAS started the move towards the transition to the "GS" regiment as the resident UAS expertise became a product of 4 AD.
So, this left the GBAD with only 1 system which was basically undeployable, mechanically unreliable, costly to run, and logistically heavy and a regiment full of SME's in STA. The cancellation of the MMEV also left no clear way forward. There was, at one time (2006) and intent to take Phalynx off of the Frigates to give them to 4 AD as a C-RAM capability, which fell through, and to have the regiment kitted with avengers for the Olympics (2010) which fell through. Moreover, the artillery branch wanted to get into HIMARs, so there was a project at getting HIMARs to fire both SS and SA missiles, which clearly also fell through. Thus, the GBAD was left with no weapon systems once the ADATS was divested in 2012/2013 and no real plan for replacement.
From discussions with many pers in Ottawa it was clearly laid out that the army was concerned about GBAD but the artillery branch was more interested in divesting the capability IOT clear PYs and money for things it deemed more important, such as STA and HIMARs.
On a side note- the RCAS GBAD cell was discussing the inherent issue with defending against a MUAS and came to the AAAD conclusion. The inherent problem with C-MUAS is that you can detect the systems but they would be extremely difficult to target the system directly. The easy solution would be to jam the video feed, rendering the system useless, but requiring some sort of jamming capability. The second option was to engage the system via AAAD, which would be extremely difficult to say the least. The third option would be to engage the control station.
The proposed SOP was that once a launch was detected the main effort would be in identifying where the control system was (since they would need a LOS and would need to be relatively in the open and within 3-5 km of the unit being targetted) based on where the detections were spotted and engaging the control system via artillery or other effect. For those being targeted, the SOP would be to adopt a posture akin to the old "actions on air attack" where the units attempts to hide or disperse before the MUAS can target it and call in their own effects.