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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

I'd just like to see them stop using the mission as a political wedge to shamelessly try to draw some sort of support from fear mongering.  All the parties can fight each other tooth and nail, scream about absurdities in the papers and act like oxygen deprived toddlers during Question Period on pretty much any other topic for all I care.  But leave the CF out of the realm of politics.  They are hurting real people in Afghanistan by screwing with a righteous mission, and putting our men and women at risk by emboldening the enemy with their defeatist talk. 
 
I've given this thread a quick sweep,  I don't know if anyone has brought up the report to Parliament on the progress in Afghanistan.
http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/docs/260207_Report_E.pdf (En francais: http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/docs/260207_Report_F.pdf )

In fact I've found tonnes of usefull information at http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/menu-en.aspx  If this is a duplicate post, I apologise - I'm just posting this here because I finally swayed an acquaintance of mine,  who works for the NDP, using the very facts found in the report to Parliament.  (I know it is a few months old,  but still usefull)

 
zipperhead_cop said:
But leave the CF out of the realm of politics.  They are hurting real people in Afghanistan by screwing with a righteous mission, and putting our men and women at risk by emboldening the enemy with their defeatist talk. 

Nothing is sacred in politics...
 
A retired Army Colonel with SAT experience is Kabul furthers some thoughts expressed by UK former Liberal Democratic leader Paddy Ashdowne

Are NATO (and the UN) failing in Afstan?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/07/are-nato-and-un-failing-in-afghanistan.html

And the UK and US defence secretaries (I wonder if Canadian diplomacy is engaged along these lines):

Afstan: Overall coordination of various types of activities
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/06/afstan-overall-coordination-of-varous.html

In Afghanistan, the poppies are just a symptom
MIKE CAPSTICK, Globe and Mail, August 30
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070829.wcomment0830/BNStory/Afghanistan/home/

The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime's annual report on poppy cultivation has unleashed critics of the Afghan mission, with interest groups renewing calls for opium commercialization and licensing and columnists and commentators declaring the mission to be "hopeless." Coupled with recent casualties, the report has led many to declare Afghanistan beyond help. Canadian opposition leaders have threatened to topple the government unless it goes firm on a February, 2009, withdrawal date.

All of this means one thing: The Taliban strategy is working.

Insurgent leaders know that they cannot defeat Canadian and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces on the battlefield, but they can beat our leaders on the moral plane.

The implication inherent in the criticism is that Afghan history and culture are at the root of the many issues still plaguing the country six years after the Taliban's fall. But nothing could be further from the truth. After a year in Kabul, I could only conclude that the real issue was the lack of international strategic vision, political will and unity...

Both of these problems — lack of vision and international incoherence — bedevil the fight against poppy cultivation. But the poppy issue itself is just one difficult issue among many. Clearly, establishing and maintaining an Afghan-international strategic vision and implementing it coherently is the prerequisite for the mission's success.

The vision itself was, in fact, established at the London Conference in 2006. The Afghanistan Compact lays out an ambitious strategic vision agreed to by Canada and more than 60 other countries. The real issue now is the ongoing failure to make real progress in implementation.

In Kabul, there is no real "hammer" co-ordinating the work of the multiplicity of official development agencies, international organizations and donors. Co-ordination between NATO and the UN is ad hoc and Afghan state institutions remain weak.

All these problems can be attributed to weak governance. They could be solved by a renewed international commitment to the Afghan Compact, coupled with tough measures to ensure that President Hamid Karzai's government meets its commitments.

On the international civil-military front, it is long past time that the NATO and UN secretaries-general agree to appoint a high-profile joint special representative to co-ordinate all aspects of the effort. It is just as essential that the U.S. administration recognize its state-building failures (magnified by its focus on Iraq) and actively support this special representative.

The military chain of command must also be totally unified [emphasis added]. Since last November, most operations have come under NATO command. However, the development of effective Afghan National Army and police units are under a separate U.S. command structure, as are special operations. This situation is militarily untenable and must be fixed.

Kabul must encourage the international community to sponsor a comprehensive governance reform program to develop clean, effective institutions. In turn, international organizations must concentrate their efforts under a strong leader with the mandate to insist that the government makes a genuine effort to reform, and the power to support the President when vested interests and old warlords feel threatened.

Developing a strong and effective governance structure is the right and proper course of action. The Conservative government has made an enormous effort to build an institutional structure around the previously loosely defined defence, diplomacy and development (3D) approach. General Rick Hillier's personal effort and influence were important factors in NATO's assumption of military command throughout the country. Building on these successes and our sacrifices, Canada should forcefully advocate for coherent implementation of the strategy agreed to in 2006...

Instead of abandoning the people of Kandahar and handing the Taliban a victory in 2009, Canadian politicians and leaders should come together to make the "good war" winnable.

Colonel (retired) Mike Capstick was commander of the first deployment of the Canadian Forces Strategic Advisory Team — Afghanistan, in 2005-06. He is now an associate of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

"Comments" are still open.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070829.wcomment0830/CommentStory/Afghanistan/home

Mark
Ottawa
 
Leaving Afghanistan is no answer
By ED FEUER September 3, 2007
Article Link

As opposition politicians scramble to score political points on Afghanistan, Stephane Dion's position bears the most scrutiny because his party has the only chance of replacing the government.

On the Liberal party website, we read: "In the face of a mounting insurgency in Afghanistan, and with fading support from our NATO partners, our troops are facing an increasingly difficult mission. We owe it to our soldiers to develop a strategy that will achieve real results in establishing a lasting peace."

But last week Dion said: "I want the prime minister to say right away that we are out of the combat mission in February 2009."

If the Liberals think that'll bring "real results," they really should update their website.

Dion says Canadians could do development and humanitarian work or help train Afghan soldiers and "provide security in certain provinces" -- in other words like what some European NATO countries do in the so-far safer zones.

While that line might work with focus groups, there is no development without security. Australian counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen, now an adviser to U.S. Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq, hit the nail on the head.

A Dec. 18, 2006, New Yorker article says Kilcullen met senior European officers with the NATO force in Afghanistan applying "a development model to counterinsurgency," hoping that gratitude for good work would do the trick. "The gratitude effect," Kilcullen said, "will last until the sun goes down and the insurgents show up and say, 'You're on our side, aren't you? Otherwise, we're going to kill you.'"

That harsh reality is why Retired Maj.-Gen. Lewis Mackenzie recently called for at least another 10,000 NATO combat troops in the south.

More on link
 
I don't think the opposition parties give a damn what happens in Afghanistan, or ever did. I think the Liberals sent the CF there because it was politically expedient, and now their only interest is what angle will "play the best" with the Canadian public in the next election. Statements like those coming from Dion just make me more cynical.  What really ticks me off, is that I don't see pulling out of the Afghanistan mission as being a big issue with the Canadian public, compared to say, environmental issues.  But our illustrious leaders are clearly going to try to make it one, so they can score cheap political points.

I could respect either the choice to stay or the choice to pull out,  if I really believed the decision was being made with some rational justification, and not just pathetic political maneuvering.
 
Of course it's ALL about politics at this point.

But someone needs to remind Dion of three things.

1. Huffing and puffing in public about withdrawl actually helps the bad guys.

2. Withdrawl is no way to achieve peace.
If enough of the coalition withdraws, Dion has achieved civil war.

3. Crying "we don't like this job" is no way to get someone to take it over for us.
 
Afghan mission about goals, not deadlines: NATO
Updated Thu. Sep. 6 2007 3:12 PM ET CTV.ca News Staff
Article Link

The mission in Afghanistan does not have a fixed end date, says a top NATO official, who says the goal is for Afghans to take over their own security.

"We have a requirement to ultimately help the Afghans develop those security forces and security mechanisms that will allow them to take those matters into their own hands," Canadian Gen. Ray Henault, chair of NATO's military committee, told a news conference in Ottawa on Thursday.

"There isn't a date you can set on that. It's an 'end state.'"

Henault acknowledged that Canada is only committed to its present mission in Kandahar province until February 2009.

The fate of that mission is the source of significant political controversy. Even the government is hinting that the current mission, involving about 2,500 troops, won't continue in its current configuration.

"A lot of things happen in 18 months," Henault said. "We're certainly hopeful Canada will find a way to continue to operate in Afghanistan."

The general also noted that the Netherlands are also engaging in debate about whether to maintain a combat presence in Afghanistan. Dutch troops currently operate in Uruzgan province, immediately north of Kandahar province.

"The Dutch have been marvellous ... they have done some great work," he said.

More on link
 
Some useful facts in the article

The Taliban Lose One To The School Teachers
June 11, 2007: One of the most powerful counter-terrorism tools in Afghanistan has been education, especially of children. Afghanistan has long had the highest illiteracy rate in Asia, especially among women. A large part of this was cultural. Many of the Pushtun tribes in the south had a tradition of keeping women at home, not even allowing the girls out to go to school. This has been changing slowly, especially among the wealthier Pushtuns, and those who had moved to cities. But millions of Pushtun in the countryside clung to the old ways. It was from this group that the Taliban got, and still gets, most of its support. But to put it all into perspective, note that, since the Taliban fell six years ago, the number of children in schools has gone from 900,000 to over six million. Only about 35 percent of the students are girls. In the Pushtun south, the Taliban used violence against schools for girls, and in many areas, schools in general (because the Taliban only accept religious schools, that concentrate on studying the Koran). Thus in 2006, the Taliban shut down 537 schools (including 187 destroyed), and killed 85 students and teachers. But that was only 6.4 percent of the 8,400 schools in the country. Moreover, the lower number of girls in school is largely a matter of limited resources. Only about half the eligible children are going to school, and the boys are given preference, because they will be the main earners for families.


Since 2001, the number of teachers has gone from 21,000 to 143,000, and the number of schools from 3,400 to 8,400. Under Taliban rule, there were 265 students and six teachers per school. The quality of instruction was low, and concentrated on memorizing passages from the Koran. Today, there are 714 students and 17 teachers per school, and secular subjects predominate. The shortage of teachers is largely the result of there being few college educated  Afghans.



The Taliban attacks on schools last year was very unpopular among the parents of the children affected. In most southern villages, the adults are divided on the issue of secular education, and sending girls to school. The Taliban used a lot of threats, and that got 350 schools closed. Where the threats did not work, violence was used, and that caused a backlash that even the Taliban could not avoid noticing. So this year, the schools have been largely left alone, and the Taliban are talking about establishing more religious schools. The Taliban are also pressuring the government to include more religious instruction in all schools, something the government is trying to accommodate.



The Taliban has good reason to fear secular education, for past experience has shown that it diminishes enthusiasm for the old customs, and Islamic conservatism. The Taliban has been unable to stop the spread of education, even in their own heartland. That, more than failed military operations and terror attacks, has been the defeat that has done the most damage.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/articles/20070611.aspx



 
Colin P said:
Thus in 2006, the Taliban shut down 537 schools (including 187 destroyed), and killed 85 students and teachers. But that was only 6.4 percent of the 8,400 schools in the country. Moreover, the lower number of girls in school is largely a matter of limited resources. Only

"Only 6.4%". That's putting the best face on it I guess, but I don't think I'd like my chances if you factored in, say, 10 years of school.  As to the girls, I wish we could teach the them to shoot and to fight ... it might then become a little harder to murder them in cold blood for wanting to something other than chattel.
 
Guys, it's going to take time for cultural feelings about education to change, all we can do is make sure the schools are available to them and have faith that they will come around and start taking advantage of the opportunity. We have to do our part, and they have to do theirs, and it seems that they are STARTING to.
 
Just watched an excellent TVO progran on what Canada should be doing in Afghanistan.

The Debate: The Ambiguity of Afghanistan
Uncertainty on the ground, and an uncertain political climate at home: checking in on Canada's role in Afghanistan

http://tinyurl.com/yqsx25

I was encouraged to hear much support for Canada staying in KAF in the combat role after Feb 2009. Except for Steven Staples (insert fancy word for idiot here) the general opinion of this group of very informed individuals was that Canada realistically would have to stay in KAF in combat role but with increasing emphasis on OMLT with the Kandak.

I will provide updating info as TVO makes a video of this program available in the next few days.

 
A little dated (7 Sept), but interesting......

RUSSELL D STORRING: A Soldier's Life
September 7, 2007
Article Link

The daily grind 
After returning from a training excercise in Wainwright, Alta., at the beginning of June, I sign my detachment over to Golf Troop and I remain part of Fox Troop, scheduled for an upcoming tour of duty to Afghanistan. Half of my detachment members remain together in their troop, the other half are divided up between the other troops in 3 Squadron.

A few of my soldiers were hoping we would be able to stick together longer, but the squadron has to plan for future deployments and decides to spread the knowledge base of my soldiers around. Although not everyone likes where they head off to, it gives an idea of when they can expect to be deployed overseas.

I find myself filling the role of the Fox Troop training and administration sergeant, as I am only slated as an alternate for the upcoming tour. Essentially, if anything happens to the other two sergeants, or for some reason they cannot deploy, then I will replace them. I have to be ready to deploy, but in the end, I may not go.

I have seen some people at CFJSR (Canadian Forces Joint Signals Regiment) deploy with only a couple of weeks' notice, and since I just left the High Readiness Troop, I am pretty much ready to go. Nathalie and the boys understand the situation, and although it would not be ideal for me to deploy, we hope that, if I have to go, it won't interfere with Christmas.

Afghanistan makes the headlines every week or two with its steadily growing list of casualties, tragically reminding the nation of the human cost of the mission. The new, large Canadian flag at CFB Kingston, in Ontario, is one of the first symbols I see every day when I head to work, and, sadly over the past few months, it has been lowered to half mast at least every two weeks on the death or burial of fallen soldiers. It is a solemn reminder to all who drive by or through the gates of the price that is paid for what we believe in.

The recent naming of the "Highway of Heroes" along Ontario's 401 freeway seems such a small yet fitting tribute to those who travel its path in memorial police and military escorts. The impromptu thousands of mourners and respect-payers for each soldier who makes that final journey from CFB Trenton to Toronto demonstrate the support that Canadians have for their fallen, and for soldiers as a whole. There are no politics, no protests and no demonstrations, just support for those who have paid the ultimate price.
More on link
 
Baden  Guy said:
Just watched an excellent TVO progran on what Canada should be doing in Afghanistan.

The Debate: The Ambiguity of Afghanistan
Uncertainty on the ground, and an uncertain political climate at home: checking in on Canada's role in Afghanistan

http://tinyurl.com/yqsx25

I was encouraged to hear much support for Canada staying in KAF in the combat role after Feb 2009. Except for Steven Staples (insert fancy word for idiot here) the general opinion of this group of very informed individuals was that Canada realistically would have to stay in KAF in combat role but with increasing emphasis on OMLT with the Kandak.

I will provide updating info as TVO makes a video of this program available in the next few days.

To watch the video of this interesting discussion go to:

http://www.tvo.org/cfmx/tvoorg/theagenda/index.cfm?page_id=7&bpn=779018&ts=2007-09-12%2020:00:00.0

and click on "Watch video."

Edit:
Chose "The Ambiguity of Afghanistan" if you want to miss the Michael Byers interview.  :)

 
Sarcasm off....

Found this intriguing chart put together by the Swiss Peace Foundation.  It's a pretty lefty-sounding group from its description, but the chart is the first graphic representation I've seen encompassing a good chunk of the factors that have to be considered in making AFG a better place to live.

Analytical Framework Afghanistan

Last pages also have fair number of links for more information (albeit mostly development & NGO'ish).

Shared FYI.....
 
If Canada withdraws, Taliban will run rampant, mullah says
GRAEME SMITH  From Monday's Globe and Mail September 17, 2007 at 3:59 AM EDT
Article Link

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — Canada must not be scared away from Kandahar because Afghan forces wouldn't be capable of stopping the Taliban from overwhelming government towns, one of the region's most prominent tribal elders says.

Mullah Naqib is not the first Afghan leader who has pleaded for Canadian troops to stay, but his emotional words are the most pointed example so far of the deep worry among local allies about what will happen after the Canadian commitment expires in 18 months.

"They should not be scared," Mr. Naqib said in an interview.

The elder's opinions carry weight in Kandahar, where he rose to prominence during the fight against Soviet occupation and later served as provincial governor. Mr. Naqib's band of Alokozai tribesmen has been a pillar of support for every regime in Kandahar for the past 15 years, including the Taliban and the current Afghan government.
More on link

 
In spite of Bruce Campion-Smith's spinning efforts this piece in the Toronto Star suggests strongly that Afstan's far and away largest city is doing pretty well by local standards (rather different from Baghdad); now if only the major networks showed us video on a regular basis Canadians might have a rather more informed view of Afghan realities:
http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/257645

In Kabul, the biggest fear is crime
...
KABUL–Strolling past the carpet and jewellery stores along Chicken St., the fighting and bombings in Kandahar seem like a distant problem.

Indeed, ask a few shopkeepers who work this favoured haunt of visitors what worries them most, the Taliban and insurgents aren't mentioned.

Instead, their talk turns to everyday problems that could just as easily be heard on Yonge St. – crime and worries about the economy...

This is a city of sharp contrasts, where money pouring in from the international community has given birth to some good restaurants and one swank hotel, the Serena.

But it's like a gated community, with foreign dignitaries and diplomats emerging from their enclaves in armoured SUVs, carving through the chaotic traffic with machine-gun-toting guards hanging out the back.

But they rush past scenes of desperate poverty, small storefronts where residents try to eke out a living, past beggars on the street, many missing a limb, a testament to this country's legacy of land mines. Women in burqas holding small children stop visitors and implore, "Please sir, food for baby."

"Economic problems make that (crime) problem. People are poor," Noori tells a visitor.

But while crime and economy are their everyday concerns, shopkeepers also have a view on the insurgency in southern Afghanistan. And President Hamid Karzai's proposed solution – negotiations with the Taliban – is a response endorsed by some on the street.

"It is good. Peace is good. If government want to speak with the Taliban, we prefer that over the fighting," Noori said.

Across the street, at Enfield and Tower Guns House, Abdul Hadi and his son Hamid Fahim watch the pedestrian traffic outside their dusty shop window and express support for negotiating with insurgents.

"If they speak with the Taliban, the country not have any problem," said Fahim, 19.

But he expresses caution about the Taliban's one chief demand – the withdrawal of all foreign troops [emphasis added].

"I will not trust Taliban. If (foreign troops) are not here, everyone will have troubles," Fahim said...

Kabul has not been immune to terror attacks. But it has seen nothing on the scale of suicide bombings or roadside blasts that have terrorized Kandahar. But even here, diplomats and aid organization workers are restricted in their movements, fearing attack or kidnap attempts.

Wander a little farther and a visitor finds dissent in the carpet store operated by Muktar Subir, 19.

"That's not a good idea," he says of Karzai's overture for talks. "I don't like the Taliban."

Subir says he became friends with two Canadian soldiers during the time they were based in Kabul. Foreign troops have helped Afghanistan, he says. He doesn't want to see them gone, especially under pressure from the Taliban [emphasis added].

But ask Ahmed Samir about the talks with the Taliban and he shrugs. Not a care for today, said Samir, a clothing store owner who stands behind his counter framed by the bright colours of shirts for women and children.

"Business is not good," he tells a visitor.

On this day, he's more interested in making a sale than talking about insurgents.

Mark
Ottawa
 
The Star - Toronto

PM needs new tack on Afghanistan

September 22, 2007
James Travers

Ottawa

Stephen Harper wisely changed his defence minister this summer. Unwisely, his government is hesitating to change the Afghanistan channel this fall.

Peter MacKay, Gordon O'Connor's younger, more media-savvy replacement, is mouthing a familiar sound bite as he pleads for support. Reduced to its essence, the new defence minister is saying now what George W. Bush said before toppling governments first in Kabul, then Baghdad: Fighting them over there keeps us safe over here.

That the argument is suspect is no longer the point. Watching complex plots unfold in two war zones is creating a more sophisticated North American audience. Few today believe, as many did after the Taliban fled and Saddam Hussein fell, that decisive military victories are still possible.

Generals now compete with academics for airtime to argue for political solutions. Accepting that accommodation is necessary is not just a tonal adjustment, it alters the picture. Demonizing future negotiating partners no longer makes any more sense, or is any more convincing, than attacking the patriotism of those who question the mission.

Facing a debate and a decision on Canada's combat role after February 2009, this government needs to fast-forward its rhetoric to catch up to shifting reality. Canadians who knew next to nothing about Afghanistan in 2001 now know too much about the region to risk more lives and billions on the strength of the simplistic notion that killing Taliban insurgents will stop terrorism incubating.

Along with forgetting history and ignoring that extremists have many other nesting options – Al Qaeda festers in Africa's horn 20 years after embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania – the Conservative argument skips too lightly over what Canadians have learned since Liberals first sent troops to Afghanistan.

Endemic corruption, a booming opium trade and the duplicity of allies who leave borders open to enemies have stripped away the good versus evil illusions. At home, it has become patently obvious the mission has layers of motives stacking from reassuring Washington that Ottawa is serious about security to the military remaking its peacekeeping image as it rearms.

Each element has a place in a public debate that to be complete must also include an unflinching look in the mirror. If politicians can find enough courage to face the reflection, Canadians will discover that, along with imperfections, there are notable improvements. A mission dominated by the military but marketed as combining the three Ds of defence, development and diplomacy is glacially morphing into a broader, more disciplined effort that accepts generals have agendas and writing aid cheques doesn't guarantee measurable improvements in impoverished lives.

That's progress. So is recognition that reconstructing failed states is painfully slow work with uncertain results. Six years of watching the grimmest reality TV has better prepared Canadians to answer questions about what they are willing to do for Afghanistan when the current commitment ends.

Harper and his ministers need to make two new candid arguments in favour of a continuing role. More time is needed to find a political compromise, one that inevitably includes the Taliban and excludes Al Qaeda. And development will continue in the north only as long as the military contains most of the insurgency in the south.

Along with moving the debate from fantasy to facts, that would finally change the channel from today's cartoon images to something more suitable for adults.

http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/259313









 
James Travers hasn't said anything new.  He has written a piece to fill space in a newspaper and completely missed the point.  The "General Public" has always been 'relatively' sophisticated.  Decisive military victories have never been the "be all - end all".  They have never brought peace.  They have had to be followed by strong "Statesmanship" on the part of our political leaders.  Without the strong Statesmanship amongst the world's leaders, military victories are all for naught.  Conflict will only continue.  It is the Statesman in the end who must forge the final articles that bring about Peace.

Unfortunately, as we look around, do we see any Roosevelts or Churchills? 

This is where we are loosing our wars. 
 
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