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Here was an excellent paper (IMHO) by LCol(Ret) David Pentnay in a recent edition of the Army Journal:
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_09/iss_1/CAJ_vol9.1_08_e.pdf
Seems to conflict with some common conceptions that have been expressed here - is the good Colonel on target? His numbers seem to show that the Staff and Training establishments are properly manned and that it's the field force that is drastically short on troops. We've always knew the latter, but I've seen the former (no trainers/staff officers) alot - thoughts/comments?
Anyways, here are some interesting parts I found in the article:
Basically enunciated what I wrote above.
I found this interesting, especially with all the talk of bringing back Combat Support Platoons. Obviously, the decision to put the capabilities on the Artillery and the Engineers was a bad one, as these are two very undermanned Branches as is (both now heavily involved in providing support to the maneuver forces). The fact is we need more boots on the ground...period. The figures also tell us how hard our CS/CSS trades are hurting in the field force.
The pages before this quote were interesting as they highlighted how the Army changed from an organization centralized on FMC to the one we have now - any comments/criticisms on moving from 1 HQ to our current structure. Of course, with the latest focus on joint organizations, I can feel that we will see further changes down the road.
Force structure is driven not by operational neccessity but by pragmatic recognition of the resources and manpower available. This has led to us to move from Unitary Battlegroups to cut'n'pasted plug-n-play Task Forces. Is a wholesale review of our force structure required now - this one being based upon a "fundamental review of operations"? Lord knows "The Infantry Battalion in Battle" is woefully out of date.
I found this interesting as a highlight to how we structure command arrangements. The author believes that one of the causes of the problem was the fact that no field force units were represented on the Army Council with the downgrading of Brigade Commanders to Colonels. His recommendation is to bump them up to Brigadiers by bumping down the Land Staff Director-Generals. An interesting proposal, but would it really address the problem? The whole issue of how ranks are structured within the military was also covered recently in the Australian Army Journal; in it the author argues that rank inflation is leading to problems in organization (which may or may not be similar to the above article's targetting of a slide to management at the expense of the field force).
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/journal/AAJ_Winter06/Patterson_ArmyForce.pdf
The crux of the author's paper; his near term solution is:
Interesting ideas for ad-hoc solutions - I have actually seen both done before. But do they address the problem with CS/CSS functions?
Anyways, I thought the article layed out clearly a whole gamut of issues that are related to how are forces are organized and manned in a fairly clear fashion. In our joint forces, the issue of purple trades, Joint Units (CSOR) and joint HQ's come to mind - all things that he brushes upon, but I still think the emphasis on the conventional field forces are a valid one.
Anyways, give 'er a read and put your thoughts up.
Infanteer
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_09/iss_1/CAJ_vol9.1_08_e.pdf
Seems to conflict with some common conceptions that have been expressed here - is the good Colonel on target? His numbers seem to show that the Staff and Training establishments are properly manned and that it's the field force that is drastically short on troops. We've always knew the latter, but I've seen the former (no trainers/staff officers) alot - thoughts/comments?
Anyways, here are some interesting parts I found in the article:
The Regular Field Unit function provides at least 70% of the Army’s personnel resources committed to overseas operations, yet this function only represents 22.64% of the Army’s PE. The answer to the question of sustaining operations becomes clear: the actual pool that provides the majority of personnel to conduct and sustain overseas operations is fewer than 12,000.
Basically enunciated what I wrote above.
The only sub-units that are in the “operational” category are the light infantry companies and the TOW Under Armour (TUA) squadron. The surveillance squadrons fall into the “effective” category. The remaining Field Force sub-units are noneffective. The status of the artillery field batteries and the combat engineer field squadrons is particularly alarming when one considers that they are now responsible for providing the indirect fire capability and the pioneer capability that were formerly integral to the infantry battalions.
I found this interesting, especially with all the talk of bringing back Combat Support Platoons. Obviously, the decision to put the capabilities on the Artillery and the Engineers was a bad one, as these are two very undermanned Branches as is (both now heavily involved in providing support to the maneuver forces). The fact is we need more boots on the ground...period. The figures also tell us how hard our CS/CSS trades are hurting in the field force.
So, what has happened over the past 15 years? All of the functions except the Regular Field Unit function have increased. Command and Control, the Support Infrastructure and Training Infrastructure functions have all seen significant expansion. The Reserve Unit and the Ranger functions have seen much more modest growth. On the other hand, there was a significant, if not drastic, reduction in the Regular Field Unit function. Clearly, the past 15 years has been a period of considerable change.
The pages before this quote were interesting as they highlighted how the Army changed from an organization centralized on FMC to the one we have now - any comments/criticisms on moving from 1 HQ to our current structure. Of course, with the latest focus on joint organizations, I can feel that we will see further changes down the road.
Traditionally, Canada used the “rule of four” for the design of Canadian brigade groups and manoeuvre unit WEs. This recognized that offensive and defensive operations require two manoeuvre elements for the main operation, one for depth and a fourth as reserve. Current WEs reflect a “rule of three”. The genesis of this drastic reduction to the WEs was not the result of a fundamental review of operations. It was
caused by a perceived need to move the positions elsewhere outside of the Regular Field Unit function.
Force structure is driven not by operational neccessity but by pragmatic recognition of the resources and manpower available. This has led to us to move from Unitary Battlegroups to cut'n'pasted plug-n-play Task Forces. Is a wholesale review of our force structure required now - this one being based upon a "fundamental review of operations"? Lord knows "The Infantry Battalion in Battle" is woefully out of date.
A good indicator is the distribution of its general officers. In the late 1980s, there were a total of 13 general officers in the Army. Of these, there were four in the C2 function, two in the Training Infrastructure function, four in the Reserve Unit function and four in the Regular Field Unit function. There were four general officers in FMC HQ—a lieutenant-general (Commander), a major-general (Deputy Commander) and two brigadier-generals (one Assistant Chief of Staff Operations and the other Assistant Chief of Staff Administration). The Commandants of CLFCSC and CTC, the Commanders of the four Militia Areas and the Commanders of the four CMBGs were all brigadier generals. Three of these latter four also had responsibilities in the Support Infrastructure function. Today, the Army has 15 general officers, all in the C2 function. The distribution is: one lieutenant-general (CLS); two major-generals (Assistant CLS and Commander LFDTS); and eleven brigadier-generals (the four Area Commanders, four Area Deputy Commanders, DGLS, DGLR and DGLCD).
I found this interesting as a highlight to how we structure command arrangements. The author believes that one of the causes of the problem was the fact that no field force units were represented on the Army Council with the downgrading of Brigade Commanders to Colonels. His recommendation is to bump them up to Brigadiers by bumping down the Land Staff Director-Generals. An interesting proposal, but would it really address the problem? The whole issue of how ranks are structured within the military was also covered recently in the Australian Army Journal; in it the author argues that rank inflation is leading to problems in organization (which may or may not be similar to the above article's targetting of a slide to management at the expense of the field force).
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/journal/AAJ_Winter06/Patterson_ArmyForce.pdf
The Army appears to have structured itself well for managing things right. However, is it managing the right things?
The crux of the author's paper; his near term solution is:
There are two options to do so. One option is to consolidate what is available into fewer formations and units....Another option would be to retain the same number of formations and units that exist now, but consolidate at the sub-unit level. Rather than having three under-strength rifle companies in a battalion, for example, have two full-strength ones with the third being manned with a very small cadre.
Interesting ideas for ad-hoc solutions - I have actually seen both done before. But do they address the problem with CS/CSS functions?
Anyways, I thought the article layed out clearly a whole gamut of issues that are related to how are forces are organized and manned in a fairly clear fashion. In our joint forces, the issue of purple trades, Joint Units (CSOR) and joint HQ's come to mind - all things that he brushes upon, but I still think the emphasis on the conventional field forces are a valid one.
Anyways, give 'er a read and put your thoughts up.
Infanteer