Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

[SupersonicMax]

In the end, I don't think who owns the aircraft makes a difference.  In the US and NATO doctrine, all air assets fall under the C/JFACC, regardless of the domestic affiliation.  It provides a better efficiency in how the assets are used and better coordination.

CAS is only one of the missions air assets do.  It should not always be pri 1.  Priorities are normally dictated by the JFC, after consultation with the elements commanders (ACC, LCC and MCC).  Even when the troops are on the move, qhile there should be assets available for CAS, on call or dedicated CAS is generally a big waste of efforts.  Get airplanes up with bombs, assign them a target and if troopa need them, re-role them into CAS.  Keeps the pressure on the strategic front while providing flexibility to the troops.

 

[cupper]

Blame the foresight of the military-industrial complex for having the wherewithal to spread production, operation and maintenance aspects of weapons programs and platforms across many many congressional districts.

Members of Congress cut programs and platforms at their own peril. And thus we get ill considered decisions to maintain outdated, obsolete or unwanted equipment and programs all in the name of not losing votes in the next election.

I found it interesting that when the decommissioned the Iowa and Wisconsin after the first Gulf War, Congress passed a bill that required both ships to be maintained in a state such that they could be reactivated with minimal effort and expense. The justification was that the US needed to maintain a shore bombardment capability.

When the ships were removed from the reserve and turned over as museum pieces, Congress made further requirements to maintaining both ships in a state where they could be easily reactivated, precluding any modifications being made to the ships. This included requirements for maintaining a stock of barrels for the 16" guns. They finally eliminated the requirement in the mid 2000's, presumably when the Zumwalt's moved from concept to full design.

 

[KevinB]

I'm a big A-10 fan, mainly as that gun can chew up a lot of stuff.

It's also a slower platform so I would guess in theory the pilot has better SA of the ground.

In my experience its pilots are also the only ones in the USAF who actually enjoy ATG CAS missions, the rest dream loftily of Air Combat kills.
Since the vast majority of senior leaders in the Air Forces of the world are fighter pilots they pick the priorities.

Look at AF priorities -- they are always for air superiority fighters.

It is a tool in the tool box, and one that for some tasks has not been bested by new designs.
It arrives faster than Helo's
It offers more loiter in the immediate area than other planes
It has more weapons than drones.
It has a GAU-8 30mm Cannon so it wins...

 

[Baz]

In the end, I don't think who owns the aircraft makes a difference.  In the US and NATO doctrine, all air assets fall under the C/JFACC, regardless of the domestic affiliation.  It provides a better efficiency in how the assets are used and better coordination.

That's a very Air Force view of the world, and not doctrinally complete.  It should say in the US and NATO Air Doctrine, all air assets fall under the C/JFACC.

In a fully formed joint theater, there will be (at a minimum) an MCC, LCC, ACC, and SOCC.  The MCC will have a MAOC (Maritime Air Operation Center), with assigned air assets, including MPAs and assigned maritime organic air amongst others.  They will co-ordinate with the ACC and the lines may be on the ATO, but they retain OPCON of assigned air assets.  ACCs will have Maritime and Land liaison elements with the other commanders.

Maritime Organic Air OPCON is normally retained by the fleet... especially for Carrier Strike Groups.  A side effect is the inability of the ACC to realize certain capabilities exist in the fleet (witness not using MH-60Rs for ISR in Libya), but it is almost always left that way for Force Protection reasons.

During land maneuver warfare army air assets can be kept OPCON to the maneuver forces, in order to keep his ability to concentrate force at the time and place of his choosing, not the ACCs.

The reason for these measures is that ACCs can, and do, get drawn into certain air centric aspects of the fight.  Without proper C2 arrangements that can (and has) put other forces at undo risk.  I've had these discussions with both CAOC directors and ISRDs at ACC Ramstein, as NATO works through the new command relationships post the latest downsize.

In my opinion the Air Forces of the Western World are the least Joint of the services: the Army understands Tactical Air, the Navy understands Maritime Air (although, unfortunately, the RCN less than most), but the Air Forces don't understand land and maritime maneuver.

 

[Journeyman]

That's a very Air Force view of the world, and not doctrinally complete. 

Yes, but he also said that "on call or dedicated CAS is generally a big waste of efforts."  It appears that his extensive operational and doctrinal experience doesn't go much beyond defending the outer markers of Cold Lake and taxiing into Nellis for Las Vegas visits.

However, I know people with actual combat experience certainly appreciated on-call CAS.....even if the people above us were USAF.



I know it's my old hobby-horse, I know.  But at least the USAF showed up for the war; beyond NORAD, I don't know why we spend a single fucking penny on the RCAF fighter world.

 

[Baz]

It appears that his extensive operational and doctrinal experience doesn't go much beyond defending the outer markers of Cold Lake and taxiing into Nellis for Las Vegas visits.

I actually don't think that's it.  All of the Western Air Forces (NATO plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) are teaching this way.  Its the same discussion as World War II: strategic vs operational vs tactical use of Air Power.  In the Air Forces mind the best use is to concentrate it all in the hands of the ACCs and then let the "Air professionals" determine how to use it.  This comes to a heavy bias towards operational effects vs tactical support.

For certain types of campaigns in makes sense; for other's, not so much.  Hence why the countries that have spent a lot of money developing army and maritime air have commander's of the army and maritime type that go to a lot of effort to keep control of "their" air assets.

Example: the US Army is the second biggest operator of the Predator in the world (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Atomics_MQ-1C_Gray_Eagle).

Example: the US Navy will be the largest Global Hawk operator in the world (42 USAF http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_RQ-4_Global_Hawk vs 68 USN Tritons http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_MQ-4C_Triton)... and the fight over how they should be used and who should control them still goes on, even though the Navy paid for them.

In the face of a true maritime threat, do you think the Carrier Strike Group Commander would allow all his fighters to be used to support the JFACC's operational plan?

 

[vonGarvin]

I know it's my old hobby-horse, I know.  But at least the USAF showed up for the war; beyond NORAD, I don't know why we spend a single fucking penny on the RCAF fighter world.

Come now!  We had Kosovo....and Libya...and now the RCAF is roughing it in the hotels of Eastern Europe.  Eastern!



/sarcasm

 

[SupersonicMax]

Yes, but he also said that "on call or dedicated CAS is generally a big waste of efforts."  It appears that his extensive operational and doctrinal experience doesn't go much beyond defending the outer markers of Cold Lake and taxiing into Nellis for Las Vegas visits.

However, I know people with actual combat experience certainly appreciated on-call CAS.....even if the people above us were USAF.



I know it's my old hobby-horse, I know.  But at least the USAF showed up for the war; beyond NORAD, I don't know why we spend a single ******* penny on the RCAF fighter world.

JM:  having assets available is important.  Having them loiter in an orbit until required is imdeed a waste of effort.  Assign a target and a TOT (and make them such that they coincide with specific manoevers from the ground war) and re-role if required.  To the people on the ground, it's the same.  To the overall war effort, it means more bombs on more targets: a more efficient way of employing scarce, expensive assets.  Of course every ground commander wants his dedicated CAS 24/7.  In the overall campaign, it's generally not the right way to do buisness. 

Baz:  For the US anyways, the Goldwater-Nichols Act is where the relationships are laid out.  Yup, it is very theater dependant and different commanders will ultimately agree on who retains what in terms of control.  Some specific assets should be kept OPCON to their services (MH, any national assets obviously, SOF helos), but any fighters should be under the C/JFACC if it is just for coordination.

A good read on the subject is Every Man a Tiger by Chuck Horner.  A little biaised towards the blue side (he was the JFACC during the Gulf War) but a good intro on the subject nonetheless.

 

[George Wallace]

JM:  having assets available is important.  Having them loiter in an orbit until required is imdeed a waste of effort.

Sorry.  You are sooooooo wrong.  If, for any instance, you have any thoughts that aircraft do not have to loiter near where they are needed, you are just showing your lack of knowledge and experience.  There is no way in hell that an aircraft can be scrambled from an airfield to accomplish CAS on the short notice that will be given.  The enemy are not that cooperative.

Assign a target and a TOT (and make them such that they coincide with specific manoevers from the ground war) and re-role if required.

Only in a board game can you safely sit back and "Assign a target" when it comes to CAS.  The targets are not stationary.  They are not fixed fortifications.  They are very mobile combat vehicles.

To the people on the ground, it's the same.

To the people on the ground it is NOT the same.  It is LIFE OR DEATH......and they do not have time to wait for some "dispatcher" to prioritize them as "needing CAS NOW!" or third or fourth in line for air support.

To the overall war effort, it means more bombs on more targets: a more efficient way of employing scarce, expensive assets.  Of course every ground commander wants his dedicated CAS 24/7.  In the overall campaign, it's generally not the right way to do buisness.

 

Back to comment #1. 

 

[Journeyman]

Believe it or not, I'm actually vaguely familiar with Air Operations -- doctrine and operations.  I also have a passing familiarity with what the Air Force's current lot of tribal elders consider "core capabilities" (hint: fighters #1; other fixed-wing: somewhere around #8-9; helo (MH or TAC): what? what's that?)

Having them loiter in an orbit until required is imdeed a waste of effort.  Assign a target and a TOT (and make them such that they coincide with specific manoevers from the ground war)

You know we tried that; not only would the Taliban not cooperate, it was obvious that they hadn't even gone to Staff College to appreciate the beauty of our JFACC orchestration; ungrateful bastards.

Although at a Weapons and Tactics 'gathering,' the USAF crowd (up in Kabul, vacationing from their time in Bagram)1 mostly had the same perspective.....except for the A-10 and F-15E guys; I guess it's because they were actually doing the job, unlike many of their USAF brethren who despite being in location, couldn't shake the Air War College mantra.


Again, several of us here have been speaking from real-world experience; one that's tempered by the reality of having a military smaller than Chuck Horner's world (therefore everyone has to contribute to the fight and not rely on a shop-steward mentality that says "D Flight Safety says I'm entitled to a 5-star hotel") -- even without his back-patting self-congratulations (yes, I've read it)


Edit:
1.  For clarity, I too was attending the WeapTac only as justification to 'vacation in Kabul' from down south;  I'm grateful to my boss for facilitating that opportunity to.....uh, fraternize.   >

 

[GAP]

We called in air strikes (one example of many) on a truck park along the Ho Chi Min Trail. The park was jammed to the hilt and was just dripping with "Come and get me" signs....

we called, and we called again....they came. A cell of B-52's (3). They struck that park and totally demolished it. Two days later.

Then they asked us to go back for a BDU...... :

We did go back. There wasn't a tree standing. Nor were there any trucks demolished....they had left 2 days before....

That was the USAF in action then, and from the sounds of it, it hasn't changed much now....

 

[Baz]

Baz:  For the US anyways, the Goldwater-Nichols Act is where the relationships are laid out.  Yup, it is very theater dependant and different commanders will ultimately agree on who retains what in terms of control.  Some specific assets should be kept OPCON to their services (MH, any national assets obviously, SOF helos), but any fighters should be under the C/JFACC if it is just for coordination.

Quoting that the way you have shows a predilection for the US way of doing things, and your other comments show a bias to the USAF interpretation.

The Combatant Commander relationship is to ensure that operations are commanded jointly, not the lower command relationships, for which there is both joint and service doctrine in the US, frequently at odds.

Commanders don't agree, they direct (ie command).  The JFC is frequently chosen from a particular service in order to put the weight of effort where it is required.

The Air Force frequently uses the coordination argument in order to attempt to centralize C2.  There is no reason why the ACC cannot do coordination of the assets operating in their area of responsibility without having C2 of those assets.  As well, the ability of the JFACC to do air coordination in the, say, mid-Atlantic, is exactly why the MCC will do so, as exercised by the Commander Carrier Strike Group.  I would argue that fighters doing land strike from carriers should be on the JFACC ATO, coordinated by the JFACC, and possibly TACON/TACON to the supported commander... conversely, land based fighters doing maritime strike should be on the Maritime Optask Air (or ATO if you want to call it that), but marshalled and controlled by the force, and TACON/TACOM to the fleet.

Again, the Air Force doesn't understand Joint.  Maritime and Ground understand task organization and the difference between span of control and unity of command.  Like any other asset, assign the aircraft to the Component Commander most able to conduct the battle.  Frequently, this means that many of the aircraft are OPCON to the ACC for the flexibility it provides, but not necessarily all of them and not necessarily all the time.


None of this surprises me, I've heard it over and over again. 

 

[Fishbone Jones]

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[SupersonicMax]

George, if you read my post again, this is not what I said.  I said that you should frag bombs against targets beyond the FSCL (BAI, AI, etc) via a route that will take the aircraft over friendly troops.  If there is a need for CAS, divert some of those jets to where they are needed and get them a discreet frequency with the FAC to conduct CAS.  If not, jets keep pushing towards their assigned target and drop their bombs.  From an operational point of view, you achieve more with the same.  You provide CAS when needed but still put bombs on targets even if no CAS is required.  I am not talking about GCAS. 

JM:  for a theater like Afghanistan where 90% of the kinetic missions are CAS, it makes sense to have dedicated CAS lines on the ATO.  In most other wars where CAS is a portion of the air effort, it doesn't always makes sense.

 

[George Wallace]

What other wars?

 

[Fishbone Jones]

George, if you read my post again, this is not what I said.  I said that you should frag bombs against targets beyond the FSCL (BAI, AI, etc) via a route that will take the aircraft over friendly troops. If there is a need for CAS, divert some of those jets to where they are needed and get them a discreet frequency with the FAC to conduct CAS. If not, jets keep pushing towards their assigned target and drop their bombs.  From an operational point of view, you achieve more with the same.  You provide CAS when needed but still put bombs on targets even if no CAS is required.  I am not talking about GCAS. 

JM:  for a theater like Afghanistan where 90% of the kinetic missions are CAS, it makes sense to have dedicated CAS lines on the ATO.  In most other wars where CAS is a portion of the air effort, it doesn't always makes sense.

And this is faster than having your CAS loitering for you how? When ground troops need CAS, they need it now. Not when someone can get it recalled from a bombing run.

The need for CAS is planned for, that's why your CAS is loitering. Troops on the ground don't have 10,000 feet of insular altitude protection and their time is not measured in fuel consumption, speed and weight.

In your scenario, if a couple of jets are recalled for CAS just before their drop zone, they have to hustle back to support carrying their bombs. Now they have to go back after their CAS task, refuel and go again to drop their bombs. If the target is still there. If the target is important enough. If it isn't or wasn't then the run shouldn't have been made in the first place. Nothing to gained but hours in the flight log.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Conventional wars.  Like a nation or an alliance of nations against a nation or an alliance of nations.  Like the Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya...

RG:  if you plan and coordinate properly, you can put aircraft on a strike mission in the right piece of sky at the right time where/when the LCC thinks he MAY need CAS making it as fast as calling for effects , getting the jets out of their hold points and pushed to the FAC (and giving essentially the same effects as XCAS).  This principle is not new and has been used effectively before.  It is sometimes called push-CAS.

 

[George Wallace]

Conventional wars.  Like a nation or an alliance of nations against a nation or an alliance of nations.  Like the Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya...

............ getting the jets out of their hold points and pushed to the FAC .

CAS has been used in every major and small war and numerous "Brushfire wars" since the first Air Force was formed.


"hold points"?  Is that just another name for "Loiter"?

 

[SupersonicMax]

Depending on who is controlling you (CRC/AWACS or FAC) and the AO, you'll be pushed to a Control Point or an Initial Point where you'll wait (hold, loiter) until something pops up.

I am not saying we do not need CAS.  What I am advocating is efficient use of air assets to accomplish a common (joint) strategic/operational objective in a timely manner.  Making aircraft loiter waiting for something to happen is generally not the most efficient use of those assets (while there is a time and place for it).

I know that in our minds, losses are not acceptable, however commanders make decisions fully understanding that lives may be lost because of competing priorities and limited resources. 

 

[George Wallace]

CAS is part of a plan.  It is not a bunch of aircraft loitering at all hours to wait for a "CONTACT" to be called in for them to destroy.  That disappeared after WW I. 

That "PLAN" as to how CAS is to be used, is not at some high Air Force level, but  that of  whatever level a Battle Group, Battle Team, Brigade, Division, whatever makes.  CAS is just one more part of the OP PLAN of a mission.  It may be for a few hours.  It may be a few days.  It could be a few weeks or months.  Like the Fire Plan and all the other plans, CAS is just one part of the much larger OP PLAN.  That means that the aircraft will be loitering on station, at a given time, for a given period of time, in support of the troops on the ground.