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What Should the Army's Role, Capabilities & Structure Be?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
  • Start date Start date
I think you may have misunderstood the Gen, or maybe there's something floating about I haven't read? (We've been disconnected from the 'Net here in Bagram for four days-just came back on now.) Your despondent post seems a bit drastic.

Cheers.
 
Two questions we must ask ourselves before we formulate a plan for the restructuring of the armed forces are:

            1) What do we want our military to do (what will be the role of our armed forces) including this role being supported by      the government.

            2) I believe that the military will never see realistically more than a 18 billion(this is the best we can hope for from any governing party even the conservatives. That means everything we buy or operate must be deployable and will be commonly deployed.

Its nice to dream but it is time to be realistic.

 
We have to stop with this "make do" attitude.  It has been in effect since the 1950's and ever since, Lefties have been asking for the 'Peace Dividend' and we have sank lower and lower in our abilities and capabilities.  An Army has to have a "Back Bone" to be effective.  Ours has turned to mush.

GW
 
George Wallace said:
We have to stop with this "make do" attitude.   It has been in effect since the 1950's and ever since, Lefties have been asking for the 'Peace Dividend' and we have sank lower and lower in our abilities and capabilities.   An Army has to have a "Back Bone" to be effective.   Ours has turned to mush.

GW

But, see Hugh Winsor in today's Globe and Mail at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050117.wwinsor17/BNStory/Front/

Winsor is a well connected Ottawa insider and he is quoting good sources when he notes that DND has a poor reputation (at the 'centre' (PMO and Finance, all that really matters)) for whining (includes ministers, most senior civil servants and most senior military officers).

The grownups are not convinced that DND is as bad off as we, here in army.ca, or 'they' in NDHQ say ... every time 'they' plead overstretched and the government says â Å“one more timeâ ? the senior staff moans and groans and then gets on with it.   The 'centre' wants less moaning and groaning and more 'getting on with it.'   The guesstimating in Ottawa is that Hillier will deliver and that he (the military) will not be rewarded for it.  

Emphasis added

Hugh Winsor

'Can do' general right choice for Forces

In spite of the Paul Martin government's notoriously sclerotic difficulties making appointments and its inability to crack heads to get agreement on a new foreign and defence policy, someone seems to have got it right in picking Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier to be the new chief of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Choosing Gen. Hillier, an in-your-face, 49-year-old Newfoundlander with a self-deprecating sense of humour, meant bypassing the two most senior officers in the current chain of command. The move is meant to send the message things are going to change in the Armed Forces, even if a lot of gold braid and even some political egos could be ruffled in the process.

Mr. Martin and his Liberal government say they want a more proactive defence capability, allowing them to play harder on the world stage. They have made lots of promises including a stand-alone peacekeeping brigade but little has happened so far. Regardless of their merits, arguments coming from National Defence headquarters to the effect the forces are overstretched, underfunded and in need of an operational pause were perceived as whining in some political circles.

Gen. Hillier, with extensive command experience in Europe, the United States and Afghanistan, as well as in Canada, is seen as a "can do" sort of soldier who will be more inclined to say "Let's deploy," when the politicians come calling. The new chief also talks the right jargon about failing states as the major contributor to international instability. He makes it clear his priority will be restructuring DND to boost capacity for rapidly deployed expeditionary forces to respond to those failures.

The initiative to appoint Gen. Hillier rather than one of his more senior colleagues came from Defence Minister Bill Graham, after a lot of back-channel consultation last fall, reaching down into the ranks as well to retired officers and academics. Just before Christmas, the general and the minister went to 24 Sussex Dr. for a long meeting with Mr. Martin.

What apparently happened is an agreement to changes Gen. Hillier wants to make to the structure of the Forces and a commitment for enough funds to make it happen. That will be reflected in procurement â ” modernized equipment for infantry soldiers with better air and sea lift to get them overseas. There will be a shakeup of structures, vigorous recruitment and reformed training programs. As one of Mr. Graham's confidants put it, "We expect to see Rick Hillier kick ass around here."

The dichotomy between the present plodding and the intended future will be underlined today when Mr. Martin visits the much-criticized Disaster Assistance Response Team in Sri Lanka, which is only getting up to steam three weeks after the tsunamis hit.

Contrast that with the performance of the disaster response team by Italy. At 6:40 on Dec. 27, the morning after the tsunamis, the first Italian plane landed on the Maldives in the Indian Ocean. Within 48 hours, another team had established a field hospital in Sri Lanka complete with carabinieri to protect them and firefighters to rescue people from collapsed buildings. The Italians also brought two amphibious water bombers (made by Canadair in Montreal), which permitted them to deliver supplies to disaster areas with no airports.

The difference is that the Italian Department for Civilian Protection, covering both domestic and foreign disaster relief, is a stand-alone organization with authority to commandeer any military or civilian resources needed, including aircraft. It needs only a phone call to the prime minister to go.The Canadian DART criticism is misplaced, according to angry officials at DND. They were ready to move within hours, but couldn't get a decision out of the government. As Doug Bland, who heads a military studies program at Queen's University, put it, "the guys were in the fire hall, the doors were open, the engines were running, but there were no dispatchers to tell them where to go."



 
Let's not confuse the "Make Do" attitude with the "Can Do" attitude.  Canadian Forces personnel are very proficient as the "Can Do" type of people, making things happen with little or no resources, but sheer initiative.  The "Make Do" attitude of the Cdn People is neutering the CF in their abilities to get things done, in that fewer and fewer resources are being allocated to replace current equipment, personnel, and infrastructures and initiative will not be able to carry the day.  Eventually that "Can Do" spirit will have just got up and left.

GW
 
This thread was a long read dating back to 2001.  I have to agree with GW on his point of can do and make do.  The Make do attitude is the polictal one that is forced upon the CF (no longer the armed forces as it is to aggressive for Ottawa) and the Can Do is from the young men and women who do it on a daily basis with little support from the majority of the puplic and none from the the Ivory Towers in Ottawa. Where the suits are are to busy wasting precious resources on studies and re-searching things instead of buying the necessary goods to get the job done.

What do i think the CF should look like (may be a pipe dream but hey its my dream)

Army 50,000 to 70,000 this includes the armour MBT's not the MGS and artillery
Air Force 20,000 to 35,000 with stratigic lift capability and a new fighter some time in the next 10 yrs with at least 150 of them for front line service with 50 for training.
Navy of 35,000 to 50,000 with the new support ships and subs( not those used ones from England) maybe 4 nuc boats LA class from the states?

Total no more then 150,000, this total according to the paper today including all expenses and equipment could be acieved for 15 billion dollars.(5000 troops to cost 500 million)  that covers medical, pensions, salary and training.  Of corse more money would have to be spent on upgrading the equipment and such so say for 20 billion over 4 yrs. 

NOT AN UNREALISTIC OPTION.

Now all we have to do is get the government on board.

Anybody have a different opinion???
 
"Can do" promotes "make do".

As I've written here before, professionalism places soldiers in a Catch-22 situation.  The CF is ultimately controlled by bureaucrats and politicians.  Politicians and bureaucrats tend to ignore anything which isn't manifestly broken or accompanied by loud protestations.  The way to get something fixed is to stand back and let it break.  But that is contrary to a soldier's professionalism.
 
Right you are Brad, which puts it squarely back in the hands of the politicians and the electorate as to how much and what.  And the "soldier" gets to determine if he likes the terms of service.
 
Bonjour a tout le monde!

I know that this is a question that requires a complicated answer but I am curious about the opinions of other people on this issue, so here it is.  Given our current operational tempo and possible future deployments needed to fight the war on terror what would would be the ideal size and capabilities of the CF to respond to these threats?

The way I see it we have 4 factors to consider: Domestic Ops, the role of the Navy, the role of the Air Force, and the capabilities of the Army (I am assuming that the army would have to meet the requirements of a 3 block war).

In my opinion (uninformed as it may be) the Navy and the Air Force should focus on supporting and transporting the army.  Support in this sense should include offensive ground support capabilities i.e. attack helicopters.  The Army reserve should be well equipped to augment the Regs and well equipped for Dom Ops.  This would mean using some of the same equipment as the Reg force for training.  For example having a couple of LAV3s or Coyotes in each infantry/Armour unit respectively.  Additionally there should be greater ties to local retailers (Walmart, Canadian Tire) to quickly get any miscellaneous equipment not normally supplied by the CF. 

As far as army capabilities, I like Tanks.  Granted that they may not be as useful in the 3 block war if we get rid of them we will lose the skills required for armoured warfare to fight a bigger war. The Direct fire system is a good idea but they should use a real tank instead of the MGS, its too wimpy.  Maybe the infantry should get the airborne regiment back. 

As far as the size of the Army goes maybe we should be able to deploy and sustain a brigade in more then one country at a time.  Like I said I am uninformed.  Ideas S.V.P.
 
Some related threads, for background information:

What Should the Army's Role & Structure Be? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25365.0.html

why would we need a large military? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/1450.0.html

Expanded role for ... reserves? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/17.0.html

What should the role of Canada's Army Reserves be? How should they structure & train for it? - http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html
 
Cannon Fodder said:
Bonjour a tout le monde!

I know that this is a question that requires a complicated answer but I am curious about the opinions of other people on this issue, so here it is.  Given our current operational tempo and possible future deployments needed to fight the war on terror what would would be the ideal size and capabilities of the CF to respond to these threats?

That is a topical question; closely related to and following - What should our defence policy be?

Cannon Fodder said:
The way I see it we have 4 factors to consider: Domestic Ops, the role of the Navy, the role of the Air Force, and the capabilities of the Army (I am assuming that the army would have to meet the requirements of a 3 block war).

That's one "task" and three services. Each service will require the development of tasks to meet defence policy expectation. And don't forget all the niche elements, like JTF-2, of course.

Cannon Fodder said:
In my opinion (uninformed as it may be) the Navy and the Air Force should focus on supporting and transporting the army.

That's one opinion, others may differ.

Cannon Fodder said:
  Support in this sense should include offensive ground support capabilities i.e. attack helicopters. 

Search, attack helicopters has been discussed.

Cannon Fodder said:
The Army reserve should be well equipped to augment the Regs and well equipped for Dom Ops.  This would mean using some of the same equipment as the Reg force for training.

That's two major roles, with few overlapping skills/equipment - and still on a 37 trg day per member funding allocation. You may have to be more specific; unless this is a "money is no object" discussion.

Cannon Fodder said:
  For example having a couple of LAV3s or Coyotes in each infantry/Armour unit respectively.

Explore the success (or not, depending on POV) of having a few Grizzlies/Cougar in designated units.

Cannon Fodder said:
  Additionally there should be greater ties to local retailers (Walmart, Canadian Tire) to quickly get any miscellaneous equipment not normally supplied by the CF. 

You mean closer ties than just buying it when the mission dictates? You want sponsorship agreements perhaps?:

Cannon Fodder said:
As far as army capabilities, I like Tanks.  Granted that they may not be as useful in the 3 block war if we get rid of them we will lose the skills required for armoured warfare to fight a bigger war. The Direct fire system is a good idea but they should use a real tank instead of the MGS, its too wimpy.

Search, you'll find all the discussion on tanks and MGS you'll ever want to read.

Cannon Fodder said:
  Maybe the infantry should get the airborne regiment back. 

That's been discussed at length, try the search function.

Cannon Fodder said:
As far as the size of the Army goes maybe we should be able to deploy and sustain a brigade in more then one country at a time.  Like I said I am uninformed.  Ideas S.V.P.

Based on what defence policy objectives? Deployment range?, duration? capabilities? ......
 
Good comments Mike. In particular, WRT to the idea of mech trg for Res Inf, I know that during the recent Reserve Roles Missions and Tasks review process our five Inf units in 38 CBG resolutely rejected any such idea, based on the "non-success" of the Grizzly fiasco. They put their money squarely on concentrating on basic Inf skills.

Res already have a Dom Ops role, which varies slightly from LFA to LFA. As you correctly identified, the question of training them for Dom Ops raises the second order question of time and money. If you train for Dom Ops (whatever that training would be...I still don't really get it...fill sandbags?) then how do you train for combat with 37 days of training and a limited budget? If you don't train for combat, then what happens to the Res augmentation role? If all the Res do is disaster response, why do we need them in the CF? Why not create a Civil Defence, as we had in the 1950s, and put it under OCIPEP.

Cheers
 
Hi everyone, thought I would put my two cents in on my opinion for Land Forces Restructure...

The way I see it, we have 4 main pillars to adapt to in respect to LFR:
    1. Increase size of army;
    2. Further development and smoothlining of medium-weight wheeled force;
    3. Enforcing new 3-year cycle to allow sustained overseas deployments and;
    4. Further utilisation of reserves in regard to 'the big L'

    Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations. As mentioned earlier in this thread, we need to lose WW II structure system and adapt to modern warfare. In order to do this, we would cut the CF into 5 Brigades, 3 Mechanized and 2 Light:

1 CMBG - Edmonton, Alberta
2 CLBG  - Shilo, Manitoba
3 CMBG - Petawawa, Ontario
4 CLBG  - The Citadel, Quebec
5 CMBG - Valcartier, Quebec

(The two bases that would house the CLBGs would obviously have to be enlarged)

    Essentially, there would be 6 MIBs and 6 LIBs. The 3 LIBs from the CMBGs would be transfered to the CLBGs. The Jump company would be removed from the LIBs and replaced with a rifle company. The LIBs would become actual 'infantry' battalions, and would lose any quasi-SF duties that was previously stamped on them (These duties would be replaced by stand up of Canadian Special Operations Regiment). This would relieve MIBs of any LI duties and they would focus primarily on mechanized warfare for high/medium-intensity conflicts. The structure of the brigades would be housed around the new task force system, as it is no longer likely that we would send an entire brigade group overseas. This would entitle all support and combat arms units within the brigade to be reorganized so that they would be easier divided up to support TFs.

Here is how the Brigades would be organized:

CMBG

1 Armoured Regiment (2 Direct-fire squadrons, 2 Recce squadrons)
2 Mechanized Infantry Battalions
1 Engineer Regiment (2 Field Squadrons, with supporting units divided up between them)
1 Arty Regiment (5 batteries: 2 LAV SP 155 mm batteries of 8 guns each, 2 HIMARS batteries of 4 vehs each, 1 UAV battery -> 2 troops)
1 CSS Battalion (2 supply coys, 2 transport coys, 2 maintenance coys)
1 MP Company (2 platoons)
1 Medical Company (2 platoons)
1 THS (2 Flights of 4 Griffins each)

Basicly divided each unit in half to form 2 seperate Mechanized Infantry Task Force units.

CLBG

3 Light Infantry Battalions
1 Engineer Regiment (3 Field Squadrons, with supporting units divided up between them)
1 Arty Regiment (4 Batteries: 3 batteries of 6 155 mm M777s, 1 UAV battery -> divided into 3 UAV troops)
1 CSS Battalion (3 Transport Coys/pltns, 3 Maintenance Coys/pltns, 3 Supply Coys/pltns)
1 MP Company (3 platoons)
1 Medical Company (3 platoons)
1 THS (3 Flights of 6 Griffins each)

Divide each unit by 3 to attain 3 individual Light Infantry Task Force units.

    Legislation would be enforced for the reserves in order to deploy them overseas while keeping their jobs. Reserve units would be reorganized similar to that of the CLBGs (with the exception of TACHEL support) and units would train on a 6-year readiness cycle.

    Basicly at any given point in the 3-year cycle, 1 Mechanized Infantry, 1 Light Infantry, and 1 Reserve Light Infantry Task Force would be deployable overseas.



Any comments?

Thanks


 
Not sure why you would try to shoe-horn a Bde into down-town Quebec instead of Gagetown.

I also do not see reserve BGs being feasible in this country.

Your arty regts seem excessively massive, and your engineer regiments inadequate.

Why not go with just two CMBGs with thee deployable manoeuvre BGs each?
 
AIC_2K5 

I don't know what your experience is, but it really doesn't show as being much in your post. 
 
AIC_2K5 said:
1. Increase size of army;

Okay, by how much?

2. Further development and smoothlining of medium-weight wheeled force;

What is smoothlining?

3. Enforcing new 3-year cycle to allow sustained overseas deployments and;

Don't we already have this with ATOF?

4. Further utilisation of reserves in regard to 'the big L'

What's the "Big L"?

Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations. As mentioned earlier in this thread, we need to lose WW II structure system and adapt to modern warfare.

Are they fat and bulky?  They seem to be pretty close in size and structure to what Douglas MacGregor proposed in Breaking the Phalanx (a key driver of Transformation in the US) and what the US Army is going towards with the Unit of Action.  As well, they are similar in size to what US Marine RCT's that were formed for Iraq.

4 CLBG   - The Citadel, Quebec

Stick a whole brigade in downtown Quebec?!?

Essentially, there would be 6 MIBs and 6 LIBs.

Okay, where are the 3 extra Infantry Battalions coming from, Army growth?

The 3 LIBs from the CMBGs would be transfered to the CLBGs. The Jump company would be removed from the LIBs and replaced with a rifle company. The LIBs would become actual 'infantry' battalions, and would lose any quasi-SF duties that was previously stamped on them (These duties would be replaced by stand up of Canadian Special Operations Regiment). This would relieve MIBs of any LI duties and they would focus primarily on mechanized warfare for high/medium-intensity conflicts.

That's another option - one I'm prone to.

The structure of the brigades would be housed around the new task force system, as it is no longer likely that we would send an entire brigade group overseas. This would entitle all support and combat arms units within the brigade to be reorganized so that they would be easier divided up to support TFs.

Essentially a "modular Brigade".  Would formation-level capability be preserved?

Here is how the Brigades would be organized:

That's alot of extra arty, engineers and support.  How many numbers would this add to your enlargement scheme?  Is this palatable?

Legislation would be enforced for the reserves in order to deploy them overseas while keeping their jobs. Reserve units would be reorganized similar to that of the CLBGs (with the exception of TACHEL support) and units would train on a 6-year readiness cycle.

Is this desirable?  People don't usually join the Reserves to be plugged into a readiness-cycle.  That's why it is called the "Reserve".
 
Infanteer said:
Don't we already have this with ATOF?
ATOF was replaced was replaced with a new three year cycle (managed readiness), that does not work any better.
 
AIC_2K5 said:
     Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations.

Are they? Given that battalions are around 300-400 troops?
 
Thanks for the feedback

Your arty regts seem excessively massive, and your engineer regiments inadequate.

This artillery regiment organization may seem a little different than what we currently have, but the blueprint of transformation is defined by change from the past. In this example, I did not increase Engineer manning from current strength in hopes to decrease the increase of troops needed for the restructure (obviously this was a bad mistake on my part).

1. Increase size of army;

Okay, by how much?

I think if we add another 5,000 on top of the current goal, it should be doable. This will only happen under a conservative government...

2. Further development and smoothlining of medium-weight wheeled force;

What is smoothlining?

In order to get the best out of wheeled armoured vehicles, I propose reorganizing units at the battalion level so there are more combined arms units (UAV platoon and anti-tank lavs in infantry battalions). Also get rid of anything not based on a wheeled chasis; i.e. MTVL

4. Further utilisation of reserves in regard to 'the big L'

What's the "Big L"?

A word dreaded by some MPs: Legislation

Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations. As mentioned earlier in this thread, we need to lose WW II structure system and adapt to modern warfare.

Are they fat and bulky?  They seem to be pretty close in size and structure to what Douglas MacGregor proposed in Breaking the Phalanx (a key driver of Transformation in the US) and what the US Army is going towards with the Unit of Action.  As well, they are similar in size to what US Marine RCT's that were formed for Iraq.

In my opinion, yes. I still think our brigade formations are organized to fight a cold war on a formation-level battlefield. Our brigades are rather large in comparison to many of our allies. When you look at it, we have 3 infantry battalions, 2 mechanized, and one armoured regiment. We then have to field the support elements for these forces. An American infantry UA is based around just 2 infantry battalions; a heavy UA 2 combined arms battalions (M1s/Bradleys); and a Stryker UA 3 combined arms battalions. I say downsize and streamsize our brigades just a little bit, but not too small so that they are not capable of fielding a brigade-level formation in time of high-intensity conflict.

4 CLBG  - The Citadel, Quebec

Stick a whole brigade in downtown Quebec?!?

Now that I think about it, this was probably not the greatest idea. But I am learning, and that's what I'm here for.

Essentially, there would be 6 MIBs and 6 LIBs.

Okay, where are the 3 extra Infantry Battalions coming from, Army growth?

Supposedly yes.

Here is how the Brigades would be organized:

That's alot of extra arty, engineers and support.  How many numbers would this add to your enlargement scheme?  Is this palatable?

Yes and no. Not under the Libs, anyway.

Legislation would be enforced for the reserves in order to deploy them overseas while keeping their jobs. Reserve units would be reorganized similar to that of the CLBGs (with the exception of TACHEL support) and units would train on a 6-year readiness cycle.

Is this desirable?  People don't usually join the Reserves to be plugged into a readiness-cycle.  That's why it is called the "Reserve".

If this were passed, I know this would defenatly be one of the more controversial issues of the modern military in this fragile Canadian society. The US does this with the National Gaurd, but keep in mind they also deploy for 12 months at a time as opposed to 6.

    Current brigade formations are fat, bulky formations.

Are they? Given that battalions are around 300-400 troops?

But then take into account the support units. I don't think anyone can argue that they can honestly see an entire Canadian Army brigade, as a formation, on a future battlefield. It's not realistic. But I think it can be with this structure. Replace old large brigade with smaller, faster, more technology-oriented and more powerful brigade.



Anything to add?
Thanks


 
AIC_2K5 said:
... take into account the support units. I don't think anyone can argue that they can honestly see an entire Canadian Army brigade, as a formation, on a future battlefield. It's not realistic. But I think it can be with this structure. Replace old large brigade with smaller, faster, more technology-oriented and more powerful brigade.
I don't know.  You've doubled the size of the Svc Bn and raised the MP Pl to a Coy.  I don't see your slimming effect (except for the Fd Amb which you've cut to a single Coy).
 
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