What Should the Army's Role, Capabilities & Structure Be?

[McG]

... Why not organize units the way they will be deployed. ... Its time to organize for operations whether it offends certain corps or not. ...    

Well said.   However, I will repeat my caution that we cannot blindly match our force generation structure to our force employment structure.   There are several reasons for this.

1)   It may force us to choose between a structure that lacks flexibility or one that is inefficient of manpower.   Which missions do we structure for; Bosnia, Kosovo, Eritria, or Afghanistan?   The problem is that none of these missions had the same structure.   If we pick a slimmed down force structure we will become to inflexible to take on unforeseen missions.   If we try to structure permanent battle groups with the capacity to do anything that might come up, then we will have units which are huge and will typically leave unimaginably large rear parties.   Before anyone jumps to answer that we can trim the excess, remember that sometimes the â Å“excessâ ? is Cbt Sp.   A previous CLS identified that over half his TUA sections never deployed (I believe I heard him say that he had too much TOW) and today we have seen TUA cut by a third.

2) Restructuring to produce only BGs would limit the scale of operation we could commit to.   Do we retain the capability to deploy an entire CER (as was done for UNPROFOR and the first Gulf War)?   Do we want to retain the ability to deploy a Bde HQ (as was done in the beginning of Op ATHEANA)?   Do we want to retain the ability to deploy a full brigade or brigade minus   (something we have not done since Korea, but would be sustainable with the PM's additional 5000 PYs)

This is not a rant against restructure.  It is only a cautiion that a proposal must take these factors into account and identify where (if any where) it may reduce flexibility or manpower efficiency.

 

[birdgunnnersrule]

I know that this is a mainly armoured thread, but I think the Canadian Forces should move away from the Regimental concept and we should not be talking about blacks hats or Artillery history.  Too much bickering limits transformation.  Enough for that....As for the thread that refers to one HLVW required to move the ammunition for each ADATS, this should not be required in a DF role.  If an ADATS fires all eight missiles on a Battle run and cannot be replen through the A echelon,  I would be seriously concerned that the battle is being lost or the MGS and TUA have been ineffective.  The focus should be on providing some sort of local protection for the ADATS as the design makes peripheral vision difficult for a Det Comd.  An HLVW is required/utilised in the Air Defence role because of the crew size (9 man Dets for continuous 24/7 operations) and the decentralised task of the Air Defence.  Systems are spread out and the availability of the ammo ensures quick reloads can take place.  A new missile should be designed for the ground role as well.
I agree that Recce Regt's should be created and would also argue that an Air Defence Regiment is also a vital requirement for the CF.  I am sure that the families of the 9 French soldiers killed in the Ivory Coast would attest the to the need for the capability.  Expecting personnel to continually shift gears and remain proficient at the DF task and Air Defence will not work.  I guess it will come down to PY's and equipment at the end of the day.  Way above me. PS.  The ADATS is not a tank even if you take the dish off.  A piece of shrapnel or a bullet can disable this thing.

 

[Kirkhill]

As for the Inf Bns......perhaps we can restore forward mobility by restoring Combat SUpport Coy, adding ATGM to the INF lavs and a DFSV Platoon of 8 DFSV to CBt SUP Coy,

If heavy armour is required, use a Pz Ko from our armoured Regiment. (Since we are talking "should be-couldbe" our Army will retain a heavy Panzer unit right?) ;D

As for Capbadge, I dont know why the RCD's for example could be re-rolled as an Amd Cav / Pz AUf unit. Enroll more Dragoons and train an Assault Squadron. All bases coverd and no Capbadge issues.

Just as, for the sake of an example, 1 RCR's new DFSV Pl would be manned by Inf Pers trained to Armoured BTS. All wearing the RCR badge.


Both units benefit from combined   arms; better cohesion; and no units are lost.

(Man, with all this "should be" stuff I nearly used 1 RHRofC as my example inf unit >, I MUST be dreaming)

We could focus our regular force combat units as follows:

1 Armoured Regt
2-3 Amd Cav / Pz-Auf Regts
6 Mech Inf Bn
3 Air Assault Bn


3 deployable Bdes w/ 1 Amd Cav Regt and 2 Mech Inf Bns + 1 Arty Regt

And 1 Amd regt + 3 air assault Bns as "Div Troops"

While I like and understand the roles and functions here I think we are missing something.

I have heard a lot of discussion about the Rule of 3, the Rule of 4.... Maybe the magic number is 5.

What little PM is saying, when he talks about defence at all, he emphasizes, Domestic Security, Arctic Sovereignty, the Coasts and then International Stability.

With those comments in mind....

Canada has FIVE areas, Northern, Western, Central, Quebec and Atlantic.
Each one has an Area HQ
Each one has a Ranger Group
Does each one have and Area Support Group?

Across Canada we have TEN Militia "Brigades" that can, on a good day, deploy a Battle Group each.  For sake of argument say that that means they could field 10 Battlegroups.
Regardless of where they were raised then they could be deployed in support of each Area HQ at the rate of TWO per area.

OK.  Area now has under command, and locally available an HQ, an ASG?, a Ranger Group and 2 Militia Battle Groups.
I suggest that the addition of a Regular Battle Group to each Area (on demand - not permanently) would give each Area Commander a very useful Formation capable of dealing with a wide range of Domestic Security, Counter Insurgency, Foreign Terrorist type threats.  They would also enhance Pacific, Atlantic and Arctic coastal security through Patrols in support of Ranger activity.  They would enhance National Sovereignty claims in all areas including the Arctic and they would be material contributions to the Treaty requirements to supply forces to defend Continental North America in conjunction with the US.  I believe we are on the hook for 1 or 2 brigades to support these obligations.  I don't think there is anything that stipulates that they have to serve outside of National territory.

Anyway.  FIVE.

Five Area Composite Brigades complete with HQ, Support Group and Rangers permanently assigned and collocated, 2 Militia Groups permanently assigned and possibly collocated and 1 Regular Battle Group assigned on rotation, deployed on need.

FIVE.

Now for the Foreign picture.

The 94 white paper calls for the ability to deploy and SUSTAIN two Battle Groups and occasionally SURGE a Brigade Group.

The accepted rate of employment on 6 month ROTOs is 1:4 (Nominally ----- I know the Actual frequency is much higher than that but apparently that is the goal - 6 months deployed, 24 months in Canada on Home station)

1+4 = FIVE

There's that number again.

For every Battle Group deployed we need a total of FIVE Battle Groups in the order of battle.

Two SUSTAIN two Battle Groups therefore we need TEN Battle Groups in the Army.

Now for the contentious bit.

I suggest that in order to SUSTAIN a force it means being able to replace the deployed force with an equally trained, IDENTICALLY ORGANIZED force, that can slot into the rotational programme withouth disrupting the organization of the Higher formation to whom the Battle Group might be attached.

That, in my view, demands that we start looking at the Forces, the Land Forces at least, that we consider first and foremost the dividing our Regular Forces into 10 Identical Battle Groups.  Two would be deployed, Two resting, One At Notice to move for international purposes and 5 within our own borders maintaining skills and prepared to fight in DOMESTIC terrain (urban, rural and wilderness areas) in support of the Area HQs.

Once we have met the needs of the TEN Identical Battle Groups, then we could look at filling out specialist roles, if the PM allocates the PYs to the task at hand.

With that perspective in mind I propose that we combine two further concepts, plug'n'play and the well known final phase of battle REORG.

First, plug'n'play.  Because of the deployment imperatives, and in the interests of cohesion I believe that the Battle Group is the correct level for the plug'n'play concept to implemented.  Not at the sub-unit level with coy/sqn/btys being shunted around under various Unit, Group and Brigade Commanders.  Maintain the Battle Group as a cohesive, deployable force commanded by a Colonel.  Relegate the Brigade to the previous American concept of being a Staff organization that would fight what ever Units were assigned to it.

I know the Americans are going the other way, but they have got more PYs and more $. They can afford to.

On the REORG front.

Consider after the assault.  You have taken casualties.  Some bodies have been detached to fill out other elements that have suffered worse than you have.  For some strange reason, your section commanders and platoon commander have all survived as have about half of your rifles while your C9 gunners and grenadiers are all dead and your Weapons Det has been reassigned to Combat Support.  OC comes through your position, informs you that you have to hold until relieved, no date certain, and assigns your arcs.  What do you do?  DS informs you, you may not surrender.

That is roughly where I perceive Land Force as being just now.  Might like more bodies, might like more money but none in sight and the arcs still have to be covered.

Only solution, thin out the line and bring up the clerks, cooks and MPs.

So......

By my reckoning the Regular Army consists of the following:

27 Rifle Coys
3 Recce Coys (equal to the actual 9 Recce Pl)
9 Armd Sqns
9 Arty Btys
3 AD Btys
11 Eng Sqns

Plus the following within the Brigades
3 Sig Sqns
3 Log Coys
3Tpt & Supply Coys
3 Maint Coys
3 Amb Coys (with CAS capabilities)



As well, within the Brigades there are
9 Inf HQs and Svc Spt Coys
3 Armd HQs and Svc Spt Coys
4 Arty HQs and Svc Spt Coys (incl 4 ADR)
4 Eng HQs and Svc Spt Coys (incl 4 ESR)
3 Med HQs and Svc Spt Coys
3 Svc Bn Hqs and Svc Spt Coys

This latter group results in a total of 26 LARGE HQ, Adm and Svc Spt Coys which coexists alongside the 15 dedicated Svc Spt Coys/Sqns found in the brigades. That equals a total of 41 Command, Control and Service subunits.

Now consider this:

27 Rifle Coys + 3 Recce Coys =  30 Inf Coys                               Divided by 10 required Battle Groups = 3 Inf Coys per Battle Group
9 Armd Sqns + 1 reroled Eng Sqn = 10 Armd Sqns                      Divided by 10 again = 1 Armd Sqn per Battle Group
9 Arty Btys + 1 reroled AD Bty = 10 Arty Btys                            Divided by 10 again = 1 Arty Bty per Battle Group
11 Eng Sqns - 1 reroled to Armd = 10 Eng Sqns                         Divided by 10 again = 1 Eng Sqn per Battle Group

There you have your F Echelon forces in your Battle Group

3 Inf Coys
1 Arty Bty
1 Armd Sqn
1 Eng Sqn

A total of 6 Sub-Units

As ArmyRick and IIRC either devil39 or pbi stated an Inf Coy size (at least for Light Roles) has been fixed at 146 All ranks by DAD.

6x 146 = 856 All ranks

To support that force in the field there are 42 HQ, ADM and Svc Spt Sub-units or   42 divided by 10 = 4 Sub Units (generally of large size) per Battle Group.

Therefore 6 F Echelon Elements are being supported by 4 A Echelon Elements.

Might it not be possible to thin out those A Echelon Elements to 2 per Battle Group and reassign the PYs to F Echelon making 2 more F Echelon Sub units available?

On that basis, if I had my druthers, I would suggest the following configuration for a Battle Group

4 Inf Sub Units
1 Armd Cav Recce Sub Unit
1 Armd Cav QRF
1 Arty Bty
1 Eng Sqn
1 C4I Sqn
1 Fwd Svc Spt Sqn/Coy

Total PYs something on the order of 1500 bodies.

I leave it up to 2Bravo et al here to figure out the best configuration for the RECCE and QRF sub units, but I would suggest that for vehicles, if it has a turret on it, it immediately goes to CAV.  I would also suggest as Steel Badger has that the force has available to it smaller, armoured vehicles that some such as George Wallace, Lance and 12A prefer for Close Recce but would also be more deployable to more theatres, more quickly - adhering to Forrest's famous maxim "Git thar firstest with the mostest"

For the Infantry they will have to be max flex forces - all things to all people.  Capable of both mounted and dismounted roles.  I suggested elsewhere, and I guess from reading Armyrick at least he, or maybe DAD concurs that vehicle skills in the infantry should be kept at the platoon weapons section level.  The 8 man - weapons section can supply 4 dvr/gnr combos suitable for manning 4 vehicles, enough to carry a platoon administratively and offer a local patrolling capability when manning an isolated protected area.  But these people would not necessarily have to be up to the vehicle skills of the CAV troops.  To reinforce that I think that the types of vehicles these troops would employ would be vehicles like the Pinzgauer LSVW or the Unimog and the Bv206.  They might also be able to be handle something like the Stryker APC, which is not a fighting vehicle, it is an armoured truck with a gun on top.

Perhaps one of the 4 Infantry Companies could actually be trained to work with or equipped with the LAV as part of the QRF.

I would further split the Battle Group into two Elements - Light and Hvy -

Light equals Recce Sqn, 3 Infantry Coys, Arty Bty, Engrs (-), C4I, Svc Spt(-)
Heavy equals LAV inf, QRF Sqn and remainder of Engrs, and Svc Spt.

Depending on terrain and reaction time the Hvys might have to be left behind, or could follow on later.
Note the Arty (in a light force application on a low intensity mission could take their mors/guns/msls with them but keep them stowed in Seacans and act as a 4th Inf Coy on base security duties)

Two of the Battle Groups could be parachute qualified.


The net result, after this long rambling effort is:

5 National Areas HQs and their integral ASGs capable of supporting, in time of crisis, 1 Ranger Group, 2 Militia Groups and 1 assigned Regular Force Battle Group.  In peace time they would support collocated forces.

The Regular Forces would consist of 10 identically organized and manned battle groups, capable of generating 10 light groups, two of which would be parachute qualified.

At least one parachute capable Battle group would always be available, within our borders, for an Immediate Reaction Force.

At any given time 2 Battle groups would be deployed overseas on peace and stability operations.

The deployed Battle Groups would be supported from a single, domestic Contingency Support Group that would be sized to be able to support 2 Battle Groups continuously.  Most members would be located in Canada or would be surged forward on occasion.  Smaller elements would be Forward Based, possibly even on the JSSs, if they ever happen.

Finally, the Battle Groups would be trained and familiarized, through working with Canadian Politicians, Rangers, RCMP, Militiamen to supply the backbone to support an indigenous Brigade of light forces for local security and policing, or possibly a larger force if augmented by NATO allies of countries like Malaysia, Bangladesh, India, Ghana, Jamaica etc.




I know this is a long way off the Cavalry thread, it really is for Foreign Affairs, Regimental Structure, Combined Arms, ..............

But I am afraid that I see most of these discussions starting from the ground up an building brick upon brick without considering the tasks that might be required and the resources available, not what we would like.

By the way, if the Gunners and Engineers feel slighted by this concept they might take partial comfort that I think that they are the best positioned forces to revive the 10/90 concept to supply dual purpose war fighting forces that can also perform a domestic security role.  Thus, if gunners and engineers were willing to act as infantry for domestic purposes I don't see any reason why Reserve Arty and Engr Regiments couldn't be retained.

The big issue here, as always will be between armd and inf and cap badges.  I leave that up to you lot to consider...............

Cheers, and as always, thanks for letting me ramble.


[Moved from the thread: Canadian Armoured Cavalry]

 

[Edward Campbell]

The Canadian Armed Forces of the Future thread http://army.ca/forums/threads/17266.0 was closed down so I will post this here, for now, at least ...

I would like to take a crack at the defence structure debate, avoiding, I hope, those issues about which my rusty old knowledge has shifted from useless to downright dangerous.

I would like to begin by asserting that we need:

o A Department of National Defence headed by the elected minister, aided by his civil service deputy minister and civil service assistant deputy ministers, etc; and

o Subordinate to that Department, the Canadian Armed Forces, headed by a Chief of the Defence Staff, who, aided by a national joint staff and by professional heads of services for the Navy, Army and Air Force, directs the training and administration of the Canadian Armed Forces, through commanders of major joint commands.

Neither DND nor the CF will be 100% civilian or 100% military.   Some of the most important operational elements of the CF, like dockyards, are manned, mainly by civil servants â “ who do far more important, operational work than do most of the pay clerks in Ottawa.   Some vital operational elements, manned by military people, belong, properly, to the deputy minister and, indeed, the Privy Council Office â “ our SIGINT services (CSE + whatever we call supplementary radio these days), for example.

To begin at the top of the operational heap, we need to be able to:

o Survey our own territory (all of it), the waters contiguous to it (out to, say, 500 miles and down to the ocean floor) and the airspace over both; and

o Collect, collate and disseminate intelligence related to the national strategy and, especially, to military matters â “ broadly.

I think we need a range of surveillance, warning and target acquisition systems - space based, terrestrial, shipborne, airborne and undersea â “ which 'belong' to a variety of national and continental commands.   There is no need for an overarching, national 'surveillance' or 'reconnaissance' office but we do need to cooperate with and support (send money to) the US National Reconnaissance Office and similar, more secret, agencies.

We can share space based radars with several allies â “ whereas we would want satellites in low earth orbit to tell us what's happening over Canada's territory and the approaches to it the Australians and New Zealanders and Singaporeans might want similar information, from the same satellites, when they are passing over other parts of the globe â “ which is most of the time.   We do, now, and should continue to help crew US and NATO owned and based AEW elements.

Intelligence is a bit more complex.

First I must assert that I think the current thrust of intelligence reform in the US is 100% wrong and will weaken US and allied security.   The US has been experimenting with collectivization of intelligence since the 1970s â “ every single attempt has failed; all the current and future attempts will fail too.   Messy and wasteful as it may be, intelligence gathering and processing is best done in a highly competitive environment â “ massive collective farms don't work, neither do massive collective intelligence agencies.   The first important principle is to establish (re-establish for the US) a real, clear barrier between intelligence and counter-intelligence services; they should not be mixed.   Each can, should â “ through a third agency â “ provide steerage to the other but when they cooperate things always go wrong -   the closer the cooperation the more things go wrong and the more damage is done.

We need three kinds of intelligence agencies:

o Foreign intelligence;

o Domestic intelligence; and

o Counter-intelligence.

We have one, known, foreign intelligence agency: CSE â “ which relies, mainly, upon SIGINT and is tied into the five nation (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States) Echelon network;

We have two embryonic domestic intelligence services: CSIS (which represents an incorrect mix of intelligence and counter-intelligence) and the RCMP â “ because, recently, some national security or counter-terrorist measures were brought under the Criminal Code of Canada and, consequently, under the jurisdiction of the RCMP.

We have, in CSIS, incorrectly mixed, one counter-intelligence service.

In my view the entire counter-intelligence responsibility should reside in CSIS and the domestic intelligence component of CSIS should be move to a new, semi-secret civilian (not RCMP) domestic intelligence agency.   I say semi-secret because civil-libertarians (which includes me and should include all soldiers â “ what else are we defending?) should demand that any domestic intelligence service operates under public scrutiny.

We should have two new foreign, non-SIGINT, intelligence services: one in the Department of Foreign Affairs and the other in DND.   Both should be highly secret â “ secret budgets and very, very limited and wholly secret parliamentary oversight.   The two agencies should not cooperate, both should, along with CSE, 'feed' an intelligence and security secretariat which reports directly and only to the Clerk of the Privy Council and, through him/her, to the prime minister.

More to follow, dealing, eventually, with more convention 'military' components, later, over the next week or so.

 

[Edward Campbell]

The more interesting question is: what force structure?

I am going to begin with a general principle: forces - formations - should, mostly, be joint and this jointness must reach all the way down, in an unbroken web, from the very top.

The national military headquarters must be a joint HQ and the major command must be joint commands which implies, mostly, regional commands.

First, the exception which proves the rule.   There is one function for which joint forces are not, normally, required: theatre air defence.   As a general rule, even in a joint theatre command all air defence forces are under the control of one, single air commander - this is essential for effective airspace management.   The air defence region normally covers the largest possible area - defined by the ranges of sensors and aircraft from bases.   For us, in Canada, that means all of North America - from Alert to the outer edges of the Caribbean and from Alaska to (and below) the Panama Canal.   This is, of course, the role of NORAD and we, Canada, need surveillance and warning and interceptor forces to identify, track, categorize, intercept (if necessary) and deal with everyone and everything which enters our sovereign airspace and our area of interest.   Our air force does not need navy or army help with this task - it, the air force, is (or can be) properly organized for the job, all by itself.   The air force should own and operate all the sensors (terrestrial and space based) which look at our territory, coastal waters and the airspace above both - obviously the navy should own and operate the sensors systems which look under the water.   This does not mean that we need a separate, distinct Air Defence Command or, worse, an Air Command; heaven knows, we, in the Canadian Forces, have demonstrated our undisputed mastery of the business of empire building - we can stop and rest on our laurels.   While there does need to be a separate, distinct, continental air defence command and control system, the air force bases/wings and units can, each, be part of a Canadian joint command.   The fact that umpteen wing in Cold Lake reports to Commander Western Command while something-else wing in Bagotville reports to Commander Eastern Command does not interfere with the continental air defence command and control system - unless very senior officers install organizational poison pills to fuel the turf wars, as they have done in the past.

That's the big exception.   Naval and land forces are, almost always, better off (more combat effective) when they operate in joint formations - with dedicated air support.

First principle: air forces are flexible.   One air force units can - should - have multiple tasks, supporting or, at least, being prepared to support more than one naval or army element.   A fighter/bomber squadron at Aviano, for example, can fly CAP (combat air patrol) over a navy task force - any close allied navy task force - in the Eastern Mediterranean in the morning and be ready to fly CAS (close air support) for an army unit in the Balkans in the afternoon - and it can be ordered to do either or both by a local, Canadian Joint Task Force commander.   Modern telecommunications and computer systems have revolutionized operational command and control since the '80s, we need to exploit that - and we do not need a separate, distinct Communications Command to do so.

What do we need?

To start we need to understand that we must have 'reserves' - every time we send a unit, any unit, overseas for anything other than a one-off, short deployment, we tie up three units: one which has recently returned from the mission and is in the process of retraining and rebuilding, the unit doing the mission, proper, and the unit preparing to relieve it.   A two to one 'reserve' requirement is not at all unreasonable.   In addition, as Tom Axworthy (formerly Pierre Trudeau's principle secretary/PMO chief) says in today's National Post* â ?Emergencies always spring up: For humanitarian crises like the Sudan or military operations like Afghanistan, there should always be a dedicated reserve.â ?   This is a different sort of reserve - it is a ready reserve, part of a larger expeditionary force.

Our expeditionary forces should include:

"¢ Two blue water task forces - destroyers and frigates, long range patrol aircraft and CAP air forces which can deploy globally to project Canadian power and protect Canadian vital interests;

"¢ Two identical amphibious joint task forces - built around a large assault ship which can deploy and sustain 750 to 1,500 soldiers with their own armour (Strykers, I suppose) and attack helicopters and a six pack of VSTOL fighter/bombers which can fly off the assault ship.   A large ship like that I a 'rich' target so the task force needs surface escorts - two or three destroyer/frigates, and CAP - which can be provided by allied air forces.

"¢ A light (airborne/air mobile) brigade - two or three battle groups with light armour, attack helicopters, artillery, etc, etc, etc and another six pack of VSTOL fighter/bombers which can operate from austere strips; and

"¢ A heavy (heavier, anyway) brigade - wheeled APCs and light armour and attack helicopters which forms Axworthy's 'reserve' for global emergencies.

Our reserve and home defence forces should include:

"¢ Two coastal defence task forces - frigates, corvettes, minesweepers and long range patrol aircraft and CAP air forces;

"¢ Two brigades - one specially equipped for continental defence.   Both available to 'rotate' into expeditionary force missions as required; and

"¢ A whole array of schools, depots, dockyards, bases and agencies which support and sustain the combat forces.

My SWAG (scientific wild arsed guess) is that we need 65,000+/- full time military and 10,000 civilian people in the combat and support forces - including the schools and dockyards and the like.   We also, I think, need another 35,000+/- full time military and 25,000 civilian people in administrative, command and control and infrastructure elements.   I guess - and I cannot overemphasize the fact that my numbers are all the guesses of a reasonably well informed layman - that we need 35,000 part time sailors, soldiers and aviators - mostly soldiers and sailors.   I also guess that we need a defence budget of about $20 billion in 2005 dollars or 2% of GDP, year after year and decade after decade.

----------

* I could not find it on the web site.   The article, in the 2005-12-18 print edition, is entitled 'Wishful Thinking Won't End Poverty'.

Edited to correct grammar

 

[Edward Campbell]

I am both so old and, in so far as military doctrine and tactics and consequential hardware and organization matter are concerned, rusty that I will not attempt to deal with sub-units and equipment, but ...

I think we need four major joint commands - each commanded by a rear admiral/major general and each of which can deploy, on short notice, anywhere in the world, an operational theatre JHQ - probably headed by the deputy commander.   The commands might be:

"¢ Pacific (BC and the Yukon for aid to the civil power issues) - a navy heavy command.   It would have one of those 'blue water' navy/air JTFs and one of the amphibious navy/army/air JTFs I described up above.   Major permanent force bases would be in Esquimalt and Comox, as now;

"¢ Western (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the North West Territories for aid to the civil power issues) - an air heavy command.   It would have most of the air force - including all the CFB Borden and Trenton air force schools and technical units at Cold Lake (which becomes the home of the Air Force) along with the Primrose Lake Experimental range, etc, etc, etc.   It would have the airborne/air mobile JTF (a brigade sized formation) and, consequently, most of the nation's air transport resources.   (Parenthetically: Edmonton is, I'm told by former air transport commanders, a better base than Trenton for national and global reach and a brand new flying base at, say, Lloydminster (where I believe the number of 'good flying' days is better than even Edmonton) would be better still.   Trenton is, of course, home of the Bay of Quinte and one of the nation's finest fresh water yacht clubs, so ...)

"¢ Eastern (Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick and PEI for aid to the civil power issues) - an army heavy command.   It would have most of the army - the main, combat ready expeditionary brigade plus all the army schools from Borden and Kingston in a bigger, better Gagetown (the Army's home).   The two 'reserve' and home defence brigades would be in ValCartier and Petawawa, as now.   Combat air operations - interceptors and VSTOL fighter/bombers) would still be at Bagotville.   (Once again, an aside: I would not close Kingston and La Citadelle because we do need to preserve and use our army (and navy and air force) heritage but I would move elements from Kingston to Gagetown and concentrate our military professional schools/colleges in Kingston.   I would move almost all the permanent force units out of Borden and make it the Toronto region/Central Ontario militia training centre and I would close Trenton, completely.)

"¢ Atlantic (Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador   for aid to the civil power issues) - a near mirror image of Pacific Command in so far as it concerns permanent forces with the addition of an operational flying base at Goose Bay.

Commands would 'own' all units in their area - even the Canadian NORAD HQ and, for administration, the national HQ in Ottawa.   The Canadian NORAD Region HQ would still be, operationally an extension of Cheyenne Mountain/Colorado Springs but, if the MGen Commander Canadian NORAD Region (do they still call it something like that?) needs his bunker in North Bay fixed he will send an e-mail to the MGen Commander Eastern Command, who sits in a nice office in Québec City and takes a very civilized lunch in La Citadelle officers mess.   Since most first and second line administrative and logistics matters, including construction and properties etc would be command responsibilities no one would have to refer such matters to Ottawa because there would be no one there to 'do' or even approve anything (other than a civilian assistant deputy minister who plans and secures resources (money) five to fifteen years 'out' into the future).

Let me a bit more army specific.

I would see permanent force, operational army elements as follows:

"¢ Pacific Command: one amphibious infantry heavy battle group in Comox - with some light armoured/mobile gun vehicles - Strykers, I suppose, and organic (part of a composite cavalry squadron) attack helicopters, along with a battery of either light howitzers or heavy mortars plus engineers, medics, and logistics, including military police elements;

"¢ Western Command: a light brigade - three battle groups plus combat support and combat service support units.   Perhaps one of the battle group can be centred on a 'beefed-up' militia unit, a unit kept at full strength with, say, 25% regulars.   The unit would have to be based in a major city - Edmonton would do, near enough to the air transport wing to do training.   The brigade would also have a composite cavalry element and its own, organic tactical/utility/transport helicopter squadron;

"¢ Eastern Command: most of the army would be here - a mechanized brigade in Gagetown and two motorized brigades - one in ValCartier and the other in Petawawa.   I do not want to speculate on how much artillery and armour (tanks) we should have although I am a believer in tanks - even light tanks (as opposed to Stryker type systems) can have a tremendous impact in low and medium intensity operations.   The full shock effect of armour is only realized when tracked behemoths with real guns clank their way onto the ridge or, even more shocking, around the corner.   (When I googled "light tank 105 mmâ ? I found, to my surprise, three modern systems - the American Stingray (updated, it says, from the time I first saw them back in the '70s) and Buford and the Austrian Ulan LT 105 variant.   Evidently I am not the only person who thinks that a light tank is suitable for some units in some situations.)

"¢ Atlantic Command: one amphibious infantry heavy battle group in Comox - with some light armoured/mobile gun vehicles - Strykers, I suppose, and organic (part of a composite cavalry squadron) attack helicopters, along with a battery of either light howitzers or heavy mortars plus engineers, medics, and logistics, including military police elements.

That brings me to something like:

"¢ One armoured (tank) regiment - plus I would buy tanks for several (five or six) training areas, primarily for militia use by units earmarked for a tank role on mobilization;

"¢ Two light armoured regiments - Strykers;

"¢ One aviation (attack helicopter) regiment - one permanent squadron, two militia squadrons;

"¢ One composite cavalry regiment (armour + attack helicopters + recce) and two, independent, composite amphibious cavalry squadrons;

"¢ One reconnaissance regiment - ISTAR++;

"¢ Three medium artillery regiments - two with, perhaps, only one or two permanent force batteries;

"¢ One light artillery, airborne/air mobile regiment and two independent amphibious light batteries;

"¢ One air defence regiment - one permanent force battery;

"¢ One combat engineer regiment;

"¢ One light airborne/air mobile engineer regiment - with a field squadron, and airfield squadron and a base support squadron;

"¢ Two independent amphibious engineer squadrons - with a field troop and a base/port troop;

"¢ Appropriate signals, EW and intelligence units - all squadrons and independent troops, I would think - no regimental sized units in a relatively small army;

"¢ Fourteen (Eleven permanent and three 'ready' reserve) battalions of infantry - three (2+1) airborne/air mobile, two amphibious, three mechanized, and six (4+2) motorized;

"¢ Several medical/dental and logistics units.   I cannot enter the fray over service battalions vs. functional battalions.   The latter are cheaper and more efficient; the former are more effective if one plans to conduct brigade level operations on a regular basis; and

"¢ One tactical (transport) helicopter regiment - in the logistics branch, mixed regular and militia squadrons - and an independent squadron and two independent flights.

Regimental (LCol's command) cap badges in the permanent and 'ready reserve' militia (I didn't include medical):

"¢ Cavalry: 5

"¢ Artillery: 5

"¢ Engineers: 2

"¢ Infantry: 14

"¢ Logistics: 4 or 5

And that, by the way, is how I got (part way) to 65,000 people in the operational permanent force and a $20 billion budget, and not too, too far away, I think, from Kirkhill, although I think I have an additional brigade because I don't think his force has enough in ready reserve.

Edited, twice to correct format and grammar errors

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks for the nod, R.O.J.  I appreciate it.

I take your point on the ready reserve, I forgot to consider both the need and the possibility of using high readiness militiamen to boost the number of available units.

Otherwise, as you say, there is a lot of agreement.

One area where there is a question mark is in terms of TAC Air and Strategic Lift.  Essentially the "high-dollar" stuff.  While I agree that we can afford 2% of GCP and that we should spend that amount I have yet to see any indication that our Government is serious about that kind of investment - more shame them.  As a result I was trying to trim my suit to suit the cloth and create some sort of effective force out of what's available.

The shame is that the difference between our current budget and the budget necessary to do things right is 50 to 60 cents per Canadian per day.  If we spent a dollar then we could go a long way to meeting Pearson's goal of 0.7% of GDP on Foreign Aid as well.

Other than that point, this taxpayer would invest in your scheme.

On your point about Light Tanks, if you are looking for some more light reading then you might want to take a look at some of these vehicles as well: the new German Puma, the Swedish CV90 as well as the Spanish ASCOD.  All of them, in roughly the 20 to 40 tonne range have a good weight of armour, and can carry a section or any weapons system up to a 120mm tank gun.  This is a link that I find very useful http://www.army-technology.com/projects/ . There are companion sites for air force and naval projects.

Cheers, Sir.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

"¢  Two blue water task forces - destroyers and frigates, long range patrol aircraft and CAP air forces which can deploy globally to project Canadian power and protect Canadian vital interests;

And if subs are not part of your TG structure then you are just kidding yourself to be able to do an effective job.

 

[Infanteer]

Don't want to put words into ROJ's mouth, but I would think the principal would be subs, cruisers, the Dreadnought - whatever you Navy squids deem effective to control the sea-lanes and the Canadian littoral.

 

[birdgunnnersrule]

First, the exception which proves the rule.   There is one function for which joint forces are not, normally, required: theatre air defence.   As a general rule, even in a joint theatre command all air defence forces are under the control of one, single air commander â “ this is essential for effective airspace management.   The air defence region normally covers the largest possible area â “ defined by the ranges of sensors and aircraft from bases.   For us, in Canada, that means all of North America â “ from Alert to the outer edges of the Caribbean and from Alaska to (and below) the Panama Canal.   This is, of course, the role of NORAD and we, Canada, need surveillance and warning and interceptor forces to identify, track, categorize, intercept (if necessary) and deal with everyone and everything which enters our sovereign airspace and our area of interest.   Our air force does not need navy or army help with this task â “ it, the air force, is (or can be) properly organized for the job, all by itself

I am sorry, but you are mistaken when it comes to the Air Force controlling all Air Defence forces under on single Air Commander.    I know that you are referring to the big picture, but Air Defence (Army/ADATS) has a AirSpace Coordination Center in conjunction with the FSCC and Air/Avn LO control the airspace from an army perspective on the battlefield.   We are not commanded by air force, but we provide the necessary link between the army and airforce for Airspace deconfliction.  General rule of thumb, below 10000 is mine above is there's...this really bothers the helicopter pilots who usually have to wait for us to clear them. The airforce will publish daily a detailed breakdown of sorties.   Through the grapevine I heard that in Afghanistan it was a jumble as it included Iraq and Afghanistan missions and took a lot of time to go through just to find out one was related to Kabul.   The ASCC   must break down all of these sorties to see what comes through our AO.   Once that is done we deconflict any problems with our fellow army personnel might have with the flights.   Throughout the day it is also likely to get Spins, or flights that we not planned. The Avn/Air LO is our link to the air force. Although I sometimes wonder what it would be like to have a blue beret and for the soldiers in my unit to get Spec pay as Radar Operators, sadly I wake inside the M577 Command Post with drool on the log book and another Spin to plot on the mapboard.  

[inserted quote boxes for you - Infanteer]

 

[pbi]

Through the grapevine I heard that in Afghanistan it was a jumble as it included Iraq and Afghanistan missions and took a lot of time to go through just to find out one was related to Kabul.

It's not so much that it's a "jumble": it's that there is one theatre ATO produced that covers Afghanistan, Iraq and the immediately adjacent airspaces. This is seen to be the best way to coordinate the resources with ops under different commanders occurring so close together, and with the practice of assets from one part of the theatre being called to another. Cheers.

 

[birdgunnnersrule]

Thanks for clarifying my jumble..had a braincramp and couldn't remember ATO. 

 

[ArmyRick]

Kirkhill and ROJ, well thought out plans and well said. We should invite the land, maritime and air commanders and the CDS to read some of this stuff.

 

[George Wallace]

Now ArmyRick; are you sure they aren't?   The popularity of this site is catching on and some ideas from here seem to be popping up in DND.......Who are all those "Guests" reading this?

GW

 

[bossi]

... The popularity of this site is catching on and some ideas from here seem to be popping up in DND.......Who are all those "Guests" reading this?

Which reminds me ... 25 and 23 Svc Bn's should be merged to form 48 Svc Bn, ditto for 25 and 23 Fd Amb/Hosp ...
(purely for cost-savings, of course ... and nothing to do with "synchronising" them with ... the 48th Highlanders ... ha!)

And then there's all the money the Army could save on underwear, if only kilts were more widely issued ... 

 

[pbi]

And then there's all the money the Army could save on underwear, if only kilts were more widely issued ... 

Wouldn't work in the PPCLI. We'd have to issue extra web straps to stop things dragging on the ground. >  Cheers.

 

[McG]

Not to worry pbi, we could put pockets in the kilts to protect your knuckles.
:evil: ouch! it burns.  :evil:

 

[pbi]

Ummmmm. (thinks for a moment...)   Oh, yeah?  :rage:  :rage:  :rage:
Cheers.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

As a nuetral observer, I would have to say game, set and match to McQ.

 

[George Wallace]

Now that we find Gen Hillier is to become the CDS and his feelings towards us filling niche roles in our future Combat endeavors, it truly looks like the CF is dead.  We can forseeably see the Armour Corps totally destroyed, with the exception of a few Surveillance type roles.  Infantry will become solely Infantry, with no Mech, no Airborne, no Support Wpn capabilities....more of a paramilitary force than an Armed Force.  The Artillery will slowly shrink down to Mortarmen.  The Navy will not be able to maintain any of their War Fighting skills above or below surface.  The Airforce may be lucky to keep the Snow Birds in the air for a year or two....

To fill niche roles, we have to have a capable Total Force.  We must have that so that we will know how to fit into those niches we are looking at filling.  If we don't keep a Total Force, we won't have the experience to even keep our future elite "niche troops" skilled.  We are loosing everywhere with this attitude.  We are laying down and dying.  Once lost, all our combat skills will take decades to relearn, at a great lose of lives.  It is a very long, slippery and dangerous slope we are being lead into.

Call me a dinosaur if you wish, but I believe that the most High Tech item we have in our inventory is our Soldier.  The more info we can load into his "Brain Housing Group" the more likely we are to succeed.  Give him the skills he needs and he will do the job.  Take those skills away and he becomes an expensive piece of cannon fodder. 

GW