Q: The dichotomy between the employment (and degrees) of violence wielded by insurgents and constituted authorities is a point well taken. Though in Mukiwa, you noted that an area in Matabeleland --one in which you spent considerable time and sweat building friendly relationships and sound human intelligence sources--essentially turned "red" after a violent incursion by the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Why do terrorization tactics work to the insurgents' advantage, but backfire so spectacularly when used by government forces?
A: Because on a balance of terror, they will always tend to win. We arrest people and put them in jail, the insurgents take much more ferocious action. It's the western paradox, but also it’s inherent in asymmetrical conflict. If you are going to lose in the balance of terror, then you have to be able to promise protection in return for support. If you don't have the continuity of presence on the ground to provide civilian population consistent protection then they will feel too exposed and afraid to support you, or be seen to support you. For that you need to stay out among the people, not pull back into secure fire bases, in which you are essentially isolated from the population, and which help to characterize you as an 'invading' force. To some extent the problem can be ameliorated by having Afghan forces, with NATO advisors, provide the continuous presence, but you still need the muscle to protect them because obviously, the danger of that continuous presence is that your forces (Afghan or NATO) are more exposed and vulnerable. And we’ve seen that with the increase of suicide bombing, which aims to counter exactly that mixing. In a counter-intuitive way, the use of suicide bombing is often actually a sign that the balance of conflict is against the insurgents. It’s an attempt to drive a wedge between the people and the COIN forces, to change the balance of fear audit I spoke about, by making civilians scared to be near govt or NATO forces or institutions.
The situation I described in Mukiwa that you refer to is one where we had being pursuing the strategy of cooperation etc, and then a fire force unit of our own side had swung in and carried out a scorched earth patrol against civilians who had, up until then, been cooperating. After that those people no longer trusted us to keep our word and no longer cooperated.
It is wrong to think of the population as being monolithic. Different elements of society cooperate or not for differing reasons, some might be politically motivated but most are swayed by fear or by promises of help and betterment.
