Afghan Detainee Mega Thread

[The Bread Guy]

It appears the current gov't is afraid to even talk about what we'll be doing in Afghanistan down the road, sp I can't see it being too willing to pick up the "public enquiry" baton and run with it, even if (as laid out by you E.R.) it would level the playing field and look at the ENTIRE picture, not just the latest snapshot, that is "handling of detainees."

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Ottawa Citizen, is an opinion piece that advocates the wrong inquiry:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/op-ed/different+kind+inquiry/2480449/story.html

A different kind of inquiry: Somalia vs. Afghanistan

BY GRANT DAWSON AND STEPHANIE CARVIN,

CITIZEN SPECIAL
JANUARY 25, 2010

A prisoner abuse scandal has again found a place in Canadian newspapers. Now it is Afghanistan. In the 1990s, it was Somalia.

With the Afghanistan scandal, the government desperately wants to avoid another Somalia Inquiry. Tom Flanagan, Prime Minister Stephen Harper's former campaign adviser, has even suggested that the main reason behind the proroguing of Parliament was to shut down any inquiry on the scandal.

Yet the government has good reason to be concerned. The Somalia Inquiry -- which dragged on for two years, and had more days of hearings than the operation itself -- destroyed the reputation of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the memory of the peace and stability it built in Somalia in 1993.

Government representatives grappling with diplomat Richard Colvin's much-discussed disclosures insist that Canada had no control over Afghan authorities that allegedly abused prisoners in secret Afghan prisons. Canadians working in Afghanistan, the government says, respected international law and norms.

Commentators outside the government argue an inquiry must be held. Canadian responsibility is rooted in the view that prisoner abuse should have been expected, given that the Afghanistan government is unused to standing-up for human rights, and corruption is a serious problem. Additionally, once that abuse was known or reasonably suspected, the government had an obligation to investigate and take corrective measures. Failure to do so is a breach of the Third Geneva Convention.

The Somalia Inquiry, which closed 13 years ago, was held after it was discovered that a detainee died from a beating by Canadian soldiers. Among other things, the Inquiry found that leadership problems within the Airborne permitted an atmosphere or climate to develop that made it harder to control soldiers. Additionally, that soldiers made mistakes or errors in judgment that partly stemmed from this atmosphere and partly from inadequate training in, among other things, the rules of engagement surrounding the use of force.

Thus, in a difficult mission, which started as humanitarian relief and became national stabilization and reconstruction, a few undisciplined soldiers took out their anger on a petty thief in Canadian custody, killing him.

Where the Somalia Inquiry highlighted deficiencies in military and government procedures, it may be seen as useful. But fundamentally, it was called for political reasons. The inquiry's purpose was to distance and shield the government from allegations that it tried to cover up the killing.

It is doubtful that the Somalia Inquiry found lessons that the military would not have implemented itself, after the internal self-assessment routinely conducted after missions. The inquiry's most conspicuous result was the destruction of the careers of promising Canadian Forces officers. What additional benefit came of the trauma and expense of the inquiry is an open question.

Given the recent acknowledgement by Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk that the Canadian Forces knew about at least one case of abuse in Afghanistan, and Colvin's comments that he had warned government officials, the desire to avoid a pubic inquiry on the prison situation there is clear. That makes sense.

It is true that international law indicates that the detaining power -- in this case the Canadian government -- remains responsible for the treatment of prisoners they have taken and transferred to a local authority. If the foreign force suspects that there is abuse, it must investigate.

But, more is involved here than first meets the eye. A brief comparison with the Somalia case can help illustrate this point:

First, in Somalia, there were no local authorities in existence to receive prisoners. Government bureaucrats in Ottawa had not considered such a problem before, and could give no advice. The Canadian contingent commander in Somalia, Serge Labbé, then a colonel, had to figure this one out himself.

As a result, the Canadian Forces solution was a "catch and release" policy that did not deter camp thievery. This may have contributed to the frustration within the Airborne and the (likely unintended) beating death of the Somali prisoner at the hands of a few individual soldiers.

Second, low-ranking personnel committed the incident in Somalia. It should have been clear that responsibility for the Somalia incident rested with the perpetrators, and to an ever-diminishing degree with the more senior leadership.

In Afghanistan, there is a functioning government, though arguably it has little influence over what happens in provinces, like Kandahar, where Canada's troops operate. Canada has a prisoner-transfer agreement with the Afghanistan government.


Afghanistan is an ally in the war against terrorism. It is also a client state NATO is hoping to build into a responsible, stable, independent actor. This means training on good governance and best practices, and inculcating respect for human rights. But nation building includes allowing Afghanistan to exercise responsibility in line with its sovereign powers. The Afghanistan prison abuse incident is a sign that Afghanistan needs Canada's help now as much as before.

An Afghanistan inquiry would be appropriate because it would look at the right people. The government would be on trial. It should not be used to shield the government of the day from criticism, as was the case with the Somalia Inquiry.

The issue with prisoner abuse in Afghanistan is when did the government know about the abuses, what did it know, and what did it do? There is a role for an inquiry to figure this out, but in that event, we must ensure it is not manipulated and capitalized on for partisan political gain.

In short, there is some use for an inquiry into the Afghanistan prison abuse case, but the way forward is fraught with hazards. We've been waylaid in the past.

Grant Dawson is deputy director of the David Davies Memorial Institute at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and the author of Here is Hell: Canada's Engagement in Somalia. Stephanie Carvin is a lecturer in international relations at Royal Holloway, University of London. Her book Prisoners in America's Wars: From 1750 to Guantanamo, will be released in June by Columbia University Press.

© Copyright (c) The Ottawa Citizen

The questions: “when did the government know about the abuses, what did it know, and what did it do?” are meaningless. The real questions must be:

1. How does Canada avoid a mess like this (detainee handling) next time? Which begs the questions –

    a.   What, exactly, is the mess? and

    b.   How did we get into it (this mess) in the first place?

2. Are any Canadians, soldiers, bureaucrats or politicians possibly complicit in any war crimes. Are they, in other words, at risk of being hauled up in front of some kangaroo court by e.g. Attaran or Byers? and

3. What should or can be done, here in Canada, to deal with any potential offences against international law thus foreclosing any requirement or opportunity for the international community to act because Canada would not.

There is plenty of meat in those three questions – and plenty of grist for the Conservatives’ political mill, too.

 

[leroi]

But Mr. Campbell, one difference between now and then is Canadian and ally forces are fighting an intense battle in Afghanistan and they're getting killed and badly wounded. Is this the time to demoralize them further?

And the big picture, our enemies want us demoralized both at home and in theatre.  Is this what Harper was trying to avoid over the Christian holiday season? Perhaps Harper wanted the troops at their fighting finest and had "intelligence" reasons to anticipate an increased danger to our troops (and others) in Afghanistan between November 2009 (when the media was breaking Colvin's story) and now.

David Bercuson suggests rules of the Geneva Convention need to be altered to reflect the contemporary insurgency reality that, among other things, "the enemy" is no longer neatly recognizably in uniform, he/she could switch sides several times in the course of a day,  for example.

If an inquiry is held it would go on and on ad nauseam, it would be expensive and what would it achieve if the problem of handing over detainees has already been worked out? It would be a non-sequiter.  It might bring the morale of our troops down--"lower that whale poop"--and that's something I would not like to see again.

An inquiry would have to go all the way back to Chretien sending in the CF (and JTF2?) and that would involve our American allies (and classified info?). Back then, Canadians turned prisoners over to the Americans--or so I've read. Is this the time to be critically delving into the detainee policies of our allies? This theme has already been done to death.

I don't understand why Colvin needs a lawyer at Canada's expense--oops I mean two lawyers--I see he's got a new one. This is a Special Committee Hearing not a courtroom.  Kady O'Malley's blog has a copy of Foreign Affairs response to Colvin's claim that he's being treated unfairly. It seems Colvin didn't submit the proper paperwork for the third lawyer fee claim and also his first two claims exceeded the pre-agreed upon amount.  That's what slowed down the payment process; surely Colvin must know that any bureaucracy is maddeningly slow and demands orderly paperwork. But the MSM is neglecting to report those facts and allowing Colvin to launch an unfettered attack against the Conservatives alleging unfair treatment--that they're deliberately blocking due process and Colvin's rights.

 

[Edward Campbell]

But Mr. Campbell, one difference between now and then is Canadian and ally forces are fighting an intense battle in Afghanistan and they're getting killed and badly wounded. Is this the time to demoralize them further?

And the big picture, our enemies want us demoralized both at home and in theatre.  Is this what Harper was trying to avoid over the Christian holiday season? Perhaps Harper wanted the troops at their fighting finest and had "intelligence" reasons to anticipate an increased danger to our troops (and others) in Afghanistan between November 2009 (when the media was breaking Colvin's story) and now.

David Bercuson suggests rules of the Geneva Convention need to be altered to reflect the contemporary insurgency reality that, among other things, "the enemy" is no longer neatly recognizably in uniform, he/she could switch sides several times in the course of a day,  for example.

If an inquiry is held it would go on and on ad nauseam, it would be expensive and what would it achieve if the problem of handing over detainees has already been worked out? It would be a non-sequiter.  It might bring the morale of our troops down--"lower that whale poop"--and that's something I would not like to see again.

An inquiry would have to go all the way back to Chretien sending in the CF (and JTF2?) and that would involve our American allies (and classified info?). Back then, Canadians turned prisoners over to the Americans--or so I've read. Is this the time to be critically delving into the detainee policies of our allies? This theme has already been done to death.

I don't understand why Colvin needs a lawyer at Canada's expense--oops I mean two lawyers--I see he's got a new one. This is a Special Committee Hearing not a courtroom.  Kady O'Malley's blog has a copy of Foreign Affairs response to Colvin's claim that he's being treated unfairly. It seems Colvin didn't submit the proper paperwork for the third lawyer fee claim and also his first two claims exceeded the pre-agreed upon amount.  That's what slowed down the payment process; surely Colvin must know that any bureaucracy is maddeningly slow and demands orderly paperwork. But the MSM is neglecting to report those facts and allowing Colvin to launch an unfettered attack against the Conservatives alleging unfair treatment--that they're deliberately blocking due process and Colvin's rights.

The demoralization and demonizing have already been done. Canadian support for the war in Afghanistan has dried up in every region of the country and in pretty much every age and income group.

Bercuson may be right, I wouldn't disagree with him, but the process will take years and years - if it is possible at all. Meanwhile the threat of legal actions by the International Criminal Court, in Den Haag, against Canadians remain.

Indeed, an inquiry will have to go all the way back to decisions taken in 2001 and there is no doubt that parts of it will have to be held in camera to protect classified information.

But, the fact remains that there is an important issue: If Canada does not address allegations of war crimes - allegations which have already been made - then someone like Attaran or Byers can, and almost certainly will, lay charges in the "War Crimes  Tribunal" against Hillier or Fraser and others.  We signed the International Criminal Court treaty (convention) and agreed to be bound by its rules. An inquiry is, in my opinion the best, maybe the only way to address that important issue.

-----
Re: Colvin. My understanding is that he does need legal advice to help him navigate the rules of the government (his employer) and e.g. the MPCC and the HoC Committee. Further, I understand that there is a rule allowing legal expenses, up so some sum which I think is $50,000.00, for just this sort of circumstance (and because representation by the Department of Justice might put both parties, certain would put the government in a conflict of interest).

 

[leroi]

Thank you Mr. Campbell; I value your words.

I agree that the interest in this is not going away and will need to be met.

I've been accused of not caring about detainee torture (not on these means) but that's not the case. It just seems that pursuing this would be a tail chasing exercise.  Colvin declares his info is "second-" and "third-hand" and Christie Blatchford reports that the Canadian military confirms one incident where a detainee was beaten by a shoe and the CF intervened.  This seems hardly enough reason to pursue an inquiry; on the other hand,  it's gone too far to be ignored.

But, Colvin will need to cite his sources if and when the hearings continue--IMO. When watching all the special committee meetings, it was not clear to me whether or not Colvin was reporting fact or rumor.  He can't dodge this; anyone bringing forward serious allegations of this magnitude should be held accountable for sources otherwise they're not credible. Equally, I found the suggestion ludicrous that the various generals with boots on the ground should have been keeping up with all the Canadian newspapers RE: detainees as well as doing their real job in theatre.

Last time I looked these generals were humans not Gods.

I seem to be the odd-woman-out on this because I simply didn't find Colvin credible; consequently, I've been called 'stupid' and 'mendacious' by an Edward Greenspon for not supporting Jeffrey Simpson's suggestion that we should all "hug Colvin."  Yet, the CF deserves to be given the benefit of doubt and sadly I don't see that happening too much in the media.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

MODS move if needed.....

News Release
Board of Inquiry to examine details of June 2006 detainee incident in Afghanistan
NR–10.005 - January 28, 2010

OTTAWA – Vice-Admiral Denis Rouleau, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) to gain a clear understanding of the specific details of the incident of 14 June 2006, in Afghanistan, during which a person in CF custody was handed over to Afghan authorities then taken back by CF personnel.

“The Canadian Forces has always been and remains committed to ensuring that detainees are handled and transferred in accordance with our obligations under international law,” said VAdm Rouleau.  “Members of the Canadian Forces demonstrate tremendous professionalism in their handling and treatment of detainees.”

Rear-Admiral Paul Maddison, Commander of Joint Task Force Atlantic, has been appointed the president of the board of inquiry that will investigate in detail the events that took place on 14 June 2006. The BOI will develop an understanding of the incident, with a view to identifying the rationale for actions taken and reports made by the CF members involved, before reporting their findings to the convening authority. 

Vice-Admiral Rouleau also directed that the circumstances surrounding the 14 June 2006 incident and the subsequent passage of this information up the chain of command be investigated by the Chief of Review Services (CRS). The investigation results are expected to be provided to the chain of command by 12 February 2010.

Upon completion of the BOI, a report containing findings and recommendations will be submitted to the convening authority for review, after which it will be forwarded to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The findings, results, and recommendations of the BOI, along with the CRS report, will be made public, subject to the limitations on the release of information imposed by the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act.

- 30-

Note to editors: The Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference are available on the DND website (http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/boi-cde/bid-ced/index-eng.asp). 

This Board of Inquiry and CRS investigation are the result of direction given by the Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, at his 9 December 2009 news conference seeking greater clarity about the flow of information related to the 14 June 2006 incident.  Gen Natynczyk's statement can be found at:  http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3217

 

[leroi]

PMO: Hearings to re-start in March and will include discussion of Canada's non-military  future role in Afghanistan; (hope it's okay to only post the link below with an excerpted quote):

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Afghan+hearings+restart+March/2492668/story.html

"Afghanistan remains a public policy priority and the special committee on Afghanistan will be reconstituted once the new session begins," the Prime Minister's Office said in a statement.

While the committee can look at detainees further, a spokesman for the prime minister said the government also hopes MPs will deal with Canada's non-military role in Afghanistan after Canadian Forces withdraw from the mission in 2011.

( ... )

Edit: re-format.

 

[GAP]

Feds ask Iacobucci to decide on release of Afghan detainee documents
THE CANADIAN PRESS March 5, 2010, EDT.
Article Link

OTTAWA - The federal government is asking a former Supreme Court judge to decide whether classified documents on the Afghan detainee issue should be released to MPs.

Justice Minister Rob Nicholson says Frank Iacobucci will vet the material and decide how much can be given out. The documents deal with the risk of torture in Afghan jails for suspected Taliban fighters handed over by Canadian troops.

A special Commons committee has been investigating the matter for months and has heard that the government had clear warnings about torture, but continued to transfer detainees.

In December, the House of Commons voted to demand release of all documents, but the government released only censored versions, saying it was bound by secrecy laws.

Opposition MPs have demanded a full-blown judicial inquiry into the matter.
End

 

[Edward Campbell]

Anyone who might doubt that some lawyers and law professors want to bring Canadian military members before some sort of war crimes tribunal need to consider Prof. Amir Attaran’s latest broadside, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the CBC web site:

http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/03/05/afghan-attaran005.html

Canada wanted Afghan prisoners tortured: lawyer
Unredacted documents show officials hoped to gather intelligence, expert says

Friday, March 5, 2010

CBC News

University of Ottawa law professor Amir Attaran says Canadian officials intentionally handed over Afghan detainees to be tortured in order to gather intelligence.
(CBC)

Federal government documents on Afghan detainees suggest that Canadian officials intended some prisoners to be tortured in order to gather intelligence, according to a legal expert.

If the allegation is true, such actions would constitute a war crime, said University of Ottawa law professor Amir Attaran, who has been digging deep into the issue and told CBC News he has seen uncensored versions of government documents released last year.

"If these documents were released [in full], what they will show is that Canada partnered deliberately with the torturers in Afghanistan for the interrogation of detainees," he said.

"There would be a question of rendition and a question of war crimes on the part of certain Canadian officials. That's what's in these documents, and that's why the government is covering up as hard as it can."

Detainee abuse became the subject of national debate last year after heavily redacted versions of the documents were made public after Attaran filed an access to information request. They revealed the Canadian military was not monitoring detainees who had been transferred from Canadian to Afghan custody. It was later alleged that some of those detainees were being mistreated.

Until now, the controversy has centred on whether the government turned a blind eye to abuse of Afghan detainees.

However, Attaran said the full versions of the documents show that Canada went even further in intentionally handing over prisoners to torturers.

"And it wasn't accidental; it was done for a reason," he said. "It was done so that they could be interrogated using harsher methods."

The government maintains that nothing improper happened.

"The Canadian Forces have conducted themselves with the highest performance of all countries," Prime Minister Stephen Harper told the House of Commons Thursday.

But many facets of the issue remain top secret, such as the role of Canada's elite Joint Task Force 2, or JTF2. There have been hints that JTF2 might be handling so-called high-value prisoners.

"High-value targets would be detained under a completely different mechanism that involved special forces and targeted, intelligence-driven operations," Richard Colvin, a former senior diplomat with Canada's mission in Afghanistan, told a parliamentary committee last November.

Colvin claimed that all detainees transferred by Canadians to Afghan prisons were likely tortured by Afghan officials. He also said that his concerns were ignored by top government officials and that the government might have tried to cover up the issue.

Opposition parties have been trying to get the Conservative government to release the uncensored versions of the documents pertaining to the handling of Afghan detainees.

The Conservatives insist that releasing uncensored files on the issue would damage national security. On Friday, Justice Minister Rob Nicholson asked former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank Iacobucci to review whether there would be "injurious" effects if some Afghan detainee documents were made public.

Nicholson did not give full details on Iacobucci's assignment or a timetable for when the review might be completed.

However, opposition parties said Parliament is entitled to those documents regardless of what Iacobucci decides.

"Parliament is supreme," said Ontario NDP MP Paul Dewar. "What this is, is a skate around Parliament."

Liberal MP Ujjal Dosanjh said the government still has many questions to answer on the subject of detainees.

"Who knew what and when, and who allowed the continuing saga of Afghan detainees being sent to a potential risk of torture?" Dosanjh said.

It's not clear whether the government will make Iacobucci's advice public. Moreover, he is not a sitting judge and can't legally rule or force the government to do anything.

This also proves that is if former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank Iacobucci allows any uncensored documents to be released to MPs we can be 100% sure that they will end up in the public domain because too many ‘public servants,’ including ‘public servants' in DND, consider that their sworn oaths and duties do not extend to any action that might spare the government of the day – Conservative of Liberal – from potential scandal.

Of course the CBC, being the CBC, accepted Attaran’s version of a document they (the CBC) have not seen as being just one, tiny step removed from the gospel truth. Maybe, considering the sources, I should have posted this in the Taliban Propaganda thread.

 

[Rifleman62]

Note that he does not state the date of these documents, hinting of course it was under the current governments watch. CBC, of course would not question anything, that might deflect from the CPC.

I Listened to Anna Maria Tremonti on CBC radio, just because it was on. Why as a taxpayer to I have to pay for this bitch to have guest after guest go on about the CF and the CPC being war criminals? Why can't we get rid of the CBC? Who do they represent?

 

[leroi]

This is a little off-topic but related. It's a refutation of Attaran's larger "Canada-the-evil-torturer-agenda" by CSIS Director Richard Fadden who clearly demonstrates in his letter which appeared Feb. 25, 2010 that Attaran argues from a false premise.

Thanks to the National Post and here reproduced in accordance with the Fair Dealing provision (29) of the Copyright Act. Taken from the CSIS website:

http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/cmmn/dr_ntpst_lttr-eng.asp

At a major conference in October of 2009, I called for a calm, measured debate about national security in Canada. Unfortunately, Amir Attaran has chosen to ignore that call and engage in ideological invective rather than participate in an important national dialogue. Mr. Attaran’s article of February 19 (‘Terrorism Isn’t Special’) is heavy on rhetoric but very light on facts.

Mr. Attaran begins his opinion piece by attributing to CSIS and other government agencies a series of statements that they in fact have never made. No one at CSIS has ever argued that “sometimes, torture is okay” or that “terrorists are monsters”. This is a distortion of the facts.

Having set up a false premise, Mr. Attaran then extols the virtues of working within the criminal law system to prosecute terrorists as an example of how CSIS should operate. But Mr. Attaran conveniently neglects to inform readers that CSIS intelligence played a pivotal role in all of the convictions he mentions, that CSIS shared portions of the careful work and successful results of its investigations with law enforcement authorities. It is puzzling that Mr. Attaran missed the role that CSIS played in various successful prosecutions, as our role in these cases has been the subject of judicial decisions and has been intensely covered by all major media.

Mr. Attaran is simply wrong when he states that CSIS has “failed to instigate even a single terrorist’s conviction”. He has created a straw man, then struck it down with vigour. But his article does nothing to advance knowledge or provide useful commentary on national security. His article is colourful and opinionated but deeply flawed. The bottom line is that terrorism presents challenges that can only be dealt with when intelligence and police agencies and the courts work together within the framework set out by the law.

Sincerely,

Richard B. Fadden
Director
Canadian Security Intelligence Service

 

[GAP]

Excellent post leroi...it`s nice to hear from someone in CSIS

 

[Armymedic]

The Liberals had better start exercising caution towards this "scandal" with Prof Attaran alerting the public about the Cdn government allowing our soldiers to hand over Afghan detainees "deliberately" for torture.

If the PMs hand is forced to call a public inquiry, it would be "prudent" for him to call forth all evidence of Afghans captured by any CF forces since 2002.  And then publicaly state that "irregularities" were seen as the new government looked deeper into the files 6-12 months after taking office, and corrections were made to  a poorly though out policy.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Slightly off topic, but here are more, some unsubstantiated, facts, rumours and innuendo, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Canadian Press via the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadian-spies-interrogated-afghan-prisoners-insiders-reveal/article1492713/

Canadian spies interrogated Afghan prisoners, insiders reveal
Security experts stunned by CSIS's role in questioning Taliban fighters who may have been tortured

Murray Brewster and Jim Bronskill

The Canadian Press

Published on Sunday, Mar. 07, 2010

Officers of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service have played a crucial and long-standing role as interrogators of a vast swath of captured Taliban fighters, The Canadian Press has learned.

The spies began working side-by-side with a unit of military police intelligence officers as the Afghan war spiralled out of control in 2006, according to heavily censored witness transcripts filed with the Military Police Complaints Commission.

The spy agency's previously unknown role in questioning detainees adds a new dimension to the controversy about the handling and possible torture of prisoners by Afghan security forces.

It also raises more questions about the critical early years in Kandahar when the Canadian military found itself mired in a guerrilla war it had not expected to fight.

CSIS acknowledged in 2006 that its members gathered intelligence in Afghanistan, but the spy service's precise role has remained in the shadows until now.

Maj. Kevin Rowcliffe, former staff adviser to Canada's overseas operations commander, told investigators with the complaints commission there were questions about how much experience the army's intelligence officers had in grilling prisoners.

“There was a lot of discussion in my headquarters about who was qualified to do interrogations, because we're not talking the normal police interview, we're talking interrogations, which (censored) were doing, not (military police),” says an edited transcript of the Dec. 6, 2007, interview.

A copy of the document was obtained by The Canadian Press.

Military police “were involved in that, but they weren't necessarily involved in interviewing or interrogation related issues; that would be (censored) or some other parade that had special training in interrogation.”

Sources familiar with the unedited version say the blanked-out references are to CSIS.

Intelligence expert Wesley Wark says the revelations are disturbing, partly because CSIS would have had no specialized knowledge of how to elicit information from Afghan prisoners.

“I find that stunning,” said Wark, a historian at the University of Toronto.

The spy agency is legally permitted to gather intelligence anywhere in the world concerning threats to the security of Canada, and has increasingly operated abroad in recent years.

In Kandahar, CSIS officers conducted what's known as tactical field questioning, essentially the first interrogations of suspects, said another source familiar with the process.

They tried to sort out who was a bona fide insurgent commander — or a simple field soldier.

The spies would sometimes make recommendations on which Taliban prisoners to hand over to the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan's notorious intelligence service, the sources said.

The final say on whether to transfer always rested with the military task force commander.

The Military Police Complaints Commission asked questions about the CSIS role in Kandahar, but abandoned the angle when it became bogged down in legal challenges about its authority to investigate Ottawa's overall prisoner transfer policy.

Diplomat-whistleblower Richard Colvin testified before a special House of Commons committee last November that the majority of prisoners Canada handed over to the Afghan intelligence service were tortured — a claim the Conservative government and military commanders, past and present, angrily denied.

Rowcliffe's interview transcript prompts questions about whether the military and CSIS officers had enough time to conduct proper interrogations early in the war, when newly arrived troops had little intelligence on the threats they were facing.

The military has 96 hours after capture to decided whether to hand over a prisoner to Afghan authorities, but Rowcliffe said there was pressure to turn them over sooner.

He said he took up the concerns with the commander of overseas operations, saying: “I understand the time sensitiveness of this issue to the Government of Canada, but we may have Osama bin Laden, yet you are trying to get me to give him over as quickly as possible.”

But the answer was often “no.” His boss, Lt.-Gen. Michel Gauthier, indicated his hands were tied and told Rowcliffe that the federal government's policy was firm.

Yet the concerns persisted.

“I said, we need to take the time to do a proper investigation, interview, interrogation, whatever you want to call it to confirm who we have and what has this guy done or gal done,” Rowcliffe said in his statement.

He was asked by police commission investigators where he thought the intelligence would come from if the instructions were to get rid of detainees right away.

“My impression was they didn't seem to care about that,” said Rowcliffe, who's retired from the military.

“I don't know if they didn't grasp the importance of it, or just that it was not important because the pressure was . . . to get rid of them because of the Government of Canada.”

He said he wasn't sure whether there was pressure from the defence minister and the chief of defence staff.

“I have no idea, but I know from Gen. Gauthier's position that (it was): Get rid of them as quickly as you can and what's taking so long? That's the kind of questions I'd get.”

Security expert Wark said it begs the question why Ottawa was so eager to transfer prisoners out of the controlled confines of Kandahar Airfield, where they are brought for initial interrogation.

It will likely fuel human-rights groups' fears that interrogation was being outsourced to the Afghans, he said.

Canada went into Kandahar thinking the Taliban and al-Qaida were simply “a nuisance” and there was a “ferocious under-estimation” of the kind of resistance troops would face, he said.

“The military simply had no expertise. It had been decades since they had to interrogate prisoners of war,” Wark added. “And if the military lacked that expertise, you can be sure, CSIS lacked it in spades.”

Moreover, Wark said, some hard questions need to be asked about how much knowledge CSIS had in 2006 of Afghanistan and its complex network of competing tribes.

“The answer would be very little,” he said. “They didn't have a trained body of people with the language skills, knowledge of the country, knowledge of the tribal situation, who was in charge of which warlord group, what was the nature of the Taliban. Those are all issues they had to develop an expertise on after 2006.”

In response to questions, CSIS spokeswoman Isabelle Scott said the agency does not discuss operations.

“We do have a presence in Afghanistan, and we've had one for the past few years. And we continue to provide security intelligence in Afghanistan in support of the safety and security of Canadian and allied forces on the ground,” Scott said.

“And we also continue to gather intelligence in Afghanistan in order to mitigate potential security threats to Canada which have a nexus on that country. However, we don't publicly discuss the specific issues linked to operational activities of the service.”

The activities in Kandahar caught the attention of the spy agency's inspector general, who investigated “policy gaps and inconsistencies.”

The declassified version of Eva Plunkett's 2007 certificate, a top secret report card on CSIS prepared for the public safety minister, contained no suggestion that the spy service had done anything wrong — or illegal, for that matter.

She noted that Afghanistan was “a fundamental intelligence priority” and commended the spy service for impressive work “in an extremely challenging environment.” But Plunkett warned that CSIS and National Defence lacked clear policies that would “guide future (censored) activities in this theatre.”

Agreements between the spy service and military were out of date, said the annual certificate, made public in May 2008. “I do believe that those who serve in this environment deserve to be equipped with the policy framework to guide their work.”

In May 2006, Jack Hooper, then CSIS deputy director of operations, said the spy service's efforts to help Canadian troops in Afghanistan were principally focused on acquiring intelligence to help soldiers defend themselves against attacks.

“This intelligence is known to have saved lives, uncovered weapons and arms caches, and disrupted planned terrorist attacks.”

But he did not elaborate as to exactly how CSIS obtained the valuable information.

The Security Intelligence Review Committee, a CSIS watchdog that reports to Parliament, raised concerns about the intelligence service's interaction with detainees in foreign jurisdictions in its review of the Omar Khadr file.

It said last year that when CSIS interviewed Khadr at Guantanamo Bay in 2003, there was policy governing the spy service's investigative activities outside Canada, including operational interviews abroad.

Prior to undertaking such activities, CSIS employees were required to submit a request for approval — to whom, exactly, remains classified.

The review committee found briefing notes that had been submitted prior to each visit to Guantanamo Bay, but these requests fell short of meeting the requirements outlined in policy.

Interrogating prisoners is a proper and legitimate function and is not, in any way, related to abusing or torturing them but it all adds to something of a Keystone Cops aura that surrounds the Intelligence and Military Police operations in Afghanistan and the high level direction thereof. Worse, it adds to the impressions that successive governments, Liberal and Conservative, and the defence chiefs who support them, didn’t manage the mission properly.

 

[Old Sweat]

Edward,

Thanks for posting the story. As for the story itself, it is sloppy and full of errors. Example - "about the critical early years in Kandahar when the Canadian military found itself mired in a guerrilla war it had not expected to fight." What type of war did the CF expect to fight or did we not expect to be fighting at all? That is not what the government and the CDS et al were saying at the time. It also seems to me that the first few rotos were  fighting something much closer to a conventional war than the guerilla war mentioned in the story.


More in the same vein from intelligence expert Wesley Wark, "Canada went into Kandahar thinking the Taliban and al-Qaida were simply “a nuisance” and there was a “ferocious under-estimation” of the kind of resistance troops would face."

The bloody thing is revisionistic balderdash!

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail website, is a a blog by Norman Spector that raises an interesting, Constitutional, wrinkle:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/blogs/spector-vision/mps-are-heading-in-to-a-detainee-trap/article1492658/

MPs are heading in to a detainee trap

Norman Spector

Sunday, March 7, 2010

On CBC radio last week, Liberal MP Derek Lee argued strenuously that he and any of his colleagues had the right to obtain any Afghan detainee document, and that MPs also had the right to make the documents public. No ifs, no doubts and no restrictions, according to Mr. Lee.

This being The Current, his argument went unopposed. However, before Members of Parliament head over the cliff taking their concept of parliamentary privilege with them, they should consider the government’s proposal to break the impasse very carefully.

In doing so, they should not shy away from proposing amendments to Frank Iacobucci’s mandate and to the timing of his report. However, they should understand that if they reject the proposal outright, the Conservatives’ next move will be to refer the dispute to the Supreme Court of Canada for a ruling. And, if the nine Justices are forced to choose between a process that has their former colleague determining whether officials went too far in censoring the documents in the name of national security, and Derek Lee’s arcane views of parliamentary privilege, the score will resemble one of those lopsided results we saw during the Olympics in women’s hockey. On that you, and they, can count.

The pure, partisan politics of this thing, on all sides, is obscuring some important principle, not least the right duty of the government to keep secrets.

 

[MarkOttawa]

There's another aspect to the Afghan detainee abuse matter that our media manage to ignore--willfully?

Maybe some former Liberal ministers should be worrying about their asses
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/liberal-ministers-might-do-well-to.html

Facts: The previous Liberal government and Afghan detainees
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/facts-previous-liberal-government-and.html

"Torture in Afghanistan: The Liberals knew" redux
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/12/torture-in-afghanistan-liberals-knew.html

Afghan detainees and the former Liberal government/Human rights Update
(letter in Globe and Mail)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/12/afghan-detainees-and-former-liberal.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Foxhound]

Intelligence expert Wesley Wark says the revelations are disturbing, partly because CSIS would have had no specialized knowledge of how to elicit information from Afghan prisoners.

From which orifice did he pull this?  Isn't that the raison d'etre of CSIS?

 

[Kat Stevens]

I think if I were in charge, I'd lay every single available document out for the world to read, with dates prominently highlighted.  That's the thing, there's no such thing as a controlled detonation in a shithouse, everyone gets covered in it.

 

[MarkOttawa]

From BruceR. at Flit:

Wrong-tree barking watch

This is an interesting story.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-spies-interrogated-brafghan-prisoners-insiders-reveal/article1492713/
Not sure why they're going with the CSIS involvement angle, though. The allegations about commanders putting orderly transfer to the Afghans ahead of intelligence-gathering would be more worth pursuing, I would have thought. Shows what I know.

And from the article, I'm not exactly clear what is is they're accusing CSIS of: all the witness appears to be saying is military police don't interrogate (they don't), that the Canadian Forces in 2007 had no interrogation capability of its own (they didn't) and so would have had to rely on CSIS personnel in theatre if it had done any, and that Afghan government's procedural time limits would have prevented anything more than tactical questioning to establish identity in any case. The upshot being any detainees would have been of limited intelligence value at the time. Anyone who was there surely knows all of this to be true...

...Prof. Wark's idea that Canadians were "outsourcing interrogation to the Afghans" at the time is ludicrous. In order to "outsource" we would actually have had to get something in the way of return or output, presumably. And if there was ever an item of intelligence that came from an Afghan NDS interrogation of a detainee taken on one of our ops, neither I nor my ANA counterpart ever saw it. The NDS weren't big on the whole info-sharing thing to start with, and in my conversations with them at the time were generally bitter that the dysfunctional court system was springing most of their detainees free before THEY could do any questioning, either [emphasis added, not much time for, er, abuse it would seem]...

Mark
Ottawa