I always look for commonalities and points of agreement so on that note let me look at where we seem to be in accord first.
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Based on the scenarios described here Militia skills would be skill at arms with small arms and sidearms, section and platoon tactics, communications procedures, vehicular movements and patrols, transport and logistics, first aid, operations in an NBC environment, C2 and ISTAR, possibly even (and contentiously) IS drills. Any time left over could be devoted to marksmanship with heavy weapons, tactical movements, patrolling, ATGMs, Mors and Guns.
I agree: but that's pretty well what they do now. Cheers.
37.5 days/year: that's what you're up against.
OK so the basic skills that I suggested are skills that Militiamen currently have. So the basic training plan and career development plan works and works reasonably well within the context of 37.5 days per year. Is that a fair statement? Would it also be a fair statement that the skills described above are basic "soldier" skills and would be common to all trades, whether infanteer or EME? Especially in an environment where it has been suggested by others that the "tail" needs to be hardened.
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If that is the case I can't help but think that boydfish would not look ungratefully on a formed uniformed body, in vehicles that can handle floods, slides, debris fields and broken roads, capable of extracting the uninjured, offering first aid where appropriate and communicating with the limited EMS personnel as to where they are needed. All the time their presence in uniform, possibly with side arms would act as a stabilizing force and help to lend an air of security
OK-we can do that more or less now. See my earlier post on our CONPLAN BISON, also see LFCA's CONPLAN TRILLIUM which has a similar concept.
So on this point we can agree that the skills the Militia currently have are generally up to the task are and will continue to be a useful adjunct to emergency preparedness planning.
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Also, I believe that military first aid has advanced a lot since my day. Aren't troops being trained to intervene more aggressively when their buddy is wounded alongside them? It seems to me that I have heard of infanteers being taught to introduce intravenous solutions in the field.
This is for Regular Force or for soldiers deploying on operations. It is not normally part of Res trg (although it certainly could be if we found time for it...)
On this point humour me and let me assume that it is a priority that will serve troops well in the field and also make them more valuable for emergency response. How many of the 37.5 days are necessary to complete that training and how often does it have to be refreshed? Is it an insurmountable load?
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Further to the HAZMAT issue, and this would be in keeping with NBC training I would think, how much emphasis should be given to training troops to maintain order in a HAZMAT environment when confronting an angry and frightened and unprotected populace. For example what happens if another SARS epidemic breaks out and it is decided to quarantine Toronto. How would we prevent people panicking and leaving? How would people react to being confronted by troops, even unarmed troops, in Gas Masks and NBC suits telling them to go back
How would you prevent people from panicking and leaving a city with a metropolitan area of over 4million people? I don't know, short of deploying the entire CF and every spare cop you can lay your hands on. You are venturing into the ever controversial issue of using the Res for public order ops. Now, the USARNG does this, and the average level of training of the average USARNG soldier is, as far as I can make out, no better than the average Canadian Army Reserve soldier. For a start, our guys parade much more often. So, in theory this skillset could be taught to our guys. But, again, what unit training do you drop to develop and maintain this skillset? It has to be refreshed regularly or the troops will be a liability rather than an asset. Do you want money spent to buy riot gear or other, more combat-related stuff?
I agree that you won't stop people panicking. And I agree that you can't seal off every exit out or Metro Toronto. So where are the choke points that allow you to isolate pockets of contagion and thus prevent transfer to uninfected populations? Does that mean barricades at the borders and airports (possible)? Securing the Lake Ontario shoreline (possible with troops at marinas, air cover and marine patrols I suppose) and barricades on Highway 11 and the 401? Thus you isolate Southern Ontario from the rest of Canada. Maybe you then have to think about putting up barriers around uninfected communities within the containment zone to keep strangers at bay. There is historical precedent for all of this. Look to how cholera, typhus, small pox and plague were handled in the past and in Canada.
Yes I am wandering into the controversial area about using the Militia in public order ops. Is there not need for somebody to be prepared to do the job and if not the Militia then who? Do the police want the job and are there enough of them? Do you want the job? Do we want a separate full time body like some of the Europeans have designed specifically for these type of operations. My sense is that those forces are universally loathed, seen as instruments of state repression and are expensive to maintain. Perhaps the Militia, being neighbours and co-workers, would be seen in a more understanding light with greater degree of empathy, and would at least be cheaper to maintain. Having said that I recognize that historically it has been a problematic area, especially with the Militia having been called out to break strikes, a task that even I find anti-democratic.
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Is there any merit to rethinking the Militia as a body of independent teams along the lines of the RAF Regiment Field Squadrons? The Field Squadron is a self contained deployable body of about 150 personnel that fields 4 rifle platoons. All platoons are trained in basic infantry tactics, focussed on area defence. All platoons are trained to do vehicular patrols in Landrovers. One platoon has additional skills and responsibilities in providing marksmen/snipers and machine gunners, while the fourth platoon is responsible for manning 4x 81mm mortars as the situation demands. The Squadron has something like 30 to 40 Landrovers and trailers as well as IIRC 11 MLVW type vehicles and a POL vehicle to supply logistic support (including field kitchen) as well as having its own CP and Comms that also includes 4 despatch riders.
OK, but what happens to the role of "augment the Regular Force"? Unless the RegF is composed of similar units, how will we execute this function? For example, how would we augment/repl units of Engrs, Arty, Armour, etc? A few units like this might be of use, but I would not be in favour of wholesale conversion to this role. unless the Regular Army was to go to a corresponding organization.
OK. Perhaps we don't need 138 independently deployable infantry companies also capable of doing some light recce work. I can see that. Perhaps we maintain the current warfighting focus of each unit but we make each unit a self contained, self deployable entity, complete with its own transportation and A and B echelon support.
That would mean that If the Army needed their services as formed units it could call up the entire entity and plug the whole group into an existing unit without having to figure out where the extra service support was going to come from.
In the meantime the community they serve would have access to an independent unit with the basic soldier skills they are capable of currently acquiring in their 37.5 days.
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The Squadrons could have their current specialized war roles (infantry, lt armd, arty, engr, etc...) but they would also be required to become proficient in the skill sets described above
37.5 days/year: that's what you're up against. What will you cut so you can teach this other skill set?
But haven't we just agreed that the skill sets needed for emergency preparedness are basic soldier skills, which they have and they apparently still find time to become Gunners, crewmen, surveillanc ops and proficient light infantrymen already?
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On the HAZMAT front pbi, there I was wondering if there was a role for the Federal Government to supply funding for Full time CBRN trained teams through the Militia, comprised of Regular personnel and Militia personnel on fulltime Callout (that's C Class isn't it?). I agree with you that I don't think that Militiamen can be that all-singing all-dancing but suppose each of my Squadrons was equipped with a HAZMAT section on standby, as I said that would be the full-time job of those individuals, perhaps some or all of them could be equipped on a similar basis with an EOD or even CT capability
OK-but I have a hard time thinking about Class C as "Reservists"-they are gap-fillers in Regular establishments.(OK-OK-calm down everybody!!!) I agree with you that once you put a Res soldier on full time service, you have solved the "time available" issue, but the question in my mind is the employment of the "traditional" Reservist: the Class A, 37.5 days/per year and two weeks in the summer guy who makes up the overwhelming bulk of our Reserve. IMHO we have to think about roles and missions that make sense for that guy, not for the relatively few Res who can go on Class C.
Here we may be coming to the crux of the matter. You may have noticed that throughout I have been making reference to the older term Militia as opposed to Reserve. In keeping with the notion of two forces, one domestic and one expeditionary, I think that it is appropriate to use the distinct term Militia as opposed to Reserve. It emphasises separateness ( I can hear you now....). But if there are to be two forces, a concept with which I am generally in agreement, contained within DND then lets make it so.
Perhaps I should say at this time that I see two different types of forces commonly being called armies. One is the American style army and the other is what I consider a traditional army, what the Americans would historically have considered a "standing army". In my view a standing army is an agent of authority, designed to impose order and maintain control over borders and populations. This army is heavy in infantry and uses light cavalry to conduct patrols to dominate the surrounds. This type of army was anathema to the Americans as it was to the Brits who left Britain to escape the depradations of that type of force wielded with an over-heavy hand against them. As I see the American army it is a counter-army, in the sense of counter-recce and counter-battery. In fact in my view the entire US military structure is designed explicitly to defeat armies. Its masters historically have had no desire to forge a tool capable of imposing order for fear that it could be used on them selves. Consequently the American forces are designed to destroy forces in being and eliminate threats. It is not trained in coercive activity.
The value of such a force was demonstrated in WW2 and that reinforced the correctness and value of such a position in the American mind. Other forces also so value in like capability and attempted to emulate it at various levels, all with lesser degrees of success.
Following on from this is the discussion over Constabulary/Peacekeeping duties. The notion exists that real armies don't do peacekeeping. I argue American style counter-armies don't do peacekeeping. Armies do do peacekeeping. That is what armies have always done. Far from an Infanteer being a policeman with a rifle, a policeman is in fact an Infanteer without a gun. A policeman is an authority figure, a governmental presence that is permitted by society and the operational environment to wander the streets on his own. He is merely one end of a spectrum that starts with getting out of the LAV, taking off the tin-lid and pointing the weapon at the ground.
With those thoughts in mind I see the need for the government of Canada to have at its beck and call the tools of a traditional army to control the population within its borders and to control its borders. Because the risks coming from within are relatively low I don't see a need for a large full-time force. Nor do I see a need at most border crossings for much more than a couple of Mounties with ready access to a Rapid Response Hazmat/EOD team (of whatever size). I do see a need for beefed up surveillance and control of our approaches and the North and that should be a permanent force.
But some such permanent full-time capabilities, the local ones anyway, not the Northern ones, could be supplied by C Class Militiamen who are employed full time in their community. Working their shifts but going home to their own beds. They could be backed up by B Class personnel, also living in their communities but making themselves available for short periods full time thus allowing them to blend Militia service into their home and community lives. Finally there would be the basic A Class personnel, with their 37.5 days per year (authorized - how many would be willing to make a greater commitment if it were Armoury time as opposed to "Camp" time?) that would available to fan-out like the Volunteer Fire Department (at various levels of Notice to Move). The local units would also require a permanent "careerist" cadre to direct and administer operations.
The Northern and approach ones will continue to be a Coast Guard and Permanent Force operation augmented to the extent possible by the existing Ranger force.
In this scenario I see the Regular, Expeditionary Force, the Army as opposed to the Militia as being a mixed, deployable force. It is a combination of both Army and Counter-Army. In its Army role it can be despatched to other countries to offer support to the central authority, thereby offering a valuable service and also learning lessons that could be applicable within Canada at some point in the future. To this end I agree that the free flow of Militia and Army personnel and sub-units is both necessary and mutually beneficial. The Army should also be a Counter-Army and this is where it should concentrate its focus. Others would call it warfighting. It should prepare itself as a deployable force that can destroy other organized forces that are a threat to the Militia-type Armies responsible for maintaining order. This mutual interaction between the Army and the Militia, practiced at home and abroad could also be used to broaden Canada's influence and for that matter support a higher rank structure. Suppose Canada were to supply a "Counter-Army" Battle Group and an "Army" battle group in support of a peacekeeping mission. Could we add a couple of locally raised and Canadian financed and trained battalions under Canadian operational control and thus justify a Canadian Brigade and Brigadier. If we got a couple of allies to supply "Army" battle groups that would support their own local battalions could we justify a Canadian led division and a Major-General? The primary focus of the Expeditionary Army in this case would be the "Counter-Army" Battle Group, Command and Control, ISTAR and Logistic support. The "Army" Battle Group would also be an Expeditionary Force element but it could be heavily augmented by Militiamen on voluntary Class B and C callouts from their units and their training working with their local civil authorities and populations would be directly applicable to their temporary voluntary expeditionary duties.
In essence I see the part-time soldier as a Militiaman first, a part-time volunteer offering service to his home community first, and a Reservist, "gap-filler" for the Regs, second. If there are "gaps" in the Reg structure then they need to be filled first, perhaps even at the expense of capabilities.
However, in my world of the tooth-fairy and Santa Claus, I would like to think that we could add some more money to support a fairly broad range of capabilities without gaps.
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I agree with you that the Militia shouldn't end up being divorced from the Regs. There should be a free flow of personnel between the Militia and the Regs. But perhaps, in assigning war roles we could start by looking at domestic needs, deciding what we need to do locally, then looking at some of those skills and asking if it is not appropriate for the Regs to ask the Militia to supply those skills when necessary to augment the expeditionary force. Those skills that the Militia do not supply, either through lack of domestic need or it being unreasonable to expect any great degree of proficiency then those are the skills that will need to be held in the Regular forces.
I suggest that is designing an Army backwards. Maybe what Canada needs is a volunteer Civil Defense Service, like we had in the 1950s, to concentrate on disaster skills to augnment the civil authorities. You would probably attract people who want to serve, but don't want to be in the military. Then we could focus our very limited training time and resources on training our soldiers for operations, while retaining an approriate "last resort" or "immediate life and limb" response capability much as we have now.
And here we disagree. I would argue that the primary role of the government is to defend its citizenry. That means that first off they need to evaluate the threat and respond to the threat then organize their forces around the threat. Skills and capacities necessary to counter the threat, that are surplus to immediate requirements can be put at the beck and call of Department of Foreign Affairs to secure advantage in the national interest.
