daftandbarmy
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Interesting article that pretty much nails it IMHO....
The reluctant pupil? Britain’s army and learning in counter-insurgency
The operational errors of counter-insurgency campaigns are too often blamed on the inability of armed forces to absorb the lessons of previous campaigns. However, as Huw Bennett demonstrates in his examination of the British Army's experience in Northern Ireland, flexibility in adapting to the unique dynamics of each campaign is of far greater importance than a strict application of out-dated doctrine.
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4AD22F8DF284C/#.UFJXPo1lTz0
In the past few years there has been increasing curiosity about the military's ability to learn, and the consequent impact on effectiveness in war. Inspired by theoretical insights into the business world, soldier-scholars such as John Nagl studied past experiences of organisational learning in order to promote reform in the contemporary American forces. Nagl compared the British experience in Malaya favourably with American failures in Vietnam.
More recently, however, scholars have noted the British Army's apparent inability to set in stone the lessons from one campaign and transmit them to the next. Given its frequent practice at counter-insurgency since 1945, why the Army continues to spend such time and effort re-learning lessons when a new insurgency breaks out is a mystery that appears unanswerable. The early years of insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan were marked by mistakes in the fields of intelligence, tactics, command and control, and inter-agency co-operation. Eventually, classic counter-insurgency principles came into play, and commanders managed to salvage varying degrees of success from impending disaster.
History thus seems to suggest that the current crisis in countering Afghanistan's Taliban insurgency conforms to a pattern rather than being anomalous. This article argues that the inability to transfer lessons from one campaign to another is, to a very large extent, inevitable. On a more optimistic note, there are positive reasons why learning should take place again repeatedly. Britain's evolving deployment in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s shows how an improved integration of intelligence products and training regimes can render the military instrument more politically versatile.
The forgetful army
So why is the British Army so forgetful of previous lessons? Writers on organisational and strategic culture emphasise the crucial role played by deeply held beliefs and assumptions in shaping military behaviour. In the British case, tradition dictates a disdain for abstract thinking about war, including doctrine. Some writers claim this reflects a national proclivity for pragmatism, contrasted with a pejorative association of theory with foreigners. The Army's culture is thought to place supreme merit in the soldier who shows initiative, is self-reliant and makes things up as he goes along. Because British soldiers therefore value creativity, they are reluctant to systematically study the past and learn lessons for the future.
The British Army's regimental structure exacerbates the problem by acting as a foil to centralising tendencies within the military, including those processes necessary to thoroughly disseminate lessons. Material constraints militate against efficient information retention even when doctrine is produced and distributed. Throughout the twentieth century, defence policy required the army to prepare for low intensity operations and conventional warfare simultaneously. Training and education had to deal with two quite distinct types of conflict. Add to this the frequent deployments abroad and at home, and it is often difficult to see where extra time for learning might have come from. Overstretch is an old challenge. In the context of insurgencies, an initial intelligence failure is almost always inevitable: if the state correctly identified the threat posed by rising disaffection, then countermeasures could be implemented before the degeneration into violence.
Early intelligence failures follow a vicious circle pattern, whereby over-confidence in the state's ability to control the situation contributes towards the inadequate allocation of resources to quell unrest. A weak intelligence system then continues to produce flawed assessments. While these factors compel the re-learning of what superficially appear to be the same lessons, in fact the security forces must orientate themselves to a distinct opponent. The Malayan National Liberation Army, the Provisional IRA and the Taliban exhibit distinct characteristics in relation to ideological motivation, organisation, strategy and tactics. The efficient transmission of the lessons of one conflict to another creates the risk of ignoring each conflict's unique dynamics, thus creating an anachronistic counter-insurgency strategy.
Learning in Northern Ireland
On 22 March 1972 the British Cabinet decided to suspend the Stormont parliament and impose direct rule on Northern Ireland. It hoped to bring order to a chaotic security situation. Both official and provisional wings of the Irish Republican Army were on the offensive, inter-sectarian violence had become an everyday occurrence, and the government's military policy was discredited by internment without trial, deep interrogation, and the Bloody Sunday massacre. The Cabinet recognised that the early objective of militarily defeating the IRA was now unattainable, and wished to de-escalate the conflict. Although flaws in the British approach had been apparent from quite early on, direct rule allowed for a strategic re-think in 1972, the most violent year of the Troubles. At the highest level politicians in Northern Ireland and London scrambled for a solution, including secret talks between the IRA leadership and members of the government.
However, less historical attention has been focused on the changing intelligence framework, and the effective integration of the information thereby produced into the army's training programme. Counter-insurgencies rely upon sound intelligence to allow force to be used in a discriminate and measured manner. While during the campaign's early years insufficient intelligence provoked serious and lasting rifts with the civilian population, improvements made during 1972 created the basis for a change in military strategy and the eventual move towards police primacy and demilitarisation.
The reluctant pupil? Britain’s army and learning in counter-insurgency
The operational errors of counter-insurgency campaigns are too often blamed on the inability of armed forces to absorb the lessons of previous campaigns. However, as Huw Bennett demonstrates in his examination of the British Army's experience in Northern Ireland, flexibility in adapting to the unique dynamics of each campaign is of far greater importance than a strict application of out-dated doctrine.
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4AD22F8DF284C/#.UFJXPo1lTz0
In the past few years there has been increasing curiosity about the military's ability to learn, and the consequent impact on effectiveness in war. Inspired by theoretical insights into the business world, soldier-scholars such as John Nagl studied past experiences of organisational learning in order to promote reform in the contemporary American forces. Nagl compared the British experience in Malaya favourably with American failures in Vietnam.
More recently, however, scholars have noted the British Army's apparent inability to set in stone the lessons from one campaign and transmit them to the next. Given its frequent practice at counter-insurgency since 1945, why the Army continues to spend such time and effort re-learning lessons when a new insurgency breaks out is a mystery that appears unanswerable. The early years of insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan were marked by mistakes in the fields of intelligence, tactics, command and control, and inter-agency co-operation. Eventually, classic counter-insurgency principles came into play, and commanders managed to salvage varying degrees of success from impending disaster.
History thus seems to suggest that the current crisis in countering Afghanistan's Taliban insurgency conforms to a pattern rather than being anomalous. This article argues that the inability to transfer lessons from one campaign to another is, to a very large extent, inevitable. On a more optimistic note, there are positive reasons why learning should take place again repeatedly. Britain's evolving deployment in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s shows how an improved integration of intelligence products and training regimes can render the military instrument more politically versatile.
The forgetful army
So why is the British Army so forgetful of previous lessons? Writers on organisational and strategic culture emphasise the crucial role played by deeply held beliefs and assumptions in shaping military behaviour. In the British case, tradition dictates a disdain for abstract thinking about war, including doctrine. Some writers claim this reflects a national proclivity for pragmatism, contrasted with a pejorative association of theory with foreigners. The Army's culture is thought to place supreme merit in the soldier who shows initiative, is self-reliant and makes things up as he goes along. Because British soldiers therefore value creativity, they are reluctant to systematically study the past and learn lessons for the future.
The British Army's regimental structure exacerbates the problem by acting as a foil to centralising tendencies within the military, including those processes necessary to thoroughly disseminate lessons. Material constraints militate against efficient information retention even when doctrine is produced and distributed. Throughout the twentieth century, defence policy required the army to prepare for low intensity operations and conventional warfare simultaneously. Training and education had to deal with two quite distinct types of conflict. Add to this the frequent deployments abroad and at home, and it is often difficult to see where extra time for learning might have come from. Overstretch is an old challenge. In the context of insurgencies, an initial intelligence failure is almost always inevitable: if the state correctly identified the threat posed by rising disaffection, then countermeasures could be implemented before the degeneration into violence.
Early intelligence failures follow a vicious circle pattern, whereby over-confidence in the state's ability to control the situation contributes towards the inadequate allocation of resources to quell unrest. A weak intelligence system then continues to produce flawed assessments. While these factors compel the re-learning of what superficially appear to be the same lessons, in fact the security forces must orientate themselves to a distinct opponent. The Malayan National Liberation Army, the Provisional IRA and the Taliban exhibit distinct characteristics in relation to ideological motivation, organisation, strategy and tactics. The efficient transmission of the lessons of one conflict to another creates the risk of ignoring each conflict's unique dynamics, thus creating an anachronistic counter-insurgency strategy.
Learning in Northern Ireland
On 22 March 1972 the British Cabinet decided to suspend the Stormont parliament and impose direct rule on Northern Ireland. It hoped to bring order to a chaotic security situation. Both official and provisional wings of the Irish Republican Army were on the offensive, inter-sectarian violence had become an everyday occurrence, and the government's military policy was discredited by internment without trial, deep interrogation, and the Bloody Sunday massacre. The Cabinet recognised that the early objective of militarily defeating the IRA was now unattainable, and wished to de-escalate the conflict. Although flaws in the British approach had been apparent from quite early on, direct rule allowed for a strategic re-think in 1972, the most violent year of the Troubles. At the highest level politicians in Northern Ireland and London scrambled for a solution, including secret talks between the IRA leadership and members of the government.
However, less historical attention has been focused on the changing intelligence framework, and the effective integration of the information thereby produced into the army's training programme. Counter-insurgencies rely upon sound intelligence to allow force to be used in a discriminate and measured manner. While during the campaign's early years insufficient intelligence provoked serious and lasting rifts with the civilian population, improvements made during 1972 created the basis for a change in military strategy and the eventual move towards police primacy and demilitarisation.
