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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Highlights mine, shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

Big mistake to quit Afghan war, expert says
Vancouver lawyer now fact-finding in Kandahar

James McNulty, The Province, 5 Oct 07
Article link

When Norine MacDonald talks about the war in Afghanistan, Canadians should listen.

The Vancouver lawyer has spent most of the past three years on the ground in the war-ravaged country as president and lead field researcher for the Senlis Council.

In her work for the European-funded think tank, MacDonald ventures from a compound in Kandahar City with armed protectors, dresses like a man, and has packed her own Kalashnikov rifle.

It is a long way from her former life as a Queen's Counsel corporate lawyer in downtown Vancouver.

It also makes MacDonald one of the best-informed Canadians on Afghanistan -- she has vastly more experience there than any member of the House of Commons -- and she doesn't like what she sees.

In an interview at The Province this week before returning to Kandahar via Moscow, MacDonald says NATO is losing the hearts and minds of Afghan citizens with its military-heavy, aid-light approach.

Rather than "stay the course," she wants to change the course, but stay and finish the job.

She agrees with Stephen Harper that Canada should continue in a combat role after 2009, but has little time for his failures on almost every other war front.

She says the opposition parties make valuable points on the need for stronger development aid and a non-American approach to the poppy-crop issue, but has no time for troop-withdrawal demands.

"When the NDP says we should leave Afghanistan, what do they think is going to happen if the [Hamid] Karzai government falls, and al-Qaeda has a geo-political base again in southern Afghanistan?"

"We should stay until the job is done," MacDonald affirms, and that means "when the Karzai government is stabilized there . . .

"If we lose the Karzai government, if we lose southern Afghanistan, it will affect the security of all NATO countries for generations to come, and we don't know -- it's a lottery -- who's going to get hit."


With the war a sure part of any Canadian election, she says the debate should be around "measures of success, and how we're going to get there -- not to 'stay or go.'

"That's a legitimate debate that Canadians have never been given an opportunity to participate in with proper facts on the table."

MacDonald's fact-finding has determined that Canada is failing miserably on aid delivery through the "dysfunctional" Canadian International Development Agency.

"It was never fit for the purpose of doing development aid in a war zone . . . I'm fed up.

"We're saying CIDA, get out of Kandahar if you can't do it, and turn it all over to the military in the short term -- they can do it."

MacDonald notes the Canadian military base has a top-notch medical facility, then asks, "Why don't we have that in Kandahar City?

"In our military base we have a Burger King and a Tim Hortons; half an hour away there's a refugee camp with starving children."

She adds that "not once in two years" has the international community provided any food, shelter or medical aid to an informal, 1,000-family refugee camp on the new, NATO-built main road to the Panjwaii district.

MacDonald says "we had the hearts and minds" of Afghans when the mission began, but "we've eroded that through bad counter-narcotics, lack of development and aid, and bombing raids" by U.S. and British planes on Afghan villages -- some called in by Canadian troops.

The Senlis Council rejects the U.S. plan to eradicate poppy crops, which will leave farmers with no way to feed their families.

MacDonald instead promotes a "poppy for medicine" trial that would see poppy cultivation licensed for pain-relief medicines in poor countries. She calls the Harper regime's silence on the issue a "cop-out, because obviously it endangers the Canadian troops."

She backs Karzai's talks with "locals" who became Taliban to feed their families but could be won back.

Harper's ambivalence on "talks" and his inability to convince other NATO nations to bolster ranks in Kandahar are failures, she adds.

MacDonald is the first to admit this is not an easy file. But that is no reason, she says, to give up.

 
IN AFGHANISTAN: Reconstruction is a delicate balancing act
Fri Oct 5 2007
  Article Link

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN - "See all the stacks of rocks out there?"

Captain Barbara Honig points out the window of our armoured truck to a rugged, barren hill, dotted with clusters of large stones.

"It's a minefield," says the specialist engineer commander for Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team, as the hulking RG 31 Nyala, a vehicle typically used to clear mines, lumbers through the Arghandab District of Kandahar.
The mines in this field -- relics of mujahadeen fighters, Soviets and the Taliban -- are marked with stone piles. But most risks in Kandahar aren't so clearly defined, and that makes redevelopment in the volatile province a careful balancing act for the roughly 350 Canadian soldiers and civilians in the PRT.

Canada has run the province's reconstruction team since taking over from American troops in 2005, and on this trip we're visiting a development project at Mazara School in the district, specifically, a concrete wall around the school. The wall was designed by Honig's team of engineers, and aimed at offering better security and more privacy, so Afghan parents would let their daughters attend the schools, and teachers would feel safe enough to show up.

The wall itself is a humble offering, as showpieces go. But the $24,000 structure was built by Afghan contractors after discussions with numerous community leaders, and 560 students now take morning classes at the school. Although it's already afternoon when we arrive, a throng of young children surrounds us, smiling and poking at our digital recorders, experienced enough to know that foreigners often come bearing gifts.

The PRT has been steadily plugging away at other projects around the province. There are five community police stations either completed or in progress in Kandahar, each worth between $200,000 and $400,000, and 23 temporary vehicle checkpoints have been set up for added security in Kandahar City and Arghandab. These are solid signs of progress, however tentative, and for now at least, they're still standing.

But then there's the matter of safety, and in Kandahar it's inextricably linked to any new development. Suicide bombings and improved explosive devices, or IEDs, are routine here, and just getting to the PRT camp required the protection of a Light Armoured Vehicle, or LAV, with two gunners sticking out the top, weapons at the ready. 
More on link
 
A post at The Torch (guess who):

A nattering nabob of negativism
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/10/nattering-nabob-of-negativism.html

Mark
Ottawa



 
How war-mongering, US respect-craving, CDS Hillier bamboozled the innocents of Paul Martin's government into the Kandahar mission (leaving Darfur and Haiti in the lurch, where in fact there has been no need or place for Canadian troops since the Kandahar decision was made)--the article is by two usual suspects:

Blame Hillier
http://www.macleans.ca/canada/features/article.jsp?content=20071015_110199_110199

EXCLUSIVE EXCERPT: The inside story of one man's push for an Afghan mission, and a government that let itself be persuaded

EUGENE LANG AND JANICE GROSS STEIN | October 15, 2007 |

On Feb. 4, 2005, Gen. Rick Hillier, a charismatic and forceful Newfoundlander, became Canada's new chief of defence staff. The visionary field commander had convinced prime minister Paul Martin that he was the man to wrench Canada's military from its Cold War-era thinking and retool it for the post-9/11 world. As two expert commentators -- Eugene Lang, former chief of staff to two Liberal defence ministers, and Janice Gross Stein, director of the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto -- set out in their book, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Penguin), within weeks of his appointment Hillier had secured from Martin's government the Canadian Forces' largest funding increase in a generation. And Hillier had also persuaded the government to set the nation on the path to a war that no one, least of all Paul Martin, expected or wanted.

In March 2005, the moral imperative to stop crimes against humanity such as those being committed in Darfur or the anarchy and violence in Haiti weighed heavily on Paul Martin's mind. The UN General Assembly had just passed a resolution giving legal weight to the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). The resolution emphasized that governments had obligations toward their citizens and when they abused these obligations the international community had a moral responsibility to intervene within states to protect innocent civilians who were the victims of systematic violence or genocide. Sovereignty no longer trumped criminal behaviour. Canada had been a strong supporter of R2P for several years, prominent Canadians had been involved in its development at every stage, and the Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, Alan Rock, had been instrumental in steering the resolution through to passage by the General Assembly. Canadian fingerprints were all over this, along with a strong sense of pride and Canadian ownership.

But the attitude within the Department of National Defence was very different. R2P was regarded as dangerous and recklessly naive, divorced from geopolitical and military realities. Deployment of several thousand troops would make little difference in many of these fragile or war-torn states, and Western governments, officials argued, were unwilling to suffer the casualties that would inevitably flow from these kinds of actions.

Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier had been in office for only one month, but already he had managed to develop a considered and integrated Canadian plan for what he thought should be the nation's priority: Afghanistan. He wanted a deployment that would get Canada deeper and deeper into the most troubled part of Afghanistan. It was heavy lifting. And it was an initiative that would impress the Pentagon and even George Bush...

Read on.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Taylor's comments are at the bottom of p. 1 at the link.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Stein and Lang are so full of sh!t their eyes are brown!

Unlike Lang, I wasn’t “in the room” so I think my comments are a little less self serving.

If Rick Hillier bamboozled the likes of Prime Minister Paul Martin, Clerk of the Privy Council Alex Himmelfarb and Chief of Staff Tim Murphy then they are dumber than a bag of hammers.

First: although it is probably true that the Brits asked us to join the Afghan mission everyone who read the papers recalls that John McCallum (then MND) was sent scurrying to Brussels to beg for a big, leadership role in ISAF (even though we did not have the resources which the original ISAF members had declared necessary for the mission leader – those resources, if I recall, included a major airfield operations team and a general hospital). The reason was simple: Jean Chrétien was about to disappoint George W Bush and our American friends and neighbours (not to mention only significant trading partner, source of our prosperity and protector) again; he had to have something, anything to offer in return for spurning BMD and Iraq. Afghanistan (ISAF, not the first mission to Kandahar) was that something. We went to Afghanistan because it served the political interests of the Liberal Party of Canada – the party which Mr. Lang serves so well.

Second: the doors Paul Martin and his government were afraid would close were not in the Pentagon; they were at the Canada/US border. Martin’s eye was, as it should have been, firmly fixed on Canada’s vital economic interests and about 90% of them involve cross border trade.

Third: Martin (is reported to have) said: "I made four demands of Hillier before I agreed to the mission … I want in, but I want out. We do peacemaking and reconstruction and win hearts and minds. I am going to make a big demand on Darfur soon and you have to tell me I can have all the troops I need. And you must have the capacity for Haiti if that blows up again. I told him none of this could be constrained by Afghanistan or I wouldn't agree to the mission." Fair enough but Martin knew, must have known, that he was not going to make any significant ‘demand’ on the CF for Darfur, not for years because his own ministers and senior officials knew full well that Darfur/Sudan was years away from anything like a solution which might involve any great number (beyond dozens) of Canadian soldiers. In any event, although it would have been very, very difficult – requiring the CF to ignore promises of 1 year between ½ year ‘tours’ – DND could have, and still can, deploy something useful to Darfur if the government so decides.

The only sensible piece in the article is: “No one in government or in the military predicted where the decision to go big to Kandahar would lead. No one expected that within a few months the Canadian Forces would be engaged in counterinsurgency warfare. No one predicted the widespread consequences from a package of military options. But Hillier's proposal was like a stone thrown into a stream. The stone is small, but the ripples are wide.” That’s the problem with war and politics.

The Ruxted Group called Mr. Lang’s bluff six months ago. That Prof. Stein fell for his drivel only proves that partisan political consideration overwhelm academic integrity in Canada, just as in the USA, Russia and France. 
 
I'm not a huge fan of Scott Taylor as he seems to always be waiting to bash senior officers whenever the opportunity presents itself, however, I think his comments on this article are good ones. It's not a book I'm tempted to buy but maybe I'll borrow one from the library.
 
I have thought a great many things about Paul Martin,  I believe he was indecisive at times and lacked some leaderships skills.But I have never doubted his intelligence. He is a lot of things but dumb is not one of them!
So it's safe say I will file Mr Lang's work in the Science Fiction/Fantasy section of my Library.
 
>If Rick Hillier bamboozled the likes of Prime Minister Paul Martin, Clerk of the Privy Council Alex Himmelfarb and Chief of Staff Tim Murphy then they are dumber than a bag of hammers.

That was my thought when I read the article yesterday.  How did the establishment civilians and politicians change so suddenly from having the CF firmly under their thumb for decades to a bunch of naive and willing virgins?
 
Re: We were never headed for Iraq - CBC

This thread I started while watching the CBC National, even interviewing Eugene Lang about it, was what....
CBC spin?
LiberaL Spin?
CBC and Liberal Spin?
Clued out MSM and Liberals trying to get out from under the accusation that they sent CF troops into Afghanistan?
 
It is, as Ruxted said, a new narrative which Liberals and 'friends of the Liberals'™ are spreading, furiously, in order to make Canadians forget that Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin conceived and executed the entire Afghanistan mission, combat role in Kandahar and all. Ruxted also assessed and explained Chrétien’s motives (from good through base and dishonourable) for going in the first place (and the second place, too) and Martin’s decision to send a PRT to Kandahar.

Lang and former Chrétien spin doctor Scott Reid, supported by fanatical anti-Conservatives like Globe and Mail columnist Lawrence Martin are spreading what we used to call, back in the Cold War, disinformation; it is better described as bull-sh!t and it is intended to baffle Canadians. I expect it to succeed because big lies about different people usually do.
 
According to Lang and Stein the CF--to curry favour with the Pentagon--also bamboozled the Chretien gov't  about Iraq over our exchange officers with the UK and US:
http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/issuesideas/story.html?id=d968e7a8-52e1-49d7-b7e6-0932d94e0da4&p=1

Their book sure looks a hatchet job on the CF, not just Hillier.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Of course, no blame can be allowed to stick to Chrétien and Martin – it’s all Hillier’s fault and the fault of the evil military culture for creating him.

These people – smart people, important people, people we like to think are responsible - are, to say the least, being "economical with the truth"; they are trying to rewrite the historical record while the ink is still wet.


Edit: I toned down my comment in the 2nd paragraph. It was inappropriate on Milnet.ca - below the standards we all accept for ourselves when we register.
 
E.R. Campbell: At least they're not, in the immortal word of Col. "Bat" Guano, "preverts" ;):
http://www.uselessmoviequotes.com/umq_d010.htm

Mark
Ottawa
 
From McCallum via Lang/Stein via the National Post"

"One of the problems I had was a misconception of military terminology. They said we had people at the headquarters in Kuwait. And at that point I didn't understand--or maybe they deliberately didn't tell me-- that headquarters move.

There's news.  The military conducts mobile operations and headquarters move.    How do you spell ASSume again?  ::)
 
A post at The Torch:

Afstan: NATO, Media, Poles Canadians
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/10/afstan-nato-media-poles-canadians.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Edward, I really liked this line.....
they are trying to rewrite the historical record while the ink is still wet.
......thus creating a smear?  ;D

When the Democrats and media went after Carl Rove the effort was
focused on removing a critical Bush asset. Had nothing to do with
facts and everything to do with political strategy. ( I suspect )

I see the same here. Get rid of the CDS because he's good at his job.
He is, in effect a Harper asset and that puts a target on his back.
I'm sure if the liberals were in power there would be no problem with him.
 
Another post at The Torch:

Looking forward in Afstan
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/10/looking-forward-in-afstan.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Afghan coalition an unequal burden
TheStar.com -October 22, 2007 Olivia Ward FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPORTER
Article Link

Sharing load tough when `every country wants to feel its troops are doing a noble thing'

Canadians may think of our soldiers in Afghanistan as lone rangers, galloping over the Himalayan hills to single-handedly hold off bomb-wielding renegades.

But Canada provides about 2,500 of 41,000 troops from 37 nations in the International Security Assistance Force – a NATO-based coalition struggling for stability in an increasingly unstable landscape.

The bad news is that it's mostly a coalition of the unwilling. Countries have drawn a line in the sand, but keep to the safe side of the sandbags.

Those on the front lines of combat, like Canada, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, call in vain for reinforcements. Those in the rear may boost their numbers, but only in areas where it's less likely their troops will be killed.

The disconnect worries not only Canadians, but military strategists who say that if Afghanistan is to avoid sliding back to failed statehood, all of its supporters must be marching to the same tune.

"What has to be done is a rethinking of national caveats, and getting more troops in who can actually do something," says Sibylle Scheipers, director of studies at the Changing Character of War program at the University of Oxford.

But, she warns, "bumping up troop levels won't work by itself. A coherent strategy is what's needed, and so far that is lacking."

Countries from Albania to Ukraine are contributing to the peace effort in Afghanistan, some to please more powerful allies, others to fulfill an obligation to NATO or to detour the killing fields of Iraq.

But their troops come with strings attached – enough to keep them tethered to low-risk posts.

"We would like to see no restrictions on what troops can do," says James Appathurai, a spokesperson at NATO's Brussels headquarters. "But there are some factors that make that difficult."

NATO doesn't publicize its contributors' rules of engagement, but some of the known prohibitions are hard to surmount. One country, for example, hasn't trained or equipped its soldiers to fight in snow. Another has transport aircraft unable to fly safely at night.

Technical restrictions account for a small percentage of contributors' caveats. Most are concerned with the political risk of sending troops on combat, rather than "peacekeeping," missions.

Politicians also worry about overstretching forces and upgrading rundown equipment. And threats and kidnappings by the Taliban and Al Qaeda have raised fears that contributing countries will be targeted.
More on link
 
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