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Why is it Canadians do so well in battle?

FormerHorseGuard

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Why is it no matter the battle or the war, Canadian Troops always seem to be the troops that take the battle to the enemy? Why does Canada with always one of the smallest armies in the world seem to punch above its weight class and win? On D-Day it was the Canadians who made it the further inland than any other Allied army. What makes us such great warriors? The water, the climate and weather we live in, is the breeding program, is it the fact we are too stubborn to give up and retreat, or it is the fact Canadians are the best when comes to doing task and we fight for the guy besides us not for the glory or the flag, but for friends?

This is a question I have been thinking all day about. Any answers? This is a serious question.
 
Depends on the Battles of which you look at.

Some are just due to pure unadulterated "luck".

Some due to our training and the amount of 'initiative' that we expect of our soldiers.

Some due to better technology - equipment, signals, etc.
 
FormerHorseGuard said:
Why is it no matter the battle or the war, Canadian Troops always seem to be the troops that take the battle to the enemy? Why does Canada with always one of the smallest armies in the world seem to punch above its weight class and win? On D-Day it was the Canadians who made it the further inland than any other Allied army. What makes us such great warriors? The water, the climate and weather we live in, is the breeding program, is it the fact we are too stubborn to give up and retreat, or it is the fact Canadians are the best when comes to doing task and we fight for the guy besides us not for the glory or the flag, but for friends?

This is a question I have been thinking all day about. Any answers? This is a serious question.

Not all of our battles were successes, Verrières Ridge being one notable example.
 
FormerHorseGuard said:
Why is it no matter the battle or the war, Canadian Troops always seem to be the troops that take the battle to the enemy? Why does Canada with always one of the smallest armies in the world seem to punch above its weight class and win? On D-Day it was the Canadians who made it the further inland than any other Allied army. What makes us such great warriors? The water, the climate and weather we live in, is the breeding program, is it the fact we are too stubborn to give up and retreat, or it is the fact Canadians are the best when comes to doing task and we fight for the guy besides us not for the glory or the flag, but for friends?

This is a question I have been thinking all day about. Any answers? This is a serious question.

I suggests you read up on Beaumont-Hamel and Operation Totalize (Hill 140)... Despite the majority of our combat history being quite outstanding; there were some embarrassing defeats.
 
FormerHorseGuard said:
Why is it no matter the battle or the war, Canadian Troops always seem to be the troops that take the battle to the enemy? Why does Canada with always one of the smallest armies in the world seem to punch above its weight class and win? On D-Day it was the Canadians who made it the further inland than any other Allied army. What makes us such great warriors? The water, the climate and weather we live in, is the breeding program, is it the fact we are too stubborn to give up and retreat, or it is the fact Canadians are the best when comes to doing task and we fight for the guy besides us not for the glory or the flag, but for friends?

This is a question I have been thinking all day about. Any answers? This is a serious question.

It's interesting you bring this up.  Being in Australia, you could replace "Canadian" with "ANZAC" in your paragraph and the exact same thing is said around ANZAC Day and Remembrance Day. 

I'm not saying one is better than the other, just noting the similarities (and I'm sure that the US, UK, etc. would have similar sentiments in the most part.)
 
One comment I heard many years ago in a discussion of the Canadian successes in WWI was that they didn't know the meaning of the work "Duck".

I suspect that a lot came from the Canadian sense of bravado and adventurism from being colonials, and not being under the old country sense of class and propriety. 
 
I can't recall the name of the book but I once read an excellent comparison of the 'shock troops' of the Empire (Canada and Australia) with the British Army in WW1.

Why did we colonials do so well? Apparently, largely because we kept our (single) Corps up to strength, largely as a result of not having to take on the cost of fielding the gigantic armies forced upon the British. We were also able to 'negotiate' for more support as a result of the influence and support of national level leaders for relatively low level commanders e.g., Currie at Passchendaele was able to lever more artillery support out of the British.

The author (a former SNCO in the British Army himself) also argued that we were less constrained by the Officers' Mess class system and were more willing to CFR high performing, battle tested NCOs and soldiers. This resulted in more skilled and experienced battlefield level commanders.

WW2? Copp's excellent book 'Cinderella Army' has a good warts and all description:

Copp's goal is to establish the reputation of the Canadian Army in the face of its international detractors who have 'underrated' the achievements of the Canadians and 'overrated' the effectiveness of the Germans in the last campaigns of the war. But his purpose does not include overlooking the mistakes and weaknesses of the Canadians. Indeed, he challenges the conventional wisdom that portrays the development of the Canadian Army in northwest Europe as a steady progression from an uneven and mistake-prone army in the weeks following D-Day into an efficient and tough fighting force by the end of the war. Copp argues, in fact, that the Canadian Army, despite its overall success, 'continued to experience both success and failure at the command, staff, and combat levels.'

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/university_of_toronto_quarterly/v077/77.1.mackenzie01.pdf
 
There is no easy "one size fits all" answer, and the situation in the Great War was quite different to that in the Second World War. In the First World War the Canadian Corps progressed from one division to a two, then three and finally four division corps. In the process there were screw ups galore, but finally by the end of 1916 the Canadian Corps had gelled and the enthusiastic amateurism had been replaced by a professional attitude. The corps had matured under the leadership of LGen Julien Byng, a British officer, and a cadre of excellent British staff officers. From Vimy Ridge in April 1917 through to the end of the war it can be claimed that the corps did not lose a major battle, and some of the successes were spectacular.

In the Second War the army grew to full size without being committed to a major battle and most of the commanders were untested before they fought for the first time. Canadian generalship, with exceptions such as Simonds, Keefler and Hoffmeister, was not up to the standard of the Canadian Corps in 1918, but if the war had lasted another year this failing, in my opinion, would have been corrected.

In both wars the Canadians were not afraid to look for other solutions. Examples include in the First War, the development of machine guns as a weapon system and not just a support weapon and the Canadian Independent Force. In the Second War the major example was the armoured personnel carrier, but there also were the armoured engineer vehicle, the land mattress rocket system, the use of radar as a mortar locating system and the use of artillery firing from landing craft in support of amphibious assaults.

The screwups were primarily because of inexperience, along with the old boys club nature of the selection of senior officers who rose without time in battle to weed out the incompetent and the unlucky.
 
I agree with Old Sweat's comments, especially regarding the First World War. I would add that Canada's most significant contributions to the Second World War were not on the conventional, military battlefields. Our most significant contribution was, in fact, made by civilians, not soldiers. We moves from a minor industrial country to a global powerhouse in just over three years. We were a HUGE part, a disproportionately important part of Roosevelt's "Arsenal of Democracy." Canada was blessed with some excellent industrial management (a far cry fro  today) and, of course, a government that, literally, "got out of the way." The second major contribution was in uniform but it was here, at home: the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The third most important contribution did involve combat: the Battle of the Atlantic was the only really decisive battle of the Second World War - as long as we won that, the Germans could have defeated the Russians, or vice versa for that matter, and the Anglo-American (and Canadian and Australian) 'world' would have been "safe." Canada's contribution was not always very effective - in, especially, 1941/42 we had too few qualified sailors in too many ships - our fast growing industrial capacity outstripped the RCN's capacity to recruit and train men and women. But: we had the ships and even when they were not doing as well as they could and should have they were doing most of what was needed. By 1943 the RCN was combat effective, joint RCN/RCAF operations were beating back the Germans in the dreaded "black hole," and a Canadian, RAdm Leonard W Murray was in a supreme or theatre allied command position as Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic.

So, I would invite you to attach three faces to Canada in the Second World War:

original.1294.jpg
LeadersLeckie.jpg

CD Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, known as the "Minister of Everything" during the war, with a Canadian worker, notably a female. Air Marshal Robert Leckie, head of the BCATP

LeadersMurray.jpg

and Rear Admiral Leonard Murray
 
The Soviets didn't think much of us in 1977 see page 12

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1700321/1980-08-25.pdf

 
Colin P said:
The Soviets didn't think much of us in 1977 see page 12

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1700321/1980-08-25.pdf

Considering that 1977 was close to the bottom for the army that assessment is about right. If I am correct in my recollection the "mechanized battle group" in CFE fielded six mechanized companies, two tank and one reconnaissance squadron supported by a CER, a tactical helicopter squadron and an 18 gun SP artillery regiment. That was not a very potent organization, perhaps a bit more than half of what we had seven years before, not counting the loss of our nuclear firepower.

At that time the direction to the MND by the central agencies was to maintain a "minimum military capability" whatever the heck that was. Whenever anybody won an international competition or excelled somewhere, the grownups went in panic mode in expectation of a budget cut for exceeding the direction. I got this from a couple of GOFOs who were dead serious. 
 
Old Sweat said:
Considering that 1977 was close to the bottom for the army that assessment is about right. If I am correct in my recollection the "mechanized battle group" in CFE fielded six mechanized companies, two tank and one reconnaissance squadron supported by a CER, a tactical helicopter squadron and an 18 gun SP artillery regiment. That was not a very potent organization, perhaps a bit more than half of what we had seven years before, not counting the loss of our nuclear firepower.

At that time the direction to the MND by the central agencies was to maintain a "minimum military capability" whatever the heck that was. Whenever anybody won an international competition or excelled somewhere, the grownups went in panic mode in expectation of a budget cut for exceeding the direction. I got this from a couple of GOFOs who were dead serious.

Also this document claims to be based on some type of mathematical assessment of the various units.  The low numerical rating likely has much more to do with the relative size of the Canadian mechanized battle group compared to various Divisions with which it is being compared than any kind of qualitative comparison between them on a soldier to soldier basis.
 
Old Sweat said:
Considering that 1977 was close to the bottom for the army that assessment is about right. If I am correct in my recollection the "mechanized battle group" in CFE fielded six mechanized companies, two tank and one reconnaissance squadron supported by a CER, a tactical helicopter squadron and an 18 gun SP artillery regiment. That was not a very potent organization, perhaps a bit more than half of what we had seven years before, not counting the loss of our nuclear firepower.

At that time the direction to the MND by the central agencies was to maintain a "minimum military capability" whatever the heck that was. Whenever anybody won an international competition or excelled somewhere, the grownups went in panic mode in expectation of a budget cut for exceeding the direction. I got this from a couple of GOFOs who were dead serious.

Add the MBTs in 1977 were technically WW2 Vintage ( first trialled in 1945) Centurians, the Leo 1s being a couple of years away, and all the sub units were under strength.  The Rifle Coys  and the Support weapons platoons ( ADP, Mortar etc) would rely on a quick flyover of mainly reservists to flesh them out

GR66 said:
Also this document claims to be based on some type of mathematical assessment of the various units.  The low numerical rating likely has much more to do with the relative size of the Canadian mechanized battle group compared to various Divisions with which it is being compared than any kind of qualitative comparison between them on a soldier to soldier basis.

That is a factor as well. 4 CMBG was technically a Bde Group, albeit an understreagth  one, comparing it to a Division it will not come out favourably
 
These are good descriptions of why Canada did so well in the tough fight through NW Europe in WW2, earning the title 'Cinderella on the Left'

An excellent book by Terry Copp:

Cinderella Army: http://www.amazon.com/Cinderella-Army-Canadians-Northwest-1944-1945/dp/0802095224


An interesting film series:

Cinderella on the Left:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLAWYBwudZk

 
I have been trying to get all this into "the big picture" and have a few points to offer. I have been studying Canada's wars/conflicts going back to the Fenian invasions of 1866, but without getting too deep into the Great War. Recently I have been trying to fill that gap. There are, to my mind, a few recurring themes:

a. good discipline with an emphasis on the important stuff. I know we have all met the stereotypical sergeant major types who infest the rear areas, but battlefield discipline has almost uniformly been intelligent and effective.

b. it might be the climate and a national personality that accepts there is no such thing as good weather, but there seems to be an attitude of not giving in and not getting into too much self pity.

c. a desire of mastery of the craft seems to be in our military DNA.

d. we realize we are not going to get much publicity or recognition from our Allies who have much larger military and publicity machines as well as well developed national egos. If you read The Longest Day or saw the movie taken from the book, you could be excused for not knowing Canadians were part of the Normandy Invasion. So, as Herbert Farlie Wood wrote in The Private War of Jacket Coates, his Korean War novel, we just hunker down, check out the local females and get on with the task at hand.

We all can no doubt quote examples that disprove this, but in general I sincerely believe my points are valid. I might add that our non-mobilized force, that is the one that existed except for 1914-1919 and 1939-1945, has had to struggle to against governmental neglect and public indifference, and maybe that has something to do with the above factors. Certainly, there is something akin to a military sub-culture with many members being second generation or more career service members.
 
As far as WWI goes, as was mentioned earlier, LGen Sir Julien Byng was an exceptional leader of the Canadian Corps.  When he handed over the reins of I Cdn Corps to LGen Sir Arthur Currie, Currie inherited a professional cohesive force.  As a Canadian himself, Currie knew he didn't have the manpower at his disposal as did the other major combatants.  He genuinely cared about the men in his command and had no interest in engaging in battles of attrition because he knew Canada couldn't easily refill depleted ranks.  He made meticulous battle plans for his Corps and the preparations were painstaking.  Down to the lowest ranks, maps and orders were given so that even Privates and Lance Corporals could continue on with their mission if NCO's and Officers fell in battle.  Currie also implemented a policy of battle rehearsals in which Units were given the opportunity to practice their assaults in safety of the rear and sandtable maps were created so all men could visually see their objectives and how the Units on their flanks were going to operate.  Right down to the Section level, the men knew exactly what their objectives were.  This was unheard of in other Armies.

The only other Army in WWI that was comparable was the ANZAC Corps, and their reasons for success mirrored ours.  In fact, had WWI dragged on into 1919, many sources speculate the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George wanted to replace Gen. Sir Douglas Haig as the overall commander of the entire BEF with Sir Arthur Currie as he had grown tired of Gen. Haig's Generalship of the BEF.
 
reccecrewman said:
The only other Army in WWI that was comparable was the ANZAC Corps, and their reasons for success mirrored ours.  In fact, had WWI dragged on into 1919, many sources speculate the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George wanted to replace Gen. Sir Douglas Haig as the overall commander of the entire BEF with Sir Arthur Currie as he had grown tired of Gen. Haig's Generalship of the BEF.

Source?
 
Both the Canadian and the ANZAC Corps had one advantage that the other Corps in the BEF did not enjoy. The two colonial corps were in effect national armies of fixed composition and did not suffer from playing musical divisions. The BEF tended to leave corps in one location so the commander and staff would become familiar with local conditions and supposedly could then better adapt newly attached divisions to the peculiarities of that section of the front.

Continuity was also a factor for the Canadian Corps. Sir Arthur Currie, his four divisional commanders and his gunner had all fought at 2nd Ypres in April 1915. This corporate cross-pollination could only have worked to the advantage of the corps as a whole. A large number of the brigade commanders and CsRA also fell into this category, which was quite different from the situation in First Canadian Army in the Second World War. (I have not researched the sappers, but suspect it may also have been true for them.) Perhaps the only general who had not a lot of time with the corps was Brigadier General RH Massie, who commanded the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery, and he held his position from January 1917 to October 1918 when he was invalided back to the UK.
 
recceguy said:

I don't want to infringe on any possible copyrights, so I'll direct you to David Lloyd George's personal war diary. Page 1,367.  It's open to interpretation, but how many other Dominion Generals could he be referring to? Possibly Monash for sure.  Open to debate I guess.
 
Because we were 'Not glamorous, but effective'

http://web.viu.ca/davies/H355H.Cda.WWI/Canadians%20and%20the%20Set%20Piece%20Attack%20(1994.pdf
 
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