PRC/PLA Buildup

[CougarKing]

This is definitely not news here, but just another reminder.

http://edition.cnn.com/2006/US/05/23/pentagon.china/index.html

 

[Armymatters]

The Chinese ability to reach out beyond its own borders is acutally fairly limited, as they lack certain important factors for power projection, despite their nuclear capability. The Chinese have had to shift from a land-based power, centered on a vast ground force, to a smaller, mobile, high-tech military that more accurately reflects the new threats to China, and shift of the the center of economic power in China, from the interior to the coastal regions. Currently, the Chinese severely are lacking in long range highly capable aircraft, which the purchase of Sukhoi fighters from Russia is intended to correct, a true blue water navy (complete with a capable submarine force) and a proper amphib capability (the Chinese have based all of their landing ships on the old LST design, but there is work on a more modern design of the LHD, plus landing hovercraft). Hard to imagine now that 20 years ago, the vast majority of the PLA (includes ground forces, navy, and air force) was completely outdated in terms of equipment and strategy. Most of this change stems from China's observations over the 1991 Gulf War as a stark realization to the PRC leadership that the PLA was an oversized, obsolecent force.

In all, what the Chinese are most worried about is the possible threat from a militarily resurgent Japan. The PRC and Japan are in dispute over the Chunxiao gas field, which if you haven't guessed already, contain natural gas, and lots of it. Also, the possibility that the dispute over the Spratly Islands with Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines might turn hot is also of major concern for the Chinese, as the Spratlys are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and gas and oil deposits (it is estimated that the islands hold more oil and gas than the fields in Kuwait). And there is of course the Taiwan issue as well.

 

[CougarKing]

In all, what the Chinese are most worried about is the possible threat from a militarily resurgent Japan.

In spite of that dispute, I doubt that Japan will take "resurgent" or "aggressive" stance against the PRC because of article 9 of its constitution, which prevents its from waging war offensively/outside its borders, even though the recent commissioning of the three Osumi Class Helicopter Assault ships has had Japan's other neighbors crying out "renewed Japanese militarism" since those ships look like small aircraft carriers. Those can land a battalion-sized from the JGSDF just like the US Tarawa/Wasp Class assault ships. Still, Japan may justify any change of constitution though, if not on a China threat, then at least on the more immediate North Korea threat, since the Kim Jong Il send that multi-stage missile prototype over Japan as a demonstration of the DPRK's capabilities in the early 1990s.

Still, don't count an aggressive Japan just yet. Japan now is far more liberal society than pre-WW2 Japan. They're busier making money or too bedazzled by Ginza/Shinjuku to be plotting for an expansionist war. Besides, I don't see all US forces leaving Japan just yet even if the Marines in Okinawa are being moved to Guam by the end of this decade.

As for Taiwan, I don't think the PRC can pull off an invasion of that island because the PLA's amphibious capability is small- only a brigade of marines- and they also having a small number of landing ships or have obselete ones, as you pointed out Army matters; the rest of ground component of the PLA isn't capable of amphibious ops. Probably the 3 divisions of the PLA's 15th Airborne Corps at Wuhan may be the likely candidates for such an invasion. The PLA may be large, but the Guo Min Jun (the ROC/Taiwan Military) has preparing for years to repel any PLA invasion. They're well prepared and have even fought off at least 2 PLA attempts to capture the ROC garrison island of Kinmen just off the mainland, (pronounced Jin Men in Mandarin) in the 1950s. I think a more probable threat is blockade rather than invasion, as David Shambaugh, a prominent China expert from the US, points out in his book "Modernizing China's Military", though the PLAN  certainly can't challenge the US 7th Fleet if it comes to Taiwan's rescue. Still, it would take an outright declaration of independence on Taiwan's part to provoke the PRC to invading.

But like the Japanese, both sides of the Taiwan Strait are too busy, yet satisfied, with prospering economies and would rather reach compromises than fight and ruin their respective economies. Still, the PRC certainly can't afford to lose a Taiwan to independence, or the CCP will lose its llegitimacy among the common mainlanders as the nationalistic, unifying force for China. In Andrew Nathan's book "China's New Rulers", the scholars infer that the CCP Politburo fear that an independent Taiwan will perhaps encourage Xinjiang and Tibet to secede. They would break off IF they could and in spite of the large PLA presence in both areas. With further secessions (or attempted ones) comes the loss of stability, so your economy goes down the drain. 

 

[Bert]

Another related news item:

Geopolitical Diary: The Pentagon's View of China
www.stratfor.com
24 May 2006

The U.S. Defense Department has released its annual report on China. The report is not so much a snapshot of Chinese military capabilities as a snapshot of U.S. perceptions of China's military. As such, it is an important document. If the United States believes the things the Defense Department says that China is doing, it will have to reconfigure its strategic posture to cope. And we do not regard this document as a Washington throwaway: It is a genuine representation of American views on Chinese strategy. The United States views China as threatening American control of sea lanes and as considering a first-use option for nuclear weapons. These strike at the core of American strategic interests.

According to the study, the Chinese remain focused on the Taiwan question. They have stationed almost 800 short-range missiles at garrisons opposite Taiwan. Beijing, however, understands that the main challenge to any Chinese attack on Taiwan remains the U.S. Navy. More important, so long as the U.S. Navy controls the waters near China, the country will remain vulnerable to a naval blockade. This did not matter to Maoist China, whose international trade was relatively unimportant. However, for a China that is deeply engaged in international trade, most of it by sea, U.S. naval capabilities present a serious potential challenge to its interests.

The Chinese, according to this report, are not responding by building a fleet capable of challenging the Americans -- something that would take too long and be too technologically daunting and expensive. Rather, the Chinese are deploying long-range missiles designed to attack U.S. surface vessels and submarines, as far out as Guam. According to the report, China "is engaged in a sustained effort to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy to the western Pacific." China reportedly is developing its own weaponry as well as buying Russian systems. According to Peter W. Rodman, assistant secretary of defense, the Chinese are developing these weapons for "contingencies other than Taiwan."

Rodman also said that while the United States believes China's pledge that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, the Defense Department is concerned that as Chinese capabilities evolve and strategic realities shift, Beijing's doctrine might shift as well. The DoD view is that there is a major debate under way in China on the subject right now.

From the American point of view, therefore, China is threatening U.S. naval hegemony as well as threatening to become more dangerous with its nuclear force. Either of these views, if sincerely held, means that the United States must act to counter the threat. Obviously, a China capable of and prepared to engage in a first strike represents a crisis of the first order. However, even if that is saber-rattling, the threat that the Chinese are posing to U.S. control of sea lanes is of enormous geopolitical significance.

The United States has dominated the world's oceans since the end of World War II. This has been the foundation of American national security. The Soviets tried and failed to challenge American naval power. As a result, the United States projects its force outward. Others cannot project force inward upon the United States, except as terrorists or in a nuclear strike. But if the Chinese are able to neutralize the U.S. Navy to a distance of several thousand miles from China's coast, the regional balance obviously would be shifted. If the Chinese can increase that range and combine it with a first-strike capability, the entire balance of military power shifts: Nuclear parity plus an open contest for maritime hegemony would introduce an entirely new era.

What the DoD document has said is that the fundamental long-term threat to American interests and security is not the intermittent threat of terrorist strikes by Islamist militants, but the emerging threat to the global naval and nuclear balance that is posed by China. Put differently, if the Pentagon really believes this report, it is fighting the wrong war in the wrong place. The jihadists are a threat to American lives, but China threatens fundamental, global American interests.

Whether the Pentagon's view of the Chinese threat is accurate or not is not the key point right now. That this is the view of the Chinese threat means everything. If this is the view, then it follows that U.S. military expenditures should not go toward Iraq and Afghanistan, but toward securing U.S. control of the western Pacific sea lanes through increased technologies focused on naval and space power.

Obviously, DoD is not suddenly trying to back out of Iraq and Afghanistan. But Defense officials certainly are saying -- whether they know it or not -- that the time has come to close out the war with the jihadists and shift emphasis to containing Chinese power projection. Interestingly, that was the view that Donald Rumsfeld came into office with, before 9-11 happened. He seems to be saying --and we'd bet he reviewed and approved this document -- that it is time to return to those roots.

Not now, but over the next few years, this view will generate a completely different U.S. military posture.

 

[Armymatters]

Well, according to Jane's, the Chinese are now swelling their ranks with the Type 63A amphibious tank, along with many other amphibious armoured vehicles as well. The Type 63A is an interesting piece of kit. Totally amphibious (designed to swim to shore from a landing ship), and weights a bit more than a LAV III (22 tons), and is armed with a 105mm gun (the same gun family as in our Leopard's). It's a bit weak in tank vs. tank combat, but the capabilites of the tank is interesting. Wonder if we can produce our own copy?
http://www.sinodefence.com/army/tank/type63a.asp

 

[tomahawk6]

Right now China's modernization doesnt concern me beyond the threat to Taiwan. Their army is very large and modern weapons are expensive, perhaps more expensive than what they can afford. Certainly they lack the resources to modernize the army, navy and air force. What China is doing though is creating the foundation to create modern weapons systems on its own, a requirement for any country seeking superpower status.

 

[Armymatters]

Right now China's modernization doesnt concern me beyond the threat to Taiwan. Their army is very large and modern weapons are expensive, perhaps more expensive than what they can afford. Certainly they lack the resources to modernize the army, navy and air force. What China is doing though is creating the foundation to create modern weapons systems on its own, a requirement for any country seeking superpower status.

They have been cutting back on the size of their army. Last year alone, they cut over 200,000 soldiers to free up internal funds for more modernization, and are in the middle of reorganizing their armies from the original four-level “group army-division-regiment-battalion” chain of command to a three-level “group army-brigade-battalion” structure. I can further surmize that future cuts in personnel strength will occur to help free up more funds for modernization. The Chinese know that numbers do not mean a whole lot in comparing military strength.

 

[CougarKing]

They have been cutting back on the size of their army. Last year alone, they cut over 200,000 soldiers to free up internal funds for more modernization, and are in the middle of reorganizing their armies from the original four-level “group army-division-regiment-battalion” chain of command to a three-level “group army-brigade-battalion” structure. I can further surmize that future cuts in personnel strength will occur to help free up more funds for modernization. The Chinese know that numbers do not mean a whole lot in comparing military strength.

If you read the Shambaugh book I suggested, you should notice that these soldiers "cut" are still a threat since virtually all were transferred to the now 500,000 strong People's Armed Police, which is more of an oppressive, home guard WITH ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS that cracks down on dissent than an actual police force. The PAP still wear a modified green PLA uniform, but are easily distinguishable from municipal police/ "Jing Cha" who wear black/dark blue.  The PAP's existence was brought on by the fear of another Tiananmen Square level disturbance or an uprising in either Tibet or Xinjiang. The PAP probably also frees up the PLA to focus on shifting its training focus from the old "People's War" guerrila war concept of Mao to the more conventional one that reflects 21st century realities.

 

[Armymatters]

If you read the Shambaugh book I suggested, you should notice that these soldiers "cut" are still a threat since virtually all were transferred to the now 500,000 strong People's Armed Police, which is more of an oppressive, home guard WITH ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS that cracks down on dissent than an actual police force. The PAP still wear a modified green PLA uniform, but are easily distinguishable from municipal police/ "Jing Cha" who wear black/dark blue.  The PAP's existence was brought on by the fear of another Tiananmen Square level disturbance or an uprising in either Tibet or Xinjiang. The PAP probably also frees up the PLA to focus on shifting its training focus from the old "People's War" guerrila war concept of Mao to the more conventional one that reflects 21st century realities.

The People's Armed Police are just that: armed paramilitary police. Regular police officers (Ministry of Public Security officers) in China except for the PAP are normally not equiped with guns. The PAP's primary mission is internal security. Such units guard government buildings at all levels (including party and state organisations, foreign embassies and consulates), provide personal protection to senior government officials, provide security functions to public corporations and major public events. Some units perform guard duty in civilian prisons and provide executioners for the state. The PAP also maintains a tactical counter-terrorism unit in the Immediate Action Unit (IAU). PAP also provides border security forces that guard China's land and sea borders, as well as its ports and airports. Other units guard China's forests, gold mines and hydropower facilities, as well as provide fire-fighting and road construction functions. The secondary mission of the PAP is external defence, and in times of war PAP internal security units can act as light infantry supporting the PLA in local defence missions. They are equivalant to the RCMP here in terms of training, roles, history, and equipment.

In China, the PAP tends to have a lot more popular support than the MPS, as the MPS is seen in China to be undermanned and essentially unable to deal with organized crime, plus a severe moral and training shortage. MPS officers in China are on a very short leash, as in 1980, the government approved new regulations governing MPS use of weapons and force. MPS personnel could use their batons (their only issued weapons) only in self-defense or when necessary to subdue or prevent the escape of violent criminals or rioters. Lethal weapons, such as pistols, could only be brought in and used if necessary to stop violent riots, to lessen the overall loss of life, or to subdue surrounded but still resisting criminals. The regulations even governed use of sirens, police lights, and whistles.

And those APC's in the PAP? They are used for riot control and as such, they are equipped with water cannons.

 

[Bert]

The chinese military is evolving and modernizing.  From a naval point of view, Stratfor drafted the
following article.  Its interesting in which the future is speculated and how larger powers could butt
heads.


U.S. Perceptions of a Chinese Threat
www.stratfor.com
By George Friedman

The U.S. Department of Defense released its annual report on China's military last week. The Pentagon reported that China is moving forward rapidly with an offensive capability in the Pacific. The capability would not, according to the report, rely on the construction of a massive fleet to counter U.S. naval power, but rather on development and deployment of anti-ship missiles and maritime strike aircraft, some obtained from Russia. According to the Pentagon report, the Chinese are rapidly developing the ability to strike far into the Pacific -- as far as the Marianas and Guam, which houses a major U.S. naval base.

Whether the Chinese actually are constructing this force is less important than that the United States believes the Chinese are doing this. This analysis is not confined to the Defense Department but has been the view of much of the U.S. intelligence community. There is, therefore, a consensus in Washington that the Chinese are moving far beyond defensive capabilities or deterrence: They are moving toward a strike capability against the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

If this analysis is correct, then the reason for U.S. concern is obvious. Ever since World War II, the United States has dominated all of the world's oceans. Following that war, the Japanese and German navies were gone. The British and French did not have the economic ability or political will to maintain a global naval force. The Soviets had a relatively small navy, concerned primarily with coastal defense. The only power with a global navy was the United States -- and the U.S. Navy's power was so overwhelming that no combination of navies could challenge its maritime hegemony.

In an odd way, this extraordinary geopolitical reality has been taken for granted by many. No naval force in history has been as powerful as the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy does not have the ability to be everywhere at all times -- but it does have the ability to be in multiple places at the same time, and to move about without concerns of being challenged. This means, quite simply, that the United States can invade other countries, anywhere in the world, but other countries cannot invade the United States. Whatever the outcome of the invasion once ashore, the United States has conducted the Iraq, Kosovo, Somali, Gulf and Vietnamese wars without ever having to fight to protect lines of supply and communications. It has been able to impose naval blockades at will, without having to fight sea battles to achieve them. It is this single fact that, more than any other, has shaped global history since 1945.

Following the Soviet Strategy?

The Soviets fully understood the implications of U.S. naval power. They recognized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the United States would have to convoy massive reinforcements across the Atlantic. If the Soviets could cut that line of supply, Europe would be isolated. The Soviets had ambitious goals for naval construction, designed to challenge the United States in the Atlantic. But naval construction is fiendishly expensive. The Soviets simply couldn't afford the cost of building a fleet to challenge the U.S. Navy, while also building a ground force to protect their vast periphery from NATO and China.

Instead of trying to challenge the United States in surface warfare, using aircraft carriers, the Soviets settled for a strategy that relied on attack submarines and maritime bombers, like the Backfire. The Soviet view was that they did not have to take control of the Atlantic themselves; rather, if they could deny the United States access to the Atlantic, they would have achieved their goal. The plan was to attack the convoys and their escorts, using attack submarines and missiles launched from Backfire bombers that would come down into the Atlantic through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The American counter was a strong anti-submarine warfare capability, coupled with the Aegis anti-missile system. Who would have won the confrontation is an interesting question to argue. The war everyone planned for never happened.

Today, it appears to be the Pentagon's view that China is following the Soviet model. The Chinese will not be able to float a significant surface challenge to the U.S. Seventh Fleet for at least a generation -- if then. It is not just a question of money or even technology; it also is a question of training an entirely new navy in extraordinarily complex doctrines. The United States has been operating carrier battle groups since before World War II. The Chinese have never waged carrier warfare or even had a significant surface navy, for that matter -- certainly not since being defeated by Japan in 1895.

The Americans think that the Chinese counter to U.S. capabilities, like the Soviet counter, will not be to force a naval battle. Rather, China would use submarines and, particularly, anti-ship missiles to engage the U.S. Navy. In other words, the Chinese are not interested in seizing control of the Pacific from the Americans. What they want to do is force the U.S. fleet out of the Western Pacific by threatening it with ground- and air-launched missiles that are sufficiently fast and agile to defeat U.S. fleet defenses.

Such a strategy presents a huge problem for the United States. The cost of threatening a fleet is lower than the cost of protecting one. The acquisition of high-speed, maneuverable missiles would cost less than purchasing defense systems. The cost of a carrier battle group makes its loss devastating. Therefore, the United States cannot afford to readily expose the fleet to danger. Thus, given the central role that control of the seas plays in U.S. grand strategy, the United States inevitably must interpret the rapid acquisition of anti-ship technologies as a serious threat to American geopolitical interests.

Planning for the Worst

The question to begin with, then, is why China is pursuing this strategy. The usual answer has to do with Taiwan, but China has far more important issues to deal with than Taiwan. Since 1975, China has become a major trading country. It imports massive amounts of raw materials and exports huge amounts of manufactured goods, particularly to the United States. China certainly wants to continue this trade; in fact, it urgently needs to. At the same time, China is acutely aware that its economy depends on maritime trade -- and that its maritime trade must pass through waters controlled entirely by the U.S. Navy.

China, like all countries, has a nightmare scenario that it guards against. If the United States' dread is being denied access to the Western Pacific and all that implies, the Chinese nightmare is an American blockade. The bulk of China's exports go out through major ports like Hong Kong and Shanghai. From the Chinese point of view, the Americans are nothing if not predictable. The first American response to a serious political problem is usually economic sanctions, and these frequently are enforced by naval interdiction. Given the imbalance of naval power in the South China Sea (and the East China Sea as well), the United States could impose a blockade on China at will.

Now, the Chinese cannot believe that the United States currently is planning such a blockade. At the same time, the consequences of such a blockade would be so devastating that China must plan out the counter to it, under the doctrine of hoping for the best and planning for the worst. Chinese military planners cannot assume that the United States will always pursue accommodating policies toward Beijing. Therefore, China must have some means of deterring an American move in this direction. The U.S. Navy must not be allowed to approach China's shores. Therefore, Chinese war gamers obviously have decided that engagement at great distance will provide forces with sufficient space and time to engage an approaching American fleet.

Simply building this capability does not mean that Taiwan is threatened with invasion. For an invasion to take place, the Chinese would need more than a sea-lane denial strategy. They would need an amphibious capability that could itself cross the Taiwan Strait, withstanding Taiwanese anti-ship systems. The Chinese are far from having that system. They could bombard Taiwan with missiles, nuclear and otherwise. They could attack shipping to and from Taiwan, thereby isolating her. But China does not appear to be building an amphibious force capable of landing and supporting the multiple divisions that would be needed to deal with Taiwan.

In our view, the Chinese are constructing the force that the Pentagon report describes. But we are in a classic situation: The steps that China is taking for what it sees as a defensive contingency must -- again, under the worst-case doctrine -- be seen by the United States as a threat to a fundamental national interest, control of the sea. The steps the United States already has taken in maintaining its control must, under the same doctrine, be viewed by China as holding Chinese maritime movements hostage. This is not a matter of the need for closer understanding. Both sides understand the situation perfectly: Regardless of current intent, intentions change. It is the capability, not the intention, that must be focused on in the long run.

Therefore, China's actions and America's interpretation of those actions must be taken extremely seriously over the long run. The United States is capable of threatening fundamental Chinese interests, and China is developing the capability to threaten fundamental American interests. Whatever the subjective intention of either side at this moment is immaterial. The intentions ten years from now are unpredictable.

As the Pentagon report also notes, China is turning to the Russians for technology. The Russian military might have decayed, but its weapons systems remain top-notch. The Chinese are acquiring Russian missile and aircraft technology, and they want more. The Russians, looking for every opportunity to challenge the United States, are supplying it. Now, the Chinese do not want to take this arrangement to the point that China's trade relations with the United States would be threatened, but at the same time, trade is trade and national security is national security. China is walking a fine line in challenging the United States, but it feels it will be able to pull it off -- and so far it has been right.

U.S. Defense Policy: Full Circle

The United States is now back to where it was before the 9/11 attacks. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld came into office with two views. The first was that China was the major challenge to the United States. The second was that the development of high-tech weaponry was essential to the United States. With this report, the opening views of the administration are turning into the closing views. China is again emerging as the primary challenge; the only solution to the Chinese challenge is in technology.

It should be added that the key to this competition will be space. For the Chinese, the challenge will not be solely in hitting targets at long range, but in seeing them. For that, space-based systems are essential. For the United States, the ability to see Chinese launch facilities is essential to suppressing fire, and space-based systems provide that ability. The control of the sea will involve agile missiles and space-based systems. China's moves into space follow logically from their strategic position. The protection of space-based systems from attack will be essential to both sides.

It is interesting to note that all of this renders the U.S.-jihadist dynamic moot. If the Pentagon believes what it has written, then the question of Afghanistan, Iraq and the rest is now passé. Al Qaeda has failed to topple any Muslim regimes, and there is no threat of the caliphate being reborn. The only interesting question in the region is whether Iran will move into an alignment with Russia, China or both.

There is an old saw that generals prepare for the last war. The old saw is frequently true. There is a belief that the future of war is asymmetric warfare, terrorism and counterinsurgency. These will always be there, but it is hard to see, from its report on China, that the Pentagon believes this is the future of war. The Chinese challenge in the Pacific dwarfs the remote odds that an Islamic, land-based empire could pose a threat to U.S. interests. China cannot be dealt with through asymmetric warfare. The Pentagon is saying that the emerging threat is from a peer -- a nuclear power challenging U.S. command of the sea.

Each side is defensive at the moment. Each side sees a long-term possibility of a threat. Each side is moving to deflect that threat. This is the moment at which conflicts are incubated.
Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.




Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provision of the Copyright Act.

 

[tomahawk6]

The Chinese have been a traditional land power. China is developing a Navy primarily for invading Taiwan. This power projection ability can be used to exert its claim to offshore oil/gas fields. The Chinese to be a real power need a carrier capability, which some think they are working toward. Being able to rearm/refuel at sea is important to being a naval power and the Chinese have alot of work to do in this area.

 

[Armymatters]

The Chinese have been a traditional land power. China is developing a Navy primarily for invading Taiwan. This power projection ability can be used to exert its claim to offshore oil/gas fields. The Chinese to be a real power need a carrier capability, which some think they are working toward. Being able to rearm/refuel at sea is important to being a naval power and the Chinese have alot of work to do in this area.

The Chinese won't be getting a carrier any time soon. Right now, they can't even protect a future PLAN carrier.

 

[CougarKing]

So you're telling me those 4 Russian-made Sorenemmy Class Destroyers in PLAN service as well as all the home-made Luda, Luhu and Jiangwei Class Destroyers the PLA has aren't good enough to make a carrier group's screen? What about the Type 52 "Aegis" Lanzhou Class DDG featured on the ff. link?

http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/lanzhou052c.asp

What about the ex-Soviet Carrier Varyag that the Chinese govt. bought under one of their front companies? A recent picture of it was featured on a January issue of the China Post (a Taiwan publication) and it was repainted in PLAN gray. In that same China Post article, the Taiwan/ROC MND speculated that the Varyag's new paint scheme may be due to a refurbishment in preparation for a future role as a training carrier, so pilots of China's naval air arm may gain real experience in arrestor hook carrier landings.

http://www.varyagworld.com/

Looks like someone else's info is out of date. The Chinese are building a blue-water navy from the looks of it, and one aimed at challenging the US Seventh Fleet based in Japan.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

They certainly have a plan to be able to exert their influence beyond their borders with  force, trade and diplomacy. The timeframe for the their big push seems to be in about 10 years judging by the naval buildup.

 

[a_majoor]

This is very interesting, particularly if China is attempting the "Sea power without ships" strategy, using long range missiles, aircraft and so on. The US Navy needs to leapfrog a generation of ships to reduce their vulnerability, but is understandably reluctent to do so, since this will also render the sunk cost of the current Navy irrelevant. The last time something like this happened was when the HMS Deadnaught (the world's first Battleship) rendered the entire world's fleets of ironclads obsolete, triggering a huge naval arms race and being one of the factors which eventually triggered WW I.

We have seen some work on stealth ships, advanced submarines, supercavitating torpedoes, Wing in Ground Effect craft (WIG) and so on (not all done by the US Navy), so these are some of the potential directions the future US Navy will go in order to maintain control of the seas.

 

[Armymatters]

So you're telling me those 4 Russian-made Sorenemmy Class Destroyers in PLAN service as well as all the home-made Luda, Luhu and Jiangwei Class Destroyers the PLA has aren't good enough to make a carrier group's screen? What about the Type 52 "Aegis" Lanzhou Class DDG featured on the ff. link?

http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/lanzhou052c.asp

What about the ex-Soviet Carrier Varyag that the Chinese govt. bought under one of their front companies? A recent picture of it was featured on a January issue of the China Post (a Taiwan publication) and it was repainted in PLAN gray. In that same China Post article, the Taiwan/ROC MND speculated that the Varyag's new paint scheme may be due to a refurbishment in preparation for a future role as a training carrier, so pilots of China's naval air arm may gain real experience in arrestor hook carrier landings.

http://www.varyagworld.com/

Looks like someone else's info is out of date. The Chinese are building a blue-water navy from the looks of it, and one aimed at challenging the US Seventh Fleet based in Japan.

1. All those modern ships are spread out between 3 different fleets, the vast majority of the PLAN is made of obsolete ships (the Type 51 Luda Class Destroyer for example, the most numerous class of destroyer in the PLAN navy is severely out of date as it possess very limited AA and ASW defences, limited C3I capabilities, and generally won't stand a chance against modern navy warships today).

2. Varyag when purchased by the Chinese was stripped of all electronic equipment and the powerplant by the Ukrainians. Varyag is also technically a rusted piece of junk, from the link you provided. If the Chinese want a carrier now, they could have looked at other places for a easier to get ship. For example, the Spanish offered to build 2 light carriers of the 25,000 ton displacement in 1995, and the French offered the 32,700 ton carrier Clemenceau at the same time. I am guessing that the Chinese are actually going to study the carrier closely in order to examine how it was constructed. It took the Chinese for example, 5 whole years after the Chinese had purchased the Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne and had it delivered before the Chinese took the ship apart for scrap. They already have looked at 2 other ex-Soviet aircraft carriers as well besides Melbourne and Varyag, so I am guessing that the Chinese might instead just build their own carrier of their own design, according to reports:
http://www.marinetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1590111.php
Varyag will be useful for the PLAN in my opinion as a take-off and landing training hulk, without significant amounts of time, money and resources to get the carrier operational that would be cost prohibitive. It will be cheaper and easier to get the carrier to a point where it can be used as a training hulk. The Chinese haven't seen this type of carrier before, so it is of great interest to them.

They certainly have a plan to be able to exert their influence beyond their borders with  force, trade and diplomacy. The timeframe for the their big push seems to be in about 10 years judging by the naval buildup.

I am thinking along the same lines as well.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Bump.

Interesting promotional video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MlD4PWb4TCU&mode=related&search=

There are many things to take note of here, for example NESOPS will be interested in the chaff shots from the surface ships.

Second, watch some of the wheeled vehilces when the main gun fires- the doors blow open.

As I understand things, China is (or has) moved to a much reduced but all volunteer professional military, which bodes well for them. 

 

[Bert]

I wasn't sure whether this Statfor take on developments in Chinese ASAT requires a new thread, however its an
interesting read.


www.stratfor.com

China's Offensive Space Capability
Summary

A Jan. 17 report on the Aviation Week & Space Technology Web site says U.S. intelligence agencies believe China destroyed its aging Feng Yun 1C polar orbit weather satellite in a successful anti-satellite weapons test Jan. 11. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe expressed concern over the test Jan. 18, confirming China's new military capability.

Analysis

China appears to have destroyed its aging Feng Yun 1C polar orbit weather satellite in a successful anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) test Jan. 11, Aviation Week & Space Technology reported Jan. 17. This test makes China the third nation -- following the United States and the Soviet Union -- to have successfully destroyed a satellite in orbit. It is also the first such intercept in more than 15 years.



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The report suggests that a ballistic missile launched from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center inserted a kinetic kill vehicle into orbit. Kinetic kill vehicles, using the energy of impact at thousands of miles per hour rather than explosive fragmentation, are also used in the U.S. ballistic missile defense program. This could be consistent with reports indicating that an extremely energetic event resulting in a massive breakup took place in low Earth orbit Jan. 11. Such an event seems unlikely to be anything other than a satellite breakup caused by a physical impact. Though a debris strike could certainly be responsible, the chances of a coincidental impact by random debris seem unlikely.

Past reports of Chinese attempts to blind U.S. spy satellites temporarily with ground-based lasers have not been publicly confirmed by the U.S. military, although it was certainly aware of the attempt. In this latest case, too, Space Command knew what happened. The U.S. 1st Command and Control Squadron at Cheyenne Mountain carefully tracks and monitors all orbiting satellites and space debris. The launch would have been detected and tracked by the 1st Space Operations Squadron. Any breakup would have been immediately noticed. Nevertheless, Washington offered no official response until after the release of the Aviation Week report.

Both Washington and Beijing are party to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (Beijing signed in 1983), although the treaty's vague wording fails even to define "outer space." Moreover, the treaty does not legally prohibit interference with other satellites or the use of non-nuclear ASATs.

Because of a lack of accuracy, early U.S. and Soviet ASAT programs both used nuclear warheads, including a successful U.S. "intercept" in 1963 that used a 1-megaton warhead. The Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle used a two-stage rocket fired from an F-15 Eagle fighter to insert a Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) into orbit. The MHV conducted a successful heat-seeking intercept in 1985 before being canceled, although the remaining ordnance might have been retained in storage.

Legality aside, the increasing visibility and aggressiveness of China's pursuit of offensive space capability represents a potential future threat to U.S. military dominance in space. In December, Robert Joseph, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, issued a public reminder of official U.S. Air Force doctrine: The United States opposes any further ban on the weaponization of space. Although the U.S. Air Force rightly considers itself the master of its domain in space operations, these developments halfway around the world are a painful reminder that such dominance will not go unchallenged.

The U.S. military's technological edge rests heavily in space. With the assets currently orbiting the Earth, U.S. communication, navigation and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are unsurpassed. From GPS-guided munitions and MASINT to launch detection and links to strategic forces, space is vital to the modern U.S. military. One or two ASATs cannot change that. But in a major military confrontation over Taiwan, for instance, a successful strike by a dozen Chinese ASATs would be a significant blow to Washington's situational awareness in the region -- and would result in massive U.S. retaliation.

Prudence would suggest that if two Chinese programs to develop the capability to control space have recently come to light, at least several more are in the works. And this is not China's first foray into space.

The U.S. Air Force is certainly far ahead of China -- or any other nation, for that matter -- in what the 2004 Air Force Counterspace Operations doctrine calls the "five Ds" of targeting an adversary's space system: deception, disruption, denial, degradation and destruction. Nevertheless, China's rise as a competitor should be of particular concern to the United States. Beijing's first attempts to control space will not be an effort to match U.S. capabilities but rather to become master of its own domain above East Asia. Facing the major competitor in all of space, China will tailor its offensive space capability specifically toward countering U.S. dominance -- at least in part. Tokyo and other challengers to Beijing's regional hegemony, however, will not be far behind.

The new cloud of debris orbiting the Earth is an indication of things to come should two space-faring nations face off in a major conflict. Especially in the case of the United States, space-based assets have become too essential an operational tool to be ignored any longer in times of war.



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[Colin Parkinson]

Bump.

Interesting promotional video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MlD4PWb4TCU&mode=related&search=

There are many things to take note of here, for example NESOPS will be interested in the chaff shots from the surface ships.

Second, watch some of the wheeled vehilces when the main gun fires- the doors blow open.

As I understand things, China is (or has) moved to a much reduced but all volunteer professional military, which bodes well for them.   

I saw this previously their version of the French wheeled APC is a tad overgunned eh? Notice also the French Dauphin type helo's flying off the decks with rocket pods. In other news I see the Chinese have bought some of Russia's giant hovercraft form them, gee I wonder why....?