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I found this fascinating. The Coasties have had enough of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman (same companies involved in the overruns on the LCS that resulted in their entry being delisted) and have decided to takeover the Deepwater programme themselves.
Apparently the Contractors have managed to take a perfectly useable design (110 ft WPB) and managed to break it resulting in the USCG having to take 8 "new" patrol boats (123 ft WPB) out of commission.
http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/123wpb.asp
http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/110wpb.asp
As a result they are off the case. Edit: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.16851726.1133540294.Q5BzxsOa9dUAAHeSPdQ&modele=jdc_34
What I find more interesting is the "6 new principles" for managing Deepwater:
This is a pretty hard slam at all the Defence Systems managers out there. One that I agree with.
The crux of the matter seems to be a traditional bug-bear in any "integrated system": how do you deal with the necessary design compromises? Every problem has a solution. However every problem solver will define their own version of what is acceptable. As a result any "component" will be a blend of hardware, software and operational procedures. When two engineers are tasked to solve a problem by integrating components they will choose from what is available. Each one will make their own decision as to which blend of strengths and weaknesses they can work with. Some of the weaknesses of one component can be offset by the strengths of another component but sometimes the weaknesses are insoluble except through transferance to the operator (the discussion about the student ejecting on the tarmac is indicative).
That then becomes one of the bases of evaluation of the integrated systems - ease of operator use - along with cost and maintenance.
And those evaluations can only be done by the end user. So they select a contractor and a design. Then they wait to see if what they ordered will work. What they inevitably discover is that some of the compromises are unacceptable to them, or just undesirable. Then the fun begins. Who pays and for what? What is necessary and what is just desirable?
If the customer doesn't have a direct financial stake in modifications to the project (a fixed cost project) then they will demand more and more changes and be unhappy when they don't get them. If they do have a direct financial stake in the modifications (a cost plus project) then they will still demand changes and complain about cost over-runs.
In order to offset this discussion the system integrators will point to the component suppliers and say that the problems lie in the performance of the components while the component suppliers will argue that the problem lies with the systems integrator selecting incompatible components from different suppliers - if only the systems integrator had bought all components from them then everything would be perfectly integrated (in which case, of course, there is no need for a systems integrator).
The Coast Guard is just the latest organization to discover this truism: If you want a job done well do it yourself.
This is NOT because of any technical competence that they have but strictly because when you are forced to make and pay for your own compromises you are more likely to have a realistic appreciation of what is possible. (Of course the sailors using the boats may not share management's views of what is an acceptable compromise but that is another thread). If you are making your own decisions and spending your own cash you are more likely to be accepting of trade-offs.
The Coast Guard wanted to get out of the decision making business on design and logistics and hand that over to "experts" so that they could concentrate on being users (punching holes in the water at high rates of Knots). They were then dissatisfied with the products the experts produced.
They are now back in the decision making and "GOVERNANCE" business. Where they should have been all along.
The two advantages that Defence Contractors were supposed to supply was "seamless" integration of multiple systems across multiple platforms and long term stability in planning life-cycle costs.
Predictability is dear to accountants because then they can make standards and hold administrators to those standards. But when you are talking about projects with 25 to 50 year life cycles predictability goes out the window. This is true in any commercial venture which is always subject to the vagaries of the market place. It is more true in the military sphere where the enemy forces change resulting in the need to "Adapt and Overcome......Right Now". And it is exacerbated by the rapid pace of change resulting from technology.
Life Cycle planning becomes a farce. It is one thing to get contractors to prepare a Life Cycle Cost to evaluate maintenance costs under steady state conditions and use that as a basis of comparing systems. It is quite another thing to hand out Life Cycle service contracts - especially in the military field. You either end up with outdated, dangerous equipment that the enemy can counter or you end up having to break the contract to redesign the system. Edit: It is equally silly to expect that actual Life Cycle cost to be anything like the planned cost proposed by the manufacturer because the operators will inevitably find ways to use the equipment that neither management nor the supplier dreamed of.
The only rational solution is for the USER to become their own General Contractor and Maintenance Provider and demand (as Admiral Allen does in Principle 5) that suppliers be required to deliver what they promised. That, unfortunately, still leaves a lot of compromises to be argued over but they are fewer in number, lower in cost, lower in risk and consequently more easily addressed.
There is no alternative to accepting responsibility for your own decisions.
The CF needs to keep that in mind as it re-equips and as people complain that there are too many people in HQ and Administration. These are the people that are necessary to integrate the projects that the boots on the ground rely on to do there work. As systems become more technically complex the demand for high priced integrators and administrators (in uniform or out) will only increase.
Given that we have determined that there is a certain irreducible need for boots on the ground (people) to interact with people - and we have too few of those already - and given that we have an increasing need for integrators and administrators to manage the technologies then where might the people and dollars come from to permit this investment. I suggest that the likely candidates are those fields where technology can replace man-power - the support fields and the technical arms. That means logistics - replacing little ships and planes with big crews with big ships and planes with little crews and buying trucks with automated loading systems. It means reducing the size of crews on fighting ships, aircraft and vehicles because it is the single platform and its weapons that supplies the effect - not the size of the crew - which in some instances can be reduced to zero these days. It means increasing the number, range and effects of weapons available to the individual decision maker - trigger puller so that one individual can influence a large portion of the battlefield with out having to rely on massive numbers of subordinates. Those PYs are more valuably employed interacting with people and making sure that the boots on the ground have the support systems in place they need to do their jobs.
PS - it appears I have done it again. Sorry - sort of. ;D
Apparently the Contractors have managed to take a perfectly useable design (110 ft WPB) and managed to break it resulting in the USCG having to take 8 "new" patrol boats (123 ft WPB) out of commission.
http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/123wpb.asp
http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/110wpb.asp
As a result they are off the case. Edit: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.16851726.1133540294.Q5BzxsOa9dUAAHeSPdQ&modele=jdc_34
Statement by Adm. Thad Allen on the Converted 123-foot Patrol Boats and Changes to the Deepwater Acquisition Program (Source: US Coast Guard; issued April 17, 2007)
What I find more interesting is the "6 new principles" for managing Deepwater:
This is a pretty hard slam at all the Defence Systems managers out there. One that I agree with.
The crux of the matter seems to be a traditional bug-bear in any "integrated system": how do you deal with the necessary design compromises? Every problem has a solution. However every problem solver will define their own version of what is acceptable. As a result any "component" will be a blend of hardware, software and operational procedures. When two engineers are tasked to solve a problem by integrating components they will choose from what is available. Each one will make their own decision as to which blend of strengths and weaknesses they can work with. Some of the weaknesses of one component can be offset by the strengths of another component but sometimes the weaknesses are insoluble except through transferance to the operator (the discussion about the student ejecting on the tarmac is indicative).
That then becomes one of the bases of evaluation of the integrated systems - ease of operator use - along with cost and maintenance.
And those evaluations can only be done by the end user. So they select a contractor and a design. Then they wait to see if what they ordered will work. What they inevitably discover is that some of the compromises are unacceptable to them, or just undesirable. Then the fun begins. Who pays and for what? What is necessary and what is just desirable?
If the customer doesn't have a direct financial stake in modifications to the project (a fixed cost project) then they will demand more and more changes and be unhappy when they don't get them. If they do have a direct financial stake in the modifications (a cost plus project) then they will still demand changes and complain about cost over-runs.
In order to offset this discussion the system integrators will point to the component suppliers and say that the problems lie in the performance of the components while the component suppliers will argue that the problem lies with the systems integrator selecting incompatible components from different suppliers - if only the systems integrator had bought all components from them then everything would be perfectly integrated (in which case, of course, there is no need for a systems integrator).
The Coast Guard is just the latest organization to discover this truism: If you want a job done well do it yourself.
This is NOT because of any technical competence that they have but strictly because when you are forced to make and pay for your own compromises you are more likely to have a realistic appreciation of what is possible. (Of course the sailors using the boats may not share management's views of what is an acceptable compromise but that is another thread). If you are making your own decisions and spending your own cash you are more likely to be accepting of trade-offs.
The Coast Guard wanted to get out of the decision making business on design and logistics and hand that over to "experts" so that they could concentrate on being users (punching holes in the water at high rates of Knots). They were then dissatisfied with the products the experts produced.
They are now back in the decision making and "GOVERNANCE" business. Where they should have been all along.
The two advantages that Defence Contractors were supposed to supply was "seamless" integration of multiple systems across multiple platforms and long term stability in planning life-cycle costs.
Predictability is dear to accountants because then they can make standards and hold administrators to those standards. But when you are talking about projects with 25 to 50 year life cycles predictability goes out the window. This is true in any commercial venture which is always subject to the vagaries of the market place. It is more true in the military sphere where the enemy forces change resulting in the need to "Adapt and Overcome......Right Now". And it is exacerbated by the rapid pace of change resulting from technology.
Life Cycle planning becomes a farce. It is one thing to get contractors to prepare a Life Cycle Cost to evaluate maintenance costs under steady state conditions and use that as a basis of comparing systems. It is quite another thing to hand out Life Cycle service contracts - especially in the military field. You either end up with outdated, dangerous equipment that the enemy can counter or you end up having to break the contract to redesign the system. Edit: It is equally silly to expect that actual Life Cycle cost to be anything like the planned cost proposed by the manufacturer because the operators will inevitably find ways to use the equipment that neither management nor the supplier dreamed of.
The only rational solution is for the USER to become their own General Contractor and Maintenance Provider and demand (as Admiral Allen does in Principle 5) that suppliers be required to deliver what they promised. That, unfortunately, still leaves a lot of compromises to be argued over but they are fewer in number, lower in cost, lower in risk and consequently more easily addressed.
There is no alternative to accepting responsibility for your own decisions.
The CF needs to keep that in mind as it re-equips and as people complain that there are too many people in HQ and Administration. These are the people that are necessary to integrate the projects that the boots on the ground rely on to do there work. As systems become more technically complex the demand for high priced integrators and administrators (in uniform or out) will only increase.
Given that we have determined that there is a certain irreducible need for boots on the ground (people) to interact with people - and we have too few of those already - and given that we have an increasing need for integrators and administrators to manage the technologies then where might the people and dollars come from to permit this investment. I suggest that the likely candidates are those fields where technology can replace man-power - the support fields and the technical arms. That means logistics - replacing little ships and planes with big crews with big ships and planes with little crews and buying trucks with automated loading systems. It means reducing the size of crews on fighting ships, aircraft and vehicles because it is the single platform and its weapons that supplies the effect - not the size of the crew - which in some instances can be reduced to zero these days. It means increasing the number, range and effects of weapons available to the individual decision maker - trigger puller so that one individual can influence a large portion of the battlefield with out having to rely on massive numbers of subordinates. Those PYs are more valuably employed interacting with people and making sure that the boots on the ground have the support systems in place they need to do their jobs.
PS - it appears I have done it again. Sorry - sort of. ;D
