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Revisionists challenge D-day history

CougarKing

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A revisionist theme seems to have settled on this year's 65th anniversary commemoration of the Normandy landings.

The tone was set in Antony's Beevor's new book, D-Day, which tries to debunk certain received ideas about the Allied campaign.

Far from being an unmitigated success, Mr Beevor found, the landings came very close to going horribly wrong.

And far from being universally welcomed as liberators, many troops had a distinctly surly reception from the people of Normandy.

The reason for this was simple. Many Normandy towns and villages had been literally obliterated by Allied bombing.

The bombardment of Caen, Mr Beevor said, could almost be considered a war-crime (though he later retracted the comment).

Many historians will retort that there is nothing new in Mr Beevor's account.

Harrowing experience

After all, the scale of destruction is already well-established.

Some 20,000 French civilians were killed in the two-and-a-half months from D-Day, 3,000 of them during the actual landings.

In some areas - like the Falaise pocket where the Germans were pounded into oblivion at the end of the campaign - barely a building was left standing and soldiers had to walk over banks of human corpses.

As for the destruction of Caen, it has long been admitted that it was militarily useless.

The Germans were stationed to the north of the city and were more or less untouched.

Twenty-five years ago, in his book Overlord, Max Hastings had already described it as "one of the most futile air attacks of the war."

Though these revisionist accounts were written elsewhere, it is in France that these ideas strike more of a chord today.

It is not as if the devastation wrought by the Allies is not known - it is just that it tends not to get talked about.

And yet for many families who lived through the war, it was the arrival and passage of British and American forces that was by far the most harrowing experience.

"It was profoundly traumatic for the people of Normandy," said Christophe Prime, a historian at the Peace Memorial in Caen.

"Think of the hundreds of tons of bombs destroying entire cities and wiping out families. But the suffering of civilians was for many years masked by the over-riding image - that of the French welcoming the liberators with open arms."

'Sullen' welcome

According to Prime, it was during the 60th anniversary commemoration five years ago that the taboo first began to lift.

At town meetings across Normandy, witnesses - now on their 70s - spoke of the terrible things they had seen as children.

At the same time an exhibition at the Caen memorial displayed letters from Allied servicemen speaking frankly about their poor reception by locals.

That too was an eye-opener for many Normandy people.

For example, Cpl LF Roker of the Highland Light Infantry is quoted in another new book about the civilian impact of the campaign, Liberation, The Bitter Road to Freedom, by William Hitchcock.

"It was rather a shock to find we were not welcomed ecstatically as liberators by the local people, as we were told we should be... They saw us as bringers of destruction and pain," Mr Roker wrote in his diary.

Another soldier, Ivor Astley of the 43rd Wessex Infantry, described the locals as "sullen and silent... If we expected a welcome, we certainly failed to find it."

Sexual violence

In his book, Mr Hitchcock raises another issue that rarely features in euphoric folk-memories of liberation: Allied looting, and worse.

"The theft and looting of Normandy households and farmsteads by liberating soldiers began on June 6 and never stopped during the entire summer," he writes.

One woman - from the town of Colombieres - is quoted as saying that "the enthusiasm for the liberators is diminishing. They are looting... everything, and going into houses everywhere on the pretext of looking for Germans

Even more feared, of course, was the crime of rape - and here too the true picture has arguably been expunged from popular memory.

According to American historian J Robert Lilly, there were around 3,500 rapes by American servicemen in France between June 1944 and the end of the war.

"The evidence shows that sexual violence against women in liberated France was common," writes Mr Hitchcock.

"It also shows that black soldiers convicted of such awful acts received very severe punishments, while white soldiers received lighter sentences."

Of 29 soldiers executed for rape by the US military authorities, 25 were black - though African-Americans did not represent nearly so high a proportion of convictions.

Happy and thankful

So why did the "bad" side of the Allied liberation tend to disappear from French popular consciousness?

The answer of course is that the overwhelming result of the Allied campaign was a positive one for the whole of France.

It was hard for the people of Normandy to spoil the national party by complaining of their lot.

The message from on-high was sympathetic but clear: we know you have suffered, but the price was worth it. Most people agreed and were silent.

In addition, open criticism of British and American bombings raids had long been a hallmark of French collaboration.

In Paris - which, it is often forgotten, was itself bombed by the British - pro-German groups staged ceremonies to commemorate the victims, and the "crimes" of the Allies were excoriated in the press.

After the war, abusing the Allies would have seemed like siding with the defeated and the dishonoured.

Of course, in some communities the devastation was never forgotten.

There are villages in Normandy where until recently the 6 June celebrations were deliberately shunned, because the associations were too painful.

And on the ideological front, there have been intellectuals of both left and right who justified their anti-Americanism by recalling the grimmer aspects of the French campaign - like the "cowardly" way the Americans bombed from high altitude, or their reliance on heavy armour causing indiscriminate civilian casualties.

But in general, France has gone along with the accepted version of the landings and their aftermath - that of a joyful liberation for which the country is eternally grateful.

That version is the correct one. France was indeed freed from tyranny, and the French were both happy and thankful.

But it is still worth remembering that it all came at a cost.

This is not the way the anniversary of that costly invasion should be observed.  :o Those revisionists are crazy.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8084210.stm
 
QUOTE:
"The bombardment of Caen, Mr Beevor said, could almost be considered a war-crime (though he later retracted the comment)."
END QUOTE.

Gen Eisenhower, General Marshall, and finally, the President of the United States, INSISTED that Winston Churchill order Bomber Command divert from the strategic bombing of Germany to tactical bombing in France in support of the Army. "Bomber" Harris strongly opposed this, but obeyed his orders. And his crews obeyed him.
My father's brother bombed Caen.  Bomber Command dropped their bombs on Caen EXACTLY where the army told them to.
7 July 1944:
CAEN:
Lancaster: ND859 L-2 576 Squadron.
Up: 1950 Down: 2350
"Cloud was 3/10ths at the base and increased to 5/10ths at the south coast. These conditions persisted to the target and bombed below the cloud. Weather on return was similar. The target was marked by P.F.F. with red and yellow T.I.'s both of which were accurately placed. The Master Bomber instructed crews to bomb the edge of the smoke pall which drifted away towards the north of the target. Bombing was exceptionally well concentrated. Accurate heavy and light flak was encountered in the target area at the outset of the attack. No fighter opposition was in evidence. A message of appreciation was received from the 2nd Army in Normandy."







 
But all Allied generals relied in the last analysis on firepower and sheer material superiority to win their battles rather than on any concept of unbalancing the enemy or forcing him to give up ground by threatened moves into his flanks and rear. Time and again the favoured method was simply to shell and bomb him into submission.

Brute Force; Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War, John Ellis, 1990
 
And there was nothing unfair or tactically inferior about using firepower and brute force. The purists and the apologists for the German army may carp about it, but it frigging well worked. We had a lot of it, and we were able to use it fairly effectively. (Everyone stand up and chant "The guns, thank God the guns" until I tell you to stop.")

One of the challenges, however, was that the heavy bomber force was not organized, equipped or trained for offensive air support. Bomber Harris was brutally frank in his report on the short bombing of 2nd Canadian Corps on 14 August 1944. Besides discussing the characteristics that made a heavy bomber a quite unsuitable platform for attacking targets close to our own troops, he was insensitive enough to state that the bomb aimers were not the cream of the air crew crop. According to him, the most intelligent became pilots, followed by navigators and then the bomb aimers and air gunners brought up the rear.

In any case, about 50% of heavy bomber missions in Normandy resulted in casualties to friendly forces. Check the appendix on air support in my book No Holding Back for details.
 
No-one is saying it didn't work.  The underlying question here is whether or not emerging evidence of dissatisfaction among that portion of the French population that was subjected to it is "revisionism".  Or is is a correction to commonly held interpretations?

Or will this be like the bomber campaign, where no disparaging words will be allowed lest they be inferred to cast aspersions upon those who fought?
 
If the dissatisfied populace of Normandy want, they can have their former guests return. I'm sure they already have the maps to get there.
 
Love793 said:
If the dissatisfied populace of Normandy want, they can have their former guests return. I'm sure they already have the maps to get there.

So, your answer is "suck it up"?

Thank you for that intellectual addition to the debate.

Whether or not the events were considered necessary at the time doesn't mean that the population should bury unpleasant memories so that the liberating heroes don't feel bad about what the local population endured.

 
With apologies to Oscar Wilde, there is only one thing worse than being liberated, and that is not being liberated.
 
In Alexander McKee's Caen: Anvil of Victory which was published in the early sixties, there is considerable material that indicates the population of Normandy were not pleased about being in the middle of a really violent two way range. This has been well documented for years. Perhaps one may ask why did they have this attitude compared to the populations of heavily fought over areas of the Channel Ports, Belgium and the Netherlands. Or was it all reported/recorded differently?
 
I think a large part of the answer lies in this sentence:

But in general, France has gone along with the accepted version of the landings and their aftermath - that of a joyful liberation for which the country is eternally grateful.

It just wasn't politically correct to speak out against any aspect of the liberation.
 
Michael O'Leary said:
The underlying question here is whether or not emerging evidence of dissatisfaction among that portion of the French population that was subjected to it is "revisionism".

The RCAF did everything humanly possible to avoid civilian casualties.
As the Luftwaffe slowly but surely appreciated the shift of target from Germany to France, so they moved their night-fighters. Bomber Command's losses mounted accordingly.
Regarding Bomber Command's three operations to Revigny-sur-Ornain in July 1944, to quote "Massacre Over the Marne: there were strict orders not to allow the bombing if if there was the slightest chance of causing unnecessary civilian deaths."
"Nous allons rendre visite a Maginot ce soir." These words, broadcast by the BBC, were enough to tell the inhabitants of Revigny  that they could expect a visit from Bomber Command that night. It was not difficult for the Revigeens to figure out the meaning of the message - Andre Maginot, the French Minister of War who gave his name to to the famous "Maginot Line", had been born in Revigny.
The question is, if French officials knew that an attack was heading for Revigny, did the German authorities also know?
The target was destroyed. Madame Jeanne Peninguy, age 39, died in hospital of her injuries. Five more bodies were found when the delayed-action bombs permitted recovery: two railway workers, a woman and her son age 7, and old woman. Three others were slightly injured.
Of the 41 Lancasters shot down, only 59 of the 290 airmen survived.
   
 
Once again:

No-one says that the decisions and actions taken weren't necessitated by the events of the day.

But nothing justifies telling the French they shouldn't be unhappy about the deaths and destruction caused by the Allied strategy and tactics.

I can't put that in any simpler language.  Repeatedly saying the events were justified isn't furthering the conversation.
 
Hi Mike. My post wasn't meant to be argumentative with yours.
Harris wanted nothing to do with bombing France: "the best and and indeed the only efficient support which Bomber Command can give to OVERLORD is the intensification of the attacks on suitable industrial centres in Germany. <snip>Though this might give a specious appearance of 'supporting' the Army, in reality it would be the greatest disservice we could do them."
The orders to bomb France came from Washington. Churchill was appalled that French civilians would become "collateral damage" under his bombers. This seemed to Churhill to be an utterly unacceptable way to liberate the French.
Even the Americans own air chief - Gen Spaatz - thought it was wrong. That his Fortresses would be reduced to running bomb shuttles for Gen Eisenhower. Spaatz complained to Professor Zuckerman: "He'll ( Harris ) go on bombing Germany and will be given a chance of defeating her before the invasion, while I am put under Leigh-Mallory's command."
 
Old Sweat said:
And there was nothing unfair or tactically inferior about using firepower and brute force. The purists and the apologists for the German army may carp about it, but it frigging well worked. We had a lot of it, and we were able to use it fairly effectively. (Everyone stand up and chant "The guns, thank God the guns" until I tell you to stop.")

But would better tactical and operational acumen have saved friendly lives?  That is the question (to which there will never be a fully satisfactory answer).  "Economy of effort" remains a Canadian principle of war - much like the others, we ignore it regularly.
 
Kat Stevens said:
With apologies to Oscar Wilde, there is only one thing worse than being liberated, and that is not being liberated.

:rofl:  it's been a long day in the sun, thanks I needed that.
 
dapaterson said:
"Economy of effort" remains a Canadian principle of war - much like the others, we ignore it regularly.

Actually General of Panzer Troops Eberbach, who commanded the German forces facing the British and Canadians in Normandy, commented in his interrogation after capture, that a consistent failing of the Canadian army was to allocate too few troops to a mission. He also was critical of Canadian generalship, however for much of the period he was talking about, our forces were still part of Second British Army. German intelligence had identified elements of First Canadian Army Headquarters in Normandy, but apparently were not aware that it had not yet become operational.
 
Just got the May 2009 issue of BBC History Magazine and I noticed that the June issue will actually have an article by Anthony Beevor on his take on D-Day. Unfortunately, I won't get until next month so we will have to wait to see what he has to say.

However, not all is lost, there are lots of articles on the internet about Beevor and his books, and the hornets-nest he has a habit of stirring up. TheTines Online has a  write-up on Beevor and his books.  Apparently, the Russians weren't impressed when Beevor wrote "that Russian soldiers, most of them drunk, had raped at least 2m German women during the long advance on Berlin."

Here is a write-up on Beevor in the Independent and another in the Telegraph on the infighting between the various Allied generals.
 
Old Sweat said:
Bomber Harris was brutally frank in his report on the short bombing of 2nd Canadian Corps on 14 August 1944. Besides discussing the characteristics that made a heavy bomber a quite unsuitable platform for attacking targets close to our own troops, he was insensitive enough to state that the bomb aimers were not the cream of the air crew crop. According to him, the most intelligent became pilots, followed by navigators and then the bomb aimers and air gunners brought up the rear.

In any case, about 50% of heavy bomber missions in Normandy resulted in casualties to friendly forces. Check the appendix on air support in my book No Holding Back for details.

Harris had this to say about the education of his airmen: "The education of a member of a bomber crew was the most expensive in the world;  it cost some 10,000 pounds for each man, enough to send ten men to Oxford or Cambridge for three years." All aircrew were Flt/Sgt and above.
Martin Middlebrook reported 14 Aug 1944 as "believed to be the first occasion on which Bomber Command had hit friendly troops during The Battle of Normandy." He reported that The Canadian Artillery Regiment was machine gunned by R.A.F. Spitfires and U.S.A.A.F. Mustangs the following day.
One statistic seldom - if ever - mentioned this time of the year is that in the first weeks after D-Day, the casualties of Bomber Command were higher than those of the British Second Army in Normandy.
I have ordered a copy of "No Holding Back". It has received high praise from military historians.
Thanks for the post!


 
Middlebrook is in error, but not by much. The FMR of 5 Bde, 2 Cdn Inf Div were hit by Bomber Command aircraft on the night of 7/8 Aug 44 while waiting to advance in Phase One of Operation Totalize.

If the truth be known, senior allied army officers in Normandy knew far less about the characteristics and limitations of ground attack aircraft than they believed. Having said that, that knowledge was light years ahead of their understanding of the employment of heavy bombers. This contributed to the friendly fire incidents, although few ever admitted it. The heavy bomber forces however were ultimately responsible, no matter how hard people like Harris tried to obsfucate matters.

Anyway, if you are able, hold the order for No Holding Back for a bit as Stackpole Press in the US is publishing a paperback edition this summer.
 
Old Sweat said:
The FMR of 5 Bde, 2 Cdn Inf Div were hit by Bomber Command aircraft on the night of 7/8 Aug 44 while waiting to advance in Phase One of Operation Totalize.
Anyway, if you are able, hold the order for No Holding Back for a bit as Stackpole Press in the US is publishing a paperback edition this summer.

10 Lancasters were lost that night, on that target. 7 to night-fighters, 2 to Flak and one to an unknown cause. The attacks were carefully controlled, and German strong points and the roads around them were well cratered.
I buy paperback fiction to read on the subway. I like my history books to be hardcover, because they never leave my den. Thanks to you, and others, Sir, they don't collect much dust, because I have to un shelve them to check my facts!
I know that after surviving the air war over Germany, that my uncle was proud to be part of the invasion.  :cdn:
 
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