Further to the discussion about the structure of the CF and the reference to the RAF Regiment field squadron I thought I would post what I have been able to find out about the organization. These comments are drawn from my interpretation of two articles that appeared in a British magazine Combat and Survival. Their orbats and technical appreciations are usually accurate. The errors will be mine.
A RAF Field Squadron is an area defence entity, designed to hold an airfield against a lightly armed force and infiltration.
It comprises 164 all-ranks: 7 Officers, 1 Warrant, 13 NCO's, 24 Jr. NCO's and 119 other ranks (aircraftsmen).
These are organized into 6 platoons (or flights): HQ flight, Logistics flight, Support Weapons flight, Machinegun and Sniper flight and 2 Rifle flights.
The Support Weapons flight, Machinegun and Sniper flight as well as the 2 Rifle flights are all apparently organize on the same basic structure as all of them can revert to Rifle flight roles and reports of the unit holding 4 51mm mortars, usually issued in British service at the rate of one per platoon HQ would seem to confirm this.
The basic structure is a platoon HQ of 1 Offr, 1 NCO and 2 Signallers with three 8 man sections under command. The sections are broken down into two 4 man bricks.
In a Rifle Platoon, the sections are identical, both in composition and structure.
In the Machinegun and Sniper platoon, one section divides into four 2 man teams each armed with the 7.62mm L96A1 (soon to be replaced by the Lapua LRR?) while the other two sections each man 2 7.62mm GPMGs (our C6) in the SF role.
The Support Weapons platoon mans 4 81mm mortars. At a guess, based on maintaining the basic platoon structure this may be organized with 2 tube sections, each manning 2 mortars, and an observation section.
The Logistics platoon includes medics, chefs, mechanics, EME techs and armourers.
The HQ platoon apparently contains the usual assortment of dogsbodies.
The tactical organization of the Squadron is interesting here but as pbi has pointed out we don't organize out companies this way from a tactical view and also we probably don't need 138 identically organized light infantry/light cavalry companies.
Having said that I think the RAF Squadron model does seem to offer some interesting capabilities for consideration. These capabilities are based around its equipment and its structure.
First of all, looking at its equipment.
Operationally the Squadron has at its disposal the following assets:
Anti-Armour Weapons
LAW 94mm (2 per section)
Indirect fire
81mm mortars 4x
51mm mortars 4x (1 per platoon)
AGGS rifle grenades issued as ammunition
Direct fire
L96A1 7.62mm sniper rifles 4x
GPMG 7.62mm Sustained Fire and Bipod Mounts 14x (4 SF and 10 bipods??)
SA80A2 5.56mm Light Support Weapons (2 per section)
SA80A2 5.56mm Individual Weapons (personal weapon for all personnel)
To facilitate operations the Squadron is also equipped with the following assets:
Situational Awareness
MSTAR (Manportable Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar) 2x
CLASSIC ground sensors 10x
Spyglass thermal imagers 10x
LP7 hand held laser range finders 4x
Passive night sights (2 per section)
CWS weapons sights (1 per LSW and IW)
Communications
VRC353 Vehicle mounted radios 14x
AM352 Amplified radios 31x
Clansman 74x
Mobility
Command Post Vehicle 1x
Motor Cycles 4x
Heavy Goods Vehicles (equivalent to our MLVW's - about 4 tonne capacity) 10x
Recovery Vehicle 1x
POL Vehicle 1x
Land Rovers with trailers 36x
Mortar Vehicles 4x
All of these non-tactical, facilitating capabilities I would imagine are the same capabilities that boydfish's EPC folks would find most valuable in time of local crisis. He apparently isn't looking for warm bodies unless they are contributing something.
Curiously it seems to me that those capabilities are the same thing that we are missing at the unit level in the Militia/Reserves. Without them and the opportunity to train with them training opportunities are curtailed, utility to the community is reduced and I would argue utility to the Army is curtailed.
This local problem is the same problem that the CF at large has with respect to adequate LUVWs, LSVWs, MLVWs, HLVWs, Utility and Medium lift helicopters, Hercules replacements and Strategic Air and Sealift. All of these transport capabilities along with Service Support like kitchens, water, sanitation and shelter are the very areas that boydfish and the emergency planners need.
So the question to me becomes not one of whose budget is going to be robbed to pay for these capabilities, thus depriving that department of other capabilities, but how can both departments present a common usage plan for the same set of kit.
I think I can hear the squawks now but hear me out......
I know that delivering services during a SARS epidemic entails a different risk than flying out troops when bullets are flying.
But.....
At bottom the difference is not the equipment, it is who is operating it and what they are being asked to do with it.
Sticking to the Militia/Reserves level and the local Squadron sized unit for a moment.
Could the argument be made, and could both Civil Defence and the Militia/Reserves and the CF at large live with this type of compromise?
The Government be requested to purchase for each Militia unit in the country kit to outfit one HQ platoon and one Logistics platoon after the fashion of the RAF Regiment Squadron. These would be dispersed around the country, thus protected from disaster at any one location and would be available to be activated at short notice. Manning would be a mixture of Permanent staff and Militia/Reserves with a high proportion of Class Cs and B's from the local community responsible for maintaining the kit. Operators, like signalers and chefs and drivers would be Class A's.
These manned and equipped HQ/Logistic entities would be beneficial to Emergency Preparedness.
However, it can't be forgotten that Civil Defence and the CF have one crucial difference between them. Civil Defence exists to SAVE people. The CF does not.
HQ and Logistics in the CF exist to support people, and can be employed to support civilians in crisis, and very effectively, but they exist primarily to Command and Support SOLDIERS â “ people prepared to close with and destroy the enemies of the nation.
If the government buys this equipment for the nation, to aid it in its periods of crises, then could the government not put the same equipment at the service of the CF in support of its soldiers so that they are rendered more operationally effective and can train more effectively.
What I am effectively suggesting, perhaps dangerously to some, is that the Militia units be built around a common backbone at the unit level. That backbone would have to come to an accommodation serving two masters - both Emergency Preparedness, communicating with EPC, Coast Guards, RCMP, local police, fire and emergency services â “ as well as an operational element tasked in support of CF operations.
I could see such an organization having internal cohesion stresses but I also see a way for the CF to get kit, the Militia to get a role and capability, for training opportunities to improve and for the CF to get a true Plug'n'Play capability out of the Militia. It could deploy complete subunits with their own A and B echelon support. The senior organization wouldn't have to figure out how to feed and shelter these bodies. Also it would present the CF the opportunity of fielding deployable independent subunits.
As well, as a_majoor suggested the concept is flexible.
The basic RAF structure, with its emphasis on light vehicles and small unit patrols is similar in role to a light recce armoured unit (much better equipped than currently envisioned in the CF but similar).
I agree with pbi. There is no need for 138 light recce units with all other capabilities ignored.
I see no reason why, especially amongst F echelon, why the existing trades responsibilities couldn't be maintained.
For example, all of the infantry, artillery, armour and possibly the engineers could be organized on the basis of a doctrinal light infantry company at the tactical level. Say for example three rifle platoons with weapons dets and possibly a marksman det, or whatever. To this organization attach a supernumary fourth platoon similarly organized and manned but assigned to a particular skill set (mortars, guns, foot recce, engineers etc). This fourth platoon/troop could be employed either to add depth to an independent deployment or it could be detached and chopped to a Regular force entity.
Such a subunit (Squadron) could continue to be a source of trained individuals for the CF on peace-time deployments.
Variations on a theme could be worked, for instance in a recce squadron maybe all four troops have LUVWs, maybe only the fourth troop has them. Maybe the fourth troop has Bisons or LAVs instead.
Service Support elements could be similarly organized but would probably be different in execution.
One point that I would make is particular to the Infantry. I would start with all Infantry being organized on a light infantry basis but all infantry units should have adequate tactical vehicles to be able to lift all troops across rough terrain. To do this I would think that you would want a vehicle small enough to be used on patrols, capable of lifting a large enough body of troops (minimum section) so that the number of drivers required can be minimized and not distract the unit from its primary role and capable of mounting (and supplied with the means to mount) medium and heavy weapons. Such vehicles should also be of benefit to the civil authorities.
Armoured vehicles may be supplied to the fourth platoon of some units but light infantry and light vehicles should be the order of the day, providing both a non-threatening vehicle for domestic operations (including tasks like delivering bodies to a fire line) as well as supplying a useful training platform and an operationally capable and internationally deployable platform.
Such an organization could be maintained by local personnel, working out of their home communities, if volunteers can be trusted to maintain fire trucks surely they can be trusted with these types of vehicles. Perhaps they are employed on Class B callouts for 16 hours a week at the armouries specifically to maintain the kit.
Anyway, creating a Militia substructure like this would serve both the needs of the CF and EPC as well as the Militia itself.
And on a related thought, perhaps the other support equipment and services we need should be sold on the same basis. One set of equipment, purchased to serve two departments but manned and operated according to the situation. Volunteers for specific tasks if necessary....
Well that's my thought for the day. Thoughts end. Waiting for snickers to erupt and return fire.
Cheers.
By the way this would also necessitate a change to training and also to readiness checks. Perhaps trainers will have to come to the units and a regular series of checks of readiness of personnel and equipment by dedicated Inspectors would do the job.
) and redirects a nearby frigate to help with the extraction. The crap hits the fan and JTF needs some firepower... If the frigate had a 5-inch it would help a great deal.
