Winning The Deep Fight

[tomahawk6]

Thought provoking article entitled "Winning-deep-fight-return-echeloned-reconnaissance-security".

https://mwi.usma.edu/winning-deep-fight-return-echeloned-reconnaissance-security/

"The dynamic, multi-domain battlefield of the future will undoubtedly create challenges for a wide range of the US Army’s functions. This is especially true for senior tactical echelons like corps and divisions as they modernize and focus on large-scale ground combat against highly capable adversaries. The requirement to execute reconnaissance and security operations, in particular, has emerged as an area of concern for Army forces as they prepare to fight across more expansive and lethal battlefields. So where should we begin looking for solutions to enable future success? As with many dilemmas about the future of war, pertinent insights may be found in the past.
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 illustrated how corps and divisions can employ echeloned reconnaissance and security forces to shape conditions for success during large-scale ground combat operations. In that offensive desert campaign, senior tactical commands relied on dedicated armored cavalry regiments (ACR) and division cavalry squadrons (DIVCAV) with cross-domain capabilities to fight for information, conduct counter-reconnaissance, prevent surprise, and more generally provide freedom of action for main body elements. VII Corps and the 1st Infantry Division, in particular, benefited from the coordinated actions of 2nd ACR and 1-4 CAV, respectively, as they maneuvered to envelop and destroy entrenched forces of the Iraqi Republican Guard."

 

[daftandbarmy]

Thought provoking article entitled "Winning-deep-fight-return-echeloned-reconnaissance-security".

https://mwi.usma.edu/winning-deep-fight-return-echeloned-reconnaissance-security/

"The dynamic, multi-domain battlefield of the future will undoubtedly create challenges for a wide range of the US Army’s functions. This is especially true for senior tactical echelons like corps and divisions as they modernize and focus on large-scale ground combat against highly capable adversaries. The requirement to execute reconnaissance and security operations, in particular, has emerged as an area of concern for Army forces as they prepare to fight across more expansive and lethal battlefields. So where should we begin looking for solutions to enable future success? As with many dilemmas about the future of war, pertinent insights may be found in the past.
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 illustrated how corps and divisions can employ echeloned reconnaissance and security forces to shape conditions for success during large-scale ground combat operations. In that offensive desert campaign, senior tactical commands relied on dedicated armored cavalry regiments (ACR) and division cavalry squadrons (DIVCAV) with cross-domain capabilities to fight for information, conduct counter-reconnaissance, prevent surprise, and more generally provide freedom of action for main body elements. VII Corps and the 1st Infantry Division, in particular, benefited from the coordinated actions of 2nd ACR and 1-4 CAV, respectively, as they maneuvered to envelop and destroy entrenched forces of the Iraqi Republican Guard."

I wonder how that might have to be rewritten for a peer/ near peer enemy vs. the Iraqis....

 

[tomahawk6]

That op saw armor warfare not seen sine WW2 and maybe the Israeli wars.

 

[Haligonian]

We've been discussing some of this over in "The Brigade Fight" thread. https://army.ca/forums/threads/129987.50.html

You may find this article interesting as well. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2019/Jennings-Reconnaissance-Security/

From my latest post there on this topic:

We've discussed structure, and deep operations.  To this I'd like to add reconnaissance and security (R&S).

The US is looking at potentially re-establishing R&S formations to enable Divs and Corps maneuver. This sees Divisions and Corps shaping deep operations and enabling the close fight for Bdes and Bns.  The US assumption is that they must/should fight for information over conducting "sneaky peeky" recce. They see a gap in their ability to echelon R&S above Bde.  This is being driven by a desire to re-establish their ability to fight major combat operations against a competent adversary.  In the article at the link below a couple of options are examined:

1.  Maintain the current initiative that sees select BCTs gain a R&S role.  This sees the use of standard, infantry, stryker, and armoured BCTs gain an R&S role and a BPT task to support a Div or Corps HQ.  There is some questions as to whether a standard BCT can be sufficiently competent in this role while maintaining their standard skills.

2.  Re role the current BCT reconnaissance squadrons into a combination of the old Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs), Divcavs, and reconnaissance troops (vice squadrons) for the Bdes.

3. Re role select BCTs into modular Cavalry formations.  This sees the option of detaching units to Divs or giving an entire formation to a Corps.  It, however, costs the army a number of line BCTs.

4. Reorganize select BCTs into recce-strike TFs.  This is more aspirational and would see these formations designed to fight and win in a multi domain, blah blah blah.... Essentially similar to 2 or 3 with some spicy technology thrown in.

Article here: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2019/Jennings-Reconnaissance-Security/

The American assumption is that they need to fight for information over doing stealthy reconnaissance. Further, they seem hesitant to use a line unit to conduct this task as they believe it is either too specialized or it's too many skills for the formation to master.  I'm sympathetic to such a perspective but I prefer Jim Storr's research.  Fighting for information, while maybe enabling tempo initially, will cost surprise, and surprise is the battle and campaign winner.

For those interested on that you can check out this oldy but a goody of a thread with the accompanying article. https://army.ca/forums/threads/35526.0.html

There is a difference between the offence and defence on this.  On the offence we want stealthy recce that can enable surprise.  On the defence when we may want a guard that can fight then we need R&S forces that are heavier.  The solution here would seem to be to assign line sub units to the task to support the Bde R&S forces.  There will be a temptation to assign a tank sqn to this but if you only have one that probably isn't the place for it and so it would have to fall to mech coys.  The advantage of this is that the deception value of mech infantry will be high as the enemy will be expecting to see LAV's and dug in infantry in the MBA. 

There is a substantial battle to be fought in the covering force area that requires some thought.  How do you prevent yourself from being deceived by the enemy's covering force? How do we deceive the enemy if we're on the defence?  What are the indicators that you've fought your way through to the enemy's MDA?  What kind of combat support do you offer to your R&S forces understanding that they could be lost by enemy action?  Counter battery as an example.

It's interesting to see the US looking at assigning standard BCTs to the R&S task. This seems like a likely employment opportunity for a Canadian Bde in any contingency that sees real fighting against a competent opponent.  A Canadian mech Bde could be tasked to support a US or Brit formation along its flanks or perhaps in front of it although that seems less likely.  It seems like this is an area that we ought to be thinking more about.

 

[Kirkhill]

For years I have heard recce types debate the fight for info or info by stealth issue.

I don't think it ever really dawned on me, until know, seeing the conflation of the Reconnaissance AND Security, that I might be grokking the security/screening part of the equation.  I've seen it referenced before, and understood it but never really appreciated it until now.  Security seemed to be very much a secondary task - I suppose given the lt cavalry history of our Brit-Canadian forces and the lack of punching power that kind of made sense to me.

The US Army "fight for intelligence" capability, is that in some ways more of a red herring?  Is the primary focus of their heavy cavalry that of keeping the enemy at bay and creating manoeuvre room for the main force?

Essentially they maintain constant pressure on the enemy like a boxer maintaining distance with a series of left jabs while wearing them down, looking for openings and opportunities to deploy the main force, the right hook?

In that sense their cavalry make much more sense as a tactical force engaged in security than British Canadian cavalry which is focused more on the recce end of things.

 

[daftandbarmy]

For years I have heard recce types debate the fight for info or info by stealth issue.

I don't think it ever really dawned on me, until know, seeing the conflation of the Reconnaissance AND Security, that I might be grokking the security/screening part of the equation.  I've seen it referenced before, and understood it but never really appreciated it until now.  Security seemed to be very much a secondary task - I suppose given the lt cavalry history of our Brit-Canadian forces and the lack of punching power that kind of made sense to me.

The US Army "fight for intelligence" capability, is that in some ways more of a red herring?  Is the primary focus of their heavy cavalry that of keeping the enemy at bay and creating manoeuvre room for the main force?

Essentially they maintain constant pressure on the enemy like a boxer maintaining distance with a series of left jabs while wearing them down, looking for openings and opportunities to deploy the main force, the right hook?

In that sense their cavalry make much more sense as a tactical force engaged in security than British Canadian cavalry which is focused more on the recce end of things.

Anyone can do security IMHO. Seriously. I don't even know why it's a 'thing' these days.

Recce, noisy or silent, not so much.

 

[FJAG]

Not sure where our armour doctrine is heading to these days but I'm pretty sure that the Tank regiment in a brigade like the LdSh shouldn't have a recce squadron but a third tank squadron while brigade recce should be an entirely separate recce regiment with two or three recce squadrons and its own integral tank squadron in support.  :2c:

:cheers:

 

[tomahawk6]

Not sure where our armour doctrine is heading to these days but I'm pretty sure that the Tank regiment in a brigade like the LdSh shouldn't have a recce squadron but a third tank squadron while brigade recce should be an entirely separate recce regiment with two or three recce squadrons and its own integral tank squadron in support.  :2c:

:cheers:

Think recon squadron/battalion. I like the organization of our armored cav regiment.There are 2 squadrons ,an aviation squadron FA Bn and support squadron..