The Crusaders Admit: Our Troops are Being Defeated in Afghanistan; An Analytical Study of the Crusader Forces Occupying Afghanistan
By SITE Institute
October 27, 2006
Prepared by Hossam Abdul Raouf, a member of the Committee of Information and Strategy for al-Qaeda, and Editor-in-Chief of the “Vanguards of Kharasan” electronic periodical, a 66-page analytical study of the “Crusader” occupation of Afghanistan was recently distributed to jihadist forums. The piece, written between June and July 2006, follows an admission that American, allied, and NATO forces are being defeated in Afghanistan. In the pursuit of proving this claim, as well as showing the might and initiative of the Mujahideen, the author focuses on news articles concerning the “Afghani problem,” which were published by English Pakistani newspapers, such as the Nation, the Dawn, and the Frontier Post, as well as quotations from American Congressmen and U.S. and British military commanders.
The introduction to the document, previously translated by the SITE Institute , summarizes Raouf’s goals in the analysis as proving Western “Crusader” hubris and selfishness in the Afghan occupation, especially by the United States, and deliberate attempts by the commanding regimes to obfuscate the reality of the ground war. The analysis then pursues the signs and indications of the Crusader’s defeat in Afghanistan, highlighting reasons for U.S. withdrawal and their handing greater authority to NATO forces in the southern provinces, and reviewing the conditions of British, Canadian, Dutch, Australian, and other foreign forces.
Hossam Raouf observes that the reduction of U.S. forces in Afghanistan this year is due to a confluence of factors, including the strength of the Taliban and their firm control in many Afghan provinces, failure of U.S. intelligence to locate Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership, and the transfer of forces to cover the “great losses” in Iraq. He also claims that American soldiers are suffering mental collapse, and refers to evolving tactics and methods of the Mujahideen in combat as additional reasons. On the latter point, suicide bombings, termed as the “Islamic nuclear bomb that the enemy cannot face,” by Taliban commander Mullah Dadallah, is one of the strategies imported from the Iraq insurgency. The author adds: “While suicide attacks were not accepted in the Afghani culture in the past, they have now become a regular [phenomenon]!”
Individually discussing British, Canadian, Dutch, Australian, and then Spanish, Portuguese, Macedonian, Czech, and Italian forces as a group, Raouf observes declines in public opinion regarding the war as casualties mount matched by politicians desire to stay the course to not appear weak and fail in their selfish desires. In particular, regarding Canada, the author quotes Prime Minister Stephen Harper as arguing that it is in his country’s national interest to fight the war in Afghanistan. However, the document claims that Canada seeks only a “leading role on the global level, in parallel to its economic force”. Raouf further states and threatens: “Despite the strong, increasing opposition to spread its forces in the fire of South Afghanistan, it seems that they will not learn the lesson easily. They will either be forced to withdraw their forces, or face an operation similar to [the operations in] New York, Madrid, London and their sisters, with the help of Allah”.
Concluding the analysis, Roauf finds a “bright horizon” in the future for the Taliban, noting that the NATO forces that will receive the “weight of the Crusade” in Afghanistan do not possess the courage or military ability to defeat the Mujahideen. He also explains that despite the negative features of democracy, it proved advantageous to the Muslims in the War in Afghanistan due to the constraints public opinion places on a leader’s action.
The document then finishes:
“Perhaps the most important thing to be learned from this study is that the circumstances in South Afghanistan announce the forthcoming expulsion of Crusading forces, in particular from the three major provinces: the province of Helmand, where the British forces are stationed, the province of Qandahar, where the Canadian forces are present, and the province of Uruzgan, where the Dutch forces are positioned. This is as a result of the complex problems these forces face and the increase of public opposition to their mission in Afghanistan. This will be especially true as their human losses get more serious”.
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