Came across this video on YouTube featuring Dr. Roel Konijnendijk from Oxford. He’s been on a few other videos and I find him quite good.
He does a great job debunking the myths about the Spartans.
Some good stuff about:
- how they were not really a warrior society (and how they didn’t actually have a professional standing army)
- the truth about how they were actually educated and trained.
- why they almost always fought as heavy infantry
- how they were viewed by contemporaries
- miscelaneous things like if lambda shields were a thing, why women were also trained in athletics, etc
IIRC that alot of the 'Sparta Hype' comes from the US military idolizing them in various ways, sadly...
... in contrast Euro-armies never mention them or, even worse, name units after them
Spartans Were Losers
The U.S. military’s admiration of a proto-fascist city-state is based on bad history.
The Athenian historian Thucydides once
remarked that Sparta was so lacking in impressive temples or monuments that future generations who found the place deserted would struggle to believe it had ever been a great power. But even without physical monuments, the memory of Sparta is very much alive in the modern United States. In popular culture, Spartans
star in film and feature as the protagonists of
several of the
largest video game
franchises. The Spartan brand is used to promote
obstacle races,
fitness equipment, and
firearms. Sparta has also become a
political rallying cry, including by members of the extreme right who stormed the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. Sparta is gone, but the glorification of Sparta—Spartaganda, as it were—is alive and well.
Even more concerning is the U.S. military’s love of all things Spartan. The U.S. Army, of course, has a
Spartan Brigade (Motto: “Sparta Lives”) as well as a
Task Force Spartan and
Spartan Warrior exercises, while the Marine Corps conducts
Spartan Trident littoral exercises—an odd choice given that the Spartans were
famously very poor at littoral operations. Beyond this sort of official nomenclature, unofficial media regularly invites
comparisons between U.S. service personnel and the Spartans as well.
Much of this tendency to imagine U.S. soldiers as Spartan warriors comes from Steven Pressfield’s historical fiction novel
Gates of Fire, still regularly assigned in military reading lists. The book presents the Spartans as superior warriors from an ultra-militarized society bravely defending freedom (against an ethnically foreign “other,” a feature drawn out more explicitly in the comic and later film
300). Sparta in this vision is a radically egalitarian society predicated on the cultivation of manly martial virtues. Yet this image of Sparta is almost entirely wrong. Spartan society was singularly unworthy of emulation or praise, especially in a democratic society.
To start with, the Spartan reputation for military excellence turns out to be, on closer inspection, mostly a mirage. Despite Sparta’s reputation for superior fighting, Spartan armies were
as likely to lose battles as to win them, especially against peer opponents such as other Greek city-states. Sparta defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War—but only by accepting Persian money to do it, reopening the door to Persian influence in the Aegean, which Greek victories at Plataea and Salamis nearly a century early had closed. Famous Spartan victories at Plataea and Mantinea were matched by consequential defeats at Pylos, Arginusae, and ultimately Leuctra. That last defeat at Leuctra, delivered by Thebes a mere 33 years after Sparta’s triumph over Athens, broke the back of Spartan power permanently, reducing Sparta to the status of a second-class power from which it never recovered.
Sparta was one of the largest Greek city-states in the classical period, yet it struggled to achieve meaningful political objectives; the result of Spartan arms abroad was
mostly failure. Sparta was particularly poor at logistics; while Athens could maintain armies across the Eastern Mediterranean, Sparta repeatedly struggled to keep an army in the field even within Greece. Indeed, Sparta spent the entirety of the initial phase of the Peloponnesian War, the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.), failing to solve the basic logistical problem of operating long term in Attica, less than 150 miles overland from Sparta and just a few days on foot from the nearest friendly major port and market, Corinth.
The U.S. military’s admiration of a proto-fascist city-state is based on bad history.
foreignpolicy.com