Operation Eagle Claw 1980, by Justin Williamson, is a generally balanced read.
Desert One, by Mike Ryan, is more an an analysis on why the mission failed so badly and links to the future structure of SOCOM and JSOC.
Both those are available on Amazon.
For a more academic (militarily speaking) view of things, particularly the higher level C2 of the effort and what went wrong in the initial phases of the op, consider
Broken Stiletto: Command and Control of the Joint Task Force During Operation Eagle Claw at Desert One, by MAJ William C. Flynt on course at U.S. Army Command and General Staff Course at Ft Leavenworth.
(Ironically via link at U.S. Naval Warfare Center library:
https://usnwc.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01USNWC_INST/1krl80q/alma991001094329706746 )
I don’t know if it’s available publicly, I read it during a visit to CGCS in Leavenworth a ‘few’ years ago. It was a DoD published student staff paper, but was in a book format, so I don’t know if it has an ISBN reference.
My personal take on the aspects that led to the Desert One disaster, was that preparation and coordination was lacking, not through effort or dedication, but because it was something new and daring with high risk, but without the solid risk management/mitigation that SF ops embody now. Cross loading organizations on similar but not own-platforms and less ROC drills than done today figured into things. Also the factor that adrenaline and sense of urgency without that solid sanity pause to reflect/think about what’s going on, particularly in this case where night vision and aviation were nascent…didn’t end well. Honestly, it could have been even worse at Desert One, IMO. Creation/refinement/currency/proficiency in TTPs/ROCs/etc. are better these days…in a way that better matches technical capabilities as well.
