I think I owe you a better explanation.
What I disagree wholeheartedly with is the idea that there are front end and back end jobs and that they are separated by a firewall. In a crew as small as an MH crew with a mission as complex and as busy as that of the MH crew, I think it is critical that we breakdown any such barriers.
For example, I fully expect the TACCO to peer forward with a jaundiced eye once in a while and ask a question if he/she sees something he doesn't like. Just because a gauge is in the cockpit doesn't mean the TACCO isn't entitled to ask my the MGB pressure is zero. And, during heavy ASW action where the back-end crew is saturated (and trust me, they get saturated), I expect the non-flying pilot to monitor the situation, back-up the TACCO on radios, and offer input into the tactical situation where appropriate.
In the case of the new MH (the Superhawk), I believe that there will simply be too many sensors and associated tasks for the backend to effectively manage them all at once. I advocate the philosophy of primary sensors and tactical nav in the back end, secondary sensors to the non-flying pilot. Granted, there will be times that the NFP is required to focus on assisting the flying pilot. But, in a modern aircraft equipped with George (autopilot) and automated system monitors, the need for the NFP to constantly monitor the FP is greatly reduced. Expecially in the case of a passive acoustic mission where 103% of the SENSO's attention will be on buoy processing, where the TACCO is fully involved in tactics and comms, and the aircraft is flying a loose holding pattern on George, it only makes sense that the NFP take on RADAR and possibly ESM. I don't think either the training bill nor the proficiency bill will be onerous because I am not suggesting that the pilots be trained to perform alll of the sensor functions but rather just the basic functions needed to monitor the system. At the first sign of contact, the sensor of interest would then be passed back to the back end for assessment and further action. (This is similar to how we used to monitor "pingers" - active buoys)
In the bad old days of the introduction of the HELTAS bird (CH-124B), the non-flying pilot was expected to maintain a manual back-up plot on a Mk-6b plotting board. Yikes. What a major PITA that was. But if a numpty in the driver's seat could maintain a decent Mk-6 plot, imagine what a trained professional could contribute to the crew with the aid of modern electronics. We just have to break a few rice bowls to get there. For example, a few years ago there was discussion about putting a display repeater in the front end so pilots could select either a slaved display from the ASN-123 (tactical computer) or a slaved image from the FLIR. Immediately the union reps came out vociferously against providing the pilots any additional information. The most vocal opponents were from within the AESOp trade who felt that pilots were incapable of interpreting the FLIR display and were better off with just a verbal commentary from the sensor expert (never mind the ICS congestion). The TACCOs were a mixed bag - some liked the idea of the pilot (particularly the Crew Commander) being able to see the tactical plot while others felt that it might lead to some CCs micromanaging the tactical situation. Pilots are not blameless either. When it was suggested that the armament control panel be moved to the TACCO's station (Because it it the TACCO who manages the weapons), there was an uproar from the front end over the "loss of control" when the fact remained that the pilot would still have the veto through the "Master Arm" switch and only the pilots can release external stores. These are the kind of attitudes the MH community needs to killl.
Something to think about - and discuss further if you wish.
Sam
