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Our North - SSE Policy Update Megathread

Inadequate vision...
I think that's right. Much of that comes from a weak foreign policy and inadequate government leadership although I have the sense there is a lack of vision throughout the CAF as well. I find that curious as most of the senior CAF folks that I've been interviewing are very aware of the issues but express lack of government and MND and DMND-buy in to give their own vision effect.
Canada cannot deploy a Heavy Force unless it has a year to get ready, or borrow/buys/steals air and sea lift, and even then, you don't have a heavy force.
We got a Leo C1 squadron into Afghanistan within three months of the need being identified. Canada concurrently executed a complex program to buy/rent a Leo C2 fleet and got them into country not that much later. Don't underestimate Canada when the hammer is down and everyone involved says "aye." As to "heavy" force let's simply say a "heavy force by Canada's standards which means MBTs, LAV6.0s and M777s"
Which is why I come back to fitting into a US Division, and having like equipment...
That's still my DS solution (especially if the MBTs are AbramsX.)
It's also an issue that you don't have a heavy armored force - so deploying it is an exercise in theory at this point.
Been there, talked about that, see my comment above. I'm a Rumsfeldian: You work with the army you got not the one you wish you had - I'll even work with TAPVs until something better comes along.
I'd argue that a comprehensive Logistical plan would have the creation of material and training of personnel included.
Yes. And long term contracts for continuous equipment output. Not quick fleet replacements followed by tumbleweeds for the next decade.
Plans only work if they are adopted.
All bureaucracies have folks who object by dragging implementation of plans out until a new regime takes the lead. They should be quickly appointed to the cocktail circuit at foreign embassies of third rate countries.

:giggle:
 
No militarization needed. Just an OiC under the Emergencies Act once an International or War Emergency is declared. One simply needs to expropriate the required engines and container cars required and a manual on how to operate an engine.

It would, however, be a lot simpler if there actually was a war plan prepared, discussed and exercised with the railroads in question in advance.

đŸ»
Granted. I was interpreting the proposed initiative as model for domestic air/coast defence; i.e. having missile systems roaming the nation's rail system in a 'hard to hit a moving target' strategy. Even at that, it would be limited on the coasts since rail touches salt water at limited locations (he said not know the range of said systems).

A plan would definitely be needed but I can't see how it could exclude the civilian crews. I don't see a bunch of military folk operating equipment on the rail network from a manual and where they have literally no equipment or facilities to be regularly trained on. Train crews have to be certified on each assigned territory for safe operation (particularly important in 'mountain-class grades). Also, I don't know what kind of reactive forces these launches create but would a launch from a typical container car damage the car and/or roadbed?

I often have difficulty with proposals that simply say 'put a gun on anything' (CCG ship, railway, lake freighter, fishing boat, taxicab, etc.) as an effective defence policy.
 
I don’t want to sound condescending (apologies to @PrairieFella if I come out that way) but they may be speaking from their experience as a crewman, which would (probably, I could be wrong) be viewing it from a unit/tactical level. That ground-level view is important but as we know from experience, rank, and postings, there is more to that. If I was about 10 years earlier in my career, I’d probably agree with them.

However 
 yes, only Infantry takes and holds ground. Even the RCAF and RCN folks know this - we can see it in Afghanistan and Ukraine. So yes, @SeaKingTacco is also correct in that the RCAF and RCN are the folks that have a hand in getting them to the point of taking/holding ground.

Stepping back, and bringing @SupersonicMax’s earlier comments that kicked this off, the question is whether Canada objectively should be an Army-centric force, or a “quicker reaction” Air/Sea-centric force. This would need to be a clean-sheet re-think, which would be tough because we all have inherent unconscious biases based on our experiences and careers - perfect example being “we should divest armour”.

There is precedent - do we become Australia and try to do everything, or New Zealand and focus on a few things? Yes, NZ divested their fighter force but anecdotally, I wouldn’t want to mess with the SOF or Infantry folks.

If we become NZ, what things do we focus on?

Note: This in itself could (and should) be a thread split.
If anything, many of the other posts should be split off. You are quite right that a discussion of SSE should be focused on the big picture. I think, though, that rather than saying if we should become Australia or New Zealand we should focus on what is needed by Canada. I get that you were using those two countries as examples, but they have their own strategic imperatives.

The CAF is an instrument of the Government of Canada. Strong Secure and Engaged expressed the priorities of Canada, North America and the world. These priorities have been considered against the likely threats. Some capabilities will be useful across all three areas, while others will be more focused on one of those. As an army officer I recognize that fighter aircraft are useful in all three areas, while my tanks might be much more focused on the world aspect. Its not all or nothing, and while a dollar spent on fighter jets cannot be spent on tanks, it should not be a "beggar thy neighbor" proposition.

Land power is certainly required for the world aspect. The recent update states that:

As a priority, Canada will meet our NATO defence commitments as they evolve in response to shifts in the global security landscape. We will continue playing an important role confronting Russian aggression through a steadfast commitment to NATO assurance and deterrence measures. Standing with our allies provides the best guarantee of our security and continued prosperity at home.

So NATO is important, and we need land power to meet a part of that requirement. Tanks are one of the key elements of land combat power, and one that we want to have as Canadian as opposed to coalition within our tactical groupings. This is due to the combined arms nature of combat at the lowest tactical levels. This isn't to say that you can't have multi-national combat teams, but it works best at those levels when you are from the same army. Our Leopards are world-class. We have deployed them before, and we have done so again. They are in Latvia now. We have others in long-term repair and overhaul, and those will then be in a position to rotate out the tanks we have there now.

I was very pleased to see this in the update:

We will explore options for upgrading or replacing our tank and light armoured vehicle fleets. Even as new technologies and techniques proliferate, main battle tanks continue to have a decisive effect on the modern battlefield and remain key to conducting land operations against conventional militaries with advanced capabilities.

If we were exclusively focused on the Indo-Pacific then we would likely see a different force mix. We are part of NATO, however, and it is important to us, so we have tanks.
 
We got a Leo C1 squadron into Afghanistan within three months of the need being identified. Canada concurrently executed a complex program to buy/rent a Leo C2 fleet and got them into country not that much later. Don't underestimate Canada when the hammer is down and everyone involved says "aye."
My only issue with your post is that occurred at times that didn't have a heavy operational drain on other assets.
At this point in time 1) Canada isn't going to find more Leo's lying around 2) Everyone would have operational needs to move equipment.


As to "heavy" force let's simply say a "heavy force by Canada's standards which means MBTs, LAV6.0s and M777s"
Following that, if you have to pick to move Abrams, Bradleys and M109's OR the CA's force - everyone with heavy lift won't be lifting the CA...
 
If anything, many of the other posts should be split off. You are quite right that a discussion of SSE should be focused on the big picture. I think, though, that rather than saying if we should become Australia or New Zealand we should focus on what is needed by Canada. I get that you were using those two countries as examples, but they have their own strategic imperatives.

The CAF is an instrument of the Government of Canada. Strong Secure and Engaged expressed the priorities of Canada, North America and the world. These priorities have been considered against the likely threats. Some capabilities will be useful across all three areas, while others will be more focused on one of those. As an army officer I recognize that fighter aircraft are useful in all three areas, while my tanks might be much more focused on the world aspect. Its not all or nothing, and while a dollar spent on fighter jets cannot be spent on tanks, it should not be a "beggar thy neighbor" proposition.

Land power is certainly required for the world aspect. The recent update states that:

As a priority, Canada will meet our NATO defence commitments as they evolve in response to shifts in the global security landscape. We will continue playing an important role confronting Russian aggression through a steadfast commitment to NATO assurance and deterrence measures. Standing with our allies provides the best guarantee of our security and continued prosperity at home.

So NATO is important, and we need land power to meet a part of that requirement. Tanks are one of the key elements of land combat power, and one that we want to have as Canadian as opposed to coalition within our tactical groupings. This is due to the combined arms nature of combat at the lowest tactical levels. This isn't to say that you can't have multi-national combat teams, but it works best at those levels when you are from the same army. Our Leopards are world-class. We have deployed them before, and we have done so again. They are in Latvia now. We have others in long-term repair and overhaul, and those will then be in a position to rotate out the tanks we have there now.

I was very pleased to see this in the update:

We will explore options for upgrading or replacing our tank and light armoured vehicle fleets. Even as new technologies and techniques proliferate, main battle tanks continue to have a decisive effect on the modern battlefield and remain key to conducting land operations against conventional militaries with advanced capabilities.

If we were exclusively focused on the Indo-Pacific then we would likely see a different force mix. We are part of NATO, however, and it is important to us, so we have tanks.
Agreed on the Australia and NZ points, and I was really using them as force structure (not strat imperative) examples.
 
Re the Infantry requirement -

My evolving take is that infantry is necessary to seal the deal, as the final commitment. However the aim should be to commit as few infanteers as possible. Minimizing the number of infantry necessary, and concurrently minimizing infantry casualties, means maximizing the support available and using machines wherever possible so that infanteers are not put at risk.

We can still have an infantry-centric force but one that minimizes infantry boots and spends money on armour, artillery, UxVs, air, moon launched rocks* and logistics.

*Moon is a Harsh Mistress" Robert Heinlein.
 
Re the Infantry requirement -

My evolving take is that infantry is necessary to seal the deal, as the final commitment. However the aim should be to commit as few infanteers as possible. Minimizing the number of infantry necessary, and concurrently minimizing infantry casualties, means maximizing the support available and using machines wherever possible so that infanteers are not put at risk.

We can still have an infantry-centric force but one that minimizes infantry boots and spends money on armour, artillery, UxVs, air, moon launched rocks* and logistics.

*Moon is a Harsh Mistress" Robert Heinlein.
So we’ll just ignore the key lessons learned from Ukraine then.
 
No, we won't.

One of the lessons that I am taking from Ukraine is that it is easier to create infanteers than it is to generate guns, tanks and missiles and that without the guns, tanks and missiles you need a lot more infanteers.
Fire can support movement (Western Doctrine). Movement can support fire (Russian Doctrine).

Movement without fire due to cost restriction (Canadian doctrine) only works during Maple Resolve.
 
Our commitment to NATO is as much political as military. Through our putting troops on the ground to deter Russian aggression we are presenting a united political front with our NATO allies and I think that, as much as their military utility, means Canada needs to maintain capabilities like armour.

Now I'm going propose a bit of a 180 degree idea here from what I've proposed in the past. I've always been banging the drum for the CAF to buy US vehicles and kit wherever possible to maximize our interoperability with our most important ally. IF however we accept that NATO and our Latvia Brigade are going to be the primary focus for the mechanized elements of our Army then I'm changing my mind.

Our primary partners in the Multinational Brigade are going to be Denmark and Sweden. Denmark also commands the Multinational Division under which our Brigade will operate. Both of these countries use the Leopard 2 and the CV90 for their mechanized forces.

My eventual goal would be to harmonize our Latvian equipment with that used by Denmark and Sweden in our Multinational Brigade. We're already using Leopards. We should begin a process to replace our Latvian-deployed LAVs with CV90's. As we get more CV90's I'd scrap the idea of having one of our Light Battalions be the fly-over reinforcements for the Brigade and instead have a pre-positioned CV90 Battalion that our flyover Mechanized troops can fall in on. I'd then have a complete replacement set of vehicles for our Latvia Brigade placed in storage sites in Denmark (far enough away from front to avoid being destroyed in place but close enough to fairly quickly move into theatre...along with allied Danish reinforcements). A 3rd (training) set of vehicles would be kept in Canada for our flyover/reinforcement troops to train with.

I'd then enter joint procurement plans with Denmark and Sweden to upgrade our tanks and IFV's to the same standard when it's time for our current vehicles to be replaced.

Our Mechanized Division (including Reserve elements) would be primarily focused on manning/reinforcing the Latvia Brigade. Our Light Division would then be free to focus on full interoperability with the Americans. I'd propose training to integrate a Brigade into the 11th Airborne Division which would give us an Arctic capability to help defend Canada/North America. And with the 11th falling under I Corps it would also provide options for Pacific deployments to support our allies in the Indo-Pacific.
 
No, we won't.

One of the lessons that I am taking from Ukraine is that it is easier to create infanteers than it is to generate guns, tanks and missiles and that without the guns, tanks and missiles you need a lot more infanteers.
The internet ate my initial reply.

It is exceedingly easy to create meat shields and cannon fodder, however it is not easy to create formed units that can anything effectively beyond sitting in a trench.

You need a lot of Infantry period. Infantry attack (seize) or defend (hold) ground. You need other arms too, but believing that a professional infantry can be created overnight is a fallacy, and you need those troops to effectively train to conduct operations, as CPX’s only do so much.
 
No, we won't.

One of the lessons that I am taking from Ukraine is that it is easier to create infanteers than it is to generate guns, tanks and missiles and that without the guns, tanks and missiles you need a lot more infanteers.

Hence why Ukraine has had such an easy time generating man power ? Or why the initial Russian invasion didn’t stall out for lack of infantry to clear ground ?

What they both have had difficulty with is generating units, that can effectively operate at Bn level. With high levels of moral, and the ability to coordinate both with their sub units and with others. Yes it’s easy for Russia to throw a Mobik in a trench, but making them a usable infantry unit is a whole other issue.
 
There is no free lunch in Defense (or Defence for those who take it less seriously ;) )

Based on the PY that the CAF has (or perhaps bodies is a better term as the Res world doesn’t like to be referred to by PY or perhaps more insultingly .258 PY ;) oh that’s only 90% pay so .231 a PY for a Class A reservist.. ) the CAF shouldn’t be on bad shape - however those bodies don’t seem to add up to actually folks in uniform, or at least equipped and deployable.

The CA is devoid a great deal of equipment and a bunch of rather pointless paper Divisions.

The RCAF is flying museum pieces for the most part.

The RCN has trouble crewing its museum pieces.

Honestly you guys could hit 4-5% GDP with 1-2% on Capital Equipment and still be in rough shape for several years.
 
"cannon fodder"
"guns, tanks and missiles"

Cannon fodder - stuff eaten by cannons

Guns, tanks and missiles - all reducible to missiles

Missile: an object (such as a weapon) thrown or projected usually so as to strike something at a distance
stones, artillery shells, bullets, and rockets are missiles

Cannons throw missiles.
Cannons are guns that throw missiles.
Tanks are armoured, self-propelled guns that throw missiles.

As far as I am concerned everything that flies, from bullets on up, including PGMs and UAVs, are all missiles and are all designed to eat cannon fodder.

More friendly missiles means fewer enemy troops.
 
"cannon fodder"
"guns, tanks and missiles"

Cannon fodder - stuff eaten by cannons

Guns, tanks and missiles - all reducible to missiles



Cannons throw missiles.
Cannons are guns that throw missiles.
Tanks are armoured, self-propelled guns that throw missiles.

As far as I am concerned everything that flies, from bullets on up, including PGMs and UAVs, are all missiles and are all designed to eat cannon fodder.

More friendly missiles means fewer enemy troops.
It isn’t a binary equation.

You need a lot of munitions, equipment and personnel to fight a war.
 
Our commitment to NATO is as much political as military. Through our putting troops on the ground to deter Russian aggression we are presenting a united political front with our NATO allies and I think that, as much as their military utility, means Canada needs to maintain capabilities like armour.

Now I'm going propose a bit of a 180 degree idea here from what I've proposed in the past. I've always been banging the drum for the CAF to buy US vehicles and kit wherever possible to maximize our interoperability with our most important ally. IF however we accept that NATO and our Latvia Brigade are going to be the primary focus for the mechanized elements of our Army then I'm changing my mind.

Our primary partners in the Multinational Brigade are going to be Denmark and Sweden. Denmark also commands the Multinational Division under which our Brigade will operate. Both of these countries use the Leopard 2 and the CV90 for their mechanized forces.

My eventual goal would be to harmonize our Latvian equipment with that used by Denmark and Sweden in our Multinational Brigade. We're already using Leopards. We should begin a process to replace our Latvian-deployed LAVs with CV90's. As we get more CV90's I'd scrap the idea of having one of our Light Battalions be the fly-over reinforcements for the Brigade and instead have a pre-positioned CV90 Battalion that our flyover Mechanized troops can fall in on. I'd then have a complete replacement set of vehicles for our Latvia Brigade placed in storage sites in Denmark (far enough away from front to avoid being destroyed in place but close enough to fairly quickly move into theatre...along with allied Danish reinforcements). A 3rd (training) set of vehicles would be kept in Canada for our flyover/reinforcement troops to train with.

I'd then enter joint procurement plans with Denmark and Sweden to upgrade our tanks and IFV's to the same standard when it's time for our current vehicles to be replaced.

Our Mechanized Division (including Reserve elements) would be primarily focused on manning/reinforcing the Latvia Brigade. Our Light Division would then be free to focus on full interoperability with the Americans. I'd propose training to integrate a Brigade into the 11th Airborne Division which would give us an Arctic capability to help defend Canada/North America. And with the 11th falling under I Corps it would also provide options for Pacific deployments to support our allies in the Indo-Pacific.

Certainly our involvement and commitment in NATO is political. The military aspect only derives itself from the political.

Our commitment to Latvia is primarily political due to the NATO politics that saw us go there in the first place. There are no strategic military reasons for us to be there due to pure Cdn defensive reasons.

It’s due to that reason and the fact of strategic realities of the US role in sustaining any NATO peer on peer war both militarily and economically that I would be reluctant to do as your proposing vs aligning our entire force structure and equipment with the Americans.

Aligning with the Nordic countries might be easier in peace and likely fits with only outfitting enough of the army with equipment to support the Latvian deployed forces but that doesn’t likely hold true for an ability to sustain the Cdn Army through a couple of years of intensive peer on peer operations.
 
The RCAF is flying museum pieces for the most part.
lol, so are most other countries including the great almighty United States.
The RCN has trouble crewing its museum pieces.
Again most major Navies around the world are using older Ships. At least Canada's have cleanish non flammable drinking water.
Honestly you guys could hit 4-5% GDP with 1-2% on Capital Equipment and still be in rough shape for several years.
We could also get serious and start domestic production of said equipment. It would would mean wonders for our manufacturing sector and Military.
but we have Quebec and Ontario who get in the way of most good manufacturing.
 
Certainly our involvement and commitment in NATO is political. The military aspect only derives itself from the political.

Our commitment to Latvia is primarily political due to the NATO politics that saw us go there in the first place. There are no strategic military reasons for us to be there due to pure Cdn defensive reasons.

It’s due to that reason and the fact of strategic realities of the US role in sustaining any NATO peer on peer war both militarily and economically that I would be reluctant to do as your proposing vs aligning our entire force structure and equipment with the Americans.

Aligning with the Nordic countries might be easier in peace and likely fits with only outfitting enough of the army with equipment to support the Latvian deployed forces but that doesn’t likely hold true for an ability to sustain the Cdn Army through a couple of years of intensive peer on peer operations.
Would be really nice if NATO STANDARD was


In the ideal world

There would be a heavy track standard
MBT
ARV
AEV
AVLB

A ‘medium’ track standard
IFV
FIST
SEV
Mortar
ATGM
AD
C-UAS
Ambulance
MRT
Etc



LAV 6.0 /Stryker 2.0 (DoubleV) would be the medium wheeled standard with similar variants to the track

With a common logistics vehicle
a HIMARS systems, and PLS etc.
 
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