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Nato promises new Afghan tactics

big bad john

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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5045560.stm

Nato promises new Afghan tactics 
 
We cannot go on alienating the people in the way that I know is happening

Lt Gen David Richards
The Nato commander in Afghanistan has pledged to use new tactics to win over the support of disenchanted Afghans.
Lt Gen David Richards said Nato soldiers would be a "people-friendly force" when they take over security in the south from US forces in July.

He said troops would "accept more risk" when driving, to prevent a repetition of rioting in Kabul last week after a US road accident killed several people.

Meanwhile, UK troops say they have killed five suspected Taleban fighters.

A British military spokesman said there had been an "intense battle" after UK troops had come under fire in a village in north-western Helmand province.

There were no UK casualties, the British army said and two suspected Taleban fighters had been taken into custody.

Earlier the Taleban said they carried out a suicide attack in Kandahar city.

The attack left four civilians dead.

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Afghanistan


The BBC's Bilal Sarwary in Kabul says that for the last four years many people in southern and eastern Afghanistan have been complaining of aggressive tactics used by American troops.

These have included house-to-house searches in which doors are broken down and male soldiers searching Afghan women.

There has also been widespread anger over a number of bombing operations in which civilians have been killed.

'People focused'

"We will be a very people focused and a very people-friendly force," Lt Gen Richards said at a news conference in Kabul.


Police inspect the wreckage of Sunday's attack in Kandahar
"I will use military power not necessarily just to defeat the Taleban but just as importantly to secure the future of their villages and their localities."

The British commander also referred to last Monday's fatal rioting in Kabul that began after a US military vehicle crashed into a number of cars, killing several people.

He said there were too many people among the US-led forces, the Nato forces and others in the international community who "drive too quickly and in an inconsiderate way".

He said: "We are all determined to improve that so the people here don't look on us as people who don't care about the Afghans."

Convoy rammed

Earlier on Sunday a suicide bomber killed four civilians and injured 13 in the southern city of Kandahar.

 
The attacker rammed into a convoy of Canadian troops, a BBC journalist with the troops says.

Earlier reports had said the target of the attack was the governor of Kandahar province, Assadullah Khalid, who was travelling close by.

Mr Khalid and the Canadian troops were unhurt. The Taleban say they were behind the attack.

Reports from the scene say the mangled body of the suicide bomber was visible in the charred wreckage of the black vehicle.

The BBC's Paul Wood, who was on one of the vehicles in the convoy of Canadian troops, says the vehicle used by the attacker was driven at speed at the Canadian convoy from a side road in the centre of the city.

It exploded between the last two vehicles of the convoy.

The blast was deflected by the armour of Canadian vehicles into the nearby crowds.

The explosion shattered the windows of several shops, with one said to have been destroyed.

The number of suicide attacks recorded in Afghanistan has shot up since the US-led invasion which toppled the Taleban in late 2001.

There were five recorded suicide attacks in 2004, 17 in 2005, and 2006 has already seen 21 such attacks.

About 900 people have been killed in the Afghan insurgency since the beginning of this year, with half of that total dying in May.

In another incident, the director of health in the province of Paktika, Edi Mohammad, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen as he was leaving his home on Saturday.

Our correspondent says the Taleban and al-Qaeda-led militants are targeting prominent public figures, such as doctors and religious leaders, to try to weaken support for the government in rural areas.

 
Kudos to the commanders in Afghanistant for sharp eyes and wise decisions. This is an important step in winning the support of the Afghani people. Ordinary people want two things from the coalition forces: Security and Peace. When soldiers break down doors in evening raid, spread panic and fear among ordinary citizens and cause deaths just because the forces don't want to "risk it". It brings nothing but picture of old regimes who used to break into houses at night to take away sons, brothers and fathers for 'intelligence gathering' and shoot at everything moves for the sole purpose of protecting themselves.

Definitely this will bring more risk to our soldiers in Afghanistan, but that is the only way to achieve this mission successfully. You either risk your life to save others, or you risk their life to save yourself!

I just hope NATO will follow on their statement and inform the soldiers of the risks and reasons behind the new tactics.
 
Nice thing for a general to say - that the lowly other ranker must take more risks.... How inspiring...
 
JackD said:
Nice thing for a general to say - that the lowly other ranker must take more risks.... How inspiring...

Sucks - but it is the only way to win a COIN OP
 
Infidel-6,

Would one way to look at the risk issue as being the difference between the risk of surviving a shot and the risk of being shot at in the first place?  Hard hats and armour may reduce the risk of being injured but they seem to make it harder to gain trust/acceptance.  On the other hand if you gain more acceptance, more friends in the community, don't you reduce the risk of being shot at in the first place?
 
That is my point.

However UNTIL you will over the populace it is a rough go for the guys on the ground...

Basically the Force Protectionalists trade long term gains in order to provide short term gains in lessening casualties -- the only way to truly win counter insurgency warfare is to win the locals and you dont do that from behind an AFV driving like an asshole.

IF I where the Grande El Supremo - I'd have platoon houses out with the locals, working with them conducting FID - and Coy sized Airmobile QRF's ready to back them up in case things went to shit.

The UNPROFOR/SFOR of who gives a shit about the locals as long as we keep them from fighting does not work here.
 
Infidel-6 said:
However UNTIL you will over the populace it is a rough go for the guys on the ground...

Basically the Force Protectionalists trade long term gains in order to provide short term gains in lessening casualties -- the only way to truly win counter insurgency warfare is to win the locals and you dont do that from behind an AFV driving like an asshole.

IF I where the Grande El Supremo - I'd have platoon houses out with the locals, working with them conducting FID - and Coy sized Airmobile QRF's ready to back them up in case things went to shit.
The Green Berets and Marines of the CAPs who served in Vietnam would likely agree with you; AISTR, that type of approach paid dividends for them.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_action_program

No real discussion of their success, but a brief description of the program nonetheless.
 
Michael -- thats where I got it from  ;)  - I have a lot of former Group guys who work with me and that has been the consensus around "the shop"
 
Sadly that mindset does not seem to prevalent in either OEF or OIF...
 
Outsider looking in again:

The impression that I get is that in the US the SF types, and the Light Fighter types fought an uphill battle against the Heavies for 30 plus years and didn't start winning until this latest unpleasantness. 

In Britain, again as I understand it,  there has also been a lot of "tension" between folks like the SAS and the Paras and the more "establishment" army.  BBJ can corroborate but it seems that the RM was somewhat protected by virtue of being an RN asset and not an Army asset.  In there case you might characterize the difference as being between the North German Plain - BAOR types and the East of Suez/Northern Ireland COIN types.  Their successful COIN ops seem to have revolved around deployed dets working with and training local police and military forces backed up by Brit (and on occasion ANZAC) QRFs.  Malaysia, Sarawak, Oman and the Arabian Peninsula and even Northern Ireland all come to mind as successful programmes.
 
Kirkhill said:
Outsider looking in again:

The impression that I get is that in the US the SF types, and the Light Fighter types fought an uphill battle against the Heavies for 30 plus years and didn't start winning until this latest unpleasantness. 

In Britain, again as I understand it,  there has also been a lot of "tension" between folks like the SAS and the Paras and the more "establishment" army.  BBJ can corroborate but it seems that the RM was somewhat protected by virtue of being an RN asset and not an Army asset.  In there case you might characterize the difference as being between the North German Plain - BAOR types and the East of Suez/Northern Ireland COIN types.  Their successful COIN ops seem to have revolved around deployed dets working with and training local police and military forces backed up by Brit (and on occasion ANZAC) QRFs.  Malaysia, Sarawak, Oman and the Arabian Peninsula and even Northern Ireland all come to mind as successful programmes.

Very true, now it has eased tensions with the formation of the new Special Forces units.  The RM was more distanced than protected.  Sometimes it is nice to be associated with a higher class of people like the Navy.  lol
 
In Malay they used the regular army to secure the towns and conduct “beater” operations and used the SAS and others to hunt down the BG as they were flushed or in their hideouts.

Yep it would be interesting if they moved right into some of these towns, isn’t that what they have done with that “hotel” that was in the press recently?
 
In the Borneo case around 1962-66 the game plan was slightly different again.  The SAS moved into villages on the Indonesian border in patrols of 4 and set up residence for up to 4 months at a time.  They supplied medical assistance and other advantages (like food, electricity and agricultural advice) to the villagers in exchange for using the villages as patrol bases and the villagers as "eyes and ears".  Regular Army company sized QRFs were helicoptered in.  Arty was dispersed in single gun dets along the border.  When concentration of the guns was required this was done by helicopter.

205,000 sq km / 1500 km of land frontier / 2400 km of coastline

1965 Strength:

1500 Border Scouts
1 Bn (equiv. SAS)

13 Bn Inf
2 Regts Eng
2 Regts Arty

2  Bn Police Field Force

40 Fixed Wing Aircraft
70-80 Helicopters
Various Vessels.

Opposition Force Strength: 300,000.

Result: Stalemate (Indonesian loss because it didn't achieve its war aims)

Ghost Force: Ken Connor
British Military Operations 1945-1984: John Pimlott.

Connor in particular makes this point: "Our success pointed up ...failures....in Vietnam at the same time, where attempts to carry out hearts and minds operations were deeply flawed.  Few American forces made the attempt to live among and befriend the indigenous population, speaking their language and eating the same food.  Instead they carried out hearts and minds operations like commuters in nine-to-five jobs.  They travelled into the area in the morning but then withdrew to their bases at night, leaving the field to the Viet Cong...."  Ghost Force pp 96,97 ff.

That was then.  This is now and this is not to cast aspersions on current American forces or doctrine.  However, regardless of the nationalities involved the opinion expressed is interesting.
 
Having exchanged a few communications with CO 1PPCLI BG, I can assure you that they are spending lots of nights "camping out". Don't let the Kandahar-based media reporting drive our understanding of what our troops are doing.

And, on the Malaya thing: that campaign is studied here at CFC (on the Adv Mil Studies Course). It was a very special and unique case that might be very difficult to replicate successfully. There was one very important difference between the Communist guerrillas there and the Taleban in Afgh. While the Taleban are to a great extent ethnic Pashtun, whose region straddles both sides of  the arbitrary Durand Line that the Brits drew as the border with Pakistan, the guerrillas were mostly ethnic Chinese who did not enjoy much connection or popular support from the Malay. It was much, much easier to isolate them from the people than it is today in Afgh. As well, the Brits could rely on an existing civil police and regional civil service that they had put in place some time before, and was quite reliable. sadly, while the ANA generally does well the ANP are far less reliable and may be an actual part of the problem. Nothing against trying "proven" methods, just a caveat that history cannot  be repeated.

Cheers.
 
Understood pbi.

Borneo was different again than Malaya. As far as I can gather the local native population was pretty much neutral going into the discussion.  They were encouraged to pick sides rather than change sides.

Cheers
 
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