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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Enfield said:
milnewstbay said:
7. in the next year and in subsequent fiscal years, until NGOs are able to safely function in Kandahar, CIDA provide from its budget $20 million directly to the Canadian Forces for their use in local development projects by Afghans.

Excellent point. I don't like seeing the CF as a development agency, but if NGOs and CIDA can't do the job, the military has too.
Development is exactly the role of the PRT (which is CF, CIDA, DFAIT, etc).  The diplomats in the PRT should be putting this money into projects within the Canadian AO.  If the diplomats won't leave the camp without mine protected helicopters, then the Army should be given the freedom to employ these funds.

milnewstbay said:
4. the Government of Canada significantly augment the $10 million contribution announced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in January
2007 to provide uniforms and, for future years, to improve benefits and salaries for the Afghan National Police.
Did we not send several of the old OD uniforms last year?

milnewstbay said:
6. the Government of Canada should announce that while it understands that Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan is long term, it will be forced to reconsider its commitment unless NATO, within the next 12 months, puts into place in Kandahar a significantly larger and fully-engaged stability force.
1. Kandahar is not the only place that needs more from NATO.  I'm guessing the Brits & Dutch could use just as much help in their provinces.

2. If we turn our backs on the Afghans, then we only become part of the problem.  This is the type of threat one might expect of a child.  We (Canada) made a commitment to Afghanistan to help rebuild & bring security to the country.  We should feel an obligation to meet that commitment even if some of our allies are not pulling their weight.
 
Usual caveat re:  the blinkers worn by the specific organization in question, but still worth at least looking at (even if just to pick it apart) - like, for example, if corruption is such a big issue, how will a government run licensing scheme guarantee no drug money to bad guys???  Highlights are mine.

The next two months will be ‘make or break’ in southern Afghanistan as threat of a major spring offensive from Taliban looms
The cities of Lashkar Gah and Kandahar are in the sights of the Taliban
Poppy crop eradication has started this year, sparking a new wave of violence –eradication will further fuel Spring offensive as anger mounts already

Senlis Council news release, 14 Feb 07
Article Link - Latest Report

LONDON - A ‘make or break’ situation is facing the international community in southern Afghanistan in the coming months, with the threat from the Taliban of a major spring offensive against international forces. Musa Qala fell two weeks ago – the Taliban now have the big towns in their sights and anyone who can leave has already left. The latest Field Report from The Senlis Council, Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies concludes that the international communities’ own policies are responsible for the dramatic loss of support for the Karzai government and international presence in the southern provinces of Afghanistan over the past year - and for the rise in the insurgency.


“With our own policies, we have created our own enemies,” said Norine MacDonald QC  :cdn:, Founding President of The Senlis Council, who has lived and worked in Afghanistan for the past two years. “The policies implemented by the international community have created these resentful and poor young men who cannot feed their families, and they are now being easily recruited by the Taliban. Through these misguided policies, the international community has turned southern Afghanistan into a recruitment camp for the Taliban”.

One insurgency – two types of insurgents


“Although the insurgency in southern Afghanistan is extremely complex, it can be divided up into two basic groups,” said MacDonald. “There is a core Taliban insurgency which has ties to the Global Jihad, Al Qaeda movement, and a ‘Grassroots’ Taliban insurgency which is driven by extreme poverty.” Recruitment to the grassroots insurgency has exploded in the last year because the local population is becoming increasingly poor, more desperate and more resentful of the international community’s actions. “The Taliban are a very competitive employer, offering wages with which no other employer can compete,” said MacDonald. “They are able to recruit so easily because people cannot feed their families.” The Taliban offer up to $12 a day against the $2 a day for a soldier in the Afghan Army.

Legitimate Grievances must be addressed to calm the insurgency

“There are many legitimate grievances of the local Afghan population which could be simply and inexpensively dealt with.” said MacDonald. “New Taliban recruitment could be avoided by simply showing local communities that the international community is in Afghanistan to help, leaving the ‘Global Jihad Insurgents” as the only legitimate enemy.” Legitimate grievances include the large numbers of civilian deaths, injuries and displacements caused by fighting; forced poppy crop eradication while many farmers are still fully dependent on poppy crops to feed their families; the lack of food aid and humanitarian assistance; the overall lack of development; the perception that the Karzai government is a puppet regime; the lack of public facilities such as hospitals and schools and the perception that the international community does not respect the culture and traditions of Afghanistan.

Reality check: the need to re-assess counter-insurgency in Afghanistan

Humanitarian aid, development and institution building have been under-funded and neglected during five years of international presence in Afghanistan. “This is a blatant disregard of the established counter insurgency theories, which advocate a complete package of diverse development based interventions such as medical assistance and education, in addition to the necessary military responses,” said MacDonald. For example, no provision has been made for treating the large numbers of civilian casualties which occur due to fighting and bombing in the southern provinces. According to Case Study also released the Senlis Afghanistan today, the two hospitals in Kandahar and Lashkar Gah are in a state of total disrepair and wholly unequipped to deal with any emergency war zone trauma or the widespread malnutrition now found in the area.. (These two hospitals of 600 are also the only health care facilities for a population of about 4 million)

“The people of Afghanistan have become the unwilling victims of a war which is not their own,” said MacDonald. “Proper provision has not been made according to the Geneva Conventions for civilian casualties in a war zone where international troops are actively fighting. These people feel that they have been abandoned by the International Community. The hospitals have no equipment, no medicines, no blood, no heating. For the most part, civilians injured in the bombing campaigns are abandoned by the international community.” The case study which accompanies the report provides examples of the unnecessary suffering caused by the lack of facilities and investment. One 8 year old girl died from burns at the hospital in Helmand in January for the lack of about £20 pounds worth of medicine. She also died after three days of agony due to lack of any medicinal painkiller – a tragic irony for someone who comes from the place in the world which produces the raw materials for essential painkilling medicines.

In 2006, some 2000 NATO bombing campaigns were executed over southern Afghanistan, causing an estimated 4000 civilian deaths and an untold number of casualties, for which there is practically no possibility of treatment. “The insurgency in southern Afghanistan has been fuelled by the neglect of the international community to address vital issues such as emergency treatment for victims of the international forces’ bombing campaigns, or the widespread starvation now present in Southern Afghanistan” said MacDonald.

Forced poppy crop eradication must stop.

Crop eradication is destroying livelihoods, creating even more poverty and has proved to be wholly ineffective – last year alone, cultivation was up by 60% despite large-scale crop eradication – yet it is the strategy that the international community, led by the United States, is still pushing for this year. By sitting back and allowing this destructive and counterproductive policy to be applied, the UK is complicit in a policy which is undermining its own military forces. “The international community has failed the Afghan government,” said MacDonald. “The Karzai government often bears the brunt for what are essentially failures of the international community

The increasing number of civilian deaths and injuries from the NATO bombing campaigns in the south has directly contributed to the disintegration of the local population’s support for the international community and their troops, and decreased support for President Karzai.” “This year’s crop eradication campaign has just started and promises to be even bigger than last year,” said MacDonald. “It has already brought with it new fighting – a foretaste of the carnage we can expect as the eradication unfolds this spring.”

Opium licensing – a practical solution for southern Afghanistan’s opium crisis


The Senlis Council has been working on a proposal to license the opium grown in Afghanistan. This would supply livelihoods for many of the rural communities, whilst at the same time providing much needed essential medicines such as morphine and codeine, for which there is currently a world shortage. Opium poppy is a very hardy crop and one of the only ones which can grow in the harsh climate of southern Afghanistan, especially under the current conditions of drought. The Council is currently calling for the implementation of a series of pilot projects in Southern Afghanistan.

Development and aid must start to match military interventions to show support for the drought stricken, under-nourished local people and gain their support. The need is urgent, or their support will be lost to the insurgents, who are offering them food and money now.

Not only has the international community failed to deliver the necessary aid to Afghanistan, it has exacerbated the desperate situation of the people by unleashing a brutal bombing campaign, using the elimination of the Taliban as justification

Destruction is more extensive than reconstruction in southern Afghanistan


The Report notes that the mounting numbers of civilian casualties and deaths resulting from the bombings intended to root out the Taliban, combined with the increasing numbers of families fleeing their home villages because they have been caught-up in violence, intensifying the conflict in the south of the country, and have provided a perfect breeding ground for Taliban propaganda and Taliban recruitment. Two thousand six hundred bombing missions were flown this year under the instructions of the international community.

Recommendations
1) Immediate cessation of forced poppy crop eradication and bombing raids

2) Immediate widespread food aid An end to the strategy of fear and destruction – a full assessment on the nature and extent of the bombing campaigns

3) Compensation to civilian victims of bombings

4) Military paramedics and field hospitals to aid civilian war casualties

5) The rebuilding of existent hospitals and the construction of new ones

6) Compensation for and rebuilding of villages destroyed by the bombing campaign

7) A complete overhaul of failed counter-narcotics strategies – crop eradication must stop

8) Pilot projects for an opium licensing scheme for the production of medicine

9) Compensation to civilian victims of bombings

10) Development and aid investments equal to military spending

11) To create stability by applying a robust economic response the grassroots insurgency

12) To create a shared long term vision for Afghanistan and to stop imposing ‘Western’ ideals.

The Economic Stablisation Process must provide an economic alternative to the young men to joining the ranks of the Taliban.The Economic Stablisation Process must provide an economic alternative to the young men to joining the ranks of the Taliban.

The Senlis Council is an international policy think tank with offices in Kabul, London, Paris and Brussels. The Council’s work encompasses foreign policy, security, development and counter-narcotics policies and aims to provide innovative analysis and proposals within these areas. The extensive programme currently underway in Afghanistan focuses on global policy development in conjunction with field research to investigate the relationships between counter-narcotics, military, and development policies and their consequences on Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts. Senlis Afghanistan has field offices in the Afghan cities of Lashkar Gah and Kandahar.
 
This article raises a number of issues that should be responded to by an appropriate Canadian government authority. One that springs to mind is are we doing anything to aid the hospital in Kandahar?

Scott Taylor's article provides further context for the Senlis report.
http://thechronicleherald.ca/print_article.html?story=558556
 
I agree with Senlis re: the poppy crop.  I think the eradication programme is, at best, ill-conceived;  I suspect it is aimed, squarely, at the US domestic constituency and ignores the social, economic and geographic realities of Afghanistan.

I am inclined to agree that we, the ISAF nations, can and should do more and more ‘development’ but, as the very recent Canadian Senate report pointed out it may be necessary, in Kandahar at least, to channel development money and effort through the military – at the risk of weakening our purely military effort if we cannot add more people to spend ,ore money wisely.

I’m in danger of straying out of my lane here, but I also worry about the effects, on our primary counter-insurgency task, of the bombing efforts.  I cannot help but believe that bombing is going to be counter productive.  I know it can and does bring certainty to a battle – quickly.

We need certainty – if we are not certain to beat the enemy then there is a chance he can/will beat us; there is an ever greater chance that he will escape and live to fight another day.  I wonder what price, in the all important ‘hearts and minds’ business, we pay for that certainty.

While I don’t want to sacrifice (much) certainty, I am convinced that we could and should win battles more slowly but just as certainly if we used direct fire weapons which are more discriminate than bombs.

OK, back into my own lane ...

I very much agree that we should not, because we cannot and we(even George Bush)  must appreciate that we cannot impose modern, Western, liberal, secular ‘ideals’ or ‘values’ on old, backwards, ‘Eastern,’ conservative and religious Afghanistan.  Our aim must be to allow the Afghans to live their own lives in their own ways – albeit in ways which do not threaten us.
 
Baden  Guy said:
This article raises a number of issues that should be responded to by an appropriate Canadian government authority. One that springs to mind is are we doing anything to aid the hospital in Kandahar?  Scott Taylor's article provides further context for the Senlis report.
http://thechronicleherald.ca/print_article.html?story=558556

Call me dopey, but I thought the CF was also doing this kind of presence patrolling/aid work, no?

E.R. Campbell said:
I am inclined to agree that we, the ISAF nations, can and should do more and more ‘development’ but, as the very recent Canadian Senate report pointed out it may be necessary, in Kandahar at least, to channel development money and effort through the military – at the risk of weakening our purely military effort if we cannot add more people to spend more money wisely.

Agreed, at the VERY least, in the shorter term until things become a bit more secure (which is why I donate $ to this worthy endeavour ).
 
I think one of the biggest hurtles we face in Afghanistan is the fact that Canadian accounting rules and code of fiscal responsibility has been applied to that theatre.  The rules need to be changed to allow for faster and more direct aide to get to the proper place fast.  I am hardly saying toss out all the responsibility and accountability for our aide but goodness there needs to be an “Afghan” set of rules developed with the goal of getting the aide to those desperately needed it.
 
In my opinion the Selenis council is raising a big, fat red herring. The Kandahar district was known for fruit production prior to the wars, and I suspect the farmers who grow poppies now are coerced in one way or another. Poppies are rather hard to eat, after all, and the poor farmers stay poor growing poppies; where do these Selenis Council clowns think the profits go?

Agricultural renewal should go hand in hand with poppy eradication, and if there is a practical way to do this, reforestation should also be high on the list. If Afghan farmers and landowners have useful crops that they can control and exploit for their own benefit, then the drug lords will have less of a hold, and the local economy can grow and diversify.

 
E.R. Campbell:  Good point on bombing.  A good reason for having tanks, I think.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Piper said:
Stop the eradication.

We buy the poppy crop. Then we buy the next one. And the next one. Then, for the next one, we say 'we'll buy the NEXT one but only if you plant these seeds'. The then we buy the next crop of wheat or whatever. And the next, and the next and the next .

This tactic deprives the Taliban of their funds AND keeps the farmers and villagers on our side because we don't deprive them of their income and slowly encourage them to plant 'goood' crops. It's foolproof.

Thoughts?

IMHO I think that the threat of being killed and having my entire family killed for planting the wheat, corn, etc... would overpower the money that has been offered. I really do think it is going to be one of the problems that is going to be left unsolved by the time that we leave.
 
a_majoor said:
In my opinion the Selenis council is raising a big, fat red herring. The Kandahar district was known for fruit production prior to the wars, and I suspect the farmers who grow poppies now are coerced in one way or another. Poppies are rather hard to eat, after all, and the poor farmers stay poor growing poppies; where do these Selenis Council clowns think the profits go?  Agricultural renewal should go hand in hand with poppy eradication, and if there is a practical way to do this, reforestation should also be high on the list. If Afghan farmers and landowners have useful crops that they can control and exploit for their own benefit, then the drug lords will have less of a hold, and the local economy can grow and diversify.

What might be the balance between coercion and market forces?  If there's more money to be made selling opium for the same effort, I'd think that would be a factor.

I, myself, would be OK paying more for "Taliban-free" products from this part of the world, the same way some advocate charging more for organic products.  Let's see how much more left-of-centrists would pay for products produced in areas no longer controlled by the Taliban.

Also, if reforestation is an issue, I'm OK with donating $ to "adopt a patch" to re-tree.  Ante up, tree huggers...

Admittedly, these would only be small tiles in the huge complex mosaic that would be "Solving AFG", but can't hurt, no?
 
Piper said:
Stop the eradication.

We buy the poppy crop. Then we buy the next one. And the next one. Then, for the next one, we say 'we'll buy the NEXT one but only if you plant these seeds'. The then we buy the next crop of wheat or whatever. And the next, and the next and the next .

This tactic deprives the Taliban of their funds AND keeps the farmers and villagers on our side because we don't deprive them of their income and slowly encourage them to plant 'goood' crops. It's foolproof. 

This was a solution proposed to me by someone trying to push it higher up and I'll be totally honest, I think it would work. Sometimes a carrot works better then a stick.

Thoughts?

Makes tons of sense to me - the question, though, is how long it would take, and is the int'l community (with its mix of different political aims/mandates/comfort levels) in a position to stay that course for kind fo timeline.
 
MarkOttawa said:
E.R. Campbell:  Good point on bombing.  A good reason for having tanks, I think.

Mark
Ottawa

When you're in a TIC and need quick support, a tank is not what I want to be waiting for.
 
MikeM said:
When you're in a TIC and need quick support, a tank is not what I want to be waiting for.

Off track, a bit.

Funny, and it shows how old and out of touch I am: in my day tanks were plentiful and readily available - even to a platoon commander.  Air support was scarce, difficult to obtain, hard to control, easily and often redirected at the last moment, and so on and so forth.

It illustrates the danger of theorizing without current knowledge of the facts on the ground.

OK, back to the topic at hand.
 
Latest in the House of Commons (from yesterday) on the K'Har hospital situation:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/53734/post-528119.html#msg528119

Ms. Caroline St-Hilaire (Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, BQ):  Mr. Speaker, my question is for
the minister.  The disgraceful condition of the hospital in Kandahar, as described in this
report, dramatically illustrates the weakness of the humanitarian side of the mission. We
are talking about a place of death, not a hospital.  Given that the Taliban could launch
an offensive in the spring, does the government not believe that investing in medical
infrastructure would send a strong message that Canada is there to help the Afghan people?

Hon. Josée Verner (Minister of International Cooperation and Minister for la Francophonie
and Official Languages, CPC):  Mr. Speaker, the Bloc member does not seem to understand yet
that Canada is there to provide Afghanistan with development assistance. We are closely
monitoring the situation at the Kandahar hospital.  As you know, we are working with our
partners in the field. As soon as needs are identified, we allocate funds so that projects
can be carried out.


Possible translation of bold:  one or several bureaucrats are being squeezed asked to make
a Treasury Board authority for funding fit a new pigeonhole entitled, "fixing hospital in Kandahar".
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I’m in danger of straying out of my lane here, but I also worry about the effects, on our primary counter-insurgency task, of the bombing efforts.  I cannot help but believe that bombing is going to be counter productive.  I know it can and does bring certainty to a battle – quickly.
We dropped a lot of bombs while I was there.  Each one was a precision attack against what we knew to be enemy.  The talk of a "bombing campaing" is misguiding and possibly intended to cause people to think of Dresden as opposed to what is really happening on the ground.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I can say, from hands on experience in 2003, that the World Bank was doing some very good work - using Canadian money and Canadian expertise, contracted/arranged by CIDA, amongst others.  But, they were World Bank projects - no big Canadian flag to wave at the taxpayers.

----------

P.S. The work in which I was involved was advisory; we did not go to Afghanstan - we advised Afghans in the comfort of our offices in Canada and in the offices of other contributors in London.  It made much better use of our time and Canada's money - it was more efficient and effective to bring a few Afghans to Canada than to send several Canadians to Kabul.

I figure I would wade in here. Having spent a year and a couple of months with one of the biggest IHAO(International Humanitarian Aid Organizations) both on the ground and back here in Canada. Our (myself as lead developer) project was given an eight month time line to develop the format and then four months on the ground implementation. The format and guidelines was accomplished in a little over three months. First problem, we worked too quick and did not included other departments in the "envisioning process". This irked myself a little since given the parameters of what they wanted accomplished there was no need to 'envision', it was just straight pen and paper work. Next the 'highers' were irked as they did not have a chance to have their opinions heard. My thoughts there was if they were so good how come we were brought in to do the project. Next by keeping those out who did not have a vested intrest we cut out allot of wasted time, hence our quick start up time. We were counselled a number of times that were are not 'political' enough. Read that is "don't hog all the glory to yourselves, this is a full time living for some of us". My next turn on the carpet came when allowed to recruit my own staff. I leaned somewhat heavily toward employing as many former service personal as I could find. Most of you reading this will understand my logic in that. The rest was filled by recent undergrads or fourth year students. Might as well access the minds who contain the most current and up to date academic data and trends.(objection here was they had no field experience). With both groups it also boilled done to a question of loyalty. They were loyal to me,each other and to seeing the project through. What more could I ask for and I could trust them to get the job done in the minimal amount of time (none of us watched the clock). When we finally got to the field stage I laid the rules down quite clear about expense claims and per diems. The rules were obeyed, allowing myself to move a little extra money into the project areas. Now when one of the 'highers' appeared on a 'visit' and promptly checked into the local version of a five star, spent one hour a day in the field and the rest of the time 'in consultation' with local government officials. It provide a very illuminating experience for the younger students that had not run across a "professional" aid worker before. Now with Afghanistan the reason aid agencies are reluctant is that is does not fit their political agenda. Most of us involved in the aforementioned project have repeatably applied for projects there, our appeals so far have fallen on deaf ears.

PS. My civic donation list is now very narrow and begins with RHQ Edmonton..............

 
Interesting 3rd herd, my sister in law lives in Malaysia and has been involved in Aceh for quite sometime through different NGO's. She was there before and after the disaster, her opinion of most of the NGO's is about as high as yours, and even though she is anti-USA, she conceded to me that the US military was the only effective group there for quite some time. She said many of the NGO's came to the area, set up a flag, tent, did a press conference/tour and never came back, leaving the people with broken promises.
 
I was intrigued by the convergance of messaging from the politicians and CDS regarding the coming campaign season in AFG:

  • Enough troops are in place to "do the job" (we're good to go).
  • Expect more casualties.
  • We don't expect them to hit us in set piece conventional fights.

I know this isn't "news" to forum participants, but I found it interesting how it's all fallen into place so nicely in a variety of MSM forums, especially after all the calls for more troops from NATO allies - good message co-ordination and discipline, indeed.

Latest news here, but highlights of recent coverage below.



NATO south Afghan mission has enough troops -Canada
David Ljunggren, Reuters, 16 Feb 07
Article Link

Senior Canadian military officials, who have long complained there are not enough NATO troops in southern Afghanistan, said on Friday that alliance force levels in the region are now adequate.  Canada has 2,500 troops in the southern city of Kandahar and as recently as last October it said it could not maintain the mission without more support.  But the official tone changed sharply after President George W. Bush said on Thursday the United States would keep higher troop levels in Afghanistan ahead of an expected surge in Taliban attacks and called on NATO to commit more troops.  "The United States is putting in more forces, Britain is putting in more forces. We have sufficient force structure on the ground in the south at this moment to do the job that we have to do," said General Rick Hillier, chief of Canada's defense staff .... 


NATO allies pulling their weight: O'Connor
Past criticisms forgotten as Canada says it's satisfied by allies' actions

Mike Blanchfield, Ottawa Citizen, 17 Feb 07
Permalink

After months of complaining that some NATO allies are shirking front-line fighting in Afghanistan, Canada backed down yesterday, saying the alliance has what it needs -- for now -- to continue combat operations in the country's volatile south.  "I'm quite pleased with our allies in the north and the west." Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor said yesterday. "I think we may have enough now in the south and the east to do the job."  He was referring to countries such as France, Germany and Italy who are operating in the more peaceful north and west of Afghanistan  ....  Mr. O'Connor said NATO was now in better shape in those two troubled sectors: The U.S. has extending the tour of duty of 3,200 of its troops, Britain is sending an additional 500 soldiers to Helmand province, and Poland is contributing 1,000 troops ....


Bush's commitment to Afghanistan 'reassuring,' Canadian ambassador says
BETH GORHAM, Canadian Press, 16 Feb 07
Article Link

President George W. Bush's increase in support for Afghanistan is "reassuring" and the United States is well aware of the lives Canada has sacrificed there, says Canadian Ambassador Michael Wilson.  .... 
Most of Wilson's meetings - on Capitol Hill, at the White House or administration offices - start with condolences for the soldiers Canada has lost in Afghanistan. "There's good awareness but there's also very strong appreciation," he said ....  For Wilson, the key element of Bush's speech was the emphasis on all three aspects of the Afghan mission - defence, development and diplomacy. "It's very compatible with what our prime minister's been saying about Afghanistan ... Definitely we're on the same page, as we are with other countries."  Concerned that Bush's deployment of more troops to Iraq would detract from Afghanistan, Canada lobbied hard late last year for continued strong support for the Afghan mission.  "When I came here, there was a period when they were down at 16,000 (soldiers)," said Wilson.  "The statement by the president was definitely reassuring, clearly demonstrating an increase in support. It's very important that we know they are solidly there with us." ....


Brace for more losses, PM says
Taliban preparing for `bloody attacks,' in spring, but NATO troops ready for threat

Richard Brennan & Bruce Campion-Smith, Toronto Star, 17 Feb 07
Article Link

Canadians should brace themselves for more casualties in Afghanistan as the Taliban prepare for a spring or summer offensive, Prime Minister Stephen Harper says.  "Our plan for Afghanistan is to be successful. We know it will not be easy; we know it will involve casualties," Harper said in Mississauga yesterday.  Harper said Taliban activity has been kept in check now for several months, so "we do expect a renewed spring and or summer offensive."  Canadian soldiers know when they go to Afghanistan they may not be coming home, the Prime Minister added. "That's one of the real risks in this country," he said at the opening of a distribution centre for pharmaceuticals destined for Afghanistan and other Third World countries.  Gen. Rick Hillier, the chief of the defence staff, says he expects insurgents to use hit-and-run guerrilla tactics that have proven costly to troops over the last year in Kandahar. The Taliban learned "painful lessons" last September when they dug in against Canadian troops and attacked en masse, he said.  "We don't believe that they will mass in conventional-style warfare (this year) because when they do, they die," Hillier said. "We think they'll concentrate on suicide bombers, vehicle bombers, (roadside bombs) and small ambushes," he told reporters after a speech to a defence conference in Ottawa ....


Afghan spring will be deadly, Harper warns
PM resolute after Hillier decries military's 'decade of darkness' under Liberal government

GLORIA GALLOWAY and KAREN HOWLETT, Globe & Mail, 17 Feb 07
Article Link

Prime Minister Stephen Harper cautioned yesterday that a spring offensive threatened by the Taliban in Afghanistan will be both dangerous and deadly but Canadian forces will not shy away from the fight.  "We certainly are aware that those are the plans of the Taliban," Mr. Harper said of the offensive predicted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization commanders and analysts. "Our soldiers, men and women who go over there, know full well when they go over there that not all of them will return." Mr. Harper told reporters he has every expectation that the Taliban will launch a renewed attack during the spring and summer.  "We know it will not be easy," he said. "We know it will involve casualties, but Canada has not shrunk from these kinds of responsibilities before." ....

 
Here, reproduced from yesterday’s Globe and Mail under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, is a ‘commentary’ by former CDSS, Gen (ret’d) Paul Manson:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070216.wcomanson16/BNStory/specialComment/home
The Taliban are overrated

PAUL MANSON

From Friday's Globe and Mail

To read accounts of the war in Afghanistan, you might conclude Canada and its allies are fighting a losing battle, and that the Taliban insurgents are gaining in their efforts to regain control of that war-torn nation.

The facts suggest the opposite: The Taliban are in trouble on just about every front.

To be sure, most media reports refer to the very real increase in casualties and suicide bombings in 2006, but these are poor indicators of how the war is really going.

Back in 1994 and 1995, when the Taliban moved into the vacuum left by the expulsion of the Soviet Army and its client communist government, they conducted a brilliant military campaign, quickly sweeping through most regions of the country and establishing their oppressive regime in Kabul.

This time around, the so-called Taliban (which, in fact, is a mix of insurgents) can lay no claim to any degree of military success. Based on their performance last year, recent public declarations of a major spring offensive ring hollow. Those who accept such claims at face value need to look at the Taliban's recent record, as well as their leadership's proclivity for boastful and arrogant pronouncements.

A major Taliban objective in 2006 was to conquer Kandahar province and its capital, Kandahar city. This, of course, is the area where Canada has undertaken a major responsibility for security and reconstruction. The Taliban failed, and failed badly. On the one occasion where they tried to fight a large-scale, face-to-face battle with NATO's International Security Assistance Force in the area, they were soundly defeated. Since that engagement in September (referred to as Operation Medusa by the allies), the Taliban have withdrawn to their safe havens, avoiding military campaigns of the kind that won them the country a dozen years ago.

Instead, they have now resorted almost exclusively to four forms of unconventional activity: suicide bombings, roadside bombs, targeted assassinations of government officials, and school burnings. The net result has been an alarming number of deaths, the great majority of the victims being Afghans.

This dramatic shift in tactics is a measure of the bankruptcy, both militarily and morally, of the Taliban. It is hard to imagine how they hope to win over the support of the people of Afghanistan by killing them in such great numbers, through such inhuman means. And recent declarations by insurgency leaders that they have 2,000 suicide bombers at their disposal will not win many hearts and minds.

Make no mistake: The NATO mission in Afghanistan still faces huge hurdles before the nation is fully on the road to recovery, and able, on its own, to manage the Taliban threat, let alone the additional challenges of opium production, warlordism and corruption.

Looking back at the past year, however, one can discern distinct signs that the principal enemies of Afghanistan, in the form of the Taliban, are failing in their attempt to regain power through terror and intimidation.

Paul Manson, a former chief of the defence staff (1986-89), is president of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

Two thousand suicide bombers, General Manson says, “will not win many hearts and minds.” 

I’m not so sure.

The suicide bomber is not a completely new phenomenon and experience says that this for of highly ritualized sacrifice resonates in some cultures.  It did for the early Christians; it did in Japan in the 20th century as it has and apparently continues to do in many Islamic societies.  Simple acts of sacrifice or martyrdom can, I think have a profound effect on people who are deeply connected to their religious beliefs – as few of us in 21st century Canada are.
 
Piper said:
Stop the eradication.

We buy the poppy crop. Then we buy the next one. And the next one. Then, for the next one, we say 'we'll buy the NEXT one but only if you plant these seeds'. The then we buy the next crop of wheat or whatever. And the next, and the next and the next .

This tactic deprives the Taliban of their funds AND keeps the farmers and villagers on our side because we don't deprive them of their income and slowly encourage them to plant 'goood' crops. It's foolproof. 

This was a solution proposed to me by someone trying to push it higher up and I'll be totally honest, I think it would work. Sometimes a carrot works better then a stick.

Thoughts?

You're forgetting that many farmers turn to Poppy crop because it is the easiest and cheapest to grow with the most payback. In the harsh terrain of many areas of Afghanistan, some farms cannot grow any other crop but Poppies! What needs to be done is the agriculture in Afghanistan needs to be supported, with funding given to farmers for equipment and knowledge so they actually can grow other crops instead of Poppy.
 
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